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Abstract 
This PhD thesis examines the way in which spectatorial relationship with certain 
dance works is reconfigured through emerging practices for documenting, analysing 
and ‘scoring’ dance, paying particular attention to the role of digital technology. I	
examine three central case studies, developed between 2009 and 2013,	which are 
outcomes of major research projects, these are; Synchronous Objects for One Flat	
Thing, reproduced (Forsythe and	 OSU 2009), Using the Sky (Hay and Motion Bank 
2013) and A Choreographer’s Score: Fase, Rosas danst	Rosas, Elena’s Aria, Bartók (De 
Keersmaeker and Cvejić	 2012). These ‘scores’ fall under the title of ‘choreographic 
objects’, a	term which, following Leach, deLahunta	and Whatley (2008) I use to refer 
to collaboratively produced, artist-led objects that	utilise technology in various ways,	
to explore and disseminate choreographic processes.	
Focussing on western contemporary theatre dance practices and drawing on 
discourses	 from Dance Studies, Performance Studies, Philosophical Aesthetics and 
Digital Theory, I	 consider how ‘choreographic objects’ pose philosophical questions 
regarding the ways in which audiences access, interpret, appreciate and value works, 
examining the evolving role of the score in issues of identity and ontology. I	 also 
consider the score-like nature of these objects, drawing comparisons with codified 
movement	notations, such as Labanotation, developed by Hungarian dance theorist	
Rudolf von Laban (1879 – 1958). The case studies pose many queries, however the 
central focus of this research is on three key questions; what	 are ‘choreographic 
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objects’?	 How do they reconfigure spectatorial engagement	 with specific	 dance 
works?	And, how does this reconfiguration encourage a	rethinking of their ontological 
statuses?	
The case studies demonstrate an increased interest	 in the articulation, examination 
and dissemination of choreographic process. In recent	 years many artists, based 
primarily in Europe and the USA, such as Siobhan Davies (1950	 - ), Anne Teresa	De 
Keersmaeker (1960	- ), William Forsythe (1949	- ),	Emio Greco (1965	- ),	Steve Paxton 
(1939 - ); have teamed up with researchers and technologists to develop digital, or 
partially digital objects which examine and articulate their choreographic processes. 
deLahunta	 (2013b) suggests that	 together these artists give rise to a	 ‘community of 
practice’. This is a	notion formulated by Etienne Wenger	(1998) to describe groups	of 
people who are engaged in collective learning, including, for example, “a	 band of 
artists seeking new forms of expression” (Wenger 2006: 1). The shared interest	 in 
cultivating new ways to express choreographic process generates a form of 
community between these artists. The objects generated through these 
investigations are labelled ‘scores’, ‘archives’ and ‘installations’, however, each one 
problematises their categorical label,	 thus generating the rubric of ‘choreographic 
objects’; an emerging class of object	which both crosses and defies existing modes of 
description. 
The circulation of ‘choreographic objects’ is relatively new therefore a detailed 
examination of their ontology, function and impact	provides a	significant theoretical 
and practical contribution to current	 dance discourses and practice. This research 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




































contextualises these objects, situating them socio-culturally and examining the 
motivations and repercussions. The ontological probing considers the nature of the 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
We live in a	 changing world of dance, and the level of discourse 
regarding dance and choreographic practices has been raised 
considerably compared to the mid or late twentieth century 
(Birringer 2013: 8). 
As performance theorist	Johannes Birringer points out, discourse in UK and European 
Dance Studies has undergone a significant	 shift	 in recent	 years. Dance artists,	
audiences and scholars are increasingly turning their attention to the articulation and 
dissemination of choreographic process. Important	questions are posed by this shift. 
For example, as a	form conventionally accessed solely via	performance, what	are the 
repercussions for the ontological status of dance? Furthermore, how are our 
appreciative, interpretive and analytic roles challenged and re-framed? 
This research considers the practices, preservation, analysis and dissemination of 
western contemporary dance practices. I examine three case studies that	belong to 
an emerging class of entities referred to by scholars Scott	 deLahunta, James Leach 
and Sarah Whatley (2008), amongst	 others as ‘choreographic objects’.	 Perhaps 
confusingly, this term is used to refer to two different, albeit	related types of things. 
Frankfurt	based, American choreographer William Forsythe adopts the term to refer 
to installations and other artefacts that	are created in accordance with choreographic 
principles (2008). However, following Leach, deLahunta	 and Whatley, I	 use it	 to 
denote an object, authored by a	 choreographer in collaboration with others,	which 
utilises digital technology to articulate and disseminate choreographic thought. These 
entities take the form of archives, such as Siobhan Davies	RePlay	 (2009), the online 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	






archive of British choreographer Siobhan Davies’ work, made in collaboration with 
Whatley and researchers from Coventry University,	 installations, such as Double 
Skin/Double Mind (2006), made by Dutch dance company Emio Greco| PC in 
collaboration with notators, researchers and technologists, and DVDs, such as 
American choreographer Steve Paxton’s Material for the Spine (2008). However, I	
focus specifically on three dance scores. My first	case study is Synchronous Objects for 
One Flat	 Thing, reproduced (Synchronous Objects) (2009) 1 an online score of 
Forsythe’s work One Flat	 Thing, reproduced (2000). The score was created by 
Forsythe in collaboration with Norah Zuniga	Shaw and Maria	Palazzi from Ohio State 
University (OSU)	and a	large inter-disciplinary team. Synchronous Objects became the 
prototype for Motion Bank, a	 large research project	commissioned by Forsythe and 
led	 by Scott	 deLahunta	 between 2010	 – 2014, which resulted in online scores 
considering the work and works of contemporary artists Deborah Hay, Jonathan 
Burrows and his collaborator, Matteo Fargion, and Bebe Miller and Thomas Hauert. 
Hay’s score, Using the Sky (2013) 2 is my second case study. The third case study, A
Choreographer’s Score: Fase, Rosas danst	 Rosas, Elena’s Aria, Bartók (A 
Choreographer’s Score) (2012) comprises a	 book and DVD. It considers the early 
works of Belgian choreographer Anne Teresa	De Keersmaeker and is the first	of three 
scores collaboratively authored with performance theorist	Bojana	Cvejić. 
These objects both generate and re-frame many important	 philosophical questions 
such as: what	 are ‘choreographic objects’? How do they reconfigure spectatorial 
1 See http://synchronousobjects.osu.edu/
2 See http://scores.motionbank.org/dh/#/set/sets 
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engagement	 with specific dance works? And, how does this reconfiguration 
encourage a	 rethinking of their ontological statuses? This thesis addresses these 
questions by interrogating the nature of these objects and testing their relationship to 
established theoretical perspectives. I	 examine how the case studies raise broader 
ontological questions about	the nature of dance works and encourage a re-thinking of 
established modes of conceptualising works as abstract	objects, physically accessed 
through the act	of performance.	I highlight	how such perspectives are problematised 
by the documentation of dance and in particular how the foregrounding of 
choreographic process suggests a	 conflation of the work of dance making and the 
work	of	dance art. 
Digital technology is central to ‘choreographic objects’, which is of particular interest	
throughout	 the research as I	 consider how it	 facilitates a	 reconfiguration of our 
engagement	with some dance works, and therefore a	rethinking of their ontology. Of	
particular relevance is the way that	 technology makes it	 possible to demonstrate 
certain features of the work, that	 are not	 visible in performance. The notion of 
‘visibility’ is a	complex one, as what people may or may not	see is dependent	upon a	
wide range of factors. Although I	do not	directly address the complexities of visibility, 
the question of which skills, forms of literacy and knowledge is required to access the 
work through the ‘choreographic object’ and to navigate the object	 itself, recurs 
throughout	 the research. When referring to the experience of using the object, I	
alternate between the terms ‘user’ and ‘viewer’, in order to reflect	 whether I	 am 
writing about	the act	of using the object, or viewing the dance through it. However, 
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these demarcations are not	 always clear in practice, reflecting the entwined 
relationship between ‘choreographic objects’ and the works they inscribe. 
Brief	History of Dance Scoring 
This study relates to a lineage of scholarship that considers the role and function of 
dance scores, and their relationship to dance works and performances. Writing in 
1972, dance notation expert Ann Hutchinson (Later Ann Hutchinson Guest), proposes 
that, “[f]or at least five centuries attempts have been made to devise a system of 
movement notation” (1972: 1). She suggests that these attempts can be traced back 
to ancient Egyptian and Roman methods for documenting gestures. One of the first 
attempts to formulate a system for notating dance was developed by Thoinot Arbeau 
in his book Orchesographie in 1588. This publication includes drawings of the 
positions and steps used in the well-known dances of the period, which were 
accompanied by written descriptions (Hutchinson 1972: 2). However, according to 
Hutchinson the drawings are inadequate in their aim to represent movement, 
suggesting that, “[w]ithout Arbeau’s lengthy explanations of terms, the dances are 
unintelligible” (1972: 2). 
The French king Louis XIV is widely considered to have had a significant influence in 
the development of ballet. 3 Under his direction Jean Baptiste Lully established the 
first academy for professional dancers. As dancing developed as a professional 
practice at this time so too did notation and in 1700 Raoul Feuillet published 
3 See Levinson	(1983:	49), Pouillaude (n.d:	7) and Reff (1983: 221) amongst	others.
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Chorégraphie, ou l'art Ae décrire la Danse, which is described by Hutchinson as, “the 
first fully fledged system of notation” (1972: 2). She describes Feuillet’s notations as, 
“extremely well worked out” (1972: 2), but explains how this system focused almost 
solely on the footwork and stepping patterns, and therefore did not provide a clear 
indication of the rhythm of the movement. 
The development of other systems followed, including Arthur Saint Léon’s 
Sténochoréographie in 1852, Albert Zorn’s Grammatik de Tanzkunst in 1887, Alphabet 
de Movements du Corps Humain by Vladimir Stepanov in 1892 and Margaret Morris’s 
Notation of Movement, published in 1928 (Hutchinson 1972: 2-3). Morris’s book was 
published in the same year as Rudolf von Laban’s Schriftanz, or ‘Written Dance’ 
(Hutchinson 1972: 2-3), which provides the basis for Labanotation (also referred to as 
Kinetography Laban). Labanotation uses symbols representing body parts arranged on 
a vertical staff. Hutchinson suggests that Laban’s system offered innovations, such as 
the vertical staff to represent the body and the use of elongated movement symbols 
to represent time. She proposes that this analysis method, “which is based on spatial, 
anatomical, and dynamic principles, is flexible and can be applied to all forms of 
movement” (1972: 3). 
Although it was not developed solely for dance, Labanotation is used in dance 
practice, however it is not the only system used. Eshkol-Wachmann notation, an 
approach developed by Noa Eshkol and Abraham Wachmann, first published in Israel 
in 1958 is still used and taught, as is Benesh notation, first published in Choreology by 
Joan and Rudolf Benesh in 1956. This is by no means an exhaustive list, but serves to 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 		
6 
demonstrate the way in which there have been multiple modes of movement 
notation developed over an extensive time frame. However, none of these systems 
are widely used in current western Contemporary Dance, although some systems are 
used in Classical Ballet. 
The fact that so many attempts have been made to formulate a sharable system of 
notation highlights the complexities of representing the movement of the body.
Whilst music notation has became commonplace in the western music-art tradition, 
in dance no single method of inscription has ever been universally adopted. There are 
many potential reasons for this, including the varied demands of different styles and 
genres. However, perhaps the most commonly cited reason is that dance is too 
complex to notate, due its existence in both time and space and dependence upon 
the body (Hutchinson 1972: 1). This view is advocated by Burrows, who outlines the 
difference between music and dance in this regard asking, “[h]ow do you “see” four 
dimensions at once?” (in Burrows and Van Imschoot 2005). 
This question is arguably unique to dance. In Languages of Art: An Approach to a 
Theory of Symbols (1976), philosopher Nelson Goodman provides a detailed account 
of the role and function of artistic scores. Alongside music he discusses painting, 
literature, sculpture and dance. Although addressed only briefly, dance captures 
Goodman’s attention, he explains that, “[t]he possibility of a notation for dance was 
one of the initial questions that led to our study of notational systems” (Goodman 
1976: 212). 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
7 
Goodman outlines the complexity of the issue, referring to the view that dance is too 
complicated to be captured by notation due to its status as a, 
visual and mobile art involving the infinitely subtle and varied 
expression and three-dimensional motions of one or more highly 
complex organisms (Goodman 1976: 212). 
However, Goodman actually disagrees with this perspective, claiming that scores do 
not need to capture all of the subtle details of a performance. He suggests that such 
an approach would be both “hopeless” and “pointless” (Goodman 1976: 212), due to 
the way in which scores function to specify the essential properties of a work. By this 
he means that scores capture the features that must be present in any correct and 
authentic performance of a work. Under Goodman’s view a score does not aim to 
capture every single detail, rather only those that are essential to the identity of the 
work. 
Goodman’s notion of the score is very specific. He uses the term to refer solely to 
work-determining documents written in codified notation. He claims that, ''the 
language in which a score is written must be notational'' (1976: 178), meaning that it 
must meet his five semantic and syntactic requirements. According to Goodman 
notation differs from a ''drawing, study or sketch on the one hand and from a verbal 
description, scenario or script on the other” (1976: 127). He proposes that in order to 
qualify as notation a system must use inscribed characters to denote components, 
with each inscription standing for only one character, hence avoiding the ambiguity 
associated with words or drawings, which have the potential for multiple 
interpretations. 
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Goodman suggests that in the case of the performing arts, scores have an important 
theoretical role, as they can be used to identify a work from performance to 
performance (1976: 128). Indeed he goes as far as to suggest that scores are essential 
to identifying genuine instances of works of the performing arts, claiming that 
performances must fully comply with their scores. This is an important feature of 
Goodman’s view, in the case of music for example, even one wrong note results in 
the performance failing to be an instance of the work (Goodman 1976: 128). 
Goodman’s position is arguably purely theoretical, as opposed to practical (Goehr 
1992: 25). In particular, he does not suggest that audience members are required to 
undergo this process of identification in order to ascertain which work they are 
watching. Rather, he attributes the score a “fundamental theoretical role” (1976: 138 
[my emphasis]), his point being that genuine instances of the work would 
theoretically comply exactly with the corresponding score and that any mistakes in 
performance would mean that it fails to constitute an instance of the work. 
Goodman’s view is discussed by the contemporary aesthetician Graham McFee, who 
also sees notation as a way to deal with the identity problems posed by dance works, 
but distances himself from aspects of Goodman’s view (2011; 42- 55). In comparison 
to Goodman, McFee has a relatively broad conception of what may constitute a 
notational form. He acknowledges the wide range of movement notation systems, 
and whilst in 1992 McFee maintains that notation is distinct from writing (1992: 97-
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98), his later work he suggests that rules, shared though language might also count as 
scores (2011: 55). He proposes that, 
any recipe which, if followed with understanding produces a 
performance of the dancework in question counts as a score for that 
dancework (McFee 2011: 55). 
Indeed, some recent dance practices have shifted in focus, away from a desire to 
formulate a universal and codified mode of dance notation. This is perhaps due to the 
ease of video recording for documentation, but can also be attributed to an 
acceptance of the nature of the form and an increase in the view that it is not 
susceptible to certain modes of inscription. For example, writing in 2005, 
performance theorist Miriam Van Imschoot refers to historical notation systems, 
suggesting that, 
[i]n retrospect, however, one can now see that none of the systems 
could establish a lasting or pervasive foothold. When looking for an 
overview on the notational endeavors of choreographers and dance 
makers in the last centuries, what one sees is more a sort of 
“babelisation” of idiosyncratic instructions than a commonly and 
widely applied overarching language (Van Imschoot 2010). 
Significantly, however, dance is frequently inscribed, but the planning, sketching, and 
writing of dance usually takes idiosyncratic form and includes the use of language. 
Choreographers often use notebooks inside and outside of the studio to keep track of 
their movement ideas. Although not composed in a universal code, such objects are 
often referred to as ‘scores’, meaning that as a choreographical term, 'score' has 
become extremely broad and arguably ubiquitous. A situation that leads Birringer to 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	









	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
10 
suggest, that ''there is always a score, in all artistic practices and in all contexts where 
art is exhibited/performed’’ (Birringer 2013: 10). Here it seems Birringer is referring to 
a score as a set of structures that determines how an artwork is performed or 
displayed. This conception stands in stark contrast to a traditional view of scoring, 
such as Goodman’s strict requirements. The vast expansion of the concept of the 
score results in the term referring to objects that do not inherit the ontological clarity 
of traditional notation systems. Developed with varied intentions, the status and 
function of these scores is harder to define and their relationship to the work difficult 
to establish. 
Recordings and	‘Choreographic	Objects’ 
Developments in technology over the past	two decades mean that	it	is now possible 
for choreographers to record their work in a	variety of ways, which limits the need for 
codified preservation strategies. However the recording of dance is not	 a new 
phenomenon,	 dance has been captured by video recording for as long as the 
technology has been available.	Film is used for documentation, as a	rehearsal tool and 
for the development	 of new art	 works. Dance also had a	 long relationship with 
cinema. In her book, Dance Film: Choreography and the Moving Image (2011), dance 
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scholar Erin Brannigan refers to dance film practitioner and scholar, Patrick Bensard’s 
observations that, 
as modern dance began, the cinematograph was invented and 
that	as the first	swirls of Loie Fuller’s veils occurred, the Lumiere 
brothers cranked their camera	 for the very first	 time (Bensard in 
Brannigan 2011: 19).	
Dance on screen takes multiple forms; it	features in films across many genres, as well 
as in specially made dance films. Of specific interest	here, however is the use of film 
for documentation. Recordings of dance have a	 central role in dance practice and 
analysis. 
For example, contemporary American choreographer Meg Stuart	writes, 
[w]e spend a	 lot	 of time looking at	 the videotapes of the 
rehearsals. I often have the dancers learn their improvised 
material directly from video, including every little mistake (Stuart	
2012: 193). 
This articulation highlights the practical role of recordings, which is further discussed 
by Cvejić,	who describes the video camera	as “an obligatory rehearsal tool” (2012b:	
192). 
As well as serving a	 function within the studio, recordings often provide audiences 
with the only possible way of seeing a	dance, due to geographical, economic or time 
constraints. Paraphrasing American dance critic Lewis Segal, McFee suggests that	
recordings might be the only option available to most	viewers	(2011: 113).	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
12 
He quotes Segal as suggesting that, 
[I]n Los Angeles, our pleasure in dance and even in dance literacy 
are compromised by everything we can’t	 see in the flesh (Segal in	
McFee 2011: 113). 
However, the observation of dance through recording raises philosophical problems. 
In Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (1993) performance theorist	Peggy Phelan 
famously 4 claimed that, 
[p]erformance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot	
be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the 
circulation of representations of representations; once it	 does 
so, it	becomes something other than performance (Phelan 1993: 
146). 
This view poses problems primarily because performance does get	 documented 
therefore some consideration of this ‘other’ is necessary. In agreement	with Phelan, 
McFee argues that	watching a	recording of a	performance does not	count	as viewing 
the work, due to the ontological centrality of live performance (2011: 33).	 These 
perspectives and the way they rub up against	common practice are important	to this 
research, which considers the relationship between the work, performance, score and 
recording, attempting to uncover and map this complex web of relations. 
4 Phelan’s claim sparked a	wide debate in Performance Studies and has been 
challenged by Rebecca	Schneider (2001,2011) and Philip Auslander (1999) among 
others. 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
13 
The ‘choreographic objects’ at	the centre of this enquiry do not	smoothly align with 
conventional modes of conceptualising dance scores. This is primarily because they 
are focused towards the analysis and dissemination of choreographic processes and 
knowledge, alongside performance outputs. One of Forsythe’s key interests, 
articulated on the homepage of Synchronous Objects is the question, “what	 else 
might	physical thinking look like?” (2009). The notion of ‘physical’ or ‘choreographic’ 
thought	 implies an alternative mode of knowledge. The primarily physical nature of 
dance does not	 only makes it	 difficult	 to capture, it	 also generates forms of 
knowledge that	 do not	 easily align with western dualist	 traditions. Dance theorist	
Gabriele Klein suggests that, 
[j]ust	as theories on modern art	generally see the physical medium 
of dance as a	 ‘the other’ of modernity, dance knowledge is also 
considered ‘another type of knowledge’ — a form of knowledge 
whose physical nature prohibits discourse about	 it	 (Klein 2007: 
28). 
The type of knowing that	 arises from dance making and performing is sometimes 
referred to as ‘choreographic knowledge’, and this notion plays a	central role in the 
construction of ‘choreographic objects’. 
Referring to a	number of projects emerging in the last	decade, Zuniga	Shaw suggests, 
[w]ith very different	 outcomes, each of these projects is 
concerned with the idiosyncratic nature of choreographic 
knowledge and with discovering new possibilities for tracing and 
transmitting ideas contained within the specific dance practices 
of each artist	(2014: 207). 
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This poses another set	 of questions at	 the heart	 of this enquiry, such as; what	 is 
‘choreographic knowledge’? How can it	 be shared, accessed and understood? And 
what	 impact	 does the acquisition of ‘choreographic knowledge’ have on the 
appreciative faculties of the viewer? 
Perhaps one of the most	 philosophically interesting questions concerning 
‘choreographic objects’ is how they can be categorised and understood. Despite 
adopting existing terms such as ‘archive’, ‘installation’ and ‘score’, each example I	
refer to problematises these categorical distinctions in various ways, as is
demonstrated by the coining of the term ‘choreographic object’.	 They perhaps 
propose a	 new form of object, not	 fully explainable through existing terminology. 
Forsythe describes his ‘choreographic objects’ as, “a	 model of potential transition 
from one state to another in any space imaginable” (2008). He theorises this 
transition in relation to musical scores, suggesting that	 they represent	 the potential 
for action, and that	in activation a	transition occurs from the visual to the aural. 
He goes on to suggest, 
[a[ choreographic object, or score, is by nature open to a	full palette 
of phenomenological instigations because it	acknowledges the body 
as wholly designed to persistently read every signal from its 
environment	(Forsythe 2008). 
Although discussing a	 different	 class of entities to those considered here, this 
articulation from Forsythe demonstrates how the two conceptions of the term are 
related. Although Synchronous Objects, Using the Sky and A Choreographer’s Score 
offer less potential for action than other dance scores, the notion of transition 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 		
15 
connects them to Forsythe’s articulations. Through these objects the work transitions 
from an abstract/material conception to an open web of metaphysical, cognitive and 
kinaesthetic instances. Furthermore, the space the work occupies is multiplied, as it	is 
re-contextualised in new forms of object. 
I suggest	that	the novelty of ‘choreographic objects’ arises primarily from the way in 
which they conflate process and product. Choreography is typically, or at least	
traditionally, performance oriented, focussed towards constructing a	 performance 
event, usually with enough constraining features to, theoretically at	 least, allow for 
the work to be repeated through multiple performances. The ontological complexity 
of dance is demonstrated by the fact	that	the product	of choreography is two-fold, as 
it	 generates both a	 work and infinite potential performances. Documentation 
strategies such as notation, photographs and recording offer artefacts through	which	
the products of work and performance can arguably be experienced. This is where 
the key distinction lies between these strategies and ‘choreographic objects.’ As the 
aptly named research project developed by Dutch company Emio Greco I PC 
demonstrates, ‘choreographic objects’ are more concerned with ‘Capturing Intention’ 
(2004), than replicating or capturing the work in performance, and are therefore 
different	 to previous notation and documentation strategies. Furthermore they 
generate a	new form of commodity; one that is distinct	from the performance event, 
but	 that	 nevertheless has a	 relationship to the abstract	 work. Significantly, these 
objects reveal the labour of choreography, the detailed examination of both process 
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The motivation to articulate and share ‘choreographic knowledge’ is arguably 
indicative of the contexts in which these projects were	produced. For example, the 
increased presence of practice-as-research in UK Universities gives rise to a	context	in 
which artists undertaking such research are required to find ways to articulate the 
research-ful and knowledge producing nature of their work, to fit	within institutional 
frameworks for assessment. This situation is reflective of wider sociological concerns 
in contemporary culture. Klein outlines the way in which knowledge is associated with 
value and power. She suggests, “[i]n the gloablised world of the 21st century, 
knowledge is considered the key to prosperity, influence and power” (2007:2). Leach 
(2013) further suggests that	‘choreographic objects’ are the result	of the relationship 
between knowledge and value in western culture. Articulating and documenting the 
process of dance making foregrounds the activity’s knowledge producing nature. 
Historically, the notation, documentation and circulation of dances had significant	
socio-political implications. For example, in Choreographing Empathy: Kinesthesia in 
Performance (2011), dance scholar Susan Leigh Foster suggests that	 the 
transportation of dance through the development	 of Feuillet	 notation had colonial 
implications, as it	 allowed for the introduction of the “finest	 accomplishments of a	
colonial power” (2011: 32). In a	 related discussion in,	 ‘Media	 and the No-Place of 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
17 
Dance’ (2008), dance scholar Harmony Bench considers the position of the subject	in 
Feuillet	writing.	She suggests that, 
[a]t a	representational level, Feuillet	notation describes a	subject	
that	 establishes himself as a center from which to govern a
periphery”	(Bench 2008:	39). 
The positioning of the subject	 informs Bench’s argument	 for further links between 
notation systems and colonial paradigms. These observations from Foster and Bench 
raise an important	point	regarding the implicit	ideologies embedded within all forms 
of documentation. Through considering the questions, what	 are ‘choreographic 
objects’? How do they reconfigure spectatorial engagement	 with specific dance 
works? And, how does this reconfiguration encourage a	rethinking of their ontological 
statuses? This study seeks to excavate the onto-political, considering the relationship 
between socio-political structures, ideological frameworks and philosophical enquiry. 
Addressing ontological questions, such as what	is a	dance work? And what	is a	dance 
score?, alongside questions about	 appreciation and interpretation,	 allows for the 
consideration of the relationship between the socio-political context	 of the objects 
and their metaphysical repercussions. 
Outline	of Thesis 
Chapter Two provides a	literature review, examining a	range of sources central to the 
study. I	 outline arguments from philosophers and dance scholars such as Goodman 
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(1976) McFee (1992, 2011), Frédéric Pouillaude (n.d),5 Anna	Pakes (2013) and Sarah 
Rubidge (2000a,b) regarding the ontology of dance works. I go on to consider 
discourses in Philosophical Aesthetics, Dance Studies and Performance Studies that	
consider the philosophical issues raised through the documentation of dance. 
Drawing on theorists such as Phelan (1993) and McFee (1992, 2011), this section 
provides an overview of some key questions regarding the digital recording of dance. I	
go on to outline the field of ‘choreographic objects’, in reference to writing from 
deLahunta	 (2013a), Leach (2013) and Zuniga	 Shaw (2014), addressing the ways in 
which the objects pose related, yet	 distinct	 questions from those addressed in 
relation to recordings. I	go on to provide an overview of some of the key methods and 
frameworks used for the analysis of works of dance art	 in the western theatre 
tradition. I start	 to explore relationships between dance analysis models, critical 
theory and dance appreciation. 
Chapter Three is the methodology chapter. It	 highlights and negotiates the ways in 
which various frameworks interact throughout	 the research. I	 outline my method, 
which involves literature analysis, theory testing and construction, and the 
examination of case studies. I	 discuss the way in which dance research frequently 
adopts a	postpositivist	framework, and compare the methods used by dance scholars 
to present	 arguments, with those used by philosophical aestheticians, in order to 
demonstrate the contrasts between each approach. Further to this, I	 outline my 
framework, leaning on Julie Van Camp’s (2006) pragmatist	 approach to dance 
5 I refer to an unpublished translation by Anna	Pakes of Pouillaude’s Le 
désoeuvrement	Chorégraphique: étude sur la notion d’oeuvre en danse, published in 
French	in 2009. 
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philosophy, I	explain how I	aim to centralise common dance practices, thus advancing 
and advocating a postpositivist ontological standpoint. This section also considers 
ontology as a method, comparing and contrasting the use of the term across	
disciplines. In relation to computational ontologies, I discuss the method of 
modelling, and explain how the construction of the model, presented in Chapter 
Thirteen serves this research. I	 justify the validity of philosophical ontology for this 
enquiry, and theorise the interplay between abstract	 ontological enquiry and the 
examination of concrete case studies. 
Chapter Four further explores issues of scoring and recording. Building on the 
foundations laid in Chapters Two and Three, I	start	to test	and question established 
modes of conceptualising dance scores. I	go on to outline the way in which the term 
refers to a wide range of objects and practices, suggesting categories for 
understanding the various forms of score and their relationship to both work and 
performance. 
Chapter Five challenges views presented by David Carr (1987) and McFee (1992, 
2011) that	 recordings do not	provide access to the work. I	 outline the flaws in this 
perspective, demonstrating how common social practices suggest	that	we are able to 
adequately access dance through recorded representations, going on to claim that	
this problematises the ontological schemas outlined in the Chapter Two. This
argument	 is important	 because of the role that	 recordings play in the three case 
studies. In order to establish the relationship between the work, performance and 
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‘choreographic object’, it	 must	 first	 be demonstrated how recordings have the 
potential to provide access to the work. 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight are focussed on the case studies. These chapters are 
descriptive, in order to provide some initial analysis. Whilst	 philosophical and 
theoretical questions are posed here, they are not	addressed in depth until later on in 
the thesis. The emphasis is on providing a	detailed account	of the objects in order to 
allow the reader to understand the claims I	go on to make about	their philosophical 
significance. 
Chapter Six considers	Synchronous Objects (2009). I	provide description and analysis 
of the site, outlining its key features. Through close consideration of a	small number 
of specific examples, I	pay particular attention to the range of approaches deployed 
by the team and how these reveal an over-arching structuralist	framework. Referring 
back to some of the perspectives outlined in Chapter Two I	ask how this site relates to 
established ways of analysing dance. 
Chapter Seven pays attention to Using the Sky. The case studies are not	presented 
chronologically; although this example was published after the third case study, I	
chose to focus on this score next	due to its relationship to Synchronous Objects. As 
previously mentioned, Using the Sky, was developed as part	of Motion Bank, which 
was commissioned by Forsythe as a	 further exploration of some of the questions 
posed by the Synchronous Objects project. My examination of Hay’s score once again 
starts with detailed description, moving on to hypothesise the relationship between 
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the digital score and Hay’s practice, suggesting that	the methods and decisions of the 
team suggest	an extension of the practice into the digital sphere. I	consider how this 
framework relates the notion of ‘posthumanism’, specifically the view articulated by 
digital theorist	N. Katherine Hayles in her book How we Became Posthuman (1999). 
Chapter Eight’s case study is a	little different	insomuch as it	does not	exist	online and 
was not	 developed under Forsythe’s patronage. A Choreographer’s Score (2012)
provides a	fitting third example, as it	demonstrates how the methods and frameworks 
adopted in the first	two case studies are not	exclusive to Forsythe’s interests. Drawing 
comparisons between the case studies helps to build the argument	 that	
‘choreographic objects’ are indicative of a	 larger class of entities, than the small 
number of examples discussed in this thesis. This chapter pays close attention to the 
methods used to develop the score and outlines its intertextual analytic framework. 
Furthermore I	 specifically consider the role of the DVD, in order to think about	 the 
relevance of digital technology. 
Chapters Nine and Ten ask what	these objects are. Chapter Nine	draws on all three 
case studies and refers back to Chapter Four in order to ask; are these objects 
‘scores’? I	outline the ways in which they elude the articulations offered in Chapter 
Four, and propose scoring as a form of ontological enquiry and knowledge 
dissemination. The specific nature of the ‘choreographic object’ is further theorised in 
Chapter Nine, which pays attention to the suggestion from Cvejić	 (2012: 8) and 
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deLahunta	(2013a:	2),	6 that	these entities offer a	form of ‘poetics’. Further extending 
the examination of ‘posthumanism’, I	propose that	the use of technology allows for 
the development	of a	form of ‘posthuman poetics’. 
Chapter Eleven moves on from the consideration of what, to ask why? Here I	consider 
the artistic and cultural context for the development	of ‘choreographic objects’ within 
the UK, mainland Europe and the USA. Drawing on Leach’s work (2006, 2012, 2013), I	
outline the knowledge-oriented context	of their production. Furthermore, I	 suggest	
that	 the foregrounding of labour and non-hierarchical structuring of process and 
performance relate to Marxist	(1887) conceptions of value, problematising traditional 
aesthetic theories. I	go on to consider how choreographic process is shared through 
performance, considering works by Burrows and Fargion (2014) and Davies (2014). I 
draw connections between performance works and ‘choreographic objects’, 
regarding the motivations and incentives for foregrounding choreographic labour and 
knowledge. 
Chapters Twelve and Thirteen consider the philosophical impact	 of ‘choreographic 
objects’ on the perception, identity and ontology of the work. Chapter Twelve 
considers how the multiplication and reconfiguration of properties reveals	features of 
the work not	accessible in performance alone, thus challenging empiricist	modes	of	
art	 appreciation. Building on this discussion, Chapter Twelve teases out	 the 
6 I am working with a	version of this article available on the Motion Bank website. It	
has been	published in various other places therefore the page numbers will vary 
between each publication.
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relationship between the work, performance and ‘choreographic object’, considering 
the notion of ‘aesthetic empiricism’,	7 which suggests that	the perception of art	works 
should not	refer to any external information. I	assess the applicability of this notion in 
relation to dance and the dissemination of ‘choreographic knowledge’. 
Chapter Thirteen focuses on the ontological repercussions of the case studies, 
addressing a	question at	the heart	of this enquiry. I	ask whether the work is changed 
via	 its re-presentation through the ‘choreographic object’. Thinking through this 
question involves considering once again the nature of dance works, specifically 
whether they can be thought	 of as capable of change.	 In the second part	 of the 
chapter I	 propose a	model, arising from my analysis, to help others to analyse and 
theorise ‘choreographic objects’.	 The Choreographic Objects Model uses dance 
analysis frameworks from Janet	Adshead et	al (1988) and Foster (1986) as a	point	of 
departure, drawing attention to the features and relations of the objects to think 
through their impact	on the work. In this chapter I	outline some of the complexities 
regarding the distinctions between analysing the work, considering the nature of the 
object, and the hybrid nature of such encounters. 
7 Both David Davies (2004) and Peter Lamarque (2010) suggest	that	this term was 
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Chapter Two: Literature	Review 
Dance	Ontology 
This thesis draws primarily on literature from Philosophy, Dance, Cultural and 
Performance Studies. The philosophical framework arises primarily from Analytic 
Philosophical Aesthetics. However, Continental Philosophy has had a	 significant	
impact	on recent	discourses in Dance Studies and Performance Studies, meaning that	
such scholarship also informs the work, albeit	in a	less direct	way than the literature 
from the Analytic field	of Philosophy.	
The way in which dance works are physically present	only temporarily has been the 
focus of much discussion in Dance and Performance Studies. It	 has led to scholars 
claiming that	 dance is particularly ephemeral. For example, performance theorist	
André Lepecki traces the acknowledgement	of dance’s “self-erasure” (Lepecki 2004: 
125) back to Jean-George	 Noverre’s Letters on Dancing and Ballets from 1760. Its	
ephemerality has often been considered a	 problematic feature of the form, and 
potentially one of the reasons that	dance is not	discussed as widely as theatre and 
music. Marcia	 Siegel suggests that, “[dance] doesn’t	 stay around long enough to 
become respectable or respected. Its ephemerality is mistaken for triviality” (in 
Lepecki 2004: 130). Phelan claims that	the non-reproducibility of performance makes 
it	 “the runt	 of the litter of contemporary art” (1993: 148) and Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone asks, “[w]ho in fact	wants to study movement? It	won’t	stay still!” (2011: 
399). Described by Arbeau as “dance’s lament” (in Lepecki 2004: 125), the 
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disappearance of dance has generated an interest	 in the preservation of 
performances, in the form of notating, writing, recording and archiving, with Arbeau 
suggesting that	 dance’s ephemerality can be overcome with writing (see Lepecki 
2004: 125), and McFee setting out	 to “acknowledge its permanence” (1992: 89). 
Although performances are disappearing as they appear, the way in which we can	re-
stage, remember and discuss works suggests that	they exist	outside of performance. 
These discourses point	to the complex ontology of dance. The term ‘ontology’ is used 
slightly differently in different	 contexts. Here I	 use it	 in the philosophical sense, to 
refer to a	mode of enquiry concerned with understanding the metaphysical nature of 
the world. Ontological questions include; what	kinds of things exist? How do	entities 
come into existence? And can abstract, as well as physical entities be said to exist? In 
relation to art, ontology asks metaphysical questions about	 the nature of its 
existence, as opposed to focussing on its value, impact, social function and so on. 
Dance ontology is	 addressed from multiple perspectives. For example, ontological 
discourse in Continental Philosophy and Phenomenology appears to associate the 
term with the notion of ‘being’ in relation to the activities of dancing and watching. 
Scholars such as Alan Badiou (2005), Jose Gil (2006) and Erin Manning (2013) have 
considered the ontology, or essential nature of dance movement, its relationship to 
time, and the sensory and phenomenological experience of both performing and 
watching dance. Ontological discourses in Dance and Performance Studies tend 
towards discussions of the role of specific elements of dance,	8 and how the removal 
8 For example Lepecki’s discussion of stillness (2006) and Phelan’s account	of liveness 
(1993). 
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of these impact	on the nature of the form. 9 These discourses are of interest, and play 
a role in the study, however the key focus is on the conceptualisation of the work of 
dance art, as opposed to the politics or phenomenology of dancing. This particular 
way of thinking about	 ontology is adopted by philosophers working in Analytic 
Philosophical Aesthetics, where attention is focussed on the notion of the work, 
asking questions such as; what	 is a dance work? In what	 way does it	 exist? 
Aesthetician Aime L. Thomasson provides a particularly useful description of 
ontological enquiry, suggesting that, 
[d]etermining the ontological status of works of art	 involves 
determining the conditions under which a	work of art	 comes into 
existence, remains in existence, and is destroyed (persistence 
conditions) and also the conditions under which works of art	 are 
one and the same (identity conditions) (Thomasson 2006: 245). 
These questions are at	 the heart	of this research, as I	 consider how ‘choreographic 
objects’ reveal ontological features of dance works. Each approach to ontological 
enquiry shares a	concern with considering the nature of being. In this context	 I am 
specifically concerned with the nature of dance works and their re-presentation 
through digital media. 
Ontological debates in Philosophical Aesthetics are well established, vast	 and on-
going.10 Despite various differences of opinion, there is a	 relatively un-contentious 
distinction drawn between ‘singular’ and ‘multiple’ art	 forms (Davies 2003: 156). 
9 Pakes (2015) suggests that	ontological discourse in this field is linked to politics and 
perhaps a	resistance to the idea	that	dance can be reduced to a	set	of parameters.
10 See Currie (1989), Hanfling (1992) and Thomasson (2005, 2006), for discussions of 
some of the key ontological issues across art	forms. 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




Singular art	 forms, such as painting are embodied in a	single object, whereas in the 
case of multiple art	 forms, such as literature, music and dance there can be many 
instances of the same work. 
Goodman also draws a	distinction between art	forms, but	in a	slightly different	way. 
He uses the terminology ‘autographic’ and ‘allographic’ (1976) and explains the 
difference through the example of forgery. Goodman suggests that	 even if a	 fake 
painting were exactly the same aesthetically and perceptually, it	would still not	be the 
same thing as the original painting (1976: 103-112), thus demonstrating the 
significance of the material object. On the other hand, he suggests that	 it	 is not	
possible to forge a	musical work, explaining that, 
[p]erformances may vary in correctness and quality and even in 
‘authenticity’ of a	more esoteric kind; but	all correct	performances 
are equally genuine instances of the work (Goodman 1978:	113). 
The term 'autographic', applies to works where the distinction between the original 
and the forgery is significant	 (1976: 113). Contrasting the autographic, is the 
'allographic', referring to art	 forms that	 are non-fakable, such as music and dance 
(1976: 113).	 These categories are not	 exactly the same as the distinction between 
singular and multiple works. Levinson (2011) points out	 that	 the definition of 
autographic arts can apply to both singular and multiple forms (2011: 90). 
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Levinson offers modifications to Goodman’s definition, drawing attention to the way 
that	autographic multiple arts are duplicated, as a	way of determining authentic and 
inauthentic instances (2011). He suggests that, in the case of multiple autographic art	
forms some duplicates are genuine, but that, “no duplicate is a	genuine instance of a	
work	irrespective of its actual physical means of production.” (Levinson	2011: 93).	
Thus, he clarifies that	if it	is possible to have exact	duplicates of a	work, which count	
as authentic irrespective of how they were made, the art	form would not	be 
autographic. He is not	arguing that	the artist	must	produce each instance for them to 
be genuine, but	that	they must	be produce via	the relevant	mechanism, or “arch 
form”	(2011: 91). 
Goodman suggests that	for autographic arts, authenticity is determined through the 
consideration of historical facts, such as by establishing that	 a specific canvas was 
painted by Rembrandt (1976: 116). He refers to these facts as a	work’s “history of 
production” (1976: 122).	 A work’s history of production also explains the way in 
which something possesses art-status, as opposed to being merely a	piece of canvas, 
or a	group of people moving. The authenticity of allographic art	 forms on the other 
hand is, at least	 theoretically, determined in reference to a relevant	 notation 
(Goodman 1976: 121). However, this claim is complicated by dance (Goodman 1976: 
121), which has no universal, or even widely used notational system and therefore 
does not	fit	neatly within Goodman’s categories. This issue has been addressed by a	
variety of scholars. Margolis (1981), for instance argues that	 dance is autographic, 
with each performance dependent	upon the dancers who instantiate it. According to 
Cvejić (2015: 10), Pouillaude suggests that	 dance has both autographic and 
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allographic features, before suggesting that	 it	 is an allographic form that	 is not	
amenable to notation.	11 
The central role of the dancer has led scholars such as David Carr (1987) to suggest	
that	dance works are distinct	from the other performing arts. In ‘Thought	and Action 
in the Art	of Dance’ (1987), Carr suggests that	although the creation of all artworks is 
reliant	 upon human action (1987: 345), this is particularly apparent	 in dance. He 
suggests that, 
[i]n the art	of dance we are confronted, more than in any other art	
form, with a	circumstance in which both the instrument	or vehicle 
of expression of artistic ideas and the intentions and the physical 
embodiment	of the art	work itself are in themselves just	 forms or 
modes of human action (Carr 1987: 346). 
This implies that	 dance depends upon the dancer in a	way that	 sets it	 apart	 from 
other art forms.	 Carr suggests, for example that	one can appreciate certain qualities 
of a	 play through reading the text, but	 that	 “[c]horeography just	 is the making of 
dances (not	the mere ‘writing’ of them)” (1987: 346). He also clarifies the difference 
to music, suggesting that	a composer is not	reliant	upon the performers to the same 
degree as the choreographer (Carr 1987:	346-347). He claims that, 
[t]he composer may make music by means other than employing 
musicians whereas I	 should argue that	the choreographer has no 
other resources than the employment	of dancers (Carr 1987: 347). 
11 Although I	have access to a	translation by Pakes of one chapter of Pouillaude’s text, 
this claim is seemingly made in a	section that is not	yet	available in English. 
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Therefore Carr is apprehensive about	 the role of notation, suggesting that	 it	 is 
incapable of capturing the interpretational and “meaning-laden” nature of dance 
movement	(1987: 355). 
Following Carr, McFee (2011)	further emphasises the fundamentally human nature of	
dance. He distinguishes between dance and music by referring to the form’s physical 
nature. He claims that	musicians produce the sound, but	that	dancers do not	produce 
the dance, “rather, they are the dance” (2011: 33). McFee concurs with Carr that	
dancers are intrinsic to the dance in a	 way that	 musicians are not, claiming that	
dancers’ movement	instigates the dance and that	nothing else could do this (McFee 
2011: 33). 
Unlike painting, which has a	stable original, and music, which usually corresponds to a	
score, dance works usually have no set	 original or determining text. So, because a	
dance work is not	solely embodied in a	singular instance, it	seems fair to suggest	that	
it	 is not	a physical object, nor a particular event. How then does a	dance work exist	
outside of performance? One option would be to consider it	as a	purely mental entity. 
R.G. Collingwood	 (1938) takes this view; suggesting that	 a work of art	 can be 
complete in the mind of the artist. It	is perhaps possible to extend this line of thinking	
to propose that	outside of performance dance works exist	purely as mental ideas and 
traces. However, this suggestion runs into problems when we think about	 the vast	
variation in how people remember works. If every individual memory constituted its 
own dance work object it	would arguably be impossible to ascribe works any sharable 
features. How then do they exist? Writing about	musical works, philosopher Lydia	
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Goehr, suggests that	 they are ‘ontological mutants’ due to the way in which they 
cannot	be thought	of simply as physical, mental or ideal objects (1992: 2). Although 
the finer points of dance work ontology highlight	significant	differences to music, it	is 
an equally ‘mutant	form’, eluding simple explanation and categorisation. 
Scholars who have addressed the ontology of dance include Anderson (1983), Carr 
(1987), Conroy (2013a), Margolis (1981), McFee (1992, 2011), Meskin (1999), Pakes 
(2013), Sparshott	 (1995) and Van Camp (1998). Although there is not	 always 
agreement	 about	 the most	 appropriate way to explain the nature of dance works, 
many consider the type/token schema	 first introduced by linguist	 Charles Sanders 
Peirce	(1906) and developed for art	by Margolis (1959) and Richard Wollheim (1975)	
useful. Under this schema	 each dance work is considered an abstract	 ‘type’, made 
present	through the physical ‘token’ of the performance. 
Wollheim uses literature to demonstrate how the schema	operates. He suggests that	
a novel is a	 type, of which every copy is a	 token (1975: 80). Under this notion 
therefore every performance of the work can be considered to be a	token, providing 
it	 meets the relevant	 constraints or ‘identity conditions’. A key condition of this 
schema	 is that	 all tokens are equal. This is most	 clearly illustrated by borrowing 
Wollheim’s discussion of literature. When faced with two copies of a	novel, we do not	
try to determine which one most	embodies the work. One may be older, printed in a	
different	typeface, or even in another language, however both books are equally an 
instance of the novel. The same can be said of performances. Petipa’s Sleeping	Beauty 
(1890) may be performed by The Royal Ballet	or a	group of school children whilst	one 
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version may be better than the other they are both versions of Sleeping Beauty. This
way of thinking about	 dance works and performances is helpful as it	 explains how 
there can be various different	instances of the same thing. 
Dance Philosopher Anna	 Pakes offers a comprehensive account	 of dance work 
ontology in her essay ‘The Plausibility of a	Platonist	Ontology of Dance’ (2013). Pakes 
responds to discourse regarding the ontology of musical works,	 considering	
specifically the relevance of a	 platonist	12 account. Julian Dodd (2000)	 advances a	
platonist	 ontology of music, suggesting that	 works are purely abstract	 sound 
structures (2000: 425). 13 Under this model neither the context	 of the work’s 
composition nor the way it	is performed are essential to its identity (Dodd 2000: 425). 
Furthering this discussion in 2007 Dodd employs the concept	of ‘sonicism’ (2007: 2), 
which suggests that, “works are identical just	in case they sound exactly alike” (2007: 
2). Under this theory, whether a	work is played live by an orchestra, from a	recording, 
or by a	school band, each instance is an example of the work, as long as it	instantiates 
the required sound structure. A contentious feature of this proposal is that	the work 
does not	 in fact	 need to be ‘played’ at all. Identifying the work purely as a	 sound 
structure implies that	a musical work can be accidentally instanced; by a	child hitting 
pots and pans for example. Pakes asks whether Dodd’s account	help us to understand 
12 Pakes explains that	contemporary platonism derives from Ancient	Greek 
philosopher, Plato’s theory of forms, but	does not	explicitly reference his views, 
therefore the term is not	capitalised (2013: 84).
13 There are multiple propositions offered in the ontology of music, many of which 
differ significantly from Dodd’s view (see Kania	2006, Kivy 2001, Levinson 2011 
amongst	others). 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	






dance works, outlining some of the issues with this view in relation to dance, she 
suggests that, 
[i]n attempting to develop a	platonist	ontology of dance, we might	
be tempted to identify dances with movement	 structures 
discovered in the choreographic process and instanced in 
performance (Pakes 2013: 95). 
However, as Pakes explains, conceptualising dance works as structures of movement	
would imply that	they are identified by how they look, which does not	exactly reflect	
the way we conceive of dances, especially given their relationship to sound (Pakes 
2013: 95). 
A further problem with conceptualising dance works purely as movement	structures 
arises when we are faced with works that	are not	identified through the repetition of 
a certain sequence of movement and are essentially dependent	upon communicating 
certain concepts. In Writing Dancing in the Age of Postmodernism	(1994) Sally Banes 
discusses the impact	of experimental choreographic collective Judson Dance Theatre 
on the development	 of choreographic methodologies. Judson Dance Theatre was a 
group of dance makers working in New York City in the 1960s,	comprising artists such 
as Yvonne Rainer, Lucinda	Childs, Simone Forti, Robert	Dunn, Steve Paxton and Hay, 
among others. They developed avant-garde choreographic practices, ran workshops 




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




Banes suggests that, 
[a]esthetic questions about	 the nature and meaning of dance and 
of movement	 were raised in the workshop and concerts, among 
them — fundamentally — the identity of a	 dance work, the 
definition of dance, and the nature of technique (Banes 1994: 211). 
The techniques developed during this time have been hugely influential in the 
development	of contemporary dance practice. 
Banes describes Robert	Dunn’s workshop which; inspired by experimental composer 
John Cage, involved activities such as leading participants through ‘chance scores’, 
and various rules structures. Techniques included borrowing arrangements from 
movement	scores and working with time constraints (Banes 1994: 212 - 213). One	of	
the key ideologies of Judson Dance Theatre was a resistance to the hierarchy 
associated with Classical Ballet. This is evident	 in the development	 of these 
choreographic approaches, some of which do not	 determine specific movements, 
thus allowing for non-trained performers and individual interpretation. Although 
some of the works developed during this period are arguably repeatable by 
performing a	specific sequence, others are more flexible. Such methods are now fairly 
commonplace in dance-making, meaning that	 the question is posed as to how such 
works can be identified if not	 through the recognition and repetition of certain 
movements. 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
35 
In order to understand the nature of such works, dance scholar and practitioner Sarah 
Rubidge introduces the notion of ‘open’ works (2000a), suggesting that	 this term 
refers to, 
a work which, by design, does not	 exhibit	 a stable temporal 
progression and/or material form from instantiation to 
instantiation (Rubidge 2000a:	7). 
Open works look different	 every time they are performed. They might	 rely upon 
improvisation or respond to a	 set	 of rules. Due to the way that	 the work is not	
identified through a	 certain set	 of movements; features such as the title, rules, 
format, context	and performers may indicate the work. Therefore to conceive of the 
work as an abstract	structure of movement is problematic. 
How then can we determine what	the work is? In the case of open works we might	
want	to think of the work as an idea, or a	set	of conditions, an outcome that	does not	
seem to align with Dodd’s platonist sound structures. So, do open works align with 
the conception of works as types? Although we may want	to disagree with the idea	of 
a dance work as a	 structure of movement, there is no requirement	 that	 a type is 
synonymous with set	movement	structures. Furthermore, it	seems feasible to suggest	
that	 even open works require structures of some kind. There seems no obvious 
reason to dispute the claim that	 works that are not	 indicated through movement	
cannot	be considered types. However, there are some features of platonist types that	
need addressing. Importantly, they are unchangeable (Dodd	 2007: 4). This is a	 key 
point	 in the development	 of this discussion, as this perspective conceptualises the 
work as an abstract, stable and unchanging entity, which means that	 changing 
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cultural perspectives can have no impact	on the nature of the work per	se, only on	
audience perceptions of it. Furthermore, it	can be argued that	if a	work is incapable of 
change, revisions and alterations that	disrupt	 its essential features cannot	 count	 as 
authentic instances. 
The question of change is addressed by Rubidge, who suggests that	open and closed 
works require different	 ontological accounts (2000a:	 6-7) and that	 the unchanging 
nature of closed works have an “ontology of substance” (2000a:	6),	whilst	open	works	
are more appropriately explained in relation to an “ontology of flux’” (2000a:	 7),	
implicating metaphysical instability. This leads to problems with the type/token 
schema, as it	 does not	 allow for the fluidity encountered in open works. However, 
conceptualising the work as a	type is not	the only option. Other ontological proposals 
have been offered, including Norm-Kinds (Wolterstorff 1975) and action types (Currie 
1989), similarly David Davies (2004) has suggested that	 all types of artworks are 
performances undertaken by the artist. Thomasson points out	that, like Collingwood, 
Jean-Paul Sartre also places high significance on the relationship between human 
consciousness, imagination and artworks (2006: 247). However, none of these 
suggestions have been as fully explored in relation to dance as the type/token 
schema, which I	therefore use as a	point	of departure to hypothesis the metaphysical 
nature of dance works.	
I advocate an ontology of flux for both open and closed works, suggesting that	works 
are human constructs and are therefore capable of change, alongside human 
practices. Thomasson’s view, inspired by philosopher Roman Ingarden, is that	 there 
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are abstract	artefacts that	lack a	spatio-temporal location, (such as dance works) but	
that	are created as opposed to eternally existing, and that	can therefore change and 
cease to exist	(2006: 247). In reference to her earlier work (1999),	she suggests that, 
[o]n this model, through their creative activities authors and 
composers bring things into existence that	 (unlike platonist	
abstracta) depend in various ways on human intentionality, and 
are capable of change and destruction (Thomasson 2006: 247). 
Thomasson’s non-platonist	 ontological positioning offers	 a view that	 allows for 
change, which seems appropriate in relation to dance. Dance works seem to evolve, 
as they are often revised and re-presented in various contexts. A key area	of interest	
in this research concerns the ways in which ‘choreographic objects’ alter the 
audience’s conception of the work. The question therefore is posed as to whether this 
alters the identity of the work, or whether it	 can truly be conceived of as entirely 
independent	from human perceptions. Through the discussion of three case studies I	
go on to suggest	 that	 dance works are at least	 partially constructed via	 the 
perceptions of those who receive them. 
What is a ‘Choreographic	Object’? 
As mentioned briefly in	 Chapter One (p.1), the term ‘choreographic object’ arises 
from Leach, deLahunta and Whatley and an Arts and Humanities Research Council	
(AHRC) funded research project they ran in 2008, entitled ‘Choreographic Objects: 
Traces and Artifacts of Physical Intelligence’. The term was used by William Forsythe 
in his 2008 essay of the same name. The research project	 was concerned with 
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considering	the cultivation of digital objects as a	means of exchange between dance 
and other disciplines (Beyond Text, n.d.). It	 bought	 together dance artists Wayne 
McGregor, Davies, Forsythe and Emio	 Greco	 | PC, each of whom had been 
individually exploring the potentials of digital technology to document, examine and 
disseminate aspects of their work (Leach 2009). The ‘Choreographic Objects’ project	
brought	them into dialogue to consider the role, motivations and processes of using 
technology to communicate aspects of their practice and works. In this context	 the 
term refers to digital entities that	explore and disseminate choreographic principles. 
A key question for this research is, ‘what is a	 choreographic object?’ I ask this 
question from an ontological perspective, meaning that	 I am not	 concerned with 
defining the term, rather I	 question the nature of these objects, in particular their 
relationship to the dance work and works that	they excavate, analyse and re-present. 
Although these objects take many forms they share the motivation to examine the 
nature of dance making in relation to a	specific artist’s practice. Idiosyncrasy plays an 
important	role in these objects. Zuniga	Shaw points out	the relevance of the artist-led	
nature of such projects, suggesting that	one of the strengths of artist-driven research 
is the “tendency to invest	 inscriptions with rich qualitative, experiential information 
as well as that	 which is more easily measured” (2014: 98). This is certainly a	
significant	feature of most	‘choreographic objects’, which often comprise an array of 
methods and modes of representation. 
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Leach furthers this claim, suggesting dance’s lack of universal mode of representation 
can be seen as a	motivating force for the development	of ‘choreographic objects’. He 
writes that, 
[t]he artists and the research teams involved in making 
choreographic objects see themselves as prototyping forms in 
which to make such representations. In doing so, it	 is explicit	 that	
they consider themselves to be taking charge of demonstrating the 
possibilities for sustained engagement	 with and critique of dance 
making. The challenge is in finding forms of representation that	are 
true to choreography’s form of creativity (Leach 2013: 5). 
This articulation is particularly helpful for understanding the motivations and 
challenges of producing ‘choreographic objects’. However, there are many questions 
regarding their aims, functions and impact	 that	 remain, and are addressed 
throughout	 this investigation. Of specific interest	 is the notion of ‘choreographic 
knowledge’ raised by Zuniga	Shaw. She suggests that, 
[t]he twin questions of what	constitutes choreographic knowledge 
and what	 traces it	 may or may not	 leave behind are perennial 
concerns in dance (Zuniga	Shaw 2014: 95). 
Broadly construed the term can be understood as referring to the knowledge created 
by and embedded within choreographic acts, but	 the question of exactly what	
constitutes choreographic knowledge and how or if it	 can be shared is further 
addressed in this research. 
‘Choreographic objects’ are indicative of a	broader and increasing interest	in western 
Contemporary Dance practice with examining and disseminating choreographic 
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processes. As mentioned in Chapter One (pp.	1 – 2) the articulation and examination 
of choreographic process currently plays a significant	 role in dance studies and 
practice. It	is shared and discussed in a	variety of academic, artistic and performative 
contexts. More than ever before, post-show discussions, artistic blogs, books, 
archives, seminars and sharings provide opportunities for choreographers, alongside 
dancers and researchers, to examine their individual methodologies. However, a	
choreographer discussing his/her work	 is not	 an entirely new phenomenon, for 
example as long ago as 1959 Doris Humphrey published The Art	of Making Dances,
which offers	a detailed guide to choreography. By the late 1950s other artists, such as 
Laban had also started to theorise movement	and choreography, however at	this time 
the process of articulating choreographic methods and theories was relatively new,	
for example, Humphrey suggests that	 compositional theories for dance did not	
emerge until the 1930s (1987: 15 – 19). She proposes that	this shift	was a	response to 
the social upheaval of the first	world war, which caused dancers to ask themselves 
serious questions about	what	 they were dancing about	and the worth of the form, 
pointing out	 that	 this thinking was particularly evident	 in the United States and 
Germany (Humphrey 1987:	17). 
More recently there have been other approaches to sharing choreographer’s voices. 
In the UK these include The Dance Maker’s Portfolio (1998), edited by Jo Butterworth 
and Gil Clarke. This was the result	of The Greenhouse Effect, a collaborative research 
project	between The Centre for Theatre Studies at	Bretton Hall and Yorkshire Dance, 
which ran between 1997 and 1999, and considered the choreographic processes of 
various contemporary choreographers. Furthermore, the Study of Dance conference 
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series, which took place in the 1980s involved	the analysis of choreographic practices, 
demonstrated in the publication ‘Choreography: Principles and Practice’ (1986) edited 
by dance scholar Janet	Adshead.
These last	 two examples involve theorists analysing choreographer’s works, 
sometimes alongside the artist, but	 the artist-led research discussed by Birringer 
(2013) and Zuniga	Shaw (2014) is a	relatively new phenomenon. The field is	manifest 
through a proliferation of publications. Texts such as Burrows’ A Choreographer’s 
Handbook (2010), Hay’s Lamb at	the Altar: The Story of a Dance (1994) and My Body 
the Buddhist	 (2013), and Rosemary Butcher and Susan Melrose’s Choreography, 
Collisions and Collaborations (2005) offer readers first-hand accounts of the 
methodologies of individual artists. Unlike Humphrey’s text, which offers a
compositional theory, intended to systematise dance making, and arguably promoted 
her specific approach as a	 choreographic method, these publications do not	aim to 
offer a universal system, but	 represent	 a unique approach to choreography, 
exemplified though the design, language, images and so on. Such publications can be 
seen to shape the way readers and viewers see and understand dance. In this way 
they share key features with ‘choreographic objects’, however I	 draw a	 distinction 
between artist-led publications and ‘choreographic objects’,	which are distinguished 
through two central features. Firstly, they use technology as a key method for 
articulation; secondly, they are the result	of collaborative research. 
The role of technology in the appreciation, interpretation and analysis of dance is	of
particular interest.	 The evolution of artistic practices during the twentieth century 
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heralded various philosophical and analytic methodologies. Ways of understanding 
art	were constantly re-adjusting to new art-making practices and styles. Dance was no 
exception to this constant	 recalibration. The emergence of Dance Studies as an 
academic field in the UK and USA 1980s, and the development	of dance analysis was 
largely supported by the adoption of existing linguistic and aesthetic frameworks 
(Bunker et	al 2013: 6, O’Shea	2010: 6, Rowell 2009: 137). 
Dance	Analysis 
The consideration of dance analysis frameworks plays an important	 role in this 
research. Dance scholarship and analysis has a	 well-established relationship with 
linguistic theory. In the second edition of the Routledge Dance Studies Reader (2010), 
dance theorist	Janet	O’ Shea	observes that, 
[o]ne of the most	 pivotal shifts for dance studies was the 
expansion of semiotics into the analysis and interpretation of 
choreography (O’ Shea	2010: 6). 
Semiotics is an analysis system originating in linguistics, which involves decoding 
‘signs’, such as words, in order to understand their significance or meaning. Early 
semiotic methods were developed at	the start	of the twentieth century, by Ferdinand 
de Saussure in France, and Charles Sanders Peirce in the USA (Counsell and Wolf 
2001: 2). Saussure was instrumental in the development	 of the structuralist	
movement	 in linguistics and philosophy. As previously mentioned (p.31),	 some	 of
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As O’Shea	explains, semiotics and structuralism were influential in the early stages of 
academic dance research and analysis. She suggests that	 being able to relate to 
structuralist	 thinking allowed dance studies to establish itself as “an autonomous 
field”, and to demonstrate its legitimacy (O’ Shea	2010: 6). She refers to Adshead’s 
early work as a	 good example of the application of structuralist	 methodologies to 
dance. Adshead’s Dance Analysis Theory and Practice (1988), co-authored with 
Valerie A Briginshaw, Pauline Hodgens and Michael Huxley, proposes a	 systematic 
approach to dance analysis. It contains a model comprising four stages, which 
address, ‘Components’, ‘Form’, ‘Interpretation’ and ‘Evaluation’. The model was 
created in response to the emergence of specialist	 dance degrees in the UK, and 
recognition of the “shaky theoretical underpinnings of the study of dance” (Adshead 
1988: 5). Movement	 analysis systems such as those developed by Laban and 
anthropologist	 Judith Lynne Hanna	 (1979), had been developed prior to the Dance 
Analysis model, however, this was the first	 system that	 concentrated on the dance 
work, as previous	 approaches, such as those developed by Laban and Hanna	were 
concerned with analysing movement	 in various contexts as opposed to focussing 
specifically on dance. 
Proposing a	method for the analysis of art	 contradicts traditional ways of thinking 
about appreciation. Discourses in Aesthetics, dating back to Emmanuel Kant	 (1892), 
and developed	by Clive Bell	 (1969), Jerome Stolnitz	 (1969) and others, suggest	 that	
art	 should be contemplated and appreciated purely for its beauty and form, rather 
than on an analytic level. For example, in ‘The Aesthetic Attitude’ (1969), Stolnitz	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





suggests that	art	works requires a	particular form of aesthetic attention. He explains 
that	the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is adopted whenever people attend to something purely 
for the enjoyment	of how it	looks, sounds or feels (1969: 19). He defines the aesthetic 
attitude as “disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any 
object	of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone” (1969: 19). Stolintz’s view is 
demonstrative of an empiricist paradigm; it	encourages the spectator to attend to art	
purely for its own sake, and without	recourse to external information. 
Analysis challenges the idea	 that	 the perception of art	 should be purely 
contemplative. However, Adshead et	al’s model does demonstrate a	formalist	stance 
and can therefore, to an extent	be seen as encouraging ‘disinterested’ attention. For 
example, although the socio-cultural context	is mentioned in Adshead’s model (1988: 
114-115), there is little discussion of causal features, external references or the 
biography of the choreographer. It offers a	 structuralist	 paradigm insomuch as it 
encourages users to address the features embodied within the performance. The 
model is also typically formalist in the way that	it urges deconstruction and discussion 
of the relationship between components. Adshead’s account	places the responsibility 
of meaning construction with the reader, and does not	suggest	that	understanding is 
linked to knowledge of choreographic intention or process. This model can therefore 
be said to follow anti-intentionalist	and poststructuralist	theories 
of authorship. 
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The role of the artist	 or author’s intention has been discussed in great	 detail in 
Philosophical Aesthetics; a	 debate ignited by philosophers William Wimsatt	 and 
Monroe Beardsley’s assertion that, 
the design or intention of the author is neither available nor 
desirable as a	standard for judging the success of a	work of literary 
art	(Wimsatt	and Beardsley 1946:	468).	
Although this suggestion has been widely critiqued, most	notably by Noël Carroll 
(1992), it	aligns with traditional Kantian paradigms outlined previously. Of particular 
interest	in this research is the way in which the author is foregrounded in 
‘choreographic objects’. Semiotic and structuralist	methods implicitly respond to 
authorial intention. Although they do not	necessarily directly confront	the intended 
meaning, the analysis of signs and deconstructing relationships, suggest	a positivist	
methodology, concerned with uncovering or discovering a	true meaning. This form of 
analysis was challenged by poststructuralist	thinkers such as Roland Barthes, who 
famously denounced the author as the authority in matters of meaning in his 1967 
article ‘The Death of the Author’. As previously mentioned this way of thinking 
informed the development	of Dance Studies, and is evident	in Adshead et	al’s model,	
through which the reader is granted authority and authorial intention is not	explicitly 
discussed.	Perhaps somewhat	paradoxically however, the activity of formal and 
structural analysis implies meaning has been consciously constructed, and can 
therefore be discovered. 
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The cultural pluralism of the 1990s meant	 that	 the acknowledgment	 of multiple 
possible readings, and recognition of the culturally embedded nature of 
interpretation became important. Writing in 2003, dance theorist	 Helen Thomas 
suggests that, 
the boundaries of dance scholarship are also being eroded through 
the impact	 of the challenges posed to the unity of theory and 
method by feminist	scholarship, postmodernist	and postructuralist	
thought	(Thomas 2003:	2). 
As critical theory expanded, the methods and frameworks used in Dance Studies 
multiplied. Ideologies and paradigms mentioned by Thomas challenged structuralist	
approaches and proposed alternative frameworks for analysis, seeking methods that	
allowed for context	specific meaning. 
This cultural shift	 is demonstrated by Adshead’s (now writing under the name 
Adshead-Lansdale) later work on Intertextuality in dance. The term ‘Intertextuality’ 
was introduced by French literary theorist	 Julia	 Kristeva	 in 1966.	 14 Intertextual 
analysis in dance involves recognising the way that	 the dance text	 refers to other 
cultural texts, beyond the structure of the work itself. Adshead Lansdale states that	
intertextuality, 
rests on the invocation of references to earlier cultural positions, 
pre-existing icons, previously developed genres, settings for 
performance and other dominant	 performance modes (Adshead 
Lansdale 2008: 3). 
14 According to Alfaro (1996: 268) the concept	first	appeared in Kristeva’s essay	
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This demonstrates how, whilst	 semiotic and structuralist	 analysis encourages the 
deconstruction of the closed structure of the text, intertextuality is a	poststructuralist	
concept	 and encourages the analyst	 to look beyond the single text. The author is 
more explicitly present	than in structural and semiotic analysis. For example, readers 
may notice how the dance they are analysing relates to other works by that	
choreographer, or references biographic information. Intertextual readings are 
dependent	 upon the knowledge of the reader,	 meaning alternative readings are 
celebrated,	 therefore, whilst	 the author is recognised, s/he are not	 treated as the 
determiner of meaning. 
The implication of this mode of analysis is that	 all possible readings are legitimate. 
Adshead points out	that	this can generate an “excess of signification” (1999: 15). In 
order to address the potential for infinite or illogical interpretations Adshead refers to 
Leitch’s adoption of a	Wittgensteinian view, suggesting there are a	limited number of 
logical interpretations (Leitch in Adshead 1999: 15). It	is important	to note here that	
the limits of the interpretations are drawn by logic, as opposed to the intentions of 
the author. Intertextuality encourages the autonomy of the reader; interpretation is 
not	 concerned with decoding a	 single meaning - implicitly linked with authorial 
intention, but	 with constructing meaning based on subjective understandings and 
reference points. Thus Kristeva’s theory aligns with Barthes’ in suggesting that	 the 
author’s intention is irrelevant	to the reader’s interpretation (1977). 
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The ‘choreographic objects’ discussed in this research can be seen to utilise 
established analytic frameworks, yet	also usher in new ways of deconstructing dance,	
which respond to the process and intentions of the choreographer. The artist-led	
nature of their production has an impact	 on the way that	 the work is manifest	
through the object, which both reveals and reconfigures its properties. Considering 
established ontological accounts, such as the type/token schema	and the notion of 
open and closed works allows for me to think through the ways in which the objects 
reveal ontological features of the works they score, simultaneously reconfiguring the 
way that	the works are experienced, and their on-going identity. 
The role of technology further contributes to the frameworks used in the 
development	 of ‘choreographic objects’. For example, this research considers how 
the rendering of the body through digital technology demonstrates a	 ‘posthuman’ 
framework. This notion, discussed by Rosa	Braidotti (2013), Matthew Causey (2007,	
2015) and N. Katherine Hayles (1999), amongst	 others, suggests that	 the role of 
technology in our lives has generated a	new cultural paradigm in which humans and 
machines are intrinsically related. I	consider this notion in relation to ‘choreographic 
objects’, suggesting that	the body is extended and re-presented through technology, 
but	calling for pragmatism, and arguing that	whilst	the boundaries between the actual 
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Spectatorship 
The development	 of new dances practices often calls for new frameworks. For 
example, Banes points out	how the development	of modern and postmodern dance 
posed problems for established mode of critiquing and evaluating dance (1994: 26). 
Artists such as Martha	Graham deliberately moved away from a	preoccupation with 
form, demonstrated through Classical Ballet, and explored the potential of the body 
to express emotion. Critics and audiences were required to develop alternative 
modes of understanding and evaluation. 
Graham’s choreography served as a	catalyst	for postmodern dance. Yvonne Rainer’s 
famous ‘No Manifesto’, clearly outlines the intentions of Rainer and her 
contemporaries at Judson Dance Theatre to avoid the tendencies of ballet	 and 
expressive	 modern dance. It begins, “NO to spectacle no to virtuosity no to 
transformations and magic and make-believe”	(1965:	178). This manifesto provided a	
framework for both artists and audience members. Perhaps more importantly, it	has 
been pivotal to the historical reading of the dance made at	this time. Understanding 
Rainer’s intention allows for audiences and researchers to appreciate the work in 
alignment	with its politics. Rainer’s work Room	Service (1964) is a	good example of 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	




the way that	 spectatorship was challenged by postmodern dance. The work is 
described by Rainer as,	
a big sprawling piece with three teams of people playing follow-
the-leader thru an assortment	of paraphernalia	which is arranged 
and rearranged by a	 guy and his two assistants (Rainer in Banes 
and Carroll 1994: 28). 
The work consists of everyday movement, as the dancers move furniture between 
rooms, and climb ladders (Banes and Carroll 1994: 28). Carroll suggests that, “[t]he 
point	of the dance is to make ordinary movement	perceptible” (1994: 28). Presenting 
everyday and practical movement	 as dance questions the form’s dependency on 
trained bodies and virtuosic movement.	 Rainer constructed ambiguous scenarios in 
order to lead the spectator into a	dialogue with the work. In order to appreciate this 
type of choreography audiences were required to engage in the ideas and concepts of 
the work, as opposed to merely responding to its aesthetics. 
The way that	postmodernist	dance demanded alternative modes of engagement	from 
the spectator echoed shifts taking place in visual art. For example, in	The Return of 
the Real (1996) art	theorist	Hal Foster points out	that	neo avant-garde art	generated 
an, 
implicit	 shift	 from a disciplinary criterion of quality, judged	 in
relation to artistic standards of the past, to an avant-gardist	value of 
interest (1996: xi).
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This shift	is echoed in the work of Judson Dance Theatre, the value of which resides in 
the delivery of a	 specific idea	 or concept. This approach to dance making laid the 
foundations for choreographers such as Jérôme Bel, Xavier Le Roy and others, 
responsible for a	wealth of concept – driven	15 dance practices in Europe and the USA 
during the twentieth and twenty-first	century. Foster explains that	the shift	of value 
instigated a	“partial move from intrinsic forms of art	 to discursive problems around 
art” (1996: xi). The shift	 towards discourse and away from form and expression in 
visual art	 was reflected in dance. Features such as technique, form, beauty and 
expression were replaced with politics, concept	and thought, calling for frameworks 
that	 involved discourse and concept	 analysis, as opposed to formal and aesthetic 
deconstruction. 
Recent	 shifts in cultural theory have further informed discourses that	 shape and 
consider dance appreciation. Dance philosopher Aili Bresnahan suggests that, 
[i]n dance philosophy there is controversy about	 how to construe 
the felt	bodily responses that	the audience can and often does have 
when watching a	dance performance (Bresnahan 2015). 
This issue has been addressed in both Philosophical Aesthetics and Dance Studies. 
Some dance theorists, such as Dee Reynolds and Matthew Reason (2012) explore the 
concept	 of ‘kinaesthetic empathy’ to describe and theorise spectators’ physical 
15 Cvejić	(2015:	8) suggests that	the use of the term ‘conceptual’ to refer to these 
practices is incorrect. Pakes (2015) further discusses this issue in relation to questions 
of ontology and refers to Cvejić’s suggestion that	choreographers always work with 
concepts. I	suggest	that	the term ‘concept-driven’ allows for the acknowledgement	
that	concepts feature widely in choreography, but	are more central to the identity 
and understanding of some works than others. 
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responses to dance. Philosopher	Barbara	Montero (2006) has similarly explored the 
topic of the kinaesthetic sense of both the performer and spectator, using research in 
neuroscience to develop an argument	for proprioception as an aesthetic sense. 
Montero’s work contributes to a	 debate in the philosophy of dance regarding the 
potential difference in perception between trained and non-trained spectators. 
Paraphrasing David Davies, Conroy asks, 
is the skilled dancer in a	privileged position to ‘see’ what’s going 
on in a	dance art	performance in virtue of her training? (Conroy 
2013b:	203). 
She considers Montero’s (2013) suggestion that	 trained dancers are indeed 
‘privileged’ dance appreciators. This argument	is based partially on the ways in which 
dancers accrue knowledge of the form. However, the main focus of Montero’s 
discussion is based on the idea	that	a dancer’s brain responds differently to the work 
in performance than that	of someone who has no physical experience of the steps 
being performed. This argument	 has been widely disputed,	16 and I	 don’t	 want	 to 
dwell on the details of this debate here. However, Montero is not	alone in the claim 
that	dancers and non-dancers have different	spectatorial experiences. 
16 For example, the topic is debated in a	number of articles by McFee, Davies and 
Carroll and Seeley in a	special addition of the Journal of Aesthetics and Art	Criticism	
71 (2), on ‘Dance Art	and Science’, edited by Conroy and Van Camp (2013c). 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




Although she does not	 focus explicitly on the physical responses of the spectator, 
Melrose similarly suggests that, 
‘dance’, to the trained dancer and the experienced 
choreographer, is ‘nothing like’ — or ‘non-identical with’ (Knorr 
Cetina	2001: 175 – 88)	— the ‘dance’ that	an expert	spectator, 
reader and educator sees and appraises in terms of her or his 
own experience (Melrose 2009: 24). 
Melrose does not	 suggest	 that	 the trained spectator’s experience is necessarily 
privileged rather that	 it	 is different. Of course, it	 is important	to remember that	the 
experiences and background knowledge of spectators will be vast	and varied. It	is not	
the case that	all dancers will respond in the same way to a	performance. 
Consideration of these frameworks is important	to this research, as the construction 
of ‘choreographic objects’ is often concerned with disseminating forms of knowledge 
to people outside of dance. These debates draw together questions concerning 
analysis and knowledge, asking what	does it	mean to posses, develop and transmit	
‘choreographic knowledge’? It	is possible to see the development	of ‘choreographic 
objects’ as marking another important	 moment	 in dance history. Analysing, 
documenting and disseminating choreographic processes, alongside the final artwork 
highlights the value of artistic practice, challenging formalist	 and strucutralist	
frameworks. Furthermore, the positioning of the choreographer at the heart	 of 
‘choreographic objects’ gives authorial intention a	central role in interpretation and 
once again calls for the development	 of new frameworks for understanding, 






	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
54 
Chapter Three: Methodology 
Methods and Frameworks 
The range of theoretical disciplines and frameworks adopted in this research means 
that	 I draw on multiple methods, including philosophical questioning, case study 
analysis, theory testing, theory generating, literature analysis and argument	building. 
By deploying a	 case study approach, I	 generate in-depth analysis of three dance 
scores in response to new and existing theories. This chapter outlines the methods 
used and contextualises the project	 within current	 research environments, and in 
relation to relevant	theoretical frameworks. 
This research is situated within Dance Studies, although it	will also refer to and make 
use of neighbouring fields and draws significantly on literature in Analytic 
Philosophical Aesthetics. Current	research in the arts, humanities and social sciences 
largely operates under a	postpositivist	paradigm. In ‘Postpositivist	Research in Dance’ 
(1999) Jill Green and Susan W Stinson suggest	that, 
the term postpositivist	 is an umbrella	 term to describe the 
variety of approaches to research that	 have arisen in 
response to a	 recognition of the limitations of the positivist	
tradition in research (Green and Stinson 1999: 92). 
As suggested here, postpositivism is a	 reaction to the priorities of positivism; a	
paradigm primarily associated with scientific enquiry. Positivists see the world as a	
knowable entity, the truth about	which can be discovered. 
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As Green and Stinson suggest, 
[s]cientific research is based on an assumption that	 the 
world is a	predictable place, if only we can determine the 
laws by which it	operates (Green and Stinson 1999: 91). 
This approach suggests the existence of a	 findable, objective truth. However, for 
many researchers within the arts and humanities this is an inappropriate way of 
seeing the world. Postpositivism is usually concerned with qualitative as opposed to 
quantitative methods. It arises from an epistemological positioning that	 sees 
knowledge as created through human experience, and views reality as socially 
constructed; challenging the notion of a	 singular, objective truth that	 can be 
discovered through quantifying data. 
Echoing to some extent	the distinction between positivism and postpositivism, there 
is an on-going debate in Analytic Philosophical Aesthetics regarding the proper 
methodology for exploring the ontology of art. The debate centres on what role	social 
practices can be seen to have in establishing the ontological status of art	works. For 
example, Thomasson (2005) suggests that	 the nature of art	 works is intrinsically 
linked to human practices, meaning that	works do not	have any mind-independent	
properties and therefore we cannot	 discover their features. This means that	 we 
cannot	 make revisionary claims about	 art	 ontology. Although offering a	 slightly 
different	 perspective, Davies (2009)	 also argues that	 human practices ought	 to 
constrain metaphysical claims. Dodd (2012, 2013) challenges Thomasson and Davies, 
arguing that	 works of art	 exist	 independently of human thought	 and practices, 
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therefore defending the discovery (or revisionist) model of ontological enquiry and 
offering a	quasi-scientific view, that	mirrors, to some extent	a positivist	 framework, 
through which reality is distinct	from human practices.	
In accordance with a	postpositivist	 framework and in line with Thomasson (2005), I	
adopt	an ontological stance that	sees human practices and the nature of art	works as 
essentially linked.	 This means that	 my positioning is an	 important	 consideration. 
Whilst	I aim to avoid answering questions purely	in response to my observations,	my
background knowledge and experiences inform the development	of arguments. My 
training in Contemporary Dance, experience of watching dance and leaning towards 
Analytic Philosophy, for example, contributes to the framework of the research. 
Furthermore, I	have a	direct	connection to Motion Bank, as deLahunta	is supervising 
this research. I	consider the objects as a	spectator, rather than exploring the methods 
of their construction as so forth. However, the interplay between my experience of 
the objects and theory construction is important. At	 times I	 use italic text	 when 
referring to my own experiences, to highlight	how they contribute to the cultivation 
of theories. Although I adopt	a postpositive epistemological view, and therefore treat 
reality as socially constructed; the methods deployed can be seen as veering towards 
the middle of the positivist/postpositivist	spectrum. This is due to the way that	I use 
philosophical analysis, test	existing theories and respond to a	hypothesis; namely that	
‘choreographic objects’ reveals and re-configures	 the ontology of particular dance 
works.	 Straddling opposing frameworks is not	 necessarily a	 unique or problematic 
feature, as demonstrated by Bannon (2004: 26-27), who refers to Lather’s (2001) view 
that research might	accommodate various different	paradigms. 
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Alongside the other performing arts, dance’s ephemerality poses quandaries for the 
researcher. Live performances cannot	 be exactly repeated, requiring scholars to 
negotiate the temporary nature of the subject	 matter. In Research Methods in 
Theatre and Performance (2011) performance scholars Baz	 Kershaw and Helen 
Nicholson suggest	 that	 the challenge of researching performance, and the changing 
nature of the form, has inspired the development	 of various creative approaches, 
which move beyond traditional book-based methods (2011: 1). Kershaw and 
Nicholson suggest	 that	methods such as practice–as-research, archiving and digital 
performance; attempt	 to “resist	 unhelpful dichotomies, and fixed binaries, which	
separate embodiment	 and intuition from intellectual practices, emotional 
experiences and ways of knowing” (Kershaw and Nicholson 2011: 2). In a	critique of 
traditional approaches, the authors suggest	 that	 new methods celebrate the 
“ambiguity” and “messiness” of performance (2011: 2). 
Kershaw and Nicholson suggest	that: 
[r]ather than attempting to resolve or smooth over 
distinctions between the ephemerality and the materiality of 
performance that, on first	 sight	might	appear incoherent	or 
inconsistent, many of the contributors to this book show how 
dwelling in the ambiguous space between binaries invites 
inventiveness (Kershaw and Nicholson 2011: 2). 
This evaluation of the current	 research environment	 of Performance Studies and 
Dance Studies suggests that my method is unusual. The use of book-based, 
philosophical methodology within the current	research environment	arguably calls for 
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justification, as it	could be seen as a	retraction to an out-dated and/or inappropriate 
set	of approaches. My defence can be articulated fairly simply; through logically and 
rigorously attempting to disambiguate ‘choreographic objects’ and their relationship 
to dance ontology, we will find valuable information within the ‘messiness’ of 
performance. Furthermore this research will do this without	 smoothing over the 
distinction between ephemerality and materiality. Rather, it	will make virtue of the 
complex relationship between the two. 
It may appear that	using literature from Philosophical Aesthetics as theoretical base 
poses challenges in relation to this aim. Whilst	 there is an abundance of convincing 
work on visual art	and musical ontology within this field, dance is somewhat	under-
explored. However, I	 pay particular attention the work of Graham McFee (1992, 
2011), who has offered comprehensive philosophical accounts for dance. Some of	his
work can be accused of smoothing over the relationship between ephemerality and 
materiality, as is demonstrated by his suggestion that	dance works are only accessible 
through the material form of live performance (2011: 112-113). This proposal 
demonstrates a	dismissal of the way in which dance does not	neatly divide into the 
abstract	and the physical. Dance works remain in existence outside of performance, 
and are accessed through memory, language and technology. McFee’s claim 
demonstrates Kershaw and Nicholson’s critique of this type of framework. However 
this is not	 necessarily a	methodological issue, but an ideological one. Furthermore, 
this opinion is not	exclusive to Analytic Philosophy. 
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Although expressed differently, as discussed in Chapter One (p.12), Phelan also 
emphasises the significance of the performance event, claiming that	 ephemerality 
defines performance (1993: 146). Although performances disappear, works remain in 
existence, and can be accessed in other ways than through live performance. 
Smoothing over the complexities of the material and the ephemeral, both McFee and 
Phelan demonstrate the way that	claims which appear to have logical consistency, do 
not	necessarily represent	the reality of practice. For example, McFee’s claim does not	
allow for digital works such as dance films, or motion-capture performances; such 
works further demonstrate the difficult	place between the material and the abstract 
and, presence and absence; reiterating the relevance of this study. It	is important	to 
note that	philosophical claims are sometimes offered as ideal theoretical notions and 
are therefore not	always intended to reflect	practice.	For example, Goehr (1992: 25)	
suggests that	this is demonstrated by Goodman’s compliance conditions, as outlined 
in Chapter One (pp.7	- 8). This research, however seeks to generate theory that	both 
reflects and informs dance practices and scholarship. 
Importantly, not	 all philosophers are guilty of avoiding the complexities of 
performance. Many scholars including Goehr (1992), Thomasson (2005,	2006), Davies 
(2009), Van Camp (2006), and so forth are concerned with basing philosophical claims 
in human practices. Furthermore, traditional methods are used in Performance 
Studies and Dance Studies, to examine performance without	 negating its 
fundamental features. This is demonstrated by Rebecca	Schneider (2001, 2011) for 
example, who acknowledges the permanence, yet	 non-materiality of performance. 
She suggests in ‘Performance Remains’ (2001) that	 performance exists in abstract	
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form outside of material presence. This allows for performance’s permanence 
without	negating its simultaneous ephemerality (Schneider 2001). 
Dance	Philosophy 
The relationship between performance and philosophy is the focus of considerable 
attention in current	scholarship in Performance Studies, much of which originates in, 
and theorises ideas arising in Continental Philosophy. There are many conversations 
to be had about	the relationship between the two schools of thought.	These debates 
are too vast	for this context, however, the way that	dance and philosophical enquiry 
interact	 is a	 crucial methodological concern, therefore some consideration of	 the 
current	 perspectives in Performance Studies, and how these relate to Analytic 
perspectives is important. 
The emergent	field of Performance Philosophy (Cull and Lagaay 2014) was born out	of 
Performance Studies and seeks to examine the relationship between performance 
and philosophical thought. There is a	 strong bias towards Continental Philosophy,	
acknowledged by Cull and Lagaay in the Introduction to the group’s inaugural book, 
Encounters in Performance Philosophy (2014). They attribute this bias to, 
the fact	 that	 when the majority of Theatre and Performance 
Studies scholars engage with philosophy, they tend to do so 
largely via	 texts and figures conventionally understood as 
belonging to the Continental tradition (Cull and Lagaay 2014: 4). 
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This claim is rather general, and there are, of course a	 number of theatre and 
performance scholars whose philosophical enquiries respond to the Analytic 
tradition. Indeed it	 is possible to argue that	 the situation is somewhat	 cyclical and 
that	 the dominance of Continental Philosophy within the Performance Philosophy 
field informs the choices made by scholars, therefore posing the risk of philosophical 
enquiry in Dance, Performance and Theatre Studies becoming synonymous with 
Continental scholarship and frameworks. 
In ‘From Odd Encounters to a	 Prospective Confluence: Dance – Philosophy’	 (2015),	
published in the inaugural issue of the Performance Philosophy network’s journal, 
Cvejić	provides a	discussion of some of the ways that	dance and Philosophy interact. 
Although she primarily addresses the work of Continental philosophers such as 
Deleuze, Spinoza	 and Badiou, she pays fleeting attention to Analytic Philosophy, if 
only to justify her dismissal of its usefulness. Cvejić addresses McFee’s ontological 
perspective suggesting that	it fails to offer insight	into the nature of dance works and 
performances due to, 
its lack of specialist	 knowledge about	 dance practice and 
secondly, its error of applying the standard of musical notation to 
dance (Cvejić	2015: 10). 
Whist	 I concur with Cvejić	 that	McFee’s stance on some issues is problematic, her 
claims are not	 entirely convincing, indeed McFee strongly disputes ontological 
comparisons between music and dance (2011: 113). Furthermore, using a	 single 
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perspective to make claims about	the entire tradition of Analytic philosophy does not	
seem fair. 
There are many potential reasons for the field’s seeming suspicion towards Analytic 
Philosophical Aesthetics. In particular I	suggest	that	the tensions are methodological 
and linguistic. Cvejić	dismisses the “positivist	logic” of Philosophical Aesthetics (2015: 
10), pointing to a	topic at	the heart	of this chapter. Whilst	there might	be a positivist	
tendency in some philosophical enquiry, especially evident	 in comparison to the 
postpositivist	frameworks utilised in much of Dance and Performance Studies,	not	all 
Analytic philosophers are postitivists. Indeed much recent	 work in contemporary 
aesthetics has set	 out	 to challenge such methods and frameworks. The work	 of	
Thomasson (2005, 2006)	 and Davies (2009, 2004), provide clear, albeit	 slightly 
different	 examples of this. Van Camp’s (2006) pragmatist	 framework further 
demonstrates a	strong resistance to essentialist	modes of enquiry. It	is important	not	
to confuse the systematic and logical working through of concepts and ideas with a	
quest	for a	single objective truth. This leads me to my second point, which is that	is 
seems as though the language of Analytic philosophy may further account	 for mis-
readings or mistrust	of the field. 
Cvejić	(2015: 10)	describes Pouillaude’s work as utilising more passionate conceptual 
imagery than that	 usually adopted by Analytic philosophers. Indeed the modes of 
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expression are often fairly different, with Continental theorists adopting a	 more 
poetic approach to writing. For example, in the prelude to Manning’s book Always 
More than One: Individuation’s Dance (2013), Continental philosopher Brian Massumi 
writes, 
[n]o sooner do we dive into composition than composition 
launches itself into a	process of iteration offering a	bounty of 
variations, thousands and thousands, on any and all 
behaviours or events. And the notion that	the iteration of the 
process can be inflected, and composition finds the double 
connotations it	 has in everyday language; not	 just	 a coming-
together, but	 a one (-many) bountifully susceptible to 
technique (Massumi 2013:	x). 
Here Massumi articulates the central thesis of Manning’s text, which following 
philosopher A.N. Whitehead, argues that	the notion of ‘one’ is in fact	always multiple. 
At	the heart	of this discussions lies the familiar question how can one thing be both 
the same and different? This question is articulated rather differently by McFee, who 
writes, 
[dance works] are multiples, such that	 the very same dance can 
typically be performed on two different	occasions (say yesterday as 
well as today) and in two different	places at	 the same time (say, in 
London and Los Angeles). How should such multiples be described so 
as the capture the relationship between the work itself (for example, 
Swan Lake) and its performances in London and Los Angeles, both 
yesterday and today? For all of these are performances of Swan
Lake: that	is, a	single artworks is involved (McFee 2011: 37) 
Comparing the way that	language is used to articulate related questions, it	is possible 
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Cvejić’s claim highlights an intriguing tension within philosophical methodologies, and 
one that	 reoccurs throughout	 this research. I am interested in how philosophical 
questioning and reasoning interacts with dance discourse and practice. Challenges 
include the framing and expression of the debates, so as to be able to talk to both 
fields. I	adopt	a narrative philosophical tone; leading the discussion through examples 
and avoiding purely abstract	 debates and solely theoretical propositions. The 
centrality of the case studies allows me to demonstrate the relevance of philosophical 
theories, as the questions posed by each example relate so closely to existing 
discourses in Philosophical Aesthetics. Cvejić	suggests that, “after centuries of musing 
on ‘what	philosophy could do for dance’, the question is now reversed” (2015: 18	 -
19). Here Cvejić refers to the work of Massumi, Manning and Alva	Noë as examples of 
thinking that	demonstrates how dance as an activity reframes existing philosophical 
thought. In this context, I	suggest	that	the consideration of dance as art, through its 
digital rendering, similarly recalls and challenges existing theories. 
It is important	to mention that	the leaning of Dance Studies away from the Analytic 
tradition is not	a new phenomenon, nor is it	solely attributable to the development	of 
the Performance Philosophy field. In the Introduction to Thinking	Through	Dance: The 
Philosophy of Dance Performances and Practices (2013), editors Jenny Bunker, Anna	
Pakes and Bonnie Rowell discuss the influence of poststructuralist	 and postmodern 
thinking on Dance Studies, suggesting that	such discourses are more present	in dance 
discourse those arising in Analytic Philosophy. They suggest	that	the field has become 
“bifurcated, with little dialogue between perspectives though there is undoubtedly 
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some common thematic ground” (Bunker, Pakes and Rowell 2013: 7). Although 
primarily focussed on the Analytic tradition, the ways in which different	 theoretical 
paradigms engage with the same, or related philosophical questions contributes a	
significant	 sub-plot	 to this research. Furthermore, analytic and conceptual 
frameworks are topics of enquiry, as well as guiding and informing the way the 
research is conducted and framed. For instance, I	consider the relationship between 
each of my case studies and modes of analysing and conceptualising dance, arising 
from structuralist, poststructuralist	and analytic modes of enquiry. 
Case	Studies 
The inclusion of qualitative, collective case studies will enhance book-based methods. 
Psychologist	John Creswell (1998) suggests that, 
a case study is an exploration of a	“bounded system” or a	case (or 
multiple cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data	
collection involving multiple sources of information rich in 
context” (1998: 61). 
Creswell claims that	 case studies are bound by time and place, highlighting the 
significance of context	(1998: 61-63). This is a	particularly relevant	feature of my case 
studies, which were published between 2009 and 2013. Their newness contributes 
significantly to the nature of the enquiry, as I	 aim to explore and determine their 
ontological standing. Furthermore, theorising their context	 of production and 
reception contributes to this aim. Moving beyond literature analysis, my method 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 			
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




	 	   
66 
triangulates between book-based, secondary case studies and first-hand accounts in 
order to build arguments. 
Other approaches to this project	would have been possible. For example, I	could have 
explored the nature of dance by making a	work. There are numerous examples of 
practice based research projects that	 explore the interplay between dance and 
technology. For example both Rubidge 17 and Simon Ellis 18 have developed significant	
bodies of work in this field, generating art	 and research through technology and 
dance, whilst	examining the non-singularity of each of these terms. Projects such as 
these generate valuable practice-oriented knowledge, however my concern is with 
the way that	 our practices, as spectators of dance works are evolving. With this in 
mind I	 aim to generate knowledge through analysis, theory testing and theory 
building and through the consideration of a	 range of artefacts. Following Creswell’s 
suggestions, I contextualise examples in relation to their function, purpose and 
physical features, and in reference to the author, date and method of development. I	
assess how the artefact	demonstrates, challenges or poses my	central questions and 
attempt	to answer these questions through analysis and reasoning, and in	reference 
to existing theories. 
Creswell outlines the difficulties of negotiating the tension between the quantity of 
cases and the depth of analysis, suggesting that	researchers usually use no more than 
four cases (1998: 63). The decision to select	three case studies was due partly to the 
17 See http://www.sensedigital.co.uk 
18 See http://www.skellis.net/projects
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wealth of questions generated through each one. Including a	 fourth would have 
limited the scope for in-depth analysis, yet	 reducing the study to fewer than three 
cases would have reduced the potential for my observations to generalise. Before 
selecting the final case studies I	examined an array of similar examples, the analysis of 
which informed my thinking about	 these objects. For example, I	 analysed dance 
scholar and Laban specialist	Valerie Preston Dunlop’s choreological map of Forsythe’s 
work	The Loss of Small Detail (1991), developed in 2008. This map utilises Laban’s 
analytic principles to map the work in great	detail, addressing the concepts, process, 
staging, structure and so forth. It	takes the form of a	CD Rom, which includes links to 
various media, including video clips, textual accounts, photographs and reviews. This 
example is not	 referred to as a	 ‘score’ but	 perhaps offers an early example of a	
related approach. I	also considered performative artefacts including, The Suchness of 
Heni and Eddie (2006), a	performance lecture by British choreographer Rosemary Lee, 
in collaboration with dancers Henrietta	 Hale and Eddie Nixon. This is a	 DVD of a	
performance event, which aims to “unpick” and explore Lee’s creative process (Lee 
2006).	 The examination of this example raised important	 questions about	 the 
performance of process, which contributed to the thinking underpinning this 
research. 
The final selection was based partially on an interest	in the nature of scoring, and the 
way that	each of the objects I	address is labelled as	a score. Furthermore, I	was drawn 
to the ambiguity of the objects and interested to explore how Forsythe’s patronage of 
the Motion Bank projects might	compare and contrast	with a	similar project	arising 
from a	 very different	 practice and paradigm. The different	ways that	 technology is 
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used in each case study further sparked my curiosity. Through analysing three related, 
yet	 distinct	 examples I	 suggest	 that	 the observations made may apply to other 
entities belonging to the class of ‘choreographic objects’. 
Creswell refers to Yin’s distinction between ‘holistic’ and ‘embedded’ analysis (1998: 
3), suggesting that	‘holistic’ approaches address the entire case, whereas ‘embedded’ 
methods focus on fewer, specific components. Although I	provide overview of each 
object, the majority of the analysis focuses on a	 small number of specific elements 
within each case study, thus demonstrating an ‘embedded’ method (Yin in Creswell, 
1998: 63). Following recent	 publications such as performance philosopher Stamatia	
Portanova’s	Moving Without	a Body: Digital Philosophy and Choreographic	Thought	
(2013), this thesis uses concrete case studies as a	 point	 of departure for more 
abstract	 theorising (Portanova	 2013: 3). The case studies function to demonstrate 
philosophical concepts and inspire metaphysical probing, in order to (re) think the 
notion of dance works, and the ways we encounter them. The result	of this method is 
that	 the selection and consideration of case studies does not	 propose to be an 
exhaustive account	of the field, rather I	probe objects that	are of specific interest	to 
the overall theoretical project. 
Ontologies and Models 
The final chapter provides a	visual model, intended to help users access and analyse	
‘choreographic objects’.	 This model arose from an interest	 in using sketched 
visualisations to explore philosophical questions. A key claim of this thesis is that	
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technology allows us to see dance works as existing in forms other than performance. 
This might	 include recordings, programme notes, reviews, rehearsal, recollections, 
scores, sketches, blogs, photographs and so on. These artefacts form a web of 
abstract, material and virtual objects. Sketching and doodling proved useful	 in my 
exploration of the way in which the multiple components of a	work inter-relate. This 
method relates to an approach to ontology arising in Computer Science.	
Computational ontologists generate charts or ‘ontologies’, which visualise the 
relationships between concepts or components. These are primarily used to sort	
information and communicate data	 about	 entities from one context	 to another 
(Ceusters and Smith 2011: 103). In ‘Switching Partners: Dancing with the Ontological 
Engineers’ (2011) Warner Ceusters and Barry Smith explain that	ontologies are now 
used in other contexts, such as by museums to classify artefacts, and by lawyers to 
help	resolve disputes regarding performing arts and property rights (2011: 104). 
Ceusters and Smith discuss their attempt	 to generate an ontology of motion (2011: 
105-106). They intended to create software that	 would help computers recognise 
specific dance movements (2011: 106). However, they explain how they encountered 
a problem at	 the heart	 of dance philosophy, namely that	 in order to commence 
engineering work they needed to establish what	dance is (2011: 108). The ontological 
complexities of the form made this project difficult, however their paper 
demonstrates the way in which the method raised existential questions. In a	critique 
of an ontology for the classification of dance, published by the Open Directory Project	
(2007), Ceusters and Smith outline how examination of the diagram raises questions, 
such as, “[c]an all dancing activities be considered to be performances, let	 alone 
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works of (performing) art?” (2011: 113). They suggest	the usefulness of philosophical 
study for computer engineers in cases such as these (2011:	112-114). I	propose that	
the reverse is also true; that	 this method of ontological enquiry can perhaps be of 
benefit	to philosophical study, by exposing gaps in our understanding of concepts and 
posing questions for further enquiry. Ceusters and Smith highlight	the complexities of 
deconstructing movement, and whilst	a computational ontology for dance movement	
may or may not	be possible, the process of categorising and formulating taxonomies 
encourages detailed consideration of the nature of the form.	In this research I	adopt	
the method of modelling, extending the approach used in the some of the 
‘choreographic objects’, to map the elements of the objects and visually 
conceptualise the way that	 they relate to each other, leading us close to 
comprehending what	 they are, and therefore helping me to address one of my key 
research questions. 
Models and ontologies are not	 exactly the same thing,	 however. In ‘Models and 
Metaphors: Theory Making and the Creation of New Knowledge’	 (1999),	 Penelope	
Hanstein suggests that, 
[m]odels can be an effective way to help researchers see 
relationships as well as discover new ways to think about	 the 
themes, ideas, and conclusions resulting from the research 
process	(1999: 71).	
Models are used in various disciplines to visualise the relationships between 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





components, or to demonstrate stages of a	process. Noë	proposes that	Synchronous 
Objects is a	model of One Flat	Thing, reproduced .He suggests, 
[s]cientists — who seek knowledge	 — frequently make 
models of phenomena	 in the domain that	 interest	 them. 
Working with the model, thinking about	the model, enables 
them to think about	what	is modelled (Noë 2009). 
This articulation relates to one of the functions of the model, the construction of 
which furthered my own thinking and analysis of the objects. However, it	 is also 
motivated by a	 desire to be outward facing and encourage interaction with the 
objects. As with computational ontologies, models can be used to share concepts. 
deLahunta	and Phil Barnard have developed dance related models, 19 and they point	
out	that	models can be used across disciplines, as when information is distanced from 
its original context	 it	 might	 become possible to see how various fields deal with 
similar questions and ideas (2011). The use of models for interdisciplinary research is 
an area	further explored by cultural theorists Vivian Van Saaze and Annet	Dekker in 
their paper, ‘Surprising Usages of a	 Documentation Model: On the Notion of 
Boundary Objects and Beyond’ (2013). In discussion of Capturing Intention, they 
outline how they developed a	documentation model for dance, which functioned as a	
‘boundary object’, allowing for greater communication between disciplines (2013). 
The process	of modelling concepts arose in scientific research, and thus can be seen 
as an essentialist, or positivist	 method. However, the use of models in dance 
research, as demonstrated by Barnard and deLahunta, and Saaze and Dekker, serve to 




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




framework, leaving aspects of the diagram open and basing the visualisation on 
observations made through philosophical probing, as opposed to reductive 
categorisations. 
Examples	o Methods 
The following section demonstrates some features of my methodology through two 
examples, offering different	approaches to analysis and argument	building. Example 
one tests an existing theory in order to construct	and propose an alternative solution. 
Example two uses a combination of “descriptive”	 and “explanatory” theories 
(Hanstein 1999: 63-64), to examine an example, and build an argument	 for its 
ontological impact. 
Example One 
1.) Identification of an ontological question posed by an example: 
We frequently access recordings of live dance works via	 the Internet. An 
example of this is a	 recording of William Forsythe’s The Loss of Small Detail 
(TLSD) (1991), uploaded onto YouTube in 2010. Online recordings pose many 
philosophical questions, such as: do these recordings provide access to the 
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2.) Acknowledgment	of existing answer (s) /schemas: 
McFee suggests that	 only live performance can provide access to a	 dance 
work,	 and that	 recordings are not	 legitimate forms of the work (2011: 112-
113). McFee explains dance works through the type/token schema	(2011: 40-
43). According to this account, a	 dance work is an abstract	 type, and each 
performance of it	is a	token of that	type. McFee claims that	dance works can 
only be accessed in live performance implies that	only live performances can 
be considered tokens. 
3.) Theory testing: 
McFee’s view does not	accurately represent	the way that	we frequently relate 
to and discuss dance works. It	is common practice to analyse, discuss and refer 
to works that	we have only seen on film. Indeed we often consider ourselves 
particularly knowledgeable about	a work precisely because we have watched 
it	repeatedly on film. It	is difficult	to dispute the claim that	recordings provide 
knowledge of a	work. Imagine a	 scenario where we were only able to gain 
knowledge about	works that	we have experienced live. Dance discourse and 
scholarship would rapidly diminish. Some may find they suddenly have no 
knowledge of dance whatsoever. Furthermore, websites such as YouTube, and 
TV programmes like Strictly Come Dancing, would no longer show dance, 
rather they would offer something pretending to be dance. Further extend 
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this thought	 experiment	 to conceptualise the same rules applying to sport, 
and we are left	with a	scenario whereby football is a	niche game, known only 
by a	 few and involving some rather impoverished players! The point	here is 
that	dance, like football is a	dominantly live form, however it	 is not	a purely 
live form.	
This outcome implies that	recordings can be considered tokens. However, this 
is problematic for many reasons. Firstly, all tokens must	be equal. Whilst	one 
performance can be better than another, it	cannot	be more an instance of the 
work than any other token. Accepting token-status for recordings suggests 
recordings and live performances as equal. This is problematic due to the way 
that	a recording is dependent	upon a	performance, yet	a performance is not	
dependent upon recording. There is another problem here, concerning the 
hierarchy of liveness. It	 is possible to predict	a future in which the recorded 
and the live are accepted as providing equal knowledge of, and access to the 
work. This is the case with football; it	is acceptable to claim that	you saw the 
match, even if you watched it	on TV. However it	is hard to imagine that	there 
would not	 still be a	 higher status attached to experiencing the game or 
performance live. This scenario exists not	only for sport, but	also for nearly all 
forms of music. The live and the recorded are not, and probably never will be 
equal,	this does not	necessarily mean, however that	 they cannot	offer equal 
knowledge of the work. 
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Despite claims for the ontological similarity of film and performance 
(Auslander, 1999: Carroll, 2006), it	 is not	 the case that	 a film and a	 live 
performance are the very same thing. Therefore, the problem remains; what	is 
a recording? And how does it	relate to both the performance and the abstract	
work? 
4.) Theory building: 
It is possible to suggest	 that	 an individual performance, such as Thursday’s 
performance of TLSD is a	type, allowing for recordings of TLSD to be tokens of 
this type. However, this is not	feasible as types are abstract	phenomena, with 
no location in time and space. Perhaps a viable alternative is that	 the 
recording is a	 new type, and each playing of it	 is a	 token of the type A
recording of The Loss of Small Detail (TLSDr), distinct	to the live version of the 
work	 (TLSDl). This outcome represents common parlance, in response to the 
question, ‘Have you seen The Loss of Small Detail?” a	perfectly valid response 
would be, ‘I	have seen a	recording’. However, the relationship between TLSD, 
TLSDr and TLSDl remains unexplained. 
There are further stages to this argument, however this brief example demonstrates 
how a	combination of theory testing and theory generating is applied in this thesis. 
Whilst	 this argument	does not	offer a	finite solution to the problem, the process of 
questioning the nature of recordings, and the appropriateness of the schema	sheds 
light	on the metaphysics of this artefact. The use of thought	experiments - a	device 
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borrowed	from Philosophy - demonstrates the problematics of McFee’s claim. I	have 
also developed predictive theories, which reinforce claims for the significance of 
liveness, and reiterate the value of investigating this subject	 matter with this 
particular style of theory testing and constructing. 
This example demonstrates the positioning of the research within the 
positivist/postpositivist	 spectrum. Although I	 conclude with no claims for universal 
truth, the methodology - based in logic and reasoning - points towards a	paradigm 
where such an outcome is feasible. Simply accepting that	some people may consider 
that a recording	 is the work, and others may not, would miss out	on the knowledge 
generated by metaphysical investigation. I suggest	 that	 the methods deployed by 
Analytic Philosophical Aesthetics can be helpful for approaching the difficulties of 
ephemerality and materiality, primarily because this method avoids abstraction of 
both subject	matter and argument	by working closely with literature and schemata, 
allowing for clarity and consistency. 
Pragmatism plays an important	 role in this research, Van Camp suggests that	 a
pragmatic approach is characterised by a	“rejection of essences and [an] emphasis on 
pluralism, experience and community” (2006: 42). Indeed many discussions follow the 
logic of my own experiences and those in the dance community. Referring to	 such
practices as ‘evidence’ of certain theoretical claims requires some qualification. For 
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example, whose practices am I	 referring to? Who is part	of the ‘dance world’? Van 
Camp suggests, 
[t]he art	 world encompasses overlapping communities of 
audiences, artists, performers, composers, choreographers, 
critics, historians, theatre managers, funding agencies, art	 law 
attorneys, art	students and many more (Van Camp 2006: 42). 
She points out	 that	 that	 there are a	multitude of activities and ways of talking that	
occur within such worlds. The dance world is not	 a single unified voice, but	 rather 
refers to a	 wide range of practices and perspectives. Referring to dance practices 
therefore necessarily denotes multiplicity and does not	offer a	single perspective	or	
solution, but	in accordance with a	pragmatist	framework, aims to reject	essentialism 
and foreground the importance of experience (Van Camp 2006: 44).	20 
In using the term ‘dance world’ it	is also important	to recognise my own	context	and 
history. Coming from a	western Contemporary Dance tradition, and being situated 
within the UK and within an academic context,	my version of the dance world and in 
particular dance discourse is of course embedded within a	specific cultural context. I	
acknowledge the cultural specificity of the research and do not	 claim that	 my 
observations generalise across all practices or cultural contexts. 





	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	







There are instances in which I	 discuss an example not	 in terms of its ontological 
status, but	rather its ontological effect. Here a	different	method is required, involving 
both descriptive and explanatory theories (Hanstein 1999: 63-64). This	 involves	
working less closely with other scholars’ arguments, instead generating my own 
analysis and theories based on the information provided by the example. This is
demonstrated briefly below.	
1.) Descriptive theory: 
Siobhan Davies	 RePlay	 is the online digital archive for British choreographer 
Siobhan Davies. The archive was created in 2009, by Siobhan Davies and Sarah 
Whatley, alongside collaborators from Coventry University and Siobhan Davies 
Dance Company. It	houses footage, photographs, written accounts, interviews 
and so on, spanning Davies’ on-going career, from her first	professional work 
in 1977. A particularly interesting feature of the archive are the Kitchen pages, 
which offer a	visual representations of the ways in which components such as 
sound, lighting, creative stimuli, dancers’ notes and costumes contribute to 




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




2.) Explanatory theory: 
By visually exposing the multiplicity of components present	 in these works, 
the ‘Kitchen’ pages demonstrate the way that	 dance works come into, and 
remain in existence in forms other than human embodiment. The articulation 
of the creative process through notes and the sharing of creative stimuli 
demonstrate how the work is formed through modes other than solely moving 
in space. The ‘Kitchens’ do not	feature recordings of performances, although	
these are available elsewhere on the archive. This further demonstrates the 
decentralisation of the performance, by focussing on the multi-layered nature 
of the work, which is revealed as constituting multiple physical and abstract	
components; a	 feature made visual through the use of digital images and 
computer technology. 
This approach explores an example through describing it, asking;	what	 is this thing? 
What	does it	 look like? And,	what is its intended function? The process of thinking 
about	 these questions leads to the next	 stage of the method, which involves 
developing explanations.	 It is different	to method one in the way that	it	approaches 
metaphysical questions. Whilst	 theory testing works well for trying to establish the 
ontological status of an object, this is not	always appropriate. In relation to RePlay, I	
wish to ask what	it	does, rather than what	it	 is. Therefore a	postpositivist	approach, 





	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 		
		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




The way that	I use both positivist	and postpositivist	methods mirrors a	crucial tension 
at the heart	 of the project. Namely whether it	 is correct	 to claim that	 digital 
technology changes dance work ontology. Perhaps digital technology merely reveals	
characteristics of dance works that	 were already there. For example, the ‘Kitchen’ 
tool visualises the components that	constitute the making and existence of Bird	Song
(2004). Does this mean that	the work is now more than merely an abstract	concept, 
made physical through performance? Or does this outcome demonstrate how the 
work already existed as more than a	series of performances? Throughout	the study I	
suggest	both outcomes; that	by exposing existential characteristics of dance works, 
digital technology changes how we access the work. Whilst	 I don’t	 claim that	 the 
work’s metaphysical structure is altered by technology, I do suggest	 that	 the 
revelation of certain features alters our relationship to the work, thus, following a	
descriptivist	methodology, this raises questions about	how we might	think about	the 
ontology of works. 
In ‘The Ontology of Art	and Knowledge in Aesthetics’ (2005), Thomasson outlines the 
‘discovery view’, a	paradigm which implies that; 
the world contains a	broad range of fully determinate, mind-
independent	facts about	which everyone may be ignorant	or 
in error, but	 (some of) which the scientist	 seeks to discover 
by substantive empirical investigations (Thomasson 2005: 2). 
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Reiterating the positivist	 leanings of philosophical enquiry, Thomasson suggests that	
this approach “generally serves as our paradigm of knowledge acquisition” (2005: 20). 
She points out	that	empirical knowledge can be gained about	some types of things, 
suggesting for example it	is possible to discover biological facts about	a whale, which 
may show that previous beliefs about	the nature of whales are incorrect	(2005: 4-5). 
However Thomasson claims that	this is not	the case with art	works. 
Thomasson argues that	 because art	 works are intentional human constructs, as 
opposed to natural kinds they are classified in reference to the intentions of the 
maker, as opposed to their physical structure (Thomasson 2005: 8). Thomasson 
explains that	 in order for a	 term to be unambiguously applied to a	work of art, the 
person grounding the term will already know that	the thing they are referring to is an 
art-kind. She suggests that	 they will also have an existing conception of the 
ontological type of thing they are referring to; therefore a	 person’s use of a	 term 
suggests knowledge of both the identity and existence conditions of that	 thing 
(Thomasson 2005: 11). For example, we know the difference between an object	such 
as a painting, and an event	 like a performance, and respond differently upon 
encountering each type of art-kind. This background knowledge does not	 imply that	
we all have in-depth ontological concepts in mind when we use terms or respond to 
works. However, it	demonstrates that	the nature of art	works is constructed through 
existing knowledge and practices, which co-evolve and are co-dependent. 
Following Thomasson’s framework, this research does not	claim to make discoveries	
about	 the objective nature of dance, rather it	 makes suggestions about	 how our 
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spectatorial engagement	with specific works is reconfigured through ‘choreographic 
objects’, thus raising questions about	 what	 the work is, and highlighting the 
relationship between social practices and ontology. An important	 point	 about	
Thomasson’s paper is that	 although she is arguing against	 a discovery model	 of
knowledge, towards a	more	postpositivist	 paradigm, she maintains rigorous, logical 
theorising. This demonstrates the interplay between paradigms, and the way in 
which this methodological distinction is at the heart	 of philosophical debates 
concerning the nature of knowledge and existence. 
Summary 
This chapter outlined the way in which this thesis considers the question of digital 
technology’s ontological impact	on dance. I	have suggested some of the difficulties of 
examining the “space between binaries” (Kershaw and Nicholson 2011:2), and shown 
how ontological and epistemological debates echo the distinct	views of postitivist	and 
postpositivist	 researchers. I have positioned this research within a postpositivist	
tradition and outlined the pragmatist	 framework, which tests philosophical theories 
through ‘dance world’ practices and examples. However, I acknowledge that	
deploying a philosophical approach to argument	 construction leans towards 
positivism, insomuch as it	 seeks to avoid allowing for problems to be resolved on a 
purely subjective basis. 
I adopt	 an	ontological standpoint that	 views the relationship between abstract	 and 
physical entities and the people who construct, use and refer to them as intrinsically 
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linked.	 This demonstrates how the subject	 of enquiry is interwoven with my 
methodology. Adopting this perspective means that	this enquiry is central to shaping 
what	these objects are. The reflexive relationship between philosophical enquiry and 
dance world practices means that	 through questioning and probing the nature of 
‘choreographic objects’, their meaning, significance and ontology is co-constructed. 
Methods such as case study analysis, theory testing and descriptive accounts, allow 
me to ground the potential abstraction of this enquiry in logic, practice and concrete 
examples. Using specific examples to test	theoretical constructs enables me to think 
through abstract	 claims. Furthermore, exploring the use of various analytic and 
philosophical frameworks enables me to grasp the complexities of ‘choreographic 
objects’.	The next	chapter starts to apply these methods, furthering the conversation 
started Chapter One about	 the notation and documentation of dance, by analysing 
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Chapter Four:	What	is a Dance Score? 
Introduction 
This chapter continues to explore some of the questions raised previously regarding 
dance scoring, asking specifically, what is a dance score, and how does it relate to the 
work it inscribes? I further articulate the traditional view outlined in Chapter One (pp.6 
-9), going on to propose three responses; firstly I suggest that the idea of 
‘notationality’, central to Goodman and McFee’s perspectives is somewhat vague 
when applied to dance. Secondly, I argue that the stringent relationship between 
notation and scores proposed under Goodman’s view fails to account for the many 
roles and functions of scores in dance practice. Lastly, I suggest that the traditional 
view of notation, demonstrated in different ways by Goodman, McFee and Hutchinson 
Guest, is based on a flawed conception of dance’s relationship to writing. The chapter 
goes on to outline some of the ways that dance scores operate, and consider their 
relationship to movement and the abstract work. Finally, I propose an account of 
scoring that aims to be reflective of the breadth of dance scoring practices. 
Revisiting the Traditional View 
It is not only Goodman (1976), Hutchinson (1972) and McFee (1992) who advocate the 
potentials of notation for documenting dance. In a more recent article arts and 
technology scholar Natalie Lehoux suggests that, “[n]otation systems are essential to 
the description of movement” (2013: 154). She talks of the “problems” generated by 
the absence of a universally applied system (2013: 154). Considering this situation as 
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problematic underpins the traditional view, proponents of which firmly believe that 
the development of a universal notational system is both possible and necessary. 
McFee articulates his position in 1992 through the proposal of a 'Thesis of 
Notationality’ for dance, which suggests that, 
performance A and performance B were performances of the same 
work of art (in any performing art) just in that case where both 
satisfied or instantiated some particular 'text' in a notation agreed 
by the knowledgeable in the art form to be an adequate notation 
for that form (McFee 1992: 97-98). 
In 2011 McFee revises this thesis, suggesting that this formulation “requires too much” 
(2011: 62), by seeming to apply to all performing arts, and appearing to suggest that all 
dance works meet the same criteria (2011: 62). He acknowledges that the practical 
usefulness of this thesis is limited to those dance works that correspond to 
authoritative scores (2011: 62-63), and suggests that, “a more accurate formulation 
would apply notationality to particular artworks” (2011: 62). However, McFee 
maintains that the thesis offers insight, by making public the constraints of the type, so 
that, 
authentic performances should be seen as constrained in line with it 
even when there are no actual scores (McFee 2011: 63). 
In this sense, McFee’s views echo Goodman’s insomuch as he sees notation 
as a way to help deal with the theoretical identity problems posed by 
dance works. 
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When Goodman initially articulated his views about the usefulness of 
notation in 1976 it sparked a debate among philosophers of dance (Bunker, 
Pakes and Rowell 2013: 4). Writing in 1978 Adina Armelagos and Mary 
Sirridge oppose Goodman’s view. They argue that the specification of 
movements does not offer “adequate criterion” (1978: 129) for the 
identification of dance works. The primary issue that Armelagos and 
Sirridge have with Goodman’s claim is that notation fails to account for 
style. Dance style is a relatively complex notion 21 however, what is crucial 
here that Armelagos and Sirridge see is an essential property of any given 
dance work, yet not amenable to notation. They further argue that 
Goodman’s view fails to acknowledge the practice of making dances, 
suggesting that, 
[s]ometimes the choreographer does a great deal more than draw 
up a definitive plan of movement-and sometimes a good deal less 
(Armelagos and Sirridge 1987: 133). 
They go on to argue that choreography does not produce the compliants required by 
Goodman, due to the way in which it does not merely involve the construction of a 
sequence of movement. 
As explained in the Chapter Two (pp.27 - 29), under Goodman’s view allographic art 
forms are notational (1976: 121). Armelagos and Sirridge concur with Goodman that 
dance tends towards the allographic, but suggest that Goodman’s model is too tight 
21 See Whatley (2005) for a	detailed examination of the notion in relation to Siobhan 
Davies’s work. See also Armelagos and Sirridge (1977, 1984). 
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and that dance is not yet clearly notatable (1978: 138), thus implying a belief in the 
potential of notation, should the practice be developed. They go on to suggest that, 
[t]he fact that a need for notation is present and that notation is 
partially successful for known works in stable styles indicates that 
dance is much more likely to be an art form in transition to being 
allographic than an art form inherently autographic. It will become 
allographic only when either notation succeeds in capturing style, or 
general practice decides that style is incidental (Armelagos and 
Sirridge 1978: 138). 
Interestingly this claim demonstrates how the authors take issue with Goodman’s 
particular construal of notationality as opposed to the concept per se. They suggest 
that it is the failure of current notation systems to capture style that means 
Goodman’s view is incorrect, rather than any fundamental disagreement with the idea 
that dance works can be notated.22 
What is Notation? 
Notationality is a	 theoretical construct. Although there are important	 differences in 
their theses, McFee and Goodman similarly argue that	dance works could be identified 
and therefore constrained in relation to notation, should such a	tool exist. Therefore 
notationality is not	 disputed purely by the fact	 that	 there is no universal notational 
method for dance. However, I	wish to argue that	 there are issues with the concept	
because the idea	of ‘notation’ is somewhat	vague. So, what	is notation? As articulated 
in Chapter One (p.7) Goodman outlines five semantic and syntactic requirements for 
22 Margolis (1981) argues contra	Goodman (1976)	and Armelagos and Sirridge (1978),	
suggesting that	the centrality of the dancer to the dance means that dance can be 
considered autographic. 
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notational forms. According to Goodman notation differs from drawings, sketches and 
language, using abstract	 characters to stand for components. Each symbol can only 
stand for one component, meaning that	notation resists the ambiguity associated with 
drawing and writing (1976: 127). This way of conceptualising notation suits some 
practices, such as western musical composition, yet	in the case of dance there are only 
a few systems that	meet	Goodman's criteria. He points out	that	Labanotation passes 
the theoretical test	for notation, as it	allows for the essential features of a	dance work 
to be recorded (1976: 127). 
As previously discussed, McFee’s Thesis of Notationality partially aligns with 
Goodman’s view, however unlike Goodman, he has a relatively broad conception of 
what constitutes notation. His requirements are only that the system is agreed to be 
adequate by those knowledgeable in the form (McFee 1992: 97-98). He leaves open 
the question of which forms of inscription constitute notation, and which do not. 
In 1992 McFee argues that notation is distinct from writing. However, in 2011 he 
acknowledges the breadth of ways that scores can be constructed. He uses the 
example of American choreographer Elaine Summers’ Instant Choice (1962),23 which, 
used huge numbered styrofoam blocks, which had been carved into 
different shapes and painted in different colors on different surfaces, 
to cue movement for dancers (Banes 1983: 47). 
McFee suggests that the rules in this dance functioned as an adequate 
23 This work was performed as part	of A Concert	of Dance at Judson Theatre in 1962 
(see Banes 1983: 36-70). 
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score, “on the supposition that performance in accordance with them in 
this context results in a performance of that work” (McFee 2011: 55). He 
summarises his view by saying, 
I tend to write primarily in terms of scores in systems of movement 
notation such as Labanotation, no doubt partly because I hope the 
long time spent mastering that system as not wasted! But these are 
by no means the only styles of score that could count here. The ideas 
of a recipe for a performance of that work nicely captures all that is 
required – and, in particular, the normativity that implies. (McFee 
2011: 79) 
Once again McFee refers Summers’ work here as an example of a dance work that has 
a non-notated score (2011: 55, 79). However, whilst McFee acknowledges that scores 
need not be composed via standardised notation, and highlights the potential of rules, 
he does not address explicitly whether under his view, rules spoken or written through 
language would also provide an adequate score. 
There are two issues at play here, first what makes a mode of inscription ‘notation’, in 
particular whether this must be a) sharable and b) distinct from language, and second 
whether dance scores must be composed via ‘notation’. It seems that McFee has a 
broad conception of how scores might be inscribed, but seems to draw a distinction 
between codified movement notation systems, which have been developed to provide 
sharable methods for analysing movement, and other forms of scores, in the form of 
rules and so forth. 
Hutchinson Guest, explicitly articulates her view regarding the inadequacies of 
language for capturing movement. She suggests that, “the range of interpretation and 
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leeway for misunderstanding” makes language inefficient for effective notation (in 
D’Amato, 2014: 53). Equally Lehoux, in her comparison of various notational methods, 
advocates the use of abstract symbols, such as those used in Labanotation (2013: 159). 
In the Introduction to A Choreographer’s Score (2012), Cvejić suggests that the lack of 
a universal notation system is not a problem at all, suggesting that it “is more an 
advantage than a misfortune, paving the way for singularity” (2012: 9). Indeed each 
choreographer may choose a unique method or combination of methods to document 
and share his/her work. As previously mentioned, choreographers, dancers and 
scholars inscribe dance movement in a wide variety of ways, including sketches, 
diagrams and linguistic accounts. These inscriptions frequently come to be referred to 
as ‘scores’. If we are to agree with Goodman’s view that a score must be notational, a 
broader conception of notation is required. Alternatively it seems that scores may be 
developed through non-notational inscriptions. The second option seems the most 
logical, however the question remains as to which inscriptions might count as forms of 
notation. The distinction from language suggests that in order to be understood it 
must follow sharable conventions or codes. So, is perhaps codification, construed as a 
system following sharable rules, a necessary and sufficient condition for notation? 
The word ‘notation’ is listed in the Oxford English Dictionary (online) as, “[a] system of 
written symbols used to represent	numbers, amounts or elements in a	 field such as 
music or mathematics” (Oxford English Dictionary 2008: 977). This description clearly 
encompasses those forms of codified notation that	meet	 Goodman’s requirements. 
The central point	 is that	 in order to be codified — and therefore notation at	 all in 
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Goodman’s terms — each symbol must	be a	sign in the semiotic sense, meaning that	it	
stands for something else. Whilst	some notational systems, such as Labanotation bear 
no visual resemblance to the work, others such as Benesh use stick figures to 
represent	movement. Following semiotician Charles Peirce, Labanotation scores use a	
form	 of sign	 referred	 to as “symbols” (2001: 10). This means that	 they refer to the 
object	 of the body through analogy, rather than through resemblance, or by 
associative connection. However, Benesh notation, includes “icons” (Peirce	2001: 10),
which are signs that	refer to the subject	they represent	via	resemblance. 
.Language uses symbols, meaning that the definition does very little to shed light on 
what may constitute notation, and how this differs from abstract sketches and written 
or spoken words.. Moreover, idiosyncratic inscriptions also use symbols to stand for 
components in order to represent relations and so on. This is demonstrated in the 
image below, taken from British choreographer Rosemary Butcher’s notebook. 
According to Burrows, this image shows “preparatory time and space drawings for her 
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This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The 
unabridged version of the thesis can be found in the Lancester 
Library, Coventry University.
Figure 1:	Sketches from Butcher's notebook (Van Imschoot and Engels 2011) 
This example raises questions about codification; can these drawings be ‘de-coded’ by 
a knowledgeable reader? If so, they are sharable and their significance is not the sole 
reserve of the author. The issue seems to be that whilst non-knowledgeable readers 
might make educated guesses regarding what these signs stand for, there is no 
standardised code to ensure that we all reach the same conclusion. The signified 
component for each sign has no sharable properties. It is therefore tempting to draw a 
tidy distinction between standardised modes of dance notation, such as Benesh and 
Labanotation, and idiosyncratic inscriptions, and suggest, following Goodman that the 
latter do not constitute a notational form, due to their non-codified nature. However, 
this does not seem quite right, as Labanotation is also only accessible to those 
knowledgeable in the code. It may help here to reconsider McFee’s thesis, under 
which notations must be agreed upon by people knowledgeable in the form (2011: 
71). McFee seems to be suggesting that standardisation is desired for notation. This 
raises an important difference between Butcher’s score and Labanotation, which is not 
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intended as a standard system, rather it is composed in what Burrows refers to as a 
“private code” (in Burrows and Van Imschoot 2005). So, can this form of code be 
considered notational? 
If we are to answer positively the potential for private notations becomes apparent, 
thus juxtaposing the central concern of standardised systems, which aim to make 
movement properties sharable. However, there is no obvious reason why drawings 
such as Butcher’s cannot be considered notational, providing they reveal features of 
the work to a knowledgeable reader. The fact that we cannot all decode them — a 
situation that is equally true of Labanotation — is merely a consequence of our being 
unaware of Butcher’s code. Furthermore, if we are to think of notation in alignment 
with its dictionary definition, which makes no explicit mention of sharability, despite 
being non-codified, such ‘private’ inscriptions can be conceptualised as notation. 
In light of Cvejić’s suggestion about the important and regular role of idiosyncracy, it is 
perhaps possible to soften McFee’s view and propose that a text may be notational if 
agreed upon by those who are able to read a specific choreographer’s language of 
inscription. However, the role of standardisation and intended use of the notation is 
important. Burrows draws an important distinction between two forms of notation, 
suggesting that, 
[n]otation divides into two kinds: the various attempts at a 
complete system to write down work that already exists; or the 
score as a notebook, a tool to find something new (Burrows in 
Burrows and Van Imschoot 2005). 
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Butcher’s drawings are demonstrative of the second form of notation as they both 
arise from and inform the creative process. 
So it seems as though there is no clear reason why we must conflate notation and 
codification. However, suggesting that all inscriptions are notation rubs up against 
common practice. We tend to draw distinctions between codified, sketched and 
linguistic ways of communicating. Furthermore Burrows’ distinction between those 
forms that aim towards a complete system and those that serve a different function is 
important. McFee and Goodman certainly seem to conceptualise notation as a non-
idiosyncratic mode of inscription that has the potential to be standardised. 
Work and Score 
McFee suggests that dance scores are created before, during, or after the work and 
therefore are intended as either records or 'recipes' (McFee 2011: 52 - 69), although 
he points out that scores created as a record can also be used as a recipe to re-
instance the work. The distinction between description and prescription is important in 
matters of ontology. For example, if a dance was choreographed through the writing 
of a score, the score can be said to be an intrinsic part of the work, as it was essential 
to its creation. A descriptive score on the other hand has a different relationship to the 
work and serves primarily as a record and/or a tool for re-instantiation. Whilst it is 
theoretically possible to compose a dance by writing a Labanotation score, this is 
unusual. Such scores are usually created alongside the work, or after it has been 
completed. They are composed by a trained professional, usually someone other than 
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the choreographer and therefore a degree of interpretation is involved. Although the 
notator may be present during the creative process, the central aim of Labanotation, 
for example, is to record the finished work. Therefore the relationship between the 
score and the original instance of the work is not a reflexive one, the work can be 
‘finished’ and performed prior to the existence of a score. 
This gives a Labanotation score a different status to a musical score or the script of a 
play, both of which traditionally serve as instructions for the first performance. The 
process of writing is often an important part of the playwright or composer’s creative 
process, meaning that the score plays an essential role in the development of the 
work. The situation in dance is different; it is conceptualised as ‘externality’ by 
Pouillaude (n.d.: 5), who stresses the third-party role of the notator. He suggests that, 
[t]he space of choreographic notation has a surprisingly triangular 
structure, involving as it does three parties: the choreographer 
who demonstrates and proposes, the dancer who makes visible, 
and the notator who inscribes (n.d. : 2). 
Whilst Pouillaude accurately describes some modes of making and inscribing, this 
description does not fully reflect the wealth of approaches to making and writing 
dance. Firstly, some choreographers and dancers are trained notators. Secondly, and 
significantly, many choreographers make dances with and on their own bodies. Finally, 
this triangular structure only applies to standardised notational forms, which require 
specialist training. As previously demonstrated, many dances are inscribed by the 
choreographer or dancers through idiosyncratic sketches, written notes and drawings, 
which would not meet Goodman’s notational requirements, but nevertheless often 
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come to be referred to as scores. 
Due perhaps to the emphasis on standardised systems, such as Labanotation in 
philosophical literature, there is a tendency to suggest that writing is inessential to 
dance making. Under the traditional view, writing plays no part in the making of the 
work. 
Pouillaude suggests, 
[i]n fact, unlike music and contrary to the meaning of the very 
terms “choreography”, dance-making practice has always 
remained dissociable from the activities of writing and reading. 
Thus, today’s “choreographer” is not someone who writes, but 
rather someone who invents, demonstrates and composes (n.d: 
1). 
This is a view shared by Carr, who, as mentioned in the Chapter Two (p.26) claims that 
''[c]horeography just is the making of dances (not the mere 'writing' of them)’' (1987: 
352). These are controversial suggestions. The role of writing in dance making is well 
established and well theorised. 24 Despite the fact that systems such as Labanotation 
do not have a reflexive role in the process of dance making, choreography is often 
created on, or in collaboration with the page. As Pouillaude mentions, the word 
'choreography' is associated with writing. It derives from the Greek words 'khoreia,' 
meaning 'dance,' and 'graphein,' meaning 'to write.' Dance has a long tradition of 
being planned, composed, and written prior to being embodied, and this practice goes 
24 See Brandstetter (2011), Foster (1996) and Lepecki (2004b), amongst	others. A joint	
conference between Congress On Research in Dance and Society of Dance History 
Scholars (2014), titled Writing Dancing/Dancing Writing addressed this theme.
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




as far back as the seventeenth century, when some of the first ballets were 
choreographed at a desk (Laurenti 1984). 
deLahunta describes the central role that the choreographer’s notebook often plays. 
He suggests that choreographers, 
employ the page as a toolkit for self-reflection/examination, for 
the collective documenting and sharing of creative ideas, scripts 
and scores, capturing the dynamics of gesture and recording notes 
for future reference (deLahunta 2004: 67). 
Such processes are demonstrated by the excerpt from Butcher’s journal shown above 
and in Burrows’ articulations about the second form of notation. It is of course possible 
to argue that these activities are secondary to the making of the dance, and that just 
because writing occurs alongside the dance making it is not essential to it. However, 
some scholars and practitioners disagree with this (Brannigan 2014, Longley 2009). For 
example deLahunta suggests, “the page becomes an interactive object, inextricably 
linked with the processes of dance making” (2004: 67). This suggestion is 
demonstrated through the writing of Judson choreographer Anna Halprin, who 
suggests, 
scores can be used to serve many purposes. One is a process for 
integrating personal growth and artistic expression. Scores can 
become a way of externalizing hidden feelings, attitudes and blocks 
(Halprin 2012: 211). 
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This statement implies that hidden feelings can limit creativity, but that scores can 
help to bring such resources to the surface (2012: 211), thus demonstrating the central 
role of the score to Halprin’s artistic process. 
Given that we accept scores that are composed through a range of inscriptions and can 
see that writing plays an important role in dance making, some clarification regarding 
the distinction between notes made in rehearsal and performance scores is needed.
Burrows suggests that, 
[o]ften these notes are a private reference point for the 
choreographer, but occasionally they become a hieroglyphic that 
the dancer must translate directly (Burrows in Burrows and Van 
Imschoot 2005). 
Perhaps this marks the shift from private note to movement score. Burrows’ 
articulation importantly allows for inscriptions to change roles, without recourse to the 
artist or author’s intention. For example, a choreographic sketch might be translated 
by a future dancer or dance maker; thus making a transition from sketch to score. Van 
Imschoot suggests that, 
[c]ontrary to the music tradition, dance practice has never strictly 
reserved the word “score” for a specific object, encoded in notation 
on a piece of paper, indicating a body of work that can then be 
instantiated with great rigor in performance (Van Imschoot 2010). 
This articulation proposes a stark challenge to the strict requirements of the traditional 
view. Van Imschoot’s suggestions arise from comprehensive research with dance 
practitioners, and are therefore reflective of contemporary dance making. She focuses 
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on how scores actually function, as opposed to how they theoretically could. Van 
Imschoot goes on to suggest some unifying features of dance scores, describing them 
as “heteronomous working tools, whose use is ad hoc, local and mostly in tandem with 
verbally or physically communicated agreements” (2010). Although this provides a 
loose framework for understanding non-standardised scores, more specific 
investigation of the ways that scores relate to works is required to fully understand 
their roles. 
Work-Determinate Scores 
As demonstrated previously (pp. 6 – 10), one of the key tensions in the philosophical 
discourse regarding standardised dance notations regards their ability to adequately 
determine the work, or, to put it another way, to capture all of its essential features. 
This issue is not exclusive to standardised notations. Linguistic and idiosyncratic scores 
equally constrain and determine the work, to a greater or lesser degree.
An example of a non-standardised approach that aims at full work-determination is 
Hypothetical Stream (1997), choreographed by Forsythe for French choreographer 
Daniel Larrieu. Forsythe wrote the score for the work and sent it to Larrieu via fax 
machine (Van Imschoot 2010). This case demonstrates the potential centrality of 
writing in dance making, and provides and example of a case whereby the score was a 
prescriptive ‘recipe’ for the initial performance of the work. However, it is a marginal 
case, this method is not common practice. The context and parameters of the artistic 
exchange meant that the work must be fully determined through the score. Forsythe 
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explains how he generated a series of sketches, which resembled knots that the 
dancers needed to solve or unknot (2003a). He went on to stage the work multiple 
times and it was different each time (Forsythe 2003a), thus demonstrating the open 
nature of the work, despite the centrality of the score. Importantly, the score was 
accompanied by a letter from Forsythe to Larrieu featuring instructions for reading the 
score 25 (Forsythe 2011). The letter was initially composed as distinct from the score 
itself, yet, it became conflated with the other aspects of Forsythe’s instructions in 
order for the work to be performed. This demonstrates my previous claim that objects, 
such as Forsythe’s letter, do not have to be composed as scores to function as such, or 
else implies that the score itself was not capable of fully determining the work, as it 
relied upon extra instruction from Forsythe in order to be instanced. 
Of course it	is important	to remember that	fully determining the work is not	always a	
motivation for the development	 of scores. As Halprin’s observations demonstrate, 
some choreographers use them as creative tools. However, it	is not	enough to suggest	
that	the relationship between the score and the work is solely based on the intentions 
of the choreographer. This is demonstrated though examples where the role of the 
score has shifted, as is the case with Allan Kaprow’s work 18 Happenings in 6 Parts 
(1959). Kaprow developed the work by writing a	detailed score, consisting of diagrams, 
sketches, and lists of instruction (Lepecki 2012). 18 Happenings was not	 initially 
created to be a	 dance; it	was a	 performative event	 that	 took place on 4th October 
25 This can be seen in What’s the Score? Publication on Scores and Notation in Dance 
(Van Imschoot	and Engels 2011)
http://sarma.be/oralsite/pages/William_Forsythe_on_Scores/ 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




1959 at	the Rueben Gallery in New York. Art	critic Jeff Kelley describes coloured lights, 
recorded sounds, odours, speech, and routine-like actions (Kelley 2012:	22)
The event	did not	fit	neatly into any existing category for the performing or visual arts. 
According to Kelley, it	became the first	'happening' and came to mark the subsequent	
development	of a	new class of performance (Kelley, 2012: 22). The work was first	re-
staged in 2006 by Lepecki, at	 Munich's Haus de Kunst. In 2010 Butcher also re-
staged 18 Happenings at the Haywood Gallery in London. Significantly, these re-
stagings, and subsequent	accounts of the process, reveal the centrality of the score to 
the work. 
Lepecki explains that Kaprow created multiple scores, as well as over 400 pages of 
notes and instructions (2012), implying a distinction between the score and the notes. 
Lepecki suggests that he was initially reluctant to undertake the project due to the 
perceived singularity of happenings; however, consulting Kaprow's detailed score 
encouraged him to take on the project (2012). Kaprow was not involved in the re-
staging process, therefore the implication is that the material itself gave Lepecki 
enough information for him to be confident that the work was determined through the 
score and notes. Indeed the re-staging was presented as an instance of Kaprow’s work, 
as opposed to a new version, implying that access to the score provided adequate 
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Indeterminate Scores 
Both of the scores discussed above adopt a combination of writing and sketches, 
demonstrating that the ambiguity associated with language may not in fact limit the 
potential to fully determine dance works. However, some choreographers utilise the 
potential vagueness of language in order to develop scores that are consciously non-
determinate and ambiguous. Dance scholar Alison D’Amato discusses ‘indeterminate 
language scores’ (2014), she writes, 
[t]he creator of an indeterminate score intentionally bends 
notation towards unpredictability, putting forward signifiers that 
effectively correspond to a multiplicity of corporeal signifieds 
(D’Amato 2014: 53). 
Discussing examples from artists Jackson Mac Low, Deborah Hay and Yvonne Meier, 
D’Amato explores the practice of working with deliberately ambiguous scores. She 
suggests that such scores are generative, as opposed to functioning solely as a 
representational document (2014: 53). 
Improvisational practices also often use consciously ambiguous or polysemic scores 
inscribed through language and sketches to encourage the generation of new, or at 
least non-prescribed movement. David Koteen and Nancy Stark Smith (2008) provide a 
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detailed account of the principles and history of contact improvisation (CI). CI involves 
spontaneous movement between two or more people. Stark Smith describes is as, 
a duet form based on the dialogue of weight, balance, reflect, and 
impulse between two moving bodies that are in physical contact 
(in Koteen and Stark Smith 2008, xi). 
CI was initially developed in the USA in the early 1970s by Steve Paxton, who was also 
a key figure in the Judson Dance Theatre (Koteen and Stark Smith 2008: xi). Stark 
Smith was also central to the development of the form. She worked closely with 
Paxton, and practiced and taught CI around the world (Koteen and Stark Smith 2008: 
xi) 
Improvisational scores are particularly interesting partially due to the way in which 
they may be non-physical, verbal entities. Improvisation classes for example, might 
involve the teacher leading the students through a series of loose directives in order to 
encourage spontaneous movement. Such scores may or may not be written down and 
circulated more widely. They may be repeated, or as transient as the improvised 
movement itself, preserved only in the memories of the teacher and dancer. Van 
Imschoot refers to dance practitioner Lisa Nelson’s ‘Tuning Scores’, suggesting that 
they do not refer to a written score, but a set of “shared agreements and tools” (Van 
Imschoot 2010). She includes Nelson’s articulation that the scores cultivate a 
“communication and feedback system” (Nelson in Van Imschoot 2010). This form of 
score is used fairly regularly in improvisational contexts where the dancers will agree 
upon, or are offered a set of parameters or behaviours in order to instigate movement. 
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In these cases the score does not inscribe a specific work of dance art, therefore, I 
suggest such scores are action instigating, as opposed to work indicating. 
Stark Smith has inscribed her improvisational score, which she titles the ‘Underscore’ 
through language and symbols in order to share it with the wider community. The 
Underscore consists of 40 stimuli that guide the user through the practice of CI. It 
begins with the directive ‘Arriving Energetically’, which is described as, 
[b]ringing your attention, your presence, your will, into the room. 
Bringing your focus into the present situation. Arriving at the 
present moment” (Koteen and Stark Smith 2008: 91). 
This is followed by ‘Arriving Physically’ and ‘Pow-Wow’, which involves checking in with 
the other dancers, and ‘Preambulation’. Stark Smith goes on to encourage the 
transition between various energetic states through directions that describe ideas and 
the description of principles as opposed to specific movements. Each point has a name 
and is accompanied by a symbol, which is designed to appear hand-drawn on the 
printed page. For example, as demonstrated in the image below, two arrows meeting 
one another indicates ’Attraction’, described as, 
[s]ensing a pull toward something or someone — another dancer’s 
movement quality, presence, body mass; the music; a patch of 
sunlight on the floor. Feeling a magnetic pull to touch, move with, 
move toward (Koteen and Stark Smith 2008: 93). 
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This item has been removed due to 3rd Party 
Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis 
can be found in the Lancester Library, Coventry 
University.
These instructions encourage a way of thinking about the body in space. It may seem 
curious to prescribe feelings. However, consideration of how the score came into being 
is helpful for understanding the nature of the directions. 
Stark Smith explains that in 1990, after 
almost two decades of practicing and 
teaching CI the Underscore came to her. 
She explains that she had become 
“claustrophobic” with having to follow her 
own syllabus (in Koteen and Stark Smith 
2008: 90). In response to this she found 
herself prolonging the open and less 
structured sections of classes, during which 
she would use language and her own 
movement to suggest to the students 
particular ideas to think about in order to generate their own movement.
Stark Smith describes how her classes shifted emphasis and how they were, 
Figure 2:	Section of the Underscore (Koteen and Stark Smith 2008:	93) 
now consisting of a changing proportion of this open “talked” 
space and a few specifically focussed activities/exercises occurring 
in a seemingly random, intuitively determined order” (Stark Smith 
in Koteen and Stark Smith 2008: 90). 
Stark Smith’s students however started to notice that the class occurred in sections, 




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 			
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
106 
Stark Smith explains, 
[a]nd then it dawned on me that underneath what I was 
experiencing as a random selection of materials was a very 
consistent score operating all the time, informing my choices. 
What was this inner, under score? (Stark Smith in Koteen and 
Stark Smith 2008: 90). 
Understanding how the score arose from Stark Smith’s experiences helps us to see 
how the directions as descriptive as well as prescriptive. Stark Smith articulates what 
she feels happening at each stage of the process, making suggestions about where the 
dancer might focus their attention. The description of her feelings, such as the 
“magnetic pull” (Koteen and Stark Smith 2008: 93), referred to above, serves as a 
stimulus for the dancer. 
Although Stark Smith went through the process of articulating the score through 
writing and drawing, the score itself arose from the practice of teaching. So, how does 
this relate to movement notations systems, such as Labanotation? There are obvious 
differences. For instance, the Underscore includes ‘icons’, which refer to the directions 
via analogy, as opposed to the abstract ‘symbols’ used in Labanotation. However, 
whilst they have relatively clear meanings, this is largely to due to their relationship to 
written instructions. The icon for ‘Attraction’ clearly illustrates the notion, as do the 
others shown in Figure 2. However, readers are unlikely to comprehend the directive 
without written or spoken explanation. Stark Smith’s score is primarily inscribed 
through written language, perhaps fully or partially spoken during instantiation. 
Furthermore, Labanotation focuses on the specific movements of body parts in time 
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and space. It aims for detailed and accurate description of the components of the 
body. This is in clear contrast to Stark Smith’s score, which is consciously polysemic. 
Another interesting distinction involves the relationship to the work. When the 
Underscore is activated it is the score that is performed as opposed to a work that is 
captured through a score. 
Setting aside for the moment the nature of the inscriptions themselves, there are, 
however some similarities between Stark Smith’s score and a Labanotation score. For 
example, they share a subject position insomuch as they both articulate the behaviour 
of the dancer, as opposed to documenting an external visual image. In both instances 
the movement is generated before the score, which arises as a documentation of the 
practice, rehearsal or performance. Both are intended to provide the stimulus for 
future movement. But are there enough commonalities to claim they are the same 
type of thing, as opposed to two distinct objects that happen to share a name? 
In order to move towards answering this questions we should think about their 
respective relationships to the work. The claim that Labanotation captures the work 
(Hutchinson 1972, McFee, 1992), conceives of the work as a repeatable structure of 
movement. As previously mentioned, in most cases the work is not composed through 
the production of the score. It therefore exists independently from the notation, which 
is a document and a tool that can be used to instantiate the relevant structure of 
movement. Under the traditional view, whilst notation can be seen as essential to the 
instantiation of a specific version of the work, it is not generally considered to be 
intrinsic to the work per se. The work and score are undoubtedly linked, but are not 
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co-existent. The reflexive role of writing in dance practice problematises this 
perspective and may occur in instances where the score is essential to the work, 
nevertheless in both cases, the score articulates a dance work, or aspects of it. 
The Underscore, on the other hand arises from and describes Stark Smith’s work (as a 
verb), but does not articulate a dance work (as a noun). Performing the Underscore 
activates the score itself. This contrasts with other forms of score, which serve to 
instance a work, thus developing a conceptual separation between the score and the 
resulting movement. The Underscore is identifiable as Stark Smith’s work, meaning 
that is it this specific entity that is instanced, as opposed to CI more generally. The 
result of this is that elements of Stark Smith’s work are stabilised and repeated, even if 
the resulting movement is different every time. Here we can start to see the 
complexities of the notion of the work in some areas of dance practice. The term is 
used to refer to the practice of improvisation as well as a more conventional artwork. 
However the interplay between practice and performance, and the scoring of both 
results in a conflation between the work of dance and the dance work, as both noun 
and verb are scored and performed. 
Summary 
Dance scores exist in a wide variety of ways. They might be composed in any 
combination of standard, sketched or linguistic inscription. They might be physically 
presented and preserved, or exist only as a speech act or idea. Furthermore, each type 
of score has a relationship to a work or set of actions, which will determine the 
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behaviour of the dancers to a greater or lesser degree. So where does this take us? 
This chapter has acknowledged the breadth of the term ‘score’ in dance discourse and 
practice and outlined some of the ways that scores are inscribed and used. The 
differences are clear, however, questions remains as to the similarities between each 
approach. If we are to find meaning in the term it seems important to think through 
what it is that unifies these wide-ranging approaches. My primary observation has to 
do with each score’s intrinsic relationship to action. Whether intended to document as 
a means for re-instantiation, or to generate new movement possibilities, each score 
offers the potential for movement, in a broad sense of the term. 
Despite the wide usage of the term score’ there seems to be a consensus amongst 
both philosophical aestheticians and those working in Dance Studies and Performance 
Studies, such as Birringer (2013), D’Amato (2014) and Van Imschoot (2010) that scores 
have a direct relationship to practice. In McFee’s terms they are seen to operate either 
as a record, a ‘recipe’ or both (2011: 52 – 69), a sentiment echoed, albeit in alternative 
terms, by Van Imschoot’s observation that scores instigate praxis (2010). It seems fair 
to suggest, therefore, that although the way that the term is used is very broad, it 
generally refers to a set of instructions or parameters - that may or may not be written 
down - which documents or underlies a specific work or practice. The three case 
studies considered in this research extend and challenge this conception of scoring, as 
they do not focus on instructing an instance of a work, but on analysing and 
transmitting the choreographic structures and process, though digital, or partially 
digital means. The next chapter builds on this discussion of dance scores by 
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considering the nature of recordings, which are central to all three case studies, asking 
how they relate to the abstract work and individual live performances. 
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Chapter Five:	Instantiating Dance on the Screen 26 
Introduction 
One of the questions raised by thinking about	 dance scores that	 has not	 yet	 been	
addressed is whether one can access the work through reading the score. Whilst	it	is 
feasible to argue that	it	is possible to access a	dance work through reading a	notated 
score, perhaps through visualising the movement	of the dancers, 27 for example, this, 
however, seems a	little far-fetched. The case of recordings, on the other hand is more 
complex as they visually present	 the work in performance. Furthermore, recordings 
play a	central role in ‘choreographic objects’, therefore some consideration of their 
relationship to the work and the performance event	is important. The way that	dance 
is not	standardly made through the construction of a	score, means that	some claim 
that	 it	 is particularly ephemeral, 28 reliant	 on the presence and action of a	 human 
body to be adequately experienced (Carr 1987, McFee 2011). 29 In light	 of our 
increased access to dance in digital form, however, this poses interesting questions 
such as: What	 are we watching when we view dance on screen? And what	 does it	
mean to truly encounter a	work of dance art? 
As a	response to these questions, this chapter proposes three challenges to the view 
that	dance works are only accessible through live performance. First, I	 suggest	 that	
26 A shorter version of this chapter is published in the American Society of Aesthetics 
Graduate E-Journal. See Blades (2014) 
27 For example, dance scholar and notator Victoria	Watts (2010) discusses the desire 
to be able to visualise dance from the notation. 
28 McFee (1992, 2011) 
29 See also Phelan (1993) and Sparshott	(1995)
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viewing dance through recordings and screenings allows the viewer to gain 
knowledge of the work and appreciate its features. Second, extending an analogy 
with sports matches introduced by Stephen Davies (2001) and McFee (2011), I	
suggest	that	the experience of dance works follows a	hierarchical structure. Lastly, I	
discuss the way in which recent	 developments in dance practice and discourse de-
centralise the body in both material and digital contexts. Following Thomasson 
(2005), this study adopts an	 ontological perspective that suggests that	 because art	
works are the products of human endeavour, they are intrinsically linked to social 
practices (2005: 8), therefore, I	 claim that	 our ontological investigation of dance 
should be reflective of evolving practices for viewing the form. 
Accessing	Dance 
Dance is digitally transmitted and documented in various ways. Conventional	
performances may be recorded or screened online, on TV, projected on to cinema	
screens, or temporary ‘theatres’ in public spaces. For example, The Royal Opera	
House in London runs a	series of screenings in public locations around the UK. 30 Such	
events may or may not	be recorded and archived. Furthermore, recordings may be 
shared as excerpts or full-length films, which may or may not	be edited. They are used 
for artistic, educational, promotional and entertainment	 purposes. They may be 
embedded with digital scores or annotated by students, audiences and scholars. 31 
30 See http://www.roh.org.uk/about/bp-big-screens
31 For examples of three digital scores see Motion Bank http://motionbank.org 
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Screenings and recordings are the main focus here. However it	 is important	to refer 
to two related examples. First, specially made dance films are increasingly common. 
Such films may or may not arise from conventional performance works. Either way, 
the film is developed on set	or location, with no ‘audience’ other than the cast	and 
crew. The second, somewhat	rarer example is performances that	only happen online, 
such as Bel’s Shirtology (1997), performed as part	 of Tate’s ‘Performance Room’ 
series in 2012. Such instances are akin to live screenings, but	the fact	that	there is no 
audience in the same space as the performance sets them apart, meaning that	they 
fall somewhere in between dance films and screened performances. Each of these 
examples may be considered ‘live’, albeit	in different	ways. Furthermore, each has a	
unique relationship to the notion of a	 ‘performance’ and to the abstract	 work. 
However, related questions are posed by each example, such as: What	type of thing 
are we watching? And what	does it	mean for dance to be ‘accessed’ and ‘performed’? 
As mentioned in Chapter Two (p.31)	 the type/token schema	 is often used by dance 
philosophers in order to articulate the relationship between the abstract	work and 
the physical performance. 32 Under this schema	 each dance work is considered an 
abstract	 ‘type’, made present	 through the physical ‘token’ of the performance. The 
conventional view, advocated by Carr (1987) and McFee (1992, 2011), suggests that	
only a	live performance counts as a	token or instance of the work. The problem with 
this view is that	 it	 rules out	works that	are not	shared solely via	 live performances, 
and it	does not	reflect	the ways we commonly talk about	our experiences of dance. 
32 McFee (1992, 2011), Pakes (2013) and Sparshott	(1995) each adopt this way of 
conceptualising dance works. 
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As discussed in Chapter Three (p.73), McFee suggests that	 it	 is incorrect	 to claim 
expertise of a	work one has only viewed via	a recording. He highlights a	“profound 
difference” (McFee 2011: 113) between dance works and musical works in this 
regard, proposing that, 
[p]erhaps a	person who has listened to all of Mozart’s compositions 
on DVD has heard all of Mozart’s music; but	 someone who has 
never seen actual bodies in motion (rather than merely the 
recording of them) does not, in the same way, even arguably seem	
to have seen all of Christopher Bruce’s dances; or even any of them 
(McFee 2011: 113). 
Here McFee claims that	 in order to access dance one must	 have experienced live 
bodies in motion. It	is not	entirely clear whether he means that	one must	have seen 
Bruce’s dancers performing Bruce’s movement, or merely have a background 
knowledge of dance in live form. However, either way, his view posits a	central role to 
the dancer’s body. McFee goes on to claim that, 
if right, this seems to imply that	 a person who has seen only those 
recordings had not	seen any dance at all (McFee 2011:	113). 
Although McFee acknowledges that	 it	 is an extreme position, he maintains that	we 
cannot	seriously regard such a	person to be an expert	in Bruce’s work. However, this 
claim is not	reflected in practice. Dance scholars and audiences frequently claim, and 
accept	claims of, expertise about	works that	they have not	seen live. If expertise were 
dependent	 upon live performance, there would be no contemporary or future 
experts of 19th Century dance pioneer Loie Fuller’s work, for example. Indeed dance 
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scholarship in general would be significantly diminished. While one might	 wish to 
argue that	 there is not	 enough primary evidence to claim expertise of historical 
dances, this is not	 reflective of the practices of the dance world, which is generally 
accepting of such claims. 
The question of whether we have truly seen a	 work closely relates to issues of 
knowledge and appreciation. McFee acknowledges that	 watching a recording 
provides knowledge of the work, pointing out	 that	 repeatability allows for in-depth 
consideration of certain properties (2011: 112). It	 is therefore possible to argue that	
repeated viewing might	allow for fuller knowledge and/or appreciation of the work 
than a	 live performance. However, while attending a	 live performance is likely to 
enhance appreciation, equally audience members of a	 live performance may find 
their appreciation enhanced through the repeated watching of a	recording. An ideal 
situation would arguably include both forms of viewing. However, the key point	here 
is that	 recordings alone can provide knowledge and inform appreciation, which are 
therefore not	essentially linked to live performance. 
It seems strongly counter-intuitive to claim that	one can be an expert	about	a work 
that	 one has not	 seen. In the case of art, epistemology and ontology are related 
modes of enquiry. Thomasson argues that	the type of knowledge we are able to gain 
about	 art	 ontology is different	 to the empirical knowledge that	 we might	 acquire 
about	natural kinds. This is because in order to disambiguate art	works we must	have 
an existing understanding of the concept	of the type of object	we are faced with, thus 
demonstrating an intrinsic link between social practice and ontology (Thomasson 
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2005). Although offering a slightly different	 perspective, Davies agrees with 
Thomasson that	ontological enquiry must	work in accordance with common practices. 
He calls for the deployment	of a	“pragmatic constraint” (PC), suggesting that	we must	
constrain ontological proposals in accordance with common practices (2009:	 126). 
Van Camp (2006) also endorses the adoption of a	pragmatist	framework in issues of 
art	work identity, suggesting that, 
the identity of works of art	work can be understood pragmatically as 
ways of talking and acting by the community of the art	world (Van 
Camp 2006: 52). 
Following these perspectives it	 appears that	 in cases where we develop expertise 
through recordings and screenings, and therefore claim to have seen the work, we 
should logically allow for digital instances of dance works. However, it	is not	the case 
that all forms of digital representations count	 as an instance. Watching a	 highly 
edited trailer of Siobhan Davies’ White Man Sleeps (1988), for example, arguably does 
not	constitute a	 full experience of the work and fails to provide adequate access to 
the work’s properties for claims of expertise to be made. This begs the question; what	
constitutes a	digital instance? 
In order to answer this question we must	determine what	is meant	by an ’instance’	of
a work. Davies (2010) suggests that, 
[a]n instance of a	 work is something that	 makes manifest	 to 
receivers certain properties that	 bear experientially upon the 
appreciation of the work (Davies 2010:	412). 
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This account	 raises the question of what	 these properties are. If one considers the 
physical presence of dancers as an essential property of the work, recordings and 
screenings would fail to constitute instances of the work. However, it	 is possible to 
argue that	this property is non-essential. Furthermore, recordings arguably have the 
potential to possess all of the other manifest	properties of the work, and are able to 
bear experientially upon appreciation. 
Davies suggests that	there are two forms of instance at	play in ontological discourse. 
He distinguishes between a	 work’s “provenential instances” (P-instances) and its 
“purely epistemic instances” (E-instances) (2010: 411). Davies’ description of a	work’s 
P-instance smoothly applies to performance, 
[a] work’s	P-instances are the logically first	products of the artist’s 
generative activity that	 possess the kinds of manifest	 properties 
required in entities that	 are to ‘bear experientially’ on the 
appreciation of the work (Davies 2010: 414). 
Davies draws a	 distinction between P-singular art	 forms such as painting, in which	
cases there is one P-instance of the work, and forms such as music (and dance), which 
can have multiple P-instances. In the case of dance, for example, the premiere of a	
work is not	prioritised over subsequent	performances meaning that	the ‘first	product 
of the artists’ generative activity’ can have multiple, equal manifestations. However, 
the ‘history of production’ to borrow Goodman’s term (1976: 122)	does inform the 
status of the P-instance, which arises directly from the artist’s actions. 
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An E-instance, on the other hand, possesses the manifest	 properties of the work, 
regardless of how it	comes to do so. Davies suggests that, 
[a]n instance of a	work in general, as we have seen, is something 
that	 makes manifest	 to receivers certain properties that	 bear 
experientially upon the appreciation of the work. An instance in 
what	 I am terming the purely epistemic	sense fully justifies this 
requirement, and does so simply in virtue of the manifest	
properties that	 it	 possesses, independently of how it	 came to 
have these properties (Davies 2010: 415). 
The issue here remains as to whether the physical presence of a	dancer is an essential 
property for the appreciation of the work. Given the widespread use of recordings for 
reconstruction, analysis and appreciation, 33 it	 is worth taking seriously the idea	that	
the physical presence of a	dancer need not	bear essentially upon the appreciation of 
the work. Therefore, we might	want	to suggest	that	the notion of a	work’s E-instance 
may help to explain how it	 is that	 we can gain knowledge of a	 work through a	
recording. Given that	recordings and screenings aid in the appreciation of works, it	is 
possible to suggest	that	they might	count	as E-instances by offering epistemological 
access to the work, whilst	not	claiming to be exactly the same type of thing as a	live 
performance, or P-instance. Davies suggests that, 
[i]t is possible for a	performable work to have E-instances that	are not	
performances because an event	 can play the relevant	 role in 
appreciation without	 standing in the relevant	 causal-intentional 
relation to the composition of the work (Davies 2010: 421). 
33 See Thomas (2003) for a discussion into the role of recordings in dance 
reconstruction. 
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However, this outcome does not	 appropriately consider the role of the 
choreographer. Many recordings are made by, or under the direction of the 
choreographer, so they are not	removed from the provenance of the work in the way 
that	 an E-instance implies. Furthermore, even if we are to accept	 recordings as E-
instances the question remains as to which digital objects or events possess the 
correct	properties to constitute E-instances. McFee points out	that	there need not	be 
an exceptionless answer to the issue of accessing the work (2011: 115). It	 seems 
tempting to consider the problem on a	case-by-case basis, however this is not	entirely 
satisfactory. Intuitively it	seems that	the relationship between work, performance and 
recording cannot	 be unique for each dance work, meaning that	 a case-by-case 
outcome might	 fail to provide adequate insight	 into the general issue. A	 possible 
strategy is to refer to the intended format	of the work. For example, if Siobhan Davies 
intended White Man Sleeps to be experienced live, it	 is possible to argue that	 it	 is 
inaccessible through recording. However, a	comparison with music reveals that	 it	 is 
not	quite that	simple. It	is impossible that	Mozart	intended for his compositions to be 
experienced through recording, however theory and practice allow for us to 
encounter his works in this format. In addition, the intentions of the choreographer 
are not	always clear or accessible, 34 and so relying solely on this approach leaves too 
much room for speculation. The notion of E-instances might	 bring us closer to 
determining which digital objects allow access to the work as it	 foregrounds the 
requirement	 that	 they must	 comprise the relevant	 properties, thus arguably 
34 This issue is discussed	by Wimsatt	and Beardsley (1946), who suggest	that	the 
author’s intention has no significance to the meaning of a	text. 
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eliminating edited or partial recordings, however, the question of what	these relevant	
properties are remains open. 
Understanding	Experiences 
In order to establish which examples constitute ‘tokens’ or instances of the work we 
should turn our attention to the way we describe our experiences. Accessing music 
via	transmissions and recordings is a	widely accepted state of affairs. 35 It is possible 
to argue that	 the situation in music is different	 due to ontological distinctions 
between music and dance. Fully disputing this view would involve entering into the 
discussion regarding platonist types,	36 and I	 am not	 sure that	 this will reveal much 
about	 the issue at	 stake here. Instead, I	 suggest	 that	philosophical discourse allows 
for digital instances of musical but	not	dance works because this is our primary mode 
of experiencing music and is therefore a	 legitimate medium for developing both 
musical practices and academic discourses thereupon. In the past, the primary mode 
of accessing dance has been via	live performance, however the situation is changing. 
A report	published in 2010 by the Arts Council of England concluded that	over the half 
of the online population use the internet	to not	only to retrieve information about	art	
and culture, but	also to engage with audio-visual content. This is significantly more 
common among the 16–34 age group than any other, signifying a	generational shift. 
While music is the most	 frequently sought	 art	 form, 30% of the 341 respondents 
reported watching dance online (ACE 2010: 18), making dance the second most	
35 See Davies (2001); McFee (2011), who both discuss the way that	musical recordings 
provide access to the work.
36 See McFee (2011) and Pakes (2013) for accounts of the applicability of the platonist	
view to dance ontology. 
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popular form of art	to be experienced online. Indeed, the internet	allows us to view a	
vast	array of dance works and styles, and in many cases this is the only possible way 
to do so, due to temporal, geographical and financial constraints. 
How then do we explain such experiences? McFee clarifies that, 
while time spent	watching the film is best	described as exactly that, 
it	 is not	exactly wrong to say that	one spent	one’s time watching 
the dance – after all, one had been watching that	 film and not	
some other (McFee, 2011, 112). 
McFee points out	 that	 he could truthfully say that	 he had spent	 the afternoon 
watching Ghost	 Dances (Bruce 1981), even if he had only been watching the film 
(2011: 112), although he maintains that	 we would not	 have truly seen the work. 
Following Thomason’s view, however, this cannot	be the case, as ontological claims 
should be based in social practices. Sparshott	suggests that	when we watch a	film of a	
dance there are several different	things that	we can say we are doing (1995: 441). We 
may say that	we see the performance on film or a	film of the performance. We might	
say we see an “image” or “view” of the performance, or that	we see the filmmaker’s 
interpretation (1995: 441), although he admits that	not	all of these options occur in 
practice (1995). 
McFee raises an analogy with sport	to justify his position. He suggests that, 
sports fans want	 to attend the matches, even though the view from 
one’s couch is more comfortable (McFee 2011: 114). 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	









This comparison highlights the significance of live performance. However, despite the 
fact	that	sports fans want	to attend matches, when asked, ‘did you see the match’, it	
is legitimate and normal to answer ‘yes’ even when one only saw it	on TV. There is	a
hierarchy applied to experiences of sport	 that	 I suggest	 is useful for understanding 
dance works. To see a	 football match at	 the time and place that	 it	 is occurring is 
perhaps the most	 desired form of experience. Following this, to see the match 
through a	screen, as it	occurs, is second best	 (of course one could contend that	they 
would rather watch the match in the pub with their friends, but	this is likely to include 
acknowledgement	that	this is widely considered a	secondary experience to attending 
the game). A third option is to view the whole game via	 a recording. Even these 
distinctions are not	always entirely clear; time delay and the ability to record, pause 
and fast-forward TV means that	one’s temporal relationship to the event	can change 
during the match. Importantly, following each of these situations the spectator is 
likely to claim that	they saw the game. One last	way of viewing the match would be to 
watch edited highlights. In this case fans are likely to explain that	 they missed the 
match, even though they know what	happened. 
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This way of discussing and viewing sport	relates closely to social conventions around 
music, as demonstrated by Stephen Davies (2001), who also draws a	comparison with 
sport. He suggests it	is equally legitimate to experience sports and musical broadcasts 
via	technological transmission,	
[j]ust	 as someone can truly say, “I	 saw the first	 game of the 
World Series yesterday,” though he watched it	 on TV, so Ham 
can truly say “I	 heard the first	 performance of Minimo’s new	
quartet	last	night,” though he listened to the radio and was not	
at the concert	(Davies 2001: 301). 
I suggest	this state of affairs also applies to dance. Although it	may be preferable to 
attend a	 performance event, or P-instance, a	 live screening provides an alternative 
way to see the work. This form is one stage removed from the provenance of the 
work, and lacks the physical presence of the dancer. Still, it	partially maintains its ‘live’ 
status, due to its shared temporality with the event. Therefore I	 suggest	 that	a live 
screening can be considered an E-instance. Failing this, a	recording allows us to see 
what	 occurred on stage and arguably offers an alternative form of E-instance. The 
acquisition of knowledge is central to this claim. While one might	wish to argue that	a
recording fails to provide access to the relevant	properties required for appreciation, 
the counter-argument	remains that	the repeatable format	of recordings means that	
they provide the potential for greater knowledge of the work than encountering the 
work in live performance. Indeed it	 is often exactly this methodology that	 leads 
people to make claims of expertise. Examining the language a	 fan would use might	
also give insight	into the status of edited recordings. Just	as a	sports fan who has only 
seen edited highlights is unlikely to claim that	 they saw the match, dance fans are 
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unlikely to claim to have seen a	work having viewed only a	short	excerpt. Perhaps we 
can say, broadly speaking, that	one can claim to have seen a	work only when they 
have viewed a	 full-length recording or screening, attended to in an appropriate 
manner. 
So where does this leave the type/token schema? If a	performance is viewed via	 a
screen at	 the same time as the event	 is happening on stage, what	prevents it	 from 
being a	 token of the work? Since the performance token is occurring and being 
experienced in real time, 37 there seems no obvious reason, other than historical 
convention, to argue that	one must	one be in the same place as the dancers in order 
for the instance to count	 as a	 token of the work. However, because one object	 or 
instance cannot	be any more a	token than any other, the type/token schema	does not	
allow for a	hierarchical structure. While one might	claim that	Monday’s performance 
was better than Tuesday’s both performances are either tokens of the work or not. It	
does not	seem to follow, therefore that	recordings, screenings and live performances 
can all to be tokens of the work, since live performances, or P-instances, hold a	
privileged position. 38 So can we maintain this way of thinking about	 the form? One 
possibility from Sparshott	(1995) is to consider each performance as both a	token and 
a type, of which there might	 be further tokens. However, this does not	 help us to 
determine which of these tokens are legitimate. Another possible avenue is to extend 
Sparshott’s discussion of “hypertypes” (1995: 404) to develop a	schema	that	allows 
for non-equal tokens, in accordance with Davies’ distinctions between P and E 
37 See Stephen Davies (2001) for a	detailed discussion of this issue in relation to 
music. 
38 I discuss this issue in more depth in Blades (2011).
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instances. Unfortunately space does not	 permit	 such a	 development	 here, but	 it	 is 
clear that	the issue warrants further attention. 
The Body 
We have not	yet	fully addressed the ontological centrality of the dancing body. McFee	
firmly believes that	the way dance is made—with the body—means that	it	cannot	be 
physically present	without	the dancer. This requires further exploration. The role of
the body is not	necessarily entirely disrupted by screenings and recordings; one might	
argue that	the dancer is equally central to such instances as they are to live 
performances. However, recent	dance practices pose a	more pertinent	challenge to 
this view. Discourses have recently reflected upon the expansion of the term 
‘choreography’, 39 which is no longer applied solely to the planning of conventional 
dances. Scholars and artists, including Cvejić (2006), Mårten Spångberg (2012),	Jenn 
Joy (2014) and Lepecki (2012b)	have written about	the way that	artists such as Xavier 
Le Roy, Jérôme Bel and Mette Ingvarsten challenge the perceived dependence of 
dance upon the moving body. Both Spångberg and Cvejić (writing with Le Roy), draw 
connections between recent	choreographic practices, which use stillness, parody, 
text, untrained bodies, material objects and so forth, and ‘conceptual’ visual art, such 
as Marcel Duchamp’s presentation of ‘ready made’ objects in art	galleries in the 
1960s. Each scholar suggests independently that	choreography is increasingly 
associated with ideas and discourse, as opposed to purely the plotting of movement	
structures in space. 
39 See Allsop and Lepecki (2008) for a	detailed discussion of this topic. 
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This shift	in thinking around what	constitutes choreography is evidenced through the 
development	 of choreographic works by established dance artists, which do not	
involve the traditional performance of a	 human body. Forsythe’s Scattered Crowd
(2002), for example, is a performative installation involving thousands of white 
balloons, through which the viewer moves. Other choreographers are experimenting 
with the role of the body on stage. For instance, Ingvarsten’s The Artificial Nature 
Project	 (2012) uses dancers to perform purely functional movement	 in order to 
control the behaviour of hundreds of pieces of metallic paper. This paper gives the 
work material form and the focus is on the movement	of these materials, as opposed 
to the dancer. This challenges the link between the notion of	choreography and the 
organisation of bodies in space. However, the composition of the paper arguably 
provides reference to the body through its materiality. Of	course, ‘choreography’ and 
‘dance’ are not	exactly the same thing (Forsythe 2008), and one may wish to argue 
that	 these works are not	 dance at	 all. However, the difficulties of defining dance 
means that	 recognition of the form is often dependent	 upon context	 and 
authorship.40 Thus, as established dance artists question the role of the body, they 
increase the breadth of the form. 
Technology is playing an important	 role in the evolution of dance as the increasing 
developments in and digitisation of dance challenge the centrality of the body. There 
are many examples of digital dance practices in which works are performed by 
40 See Jones (1999) and McFee (1992, 2011) for discussions of the issue of definition 
for dance. 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




avatars or within immersive technological contexts. 41 There are now computer 
programs that	allow artists to develop movement	on a	screen using digital shapes and 
avatars, 42 disrupting the view that	 dance-making concerns solely the body. 
Furthermore, ‘choreographic objects’ demonstrate dance analysis and scoring 
practices that	focus on cultivating alternative expressions of choreographic principles 
without	 the human body. 43 Indeed, more choreographers are adopting digital tools 
to share features of their work that	are not	accessible in live performance alone, as is 
demonstrated by the case studies examined in this research. These objects are often 
developed	with the intention of enhancing appreciation of the work. 44 Each of these 
examples requires in-depth consideration, and each has a	unique relationship to the 
screen, the abstract work and concrete performances. Importantly, the body is not	
entirely absent	 from each example, it is either literally or metaphorically present, 
however, it	 frequently adopts a	 different, less pivotal role than in conventional 
performance events. 
Types	o Digital Instance 
As previously mentioned, there are many ways in which dance is transmitted digitally. 
Below I	 attempt	 to sketch some preliminary categories in order to move towards a	
41 The work of Gibson and Martelli provides clear examples of this. 
42 Such as Life Forms (Cunningham and Simon Fraser University 1991) See Schiphorst	
(1993); The Choreographic	Language Agent (Wayne McGreogor |	Random Dance and 
Open	Ended	Group	2009) See deLahunta	(2009a).	
43 As is the case with Synchronous Objects. 
44 I explore this issue in relation to aesthetic empiricism and post-structuralist	views in 
a chapter in ‘Scoring Work and Process: The Ontological Implications of Scoring 
Practices for Dance’ (2015). 
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more detailed understanding of the various forms of digital dance transmission. In 
the case of dance on film, cases can generally be categorised as either, ‘born live’ or 
‘born digital’. ‘Born live’, means that	 the dance exists initially in live form, and has 
either been recorded, or is streamed live. Examples of ‘born live’ digital objects 
include; recordings of live performances - such as those we can find on video sharing 
sites, and in university libraries, television shows with live audiences and live 
screenings, watched either online, in public or on cinema	screens. 
‘Born digital’ objects are films are made primarily for the screen, such as dance films, 
or some forms of online performances. They are not	 representations of live 
performances. Rather, the digital manifestation is the primary mode of sharing the 
work. It is important	 to mention that	 ‘Born digital’ objects usually, (although not	
always) involve an instance of live dancing. The distinction therefore resides in the 
role of the audience in relation to the type of work. For example, in the case of dance 
films, such as Belgian choreographer Wim Vandekeybus’s Silver	(2000),	45 viewing the 
work involves watching the film. Being present	 during filming would not	 constitute 
watching the work anymore than watching the making of a	Hollywood movie would 
count	 as seeing the film. Interestingly, this implies that	 television programmes 
without	 a live audience would be categorised as ‘born digital’, whereas their live 
counterparts are ‘born live’. Whether or not	the programme is broadcast	live is not	an 
issue here, rather whether or not	the work is primarily performed to either a	present	
45 This film was based on one scene from the stage work 7 For a Secret	Never to be 
Told (Vandekeybus 1997), but	is a	new work which exists only as a	dance film. 
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or digital audience. The work is made through filming, and therefore born digital, 
despite the fact	that	a live (private) event	has occurred. 
Recordings of conventionally live performance events are the primary form	of ‘born	 live’ 
documentation. Broadly speaking, recordings can be divided into two categories. They are 
either ‘complete’, or ‘edited’. Complete recordings maintain temporal faithfulness to the 
live event, while edited recordings on the other hand refer to films that	alter the temporal 
pattern of the work. Complete recordings may be viewed either as excerpts or	full films. 
Live screenings are also ‘born live’, and are initially instanced in temporal fullness, 
although once archived, they may occur in any of the forms outlined above. 
As previously explained, ‘born digital’ films are those that	are made to be primarily 
watched via	a screen. Examples include dance films and online performances. There is 
an important	 distinction to be made regarding the difference between an online 
performance watched live, and one seen after the event. Equally important	 is some 
consideration of the role of film. In ‘born live’ objects it	 is possible to conceptualise 
the film as a	platform through which the dance is re-presented. However, in specially 
rendered dance films this becomes more difficult	as the film is an essential part	of the 
art work. 46 As the title ‘dance film’ implies, such cases seem to belong equally to both 
dance and film. McFee suggests that	such instances are not	dance at	all, but	hybrid 
objects (2011: 109- 112). I	maintain that	the inclusion of dance film under the rubric 
of ‘film’ by no means limits its status as dance. However, what	 is clear is that	 the 
46 There is a	vast	field of literature that	specifically addressed screendance. See 
Brannigan (2011), Dodds (2001) Mitoma	(2002) Rosenberg (2012), to name a	few. The 
International Journal of Screendance is also dedicated to this topic. 
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central role of the technology means that	 ‘born digital’ objects cannot	 be 
conceptualised in quite the same way at	those that	are ‘born	live’.	
Summary 
The claim that	dance works can only be accessed through conventional forms of live 
performance is based on a	traditional view of dance ontology. However, as with music 
and sport, digital technology has altered the way we engage with and refer to the 
form. Whilst	I am not	arguing here that	the metaphysical nature of dance works are 
necessarily changed by recordings, I	 maintain that	 the way we think about	 dance 
ontology should reflect	common practices. As Thomasson points out, 
ontological disambiguation is achieved not	by a	philosophical and 
explicit	decision on the part	of grounders about	what	 their term 
will refer to, but	rather by appeal to background practices already 
in place that	 co-evolve with the use of the art-kind term. 
(Thomasson 2005: 12). 
The implication of this view	 is that	 ontology and practice are intrinsically linked. I	
suggest	that	dance is not	all that	different	to sport	and music. However, our practices, 
examination and thinking around these forms have evolved more quickly. 
Furthermore, while one may wish to argue that	 the physical presence of a	dancing 
body is an essential property for appreciation, emerging practices for the making, 
viewing, analysis, and documentation of dance challenge such	a view. 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
131 
Thus, I	maintain that	dance works can have digital instances. However, this does not	
mean that	all digital representations of dance provide access to the work. Rather, I	
suggest	 that	 there is a	 hierarchical structure to our relationship with the work, 
dependent	upon our temporal and spatial relationship to the primary instantiation. It	
is clear that	the type/token schema	does little to clarify which cases provide access to 
the dance work and that	we require new systems for understanding the expanding 
form. The expanding nature of the form is foregrounded in the following chapter,	in 
which I	 introduce the first	 case study, Synchronous Objects for One Flat	 Thing, 
reproduced. Building on the discussions regarding scores and recordings I	 analyse 
some of	the digital forms present	on this ‘choreographic object’, in order to develop a 
picture of the role function and nature of the site. 
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Chapter Six:	Synchronous Objects for One	Flat Thing, reproduced 
Introduction 
Red dots spread quickly through space; dividing, generating, expanding and 
connecting. They multiply quickly, creating dense patches of colour. Burnt	 orange 
marks new trails. The digital forms write over themselves, scribbling through space, 
expanding and multiplying. Green paths of energy travel vertically across the screen. 
Intersected by horizontal counterparts. Pathways become evident. The screen fills 
fast; accumulation generates complex visual patterns. Yet, the images become 
clearer; relationships, dynamics, pathways are established. Clarity appears through 
the chaos. 
These images form part	 of Synchronous Objects for One Flat	 Thing, reproduced 
(Synchronous Objects), an interactive digital dance ‘score’ 47 created by American 
choreographer William Forsythe in collaboration with researchers at Ohio State 
University (OSU). Forsythe worked with dance researcher Norah Zuniga	 Shaw and 
Maria	 Palazzi, director of the Advanced Computing Center for the Arts and Design 
alongside an inter-disciplinary research team comprising dancers from Forsythe’s 
company, scientists, mathematicians, designers and geographers. This site is my first	
case study. Through description and analysis this chapter considers its function and 
implications for dance spectatorship, asking questions such as; what	 does the site 
47 The labelling of the site as a	‘score’ is contentious (See Zuniga	Shaw 2014:	97).	
However, for the sake of this chapter I	adopt	the term, as it	is used in the subtitle to 
the site. 
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reveal about	the work? And, which analytic frameworks are at	play? 
As discussed in Chapter Two (pp.	42 – 48), dance is analysed in a	wide variety of ways. 
This case study pays particular attention to the implicit	analytic frameworks utilised 
on Synchronous Objects, in order to consider what	 this tells us about	 the way the 
work is conceptualised. Whilst	scholars, such as Laban 48 and Hanna	(1987) developed 
systems for the study of movement	 but	 it	 was not until the 1980s that	 analysis 
models for works of dance art	were published (Foster 1986, Adshead et	al 1988). This	
chapter draws connections between the model authored by Janet	Adshead, Valerie A. 
Briginshaw, Pauline Hodgens and Michael Huxley and Synchronous Objects, to suggest	
that	 the score might	 represent	 a recalling of structuralist	 priorities and established 
dance analysis methods. 
William Forsythe is an American choreographer, who began his career as a	 dancer 
with the Joffrey Ballet	 and later danced for the Stuttgart	 Ballet, where he became 
Resident	Choreographer in 1976. In 1984 he moved to the Ballet	Frankfurt, where	he	
was Artistic Director until 2004. Upon the closure of the company he remained in 
Frankfurt	 and went	 on to start	 The Forsythe Company, with whom he developed 
many ensemble works, touring internationally and establishing himself as one of the 
most	 renowned contemporary choreographers of the 1990s and 2000s. In 2014 
Forsythe announced that	he would be leaving The Forsythe Company, to take up a	
Professorial position at	the University of Southern California (Calbi and Engel 2014) 
48 See Hutchinson Guest	(2005). 
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Forsythe is an active researcher. Synchronous Objects	 is the second	major project in
an on-going	 line of enquiry from Forsythe and his team concerning ways in which
‘choreographic	 thinking’ (Forsythe	 2008) can be shared through technology.
Forsythe’s	 interest in this area dates back to the production of the CD-Rom	
Improvisation	 Technologies: A Tool	 for the Analytical	 Dance Eye (Improvisation	
Technologies) in 1999. Performance theorist Rebecca Groves explains how, 
[i]n	the mid 1990s, Forsythe	began developing a multimedia dancer
training program to codify and teach principles of improvisation he
had created (Groves 2007: 93).
This tool uses video annotation to map Forsythe’s	 movement and visualise the
relationships between body parts,	which helps	the viewer to see the form and shape
of the movement, highlighting	otherwise	invisible relationships, pathways and	traces.
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party 
Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be 
found in the Lancester Library, Coventry University.
Figure 3: Annotation	in	Improvisation Technologies (Forsythe n.d.) 
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Synchronous Objects furthers this enquiry, this time focussing on a	single work. The 
site analyses and maps the choreography of Forsythe’s stage work One Flat	 Thing, 
reproduced (2000), using a	 film version by Thierry de Mey from 2006. The site 
comprises twenty digital objects, each of which is inspired by the question, “[w]hat	
else might	 physical thinking look like?” (Forsythe and OSU 2009). They explore the 
principles of Forsythe’s choreography through methods such as graphs, interactive 
tools, animation, annotation and more. Every one of the objects warrants	 in-depth 
description and consideration beyond the scope of this chapter. However, for the 
sake of this case study I	 provide an overview of the score, before focussing on five 
interrelated objects in more detail. 
The project	was developed in collaboration with a	large research team from a	variety 
of disciplines. The website lists 27 team members from various OSU departments 
such as, Geography, Design, Statistics and Dance, alongside Forsythe Company 
members and scholars from Dance, Philosophy and Neuroscience.	 In order to 
develop the score the team analysed the film of One Flat	 Thing, reproduced and 
gathered extensive data	 regarding its structural features. This data	 was used to 
develop the objects on the site. Unlike some dance scores, Synchronous Objects is not	
intended as a	 resource for reconstruction or a	 tool for instantiation (Zuniga	 Shaw 
2009). Although there are other artists working on related projects there is no 
established or universal method for such research. The novel combination of 
motivations meant	 that	 the team could not	 adopt	 a single existing system. Instead 
they drew on approaches from their various disciplines and were also required to 
developed new methods (Zuniga	 Shaw 2009). The result	 of this inter-disciplinary 
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approach is that	 the objects on the site vary greatly from one another. Some are 
didactic, leading users through a	 clear path and demonstrating a	 motivation to 
educate. Others are more expressive, aiming to capture and replicate the ‘affect’ 49 of
movement. Despite their distinctions, each object	 is concerned with analysing and 
revealing the structures of the work. Furthermore, they are unified by the way that	
they arise from data	generated through analysing the source film. 
The Work 
The stage version of One Flat	 Thing, reproduced was choreographed for the Ballet	
Frankfurt. A performance of the work in 2014 is described by American dance critic 
Roslyn Sulcas as, 
a showstopper. Fourteen dancers, 20 tables: Mr. Forsythe does 
the math. Jumping, sliding, gliding, swerving; ducking between, 
under and over the tables, the dancers simultaneously evoke 
the crazed, random energy of adolescence and a highly 
ordered, high-wire act	of interlocking systems (Sulcas 2014). 
Following this account	 it	 seems that	 the filmed version does not	 depart	 from the 
dynamics of the stage work, it	 is fast-paced, frenetic and highly charged. Seventeen 
dancers whizz	 around a	 huge, high-ceiling space, contorting their bodies over a	
carefully placed grid of twenty tables. The action takes place in what	appears to be an 
empty train depot. As the film begins the colourfully clothed dancers storm the space, 
49 See Apostolou-Hölscher (2014), Manning (2007, 2013), Rubidge (2009), for 
discussions of the notion of ‘affect’ in relation to dance. 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





rushing towards the camera, dragging the tables behind them. Once the set	is in place 
the space empties, leaving two male dancers moving between the table-tops.	 The 
duo move in counterpoint; the dancer on the right	 throws an arm, carving an arc 
through space, as the movement	reaches the space of the second dancer, he kicks his 
leg on a	straight, direct	trajectory. Both move very fast	and they are positioned close 
together. The effect	of this is that	their actions seem to relate, even though they do 
not	exactly correlate. Other cast	members gradually join the action. There are very 
few recognisable movements or motifs. Each dancer dances their own dance, 
generating a	mass of quickly moving bodies. The action accelerates, creating a	sense 
of chaos. Yet, fleeting moments of unison make it	 clear that	 this chaos is actually 
highly organised. There are rules and structures that	we cannot	necessarily see. 
Sulcas suggests: 
Mr. Forsythe brilliantly constructs the chaos to resolve into 
sudden movements of alignment. The organization of shape 
(legs stretching straight	up), directions (heads turning the same 
way) and dynamics (everyone speeding or slowing) keep the 
eye focused and the machinery of the work in order. It’s 
fascinating, exhilarating; like nothing you have seen before 
(Sulcas 2014). 
This description provides an example of how a	viewer may see the structure of the 
work. However, Sulcas’s position as a	 dance critic implies that	 she has extensive 
experience of viewing and analysing dance. In contrast, viewers who are less used to 
‘reading’ choreography may well miss the organisational indicators that	keep Sulcas 
focussed.	
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For example, Noë describes it	as a, 
complex phenomenon, that	 is to say, as an event; the work is 
compelling and absorbing, but	it	 is also, like many dances, and like 
life itself and the environments we occupy, very difficult	 to 
understand; that	is, it	is nearly impossible to command a	clear view	
of it	(Noë 2009). 
This is a	problem that Synchronous Objects	seeks to resolve. The site aims to ‘unlock’ 
the structures of the work, in order to help users recognise the systems of 
organisation underlying the movement, disambiguating the dance and providing a	
‘way in’ to the work. Manning outlines the way that	the score is intended to target	a, 
cross-disciplinary audience that	 departs from the strict	 arena	 of 
dance studies to include mathematicians, architects, cognitive 
scientists and philosophers, to name a	few (Manning 2013: 98). 
The adoption of a	wide range of methods can be seen as an attempt	to draw viewers 
from other fields to Forsythe’s work. 
The Score 
The homepage for the site is mostly white, with a	 thick lime-green stripe travelling 
through the centre of the screen. In the middle is a	small box playing the film of One 
Flat	Thing, reproduced. From the initial encounter with the site, the user is presented 
with choices, for example, they can choose to skip the introduction and decide 
between viewing the site as a	full or windowed screen. The menu page invites users 
to take control of their experiences, which introduces them to a	key feature of the 
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site. Although not	every object	is strongly interactive, 50 the user is invited to play an 
active role. The quantity of information means that	visits to the site require readers to 
select	which objects to attend to. Furthermore, navigation is non-prescribed; users	
must	 decide in which order to access information, and decode the objects they 
encounter. However, they are offered some guidance. For example, the introductory 
text	reads: 
From dance to data	to objects, Synchronous Objects reveals the 
interlocking systems of organization in the choreography of 
William Forsythe’s One Flat	 Thing, reproduced	 (2000). Those 
systems were quantified through the collection of data	 and 
transformed into a	 series of objects that	 allow the user to 
explore choreographic structures and reimagine what	else they 
might	look like (Forsythe and OSU 2009). 
This description may seem a	little perplexing at	first as Synchronous Objects does not	
readily relate to any other site. Furthermore, the intention to quantify dance data	is 
perhaps unfamiliar to dance audiences. Therefore, an important	feature of the score	
is the way that	it	continuously clarifies the methods used and information presented, 
through the use of an ‘Object	Explanation’ and ‘Process Catalog’, which outline the 
functions and processes of making the objects. Zuniga	 Shaw (2014)	 discusses the 
significance of the Process Catalogs,	 describing them as an attempt	 to address the 
power imbalance that	 is produced by scores. She suggests that, “[s]cores tend to 
invoke ideas of right	 and wrong and authorial truth” (Zuniga	 Shaw 2014: 101) and 
that	the team wanted to acknowledge the partiality of the score and encourage the 
user’s	subjectivity through disclosing how the objects were made. 
50 See Lopes (2001) for a	detailed discussion of forms of interactivity in relation to art. 
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The introductory page helps to clarify the terminology and concepts of the site. It	
includes three essays, addressing; ‘The Dance’, ‘The Data’ and ‘The Objects’. ‘The 
Dance’ essay, jointly authored by Forsythe and Zuniga	Shaw discusses the stimuli and 
movement	 material for One Flat	 Thing, reproduced, which is described as “an 
ensemble dance that	reconfigures classical choreographic principles of counterpoint” 
(Forsythe and Zuniga	Shaw, 2009). The authors explain that	counterpoint	in the work 
is generated through the interaction of three structural systems: the movement	
material, the cueing and the alignments. They go on to clarify that	 the dance 
comprises fixed movement	 material with some structured improvisation (Forsythe 
and Zuniga	 Shaw 2009). It	 is further explained that	 there is no set	 terminology for 
referring to the movement, but	that	“members of the company most	often refer to 
the different	 segments of fixed movement	 as themes” (Forsythe and Zuniga	 Shaw 
2009). There are 25 key themes, which are repeated and combined in various ways 
throughout	the dance. This type of information is important. As previously suggested, 
the novel nature of the site perhaps makes it	 unfamiliar, therefore grasping the 
terminology, such as how the term ‘theme’ is used in this context, is essential to fully 
understanding the site. 
Forsythe and Zuniga	Shaw explain that	the work is organised by an elaborate system 
of cues between the dancers, which comprises more than 200 cues over the course of 
the fifteen- minute dance (2009). Alignments between the dancers are another 
important	 feature of the work. These are described as, “[s]hort instances of 
synchronization between dancers in which their actions share some, but	 not	
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necessarily all, attributes” (Forsythe and Zuniga	 Shaw 2009). This explanation 
demonstrates how alignments are not	 exactly the same as unison. They can occur 
between two dancers doing different	 movements, as long as they share some 
features. By ‘attributes’ Forsythe and Zuniga	Shaw are perhaps referring to features 
such as the direction, dynamics and speed of movements. There are thousands of 
alignments, which occur continuously throughout	the dance. However, for the sake 
of data	 extraction a	 sub-set	 of these are identified, labelled as ‘sync-ups’, of	which	
there are approximately 200 (Forsythe and Zuniga	Shaw 2009). 
The decision to record the relationships between movements that	are not	exactly the 
same demonstrates the analytic priorities of the score. None of the 20 objects analyse 
the specific movement	 material. In contrast	 to Labanotation, for example, the 
behaviour of the dancers’ individual body parts avoids deconstruction. Rather the 
emphasis is on the structural whole, the relationships between the dancers, and the 
dynamic shape of the work. It appears that	 this approach arises from Forsythe’s 
conceptual framework. In a	spoken commentary he suggests that, 
[w]hen I	 read the piece I	 try to read the entire picture. I	 try not	 to 
read a	 particular person because it	 was composed as an entirety 
(Forsythe 2009). 
Zuniga	 Shaw explains a	 little about	 the process of making the score. She discusses 
how the team firstly identified the structures present	in the dance and gathered the 
relevant	 data	 relating to these structures. Secondly they found ways to store and 
access this data. She describes how this resulted in two sets of data; ‘spatial data’, 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





which arose from the source film, and ‘attribute data’ which came from dancers’ 
accounts (Zuniga	 Shaw 2009), both of which contributed to making the various 
objects on the site. Interestingly Zuniga	Shaw describes the process as “codification”	
(2014: 110), drawing connections with the traditional view of dance scoring. 
Palazzi explains how the team initially used annotations to unpick the visual 
complexity of the dance so that	they could understand the core systems (2009). They 
then built	on these to generate charts, animations and maps. She suggests that	 the 
objects serve various functions, for example; some objects, “showcase our work in 
annotating the dance” (2009), while others invite the user to explore and experiment	
with the principles of the work. Palazzi describes another group of objects, comprising 
animations generated using data	from the dance as, “wonderfully complex, abstract	
animations” (Palazzi 2009). Lastly she suggests that	 some of the objects use the 
quantitative properties of the dance to “empower new composition” (Palazzi 2009). 
The quantifying of movement	occurred through the deconstruction of the structure of 
the dance, and the subsequent	transformation of bodily movement	into digital data.	
This data was then used to develop objects such as animations and 3D graphs, which 
offer new expressions	and compositions. The descriptions of the objects from Palazzi 
do not	provide distinct	categories, however they illustrate the various methods used 




















The objects are arranged in five columns on the menu page.	Moving from left to right
they become increasingly abstract. 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of 
the thesis can be found in the Lancester Library, Coventry University.
Figure 3:	Synchronous	Objects menu page (Forsythe and OSU 2009) 
At the top of the far left column, and	therefore the first object to be encountered if
following	western reading practices is an object entitled ‘The	Dance’.	 Central to this
object is the filmed version of One Flat	 Thing, reproduced, which is	 surrounded by 
data. On the right hand side of the film is a control panel, which	allows the user to
decide the perspective to view the dance from. They can choose between a front-on, 
overhead or close-up	view. Users can also select whether to view cue and alignment 
annotations, which are laid over the film. Furthermore, the dance can be
accompanied either by ambient sound, the	 score from the live work by Thom




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
144 
The choices made by the user have a	 significant	 impact	on the viewing experience. 
For example, watching the dance with and without	annotations offers	very different 
experiences. The annotations draw attention to the specific cues and alignments as 
well as the overall dynamics and energy of the movement. They generate a	striking 
aesthetic, enhancing certain features of the dance. The choice of sound 
accompaniment	 also impacts significantly on the experience of the work. Willems’ 
score provides an atmospheric musical accompaniment. At	 times evoking an 
electronic industrial wasteland, at other times dark and foreboding. The sound 
heightens the sense of drama, perhaps invoking a	 stronger emotive response than 
when viewing the movement	 alone. In contrast, choosing ambient	 sound serves to 
echo and reflect	the sparse nature of the space, and draws attention to the abstract, 
non-emotional nature of the movement. 
Forsythe’s ‘sing through’ demonstrates a	frequently used method by choreographers, 
who often use their voice to illustrate the dynamic qualities of movement	in rehearsal 
and teaching. This method is	 also used by British choreographer Wayne McGregor 
and is referred to by cognitive scientist	David Kirsch as ‘sonification' (2011). In this 
instance it	 focuses the viewer’s attention on the rhythms, dynamics and flow of the 
movement. The sound closely correlates with the energy and effort	of the dancers’ 
movement. Large curves of the arms are illustrated by vocal ‘whooshes’. As a	dancer	
jumps on to the table the effort	 is embodied in Forsythe’s accompanying grunt. The 
labour of the movement	is foregrounded, as vocals and bodies interact	and the effort	
and energy of human movement	is made evident. The notion of ‘sonification’ refers 
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to sounds as well as words, it	has a	relationship to breath and therefore is a	way for 
the choreographer or teacher to express movement	dynamics, linking the expression 
of the voice to the expression of the body, as is demonstrated by Forsythe’s 
commentary. 
The spoken commentary from Forsythe offers yet	 another reading of the work. He 
discusses the use of counterpoint, explaining how it	 involves different	movements 
that	 occur together but	 that	 are not	 performed	 in unison, and contextualising the 
notion by discussing how it	 is used in choreography and other contexts, such as 
animation (Forsythe 2009). This provides a	more cerebral experience than the sensual 
soundscapes previously discussed. Forsythe encourages the viewer (and listener) to 
see the form and structure of the work, arguably offering a directed, educational 
experience. It is possible to layer the aural accompaniment, thus enhancing the 
complexity of the experience. For example, combining Forsythe’s spoken commentary 
with Willems’ sound score generates a rich spectatorial experience, calling on 
aesthetic, sensual and cerebral faculties. 
Below the film is a	moving graph. The dancers’ names are listed down the left	hand 
side. A vertical bar moves across visually complex coloured shapes and lines, plotted 
on a	 horizontal stave. At	 the bottom of the graph users can add or remove data	
relating to the cues, movement	 and sync ups. On the left	 hand side of the screen 
attribute data	in the form of written texts provide a	commentary to the movement, 
describing the dancers, themes, cues and alignments. These graphs, data	 sets and 
annotations can only serve their function once they are understood. In much the 
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same way that	a Labanotation score is written in a	codified language, and requires the 
appropriate training to be understood, Synchronous Objects requires digital literacy. 
For example, the use of the word ‘data’ to describe the information extracted from 
movement	 analysis reiterates the digitalisation of the movement. Whilst	 the term 
‘data’ can refer to information in a	wide variety of forms, here the word indicates 
computerised data, resituating the movement	 within the digital sphere. The 
terminology of the site combined with the volume of information means that	at first	
glance this object	might	appear difficult	to engage with for those who do not	possess 
the relevant	forms of knowledge. Responses to the language and information depend 
upon the background knowledge of the user. For instance, those who are used to 
accessing data	 in this form and have high levels of digital literacy are perhaps less 
likely to be daunted by the site. Similarly, Palazzi describes the initial response to One 
Flat	 Thing, reproduced from those on the team who were viewing contemporary 
dance for the first	time. She explains that	they were not	sure how to understand the 
work, but	 that	 learning about	 the choreographic structures from Forsythe allowed 
them to draw connections between dance and their individual disciplines and make 
sense of the work. She suggests, 
[s]uddenly we were released from looking for a	 linear story and 
instead could engage with One Flat	 Thing, reproduced as a
contrapunctal composition of complex relationships, patterns and 
trends (Palazzi 2009). 
This articulation demonstrates how understanding the choreographic structure 
allowed the team to ‘read’ the dance. 
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In much the same way that	 Palazzi and her team needed further information to 
understand One Flat	Thing, reproduced, some users will require information in order 
to fully understand what	it	is that	is being demonstrated through the graphs and data	
sets. This observation from Palazzi relates to a	recurring theme on the site involving 
the perceived importance of understanding the movement. The aim to demonstrate 
the choreographic structure of the work implies that	this knowledge will enhance the 
users experience of the dance. 
Alignment Annotations 
The ‘Alignment	Annotations’ object	offers a	focussed consideration of the alignment	
data. The object	demonstrates how the annotations work though the use of colour-
coded lines and curves overlaid on the film to show how movements relate. The 
annotations have an important	practical function, to “make the spatial and temporal 
patterns of the dance’s alignments spring into view as you watch” (Forsythe and OSU 
2009). The movement	 is annotated in real time, meaning that	 the annotations are 
only visible as long as the moment	 of alignment	 between the dancers occurs. The 
result	 of this is that	 they echo the rhythms and dynamics of the movement. They 
appear as part	 of the dance, enhancing the form and flow of the movement. The 
annotations can also be viewed without	 the film. Exclusive of the dancers, the 
coloured forms carve through black space. Spiralling geometric forms (dis) appear; 
arising and fading from nowhere. They circle around each other, intersecting and 
continuing on. The animations move quickly. They leave nothing behind: traceless 
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traces of invisible movement. The dancers’ bodies are no longer present, yet	 their 
energetic impetus is maintained. 
The object	 includes an explanatory video, which demonstrates how the annotations 
reveal the alignments between the dancers. The video adopts pedagogic approaches, 
for example, text	on the screen encourages the user to try and identify alignments 
without	 the animations, before demonstrating how they work. Suddenly the 
relationships are revealed, the structure of the movement	becomes clearer. Although 
this site adopts a	 range of new and existing methods the analytic framework is not	
entirely new. The motivations of this object	align with the systematic dance analysis 
model proposed by Adshead et	al (1988). 
The motivations for analysing dance relate to the relationship between understanding 
and appreciation. In the Introduction to Dance Analysis: Theory and Practice Adshead 
outlines her belief that	the analysis of dance is beneficial for appreciation (1988: 7 -9),	
suggesting that	analysis, “is crucial in coming to understand dance, to appreciate it	
more deeply and to value it” (1988: 12). Adshead’s claim is not	without	 its critics, 
aesthetic purists might	 suggest	 that	 art	 should be appreciated without	
deconstruction. However, Adshead argues for its importance, further suggesting that	
analysis is useful for the choreographer, as well as teachers, historians and directors 
(1988: 7). Her claims relate to Synchronous Objects on two accounts; firstly Adshead’s 
belief that	analysis and understanding leads to appreciation can be compared to the 
motivations of the site, which both offers and encourages analytic readings of One 
Flat	 Thing, reproduced. Secondly, the relevance and importance of analysis for 
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Forsythe’s practice, and the intention to encourage him and others to think 
differently about	 his work is suggested at	 various points throughout	 the site. For 
example, Zuniga	Shaw writes, 
[b]ecause we focussed on the dance as a	choreographic resource — 
rather than scoring it	 for the process of preservation	 — we are 
empowered to take this rigorous process of data	collection into new 
creative spaces. We hope our choices, aesthetic and analytic, 
generate new possibilities for ongoing creativity and research, both 
in the studio and in the lab (Zuniga	Shaw 2009)	
This articulation demonstrates the motivation to feed back into practice, however, 
the ways that	this might	happen are left	open. 
Synchronous Objects adopts a	similar analytic standpoint	to Adshead’s model, which	
emphasises the relationships between the components and form of the work, and the 
viewer’s interpretation and evaluation. The focus is very clearly on “the dance itself” 
(Adshead 1988: 6 [Adshead’s emphasis]), it	 this sense the model is structuralist	 in 
both method and intention, focussing solely on the analysis of the closed structure of 
the work and inter-dependent	relations between the components. 
Writing a	decade after Adshead’s proposition, Jordan and Thomas point	out	that, 
[a]s a	 mode of analysis, structuralism seeks to explain surface 
events, in this case a	 dance, in terms of the structures that	 lie 
below the surface level and that	 underscore it. Moreover, from 
this viewpoint, the art	 work is treated as a structure that	
functions as an emerging coherent	 whole, constantly in the 
process of structuration through its own determinate internal 
rules (Jordan and Thomas 1998: 151). 
	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




The ‘Alignment	Annotations’	 object demonstrates how Synchronous Objects can be 
seen as a	re-calling of structuralist	methods. Referring back to Forsythe’s suggestion 
that	he composed and reads the work as an entirety (2009), the annotations analyse 
behaviour of individuals only in relation to one another. 
Video Abstraction Tool 
The ‘Video Abstraction Tool’ is one of four interactive tools on the site. It	allows users 
to customise how they view the dance by using filters to create various visual affects. 
The filters were developed using frame differencing, which allows for the visual 
realisation at	 the differences between every frame in the video. For example, the 
‘Positive and Negative Space’ filters leave outlines where the dancers move in space. 
Users can choose to use either accumulative or fading images. Furthermore, trails of 
motion can also be watched without	the dancers. The tool allows users to generate 
individual artistic renderings of the movement, actively responding to the research 
question by generating alternative manifestations of physical thinking. This object	
closely relates to the motivation to “explore the idea	of a	generative trace of a	dance” 
(Zuniga	 Shaw 2009). The generative nature of the project	 is demonstrated through 
user interactivity. This object allows the user to exercise autonomy and engage 


















The ‘trace’ is	 a recurring	 theme in discussions of dance, particularly	 in relation to
questions of documentation51. The ‘Trails	 Long’ filter	 allows for the visualisation of
the virtual trails of the dancers’ movement, creating	 a tangible trace of the
movement. 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged 
version of the thesis can be found in the Lancester Library, Coventry 
University.
Figure 4:	The 'Trails Long'	filter (Forsythe and OSU 2009) 
Michael Andereck, a	 graduate student from the department of Computer Science
and Engineering at OSU narrates the explanatory film. He describes the filter as
“helping you remember what just happened” (Andereck 2009). This is a unique
approach to the documentation	of movement, and	one afforded by the development
of digital technology. Instant documentation poses challenges to existing and well-
versed discourses regarding the ontological centrality of ephemerality discussed in
previous chapters (pp.	24 – 25	and 57	– 60), by	allowing past and present movement
51 Mark Franko (1995) and Andre Lepecki (2004b) both consider Jacques Derrida’s	
notion of the ‘trace’ as a way of thinking about the ephemerality and documentation
of dance. See also	Franz Anton Cramer (2007:	1-2), who suggests that dance is in
some ways defined	by the way that it leaves no trace, yet is more than just a dancer
dancing. 
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to co-exist. Furthermore, dance documentation has historically focussed on how to 
preserve the work for future viewing and performance, whereas this tool offers a	
form of instant	preservation of the elusive trace of movement, in order to inform the 
immediate viewing experience. 
Other tools on the site include the ‘Counterpoint	 Tool’, which allows users to 
experiment	 with counterpoint	 by controlling digital ‘widgets’. The ‘Cue Visualizer’ 
provides a	visual map of the relationships between dancers, and allows the user to 
control elements of what	 they see. Lastly, the ‘Generative Drawing Tool’ features 
digital ‘brushes’ that	can be moved around the screen. 
Statistical Counterpoint 
The ‘Statistical Counterpoint’ object is a	 graph that	 maps the movement	 of the 
dancers. It	 can be seen as a	 response to the goal of the project	 to “enrich cross-
disciplinary dialogue between art	and science” (Forsythe and OSU 2009). One of the 
aims in the development	of this object	was to see how methods used by statisticians 
to map weather patterns might	inform understand of the choreographic structure of 
the work (Forsythe and OSU 2009). It	 uses software called gGobi, which features a	
‘brushing’ capability to show statistical views of the data	 (Forsythe and OSU 2009).
The graph comprises three views; the multivariate view is the most	prominent, which 
maps the dancers’ names against	cues given and cues received. To the right	of this is 
the spatial view, which demonstrates cues. Below is a temporal view, which 
demonstrates the same data	 but	 in relation to time. By ‘brushing’ or ‘painting’ the 
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data, the graph visualises each dancer’s contribution. Greater activity is demonstrated 
through increased density of yellow lines. It	is not	only the alignment	data	that	is used 
here; variables also include cues, improvisation and so forth. 
When Palazzi suggests that	some of the objects “empower new composition” (2009), 
she uses the example of the interactive ‘Generative Drawing Tool’ to demonstrate 
this claim. Portanova	 pays particular attention to the generative nature of 
Synchronous Objects. She points out	that, 
the technology is generative not	 simply from a conceptual 
perspective, but	also in technical terms: for example, in relation 
to the design of some generative objects, in which a	 few 
parametric changes can create different	results (Portanova	2013:
87) 
However, alongside the generative function of the interactive tools, the ‘Statistical 
Counterpoint’ object	also empowers composition, generating new forms on screen, 
as well as providing information to feed back into choreographic practice. Noel 
Cressie, a	 professor of statistics at	 OSU who developed the graph,	 suggests that	 it 
may encourage the choreographer to think differently about	their work. He explains 
that	 one of the motivations for the tool is “not	 only to summarise, but	 to inspire” 
(Cressie 2009). These motivations clearly align with Adshead’s suggestion that	
analysis informs choreographic practice (1988: 7), and further demonstrate the 
generative nature of the site. Digital artists and theorists Casey Reas and Chandler 
McWilliams 52 discuss the generative nature of digital art, suggesting that	
52 This text	is co-authored by LUST graphic design company. 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 		
	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




transformation is a	key feature (2010: 67	– 90). Transformation can take many forms, 
but	what	is important is the way that	it	inspires new relationships whilst	maintaining 
a connection to the original form. Reas and McWilliams suggest, 
[t]ransformation provides a	 way to express continuity between 
forms, data	 and ideas, When a work utilizes techniques of 
transformation, it	 retains a	 connection between its original and 
transformed versions, such radical transformations can reveal 
entirely new relationships (Reas and McWilliams (2010: 79). 
Although this score is not	intended as a	tool for reconstruction or re-instantiation, the 
way that	 it	 reveals and inspires new relationships demonstrates a	 motivation to 
encourage generative activity from the user. This features perhaps helps to account	
for its labelling as a	score. Although a	direct	relationship to action does not	appear to 
be the primary function of the score, its generative capabilities suggest	that	it	 is not	
entirely removed from artistic practices. 
3D Alignment Forms 
There are multiple animations on	Synchronous Objects, which take many forms. As 
with the other objects on the site, they arise from the choreographic data. For 


















This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged 
version of the thesis can be found in the Lancester Library, Coventry 
University.
Figure 5:	'3D Alignment Forms'	(Forsythe and OSU 2009) 
The ‘3D	 Alignment Forms’ object is a digital animation, lasting	 one minute and 50
seconds. Like the dance, the	animation begins	with the placing of tables; however, in	
this instance they are not dragged forth by the dancers, rather	they materialise from
space, placed	on to a virtual floor. The camera is at floor level, looking	between the
table legs. The tables loom above, their	 sense of weight greatly enhanced by the
casting of shadows on the imagined floor. The camera spans the space, revealing	the
structure of the set and generating a heightened sense of dimensionality. The
animated tables are open frames with no top surface, shapes	 dance through the
space where material once stood. At first the shapes are familiar — the alignment
annotations re-appear.	However, this	time the gaps between the lines are filled with
digital mesh, the	result of a technique called ‘lofting’, used	by boat designers (Palazzi
2009). The shapes become three-dimensional	as the forms twist in space. Unlike the
disappearing annotations, these	forms accumulate, slowly	building a virtual sculpture.
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The camera	spans, moving in and out	of the shapes. Up close, the materiality of the 
form is revealed. The film plays with space perception, continuously moving and 
alternating between close and long shots. At	one point	the camera	moves above the 
form, demonstrating that the sculpture resides in between the rear two sets of tables. 
As the camera	 shifts something about	 the dance is revealed;	 seeing	how the shape 
occupies the virtual space helps the material the material form to emerge. It becomes	
clear that	this contortion of material is reflective of the moving body.	
The object	 explores the ‘what	 else’ of the research question, using information 
gathered from the movement	material to explore new ways to express choreographic 
data	 and generate “wonderfully complex, abstract	 animations” (Palazzi 2009). 
Interestingly, despite the motivation to express choreographic principles without	the 
body, viewing the animation in the context	 of Synchronous Objects arguably 
encourages the viewer to perceive the body-led nature of the images. For example, 
encountering the image without	 knowledge of how or why it	 was developed one 
would perhaps be less likely to think of the form as bodily. The image therefore 
occupies a	paradoxical space, as the body is visibly removed, yet	perceptually present. 
The abstraction of the data	into tools, animations and images demonstrate how the 
analytic priorities of the site are not	 restricted to a structuralist	 framework. 
Furthermore, the expression of the work outside of the remits of the human body 
demonstrates a	 re-thinking of how to analyse dance. The focus is not	 solely on the 
specific behaviour of the human body, but	on the kinaesthetic impetus and evolving 
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Summary 
This chapter has introduced Synchronous Objects, and provided a preliminary 
discussion of some of the objects on the site. The objects examined have helped to 
demonstrate how Palazzi’s articulations regarding the functions and motivations of 
the site, manifest	through various forms of re-presentation. As mentioned previously 
(p.142),	 Palazzi suggests that	 the objects on the site serve a	 range of functions, 
including; to showcase the team’s annotations, to encourage the user to explore and 
experiment	 with the principles of the work, to offer abstract	 animations and to 
empower new composition (Palazzi 2009). ‘The Dance’ provides an introduction to 
the work and the framework of the site. The ‘Alignment	 Annotations’ object	
introduces the annotation data	 that	 forms the basis of other objects. Furthermore, 
this object	 encourages users to see the movement	 in relation to Forsythe’s 
structuralist	choreographic framework. The ‘Video Abstraction Tool’ invites the user 
to engage in the active exploration of the research question, suggesting that	 this 
further supports understanding of the key features of the work.	 The ‘Statistical 
Counterpoint’ object	 shows how the data	 has been used to empower new 
compositions. The graph monitors each dancers’ contribution to the work as a	whole, 
allowing for the structure of the dance to be more clearly seen, foregrounding	 the 
structuralist	tendencies of the site. Lastly, the ‘3D Alignment	Forms’ demonstrates the 
abstraction of the body and foregrounds kinaesthetic features of the movement. 
This chapter started to explore the nature of ‘choreographic objects’, focussing on	
unpicking the unique nature of Synchronous Objects. Portanova	 points to the 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	






“qualitative novelty” that	arises through data	visualisation (2013: 89), highlighting the 
newness of the object. Through the consideration of these objects it	 seems that	
Synchronous Objects can be understood, not	only as offering novel aesthetic forms, 
but as demonstrative of an emergent	 form of dance analysis, which adopts 
structuralist	 priorities, whilst	 also capturing and evoking the expressive qualities of 
the work; an approach made possible through digital media. The next	 chapter	
continues to think though the role and nature of ‘choreographic objects’, considering 
the analytic and philosophical frameworks at	 play in the development	 of Using the 
Sky. 
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Chapter Seven: Using the Sky 
Introduction 
At	 first	 there is tapping. The noise made by walking in an empty room. The small 
figure of Jeanette Durning is moving in a	circle. Once complete, she takes a	few steps 
on a	diagonal, her right-side leading; her body turned to the camera. Durning’s arms 
move slowly at	 hip height, exploring the space around her. She stops. Dipping her 
head, she looks to the side, scooping the air in front	of her. It	is over quickly; Durning 
continues to travel. She stops again, this time looking to the ceiling. Her head bows 
briefly before recovering, her spine follows; smooth, snake-like. Meandering on, each 
movement	 left	 behind. Not	much resonates. The recording is non-rewindable. The 
movement	unrepeatable. It	is calm, un-spectacular, each moment	as significant	as the 
last. 
In a	box next	to Durning, Ros Warby travels in the opposite direction. Her arms search 
the air around her hips. She stops less frequently. At	times her feet	explore the air. 
Warby moves faster than Durning, the diagonal quickly completed, she walks a	
circular path in the centre of the space. Less pausing and less contact	with the floor, 
Warby’s movement	 is smooth, less weighted than Durning’s. But	 something is the 
same. They do not	 perform the same movements, yet	 they are undoubtedly 
performing the same dance. 
The dance in question is Hay’s solo work No Time To Fly (2010). The recordings are 
part	of Using the Sky, a	digital score of the work developed in 2013, as part	of the 
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Motion Bank project. As mentioned	 in Chapter One (p.2), this took place between 
2010 – 2014, and resulted in digital scores of work(s) by Deborah Hay, Jonathan 
Burrows and Matteo Fargion, and Bebe Miller and Thomas Hauert. Using the Sky is
the first	score to be completed; a	beta	version was launched at	the Tanzkongress in 
Düsseldorf in	June 2013.	
This chapter introduces Using The	Sky,	asking core questions, such as: What	are the 
analytic and philosophical frameworks at	play? And how is the work re-presented in 
this context? I	consider how the site reveals multiple layers of materiality, virtuality, 
embodiment, object-hood and abstraction. I	 go on to propose that	 features of this 
digital score can be seen to operate within a	‘posthuman’ (Causey 2007, Hayles 1999, 
Braidotti 2013) framework, reconfiguring the role of the body in the reading and 
documentation of dance. Through an examination of the score in relation to theories 
from	N. Katherine Hayles (1999),	Rosi Braidotti (2013)	and Matthew Causey (2007), I	
propose a	 pragmatic version of posthumanism, which acknowledges our reflexive 
relationship with the screen, whilst	adhering to common practice regarding the way 
we interact	with digital media. 
Motion Bank 
Motion Bank was a continuation of the Synchronous Objects project; it	 further 
explored ways to articulate and disseminate ‘choreographic thinking’ (Forsythe 2008). 
During the launch of Using the Sky, deLahunta	explained that	one of the key concerns 
for Motion Bank was the question; what	 can digital media	 offer in the project	 of 
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rendering process? (deLahunta	 2013b). This project	 concentrated on the work of 
artists other than Forsythe, each with different	 approaches to dance making. 
Considering the question posed by deLahunta	may help to understand the intended 
purpose and function of Using the Sky. The aim is reflective of the increased interest	
in sharing choreographic process and whilst	 the process of dance making often 
foregrounds the body, choreographers and theorists are simultaneously exploring the 
potentials of technology to facilitate, make and share dance. These interests may 
seem at	odds; the digital and the flesh perhaps appear to be in a	binary relationship. 
Therefore Motion Bank’s research question, and the aim to research bodily practice 
and digital media	in equal terms, is both timely and significant. 
The Score 
I want	 to choreograph exacting movement	content	 that	contains 
no end to discovery, where milliseconds of stunning recognition 
take place within a	strict	choreography in time and space. Where 
soundless rhythms drive the dance (Hay 2000: 81). 
Deborah Hay’s career spans six decades. She grew up and trained in New York City, 
going on to dance for Merce Cunningham in 1964, and work with Judson Dance 
Theatre. Despite being part	of a	burgeoning contemporary dance scene, in 1970 Hay 
moved to rural Vermont, thus began a	life-long self-reflective enquiry into the nature 
of dance (Hay n.d.). Although Hay has choreographed for existing companies, such as 
Toronto Dance Theatre,	53 she is perhaps best	known for her work with the Deborah 
Hay Dance Company and her solo works. No Time to Fly is one of many solos that	Hay 
53 Up Until Now (2010) 
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has created for herself. The self-reflective nature of much of Hay’s practice and opus 
means that	 it	 is possible to speculate that	 Hay’s interest	 in scoring arises from a	
concern for the preservation and sharing of solos that	are known only to her. 
During a	 reading called ‘The Continuity of Discontinuity’ at the Tanzkongress in 
Düsseldorf in 2013 Hay suggested that	her research is very limited, as it	concerns only 
her	body. Her practice is introspective; it	is primarily concerned with listening to, and 
learning from her body, which she frequently refers to as her teacher (2000: xxxiv). 
The appearance of Hay’s work is hard to summarise. She says of	 herself, “[i]t	 is 
difficult	 to describe her actions. It doesn’t	 seem to be necessary” (2000: 23). 
Movement	arises from repeated questions and considerations such as, “[w]here I	am 
is what	 I need, cellularly” (2000: 6). Hay uses these provocations as the basis for 
exploring simple sequences of movement	and challenging the habitual behaviour of 
the body. An interest	in cells repeatedly occurs in Hay’s writing, she told the audience 
in Düsseldorf that	she is interested in re-configuring her three-dimensional body into 
a ‘cellular’ body (Hay 2013). 
Once Hay had choreographed No Time to Fly she composed a	score of the work using 
words and sketches. Hay’s original text	 score was not	 articulated in individual 
sections. Similarly to Stark Smith’s Underscore it	provides an account	of her thoughts 
at each stage of the dance. The prose is therefore primarily descriptive and does not	
present	itself as strict	instruction. Importantly No Time to Fly was created prior to the 
score, which was developed as a series of statements to provide a tool to transmit	the 
principles of the work. As the score is activated these descriptions become 
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prescriptive. The score is distinct	 from rehearsal notes and scribbled sketches. 
Although such artefacts seem to provide the basis for the document, it	is presented in	
a way that	makes it	 easy for the reader to follow, thus implicating it	 as a	 tool for 
transmission. 
Although originally descriptive, I	 refer to Hay’s entries as ‘directives’, echoing their 
transition into prescription. Crucially, the text-score does not	specify any movements. 
For example, the first	directive reads: 
I appear at	 the edge of the stage as the last	 few audience 
members take their seats. My behaviour is matter-of-fact. I	have 
a lot	of choices to make in advance of my entrance. I	decide on 
my entrance site and the direction I	will travel in relation to the 
audience, plus where that	 path will end. Then the light	 fades 
(Hay in Motion Bank 2013). 
This section of text	 demonstrates how the score perfectly aligns with D’Amato’s 
conception of “indeterminate language scores” (2014), 54 which deploy the ambiguity 
of language in order to allow (relative) freedom in interpretation. As is clear through 
the nature of the directives, the work does not	 consist	 of a	 repeatable movement	
structure; it	can look different	each time. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two (p.35), dance works such as this — which possess	
flexibility of form — including, improvisation, interactive performances, and task-
based dances are referred to by Rubidge as “open” (2000a:	7).	No Time to Fly can be 
categorised as an open work, insomuch as the identity of each instantiation is not	
54 D’Amato (2014)	discusses Hay’s work as an example of this approach to scoring. 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




dependent	 upon specific movement. However, as demonstrated in the opening 
paragraphs, despite differences in movement, when observing interpretations of	the 
work	 on Using the Sky, the work is recognisable. The renditions are unified by a	
certain style or tone. This is potentially the result	 of the dancers’ experience of 
working with Hay, alongside their detailed engagement	 with the text-score. It is 
possible to suggest	 that	 interpreting the score without	knowledge of Hay’s practice 
would not	result	in an instance of the work. Consequently, Hay’s practice is central to 
the dancers’ interpretations, meaning that	 the work is consistent	 and recognisable 
through features other than movement. 
Different	dance works are constrained by different	types of identity conditions. For 
example, some works may be defined by a	particular aesthetic or be dependent	upon 
the use of a	specific sequence of movement, piece of music and so on. However, in 
the case of No Time to Fly, the work‘s identity is arguably defined by its relationship 
to Hay’s practice, and to the text-score.	 Engagement	with both of these elements is 
fundamental to performing the work. For example, simply interpreting the text-score 
at random, with no knowledge of Hay’s choreographic principles, would not	qualify as 
an instance of	No Time to Fly, as the work is essentially linked to the principles of 
Hay’s practice. This is not	 always the case; dance works that	 are constrained by 
movement	 structures, for example, can arguably be correctly performed without	
knowledge of the choreographer’s individual practice. However, Hay’s work and 
practice are enmeshed. 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	











In order to make Using the Sky, the text-score was sent	 to Durning, Warby and 
Juliette Mapp in December 2010. These three dancers had worked extensively with 
Hay in the past, and were therefore very familiar with her practice. The three 
“executants” (Hay and Motion Bank 2013) were instructed to practice the score alone 
for three months in order to create their own adaptations (Motion Bank 2103). These 
adaptations were recorded in April 2011 at	 the Forsythe studios in Frankfurt. Each 
dancer was recorded performing the work seven times resulting in 21 digital versions 
of No Time to Fly. The decision to use multiple versions was a	response to the open 
nature of the movement	 content	 (Motion Bank 2013). The digital-score has a
different	 function to the text-score, as suggested by deLahunta, the aim was to 
render choreographic process, as opposed to providing a	 tool for (re)instantiation. 
Because No Time to Fly is an open work, constrained by a set indeterminate 
instructions, which do not	 dictate a	 specific movement	 structure, using a	 single 
recording of one interpretation would be inappropriate, as it	would suggest	the work 
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This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of 
the thesis can be found in the Lancester Library, Coventry University.
Figure 6 Using the Sky homepage (Motion Bank 2013) 
The text	score was	divided into 30 units by	the Motion Bank team.	The 21 versions	of
No	 Time to	 Fly were then annotated using Piecemaker, a	 digital annotation tool
developed by Forsythe Company member David Kern,55 which allowed	 the team to
align the sections of each interpretation with the directives of the text-score.	 The 
text-score is	 central to Using the Sky, which is accessed through the Motion Bank 
website. The site is made up of five ‘sets’, these	 are: ‘Introduction	 to Concepts’, 
‘Jeanine	Durning and Ros Warby	 Insights’, ‘Digital	 Adaptation of “No	 Time to Fly”’,	
‘Movement	 Character’ and	 ‘All	 Recordings (with Overlays) From April 2011’. The	
design of the site, in	keeping with Hay’s	thinking, is	not entirely linear. For example, 
55 A version of Piecemaker, PM2GO can be downloaded from the Motion Bank
website: http://motionbank.org/en/event/pm2go-easy-use-video-annotation-tool 
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boxes of text	overlap one another, so that	access to information is disrupted, perhaps 
reflecting Hay’s interest	in discontinuity (Hay 2013). 
The use of language further demonstrates how the site embodies Hay’s thinking. The 
word “cell” is used to describe the organisation of information (Motion Bank 2013).	
This links Hay’s perception of the body and her concern with human cells, with 
language from computer science - drawing together the biological and the digital. This 
perhaps implies the site as a	 living form, made up of numerous active components, 
proposing itself as a	‘cellular’ body. 
This observation raises a	core theme regarding the interplay between the body and 
the digital. It is possible to suggest	 that	 the involvement	 of digital technology to 
create, share and examine dance, poses a	 threat	 to the centrality of the body. This 
argument	 is based upon a conception of digital information as dis-embodied,	
operating under a	 paradigm whereby the ‘real’ body and the digital surrogate are	
oppositional forces. This distinction relates to Hayles’ (1999) central thesis,	she argues 
that	 the distinction between information and embodiment	 is based on flawed 
historical theorising and that	the two are intrinsically linked. 
The relationship between technology and bodily practices is particularly important	in 
this context. Digitally scoring Hay’s work is interesting partly because her practice 
focuses	primarily on the on-going perception of her body in space. Unlike some other 
choreographers who might	 be concerned with constructing shapes, expressing 
emotions, or representing particular scenarios, Hay’s concern is with learning from 
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her body. This approach offers a subversive rendition of traditional dualism, 56 
whereby the mind is seen to control, command and instruct	 the body. This 
construction is often associated with traditional modes of dance training, during 
which dancers may be encouraged to engage their minds in order to control their 
bodies, by visualising the successful execution of certain movements for example. 
This strategy enforces the perceived dominance of the mind over the body -
employing its strength to manipulate the body into behaving correctly. Although 
Hay’s work arguably maintains a	dualist	perspective, the body dominates. 
Hay’s body-centric paradigm may not	 be easily transmitted in digital form. It is 
possible to suggest	that	experiences of the body are transmitted to other bodies only 
by sharing physical space, whereas digital forms can be seen as removed from the 
body, accessed solely by the mind. Using the Sky challenges these assumptions in 
multiple ways, including by generating digital objects that	appeal to the kinaesthetic, 
or bodily sense of the observer. 
Introduction to Concepts 
This page contains many short	clips of Hay and During discussing Hay’s practice and 
No Time to Fly. The films are labelled by theme, so that	 the user can link the 
conversations together. The themes are: ‘What	If (Questions and Notes’, ‘Continuity 
of Discontinuity, Nonlinear Versus Linear’, ‘Executants and Adaptations’, ‘Practice as 
56 Conventionally associated with the philosophy of René Decartes (1641 [republished 
in 1993]) 
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Performance’ and ‘On Language’. Considering the themes alone introduces us to the 
key concepts of the work, which are further reflected in the design decisions. For 
example the films are edited into clips of approximately two minutes each, and 
arranged randomly across the set, as opposed to being grouped together by theme, 
or arranged in linear form. This continues the sense of discontinuity introduced on 
the homepage. Also on this page is the text-score, recordings of Mapp and During’s 
adaptations and visualisations of travel paths and time variances. 
The version of the text-score at	 the centre of this page includes extra	 notes from 
Hay’s. For example, section 24 states simply, ‘I	mend the field’, Hay’s notes suggest: 
Accepting any movement, I	 call it	mend. At	 the same time it	 is an 
effort	 not	 to automatically produce arm or hand movements or 
behave like a	mother hen (Hay 2013). 
The inclusion of notes provides more information to the user about	Hay’s thinking. 
Furthermore they tell us something about	 the way in which Hay wrote the score. 
Some choreographers use their rehearsal notes as scores, or else these notes might	
be utilised by others as scores. However, in this case the score is more than merely 
Hay’s choreographic notes, she deliberately chose how to describe each section of 
the work. The series of directives derives from, but	 is also distinct	 from, Hay’s 
experiences, some of which we can access through the notes. Watching the 
recordings in correlation with the score creates a reciprocal deepening of 
understanding. It	allows the user to see how the text	might	instigate movement, thus 
making sense of the directive, whilst	potentially enhancing the user’s understanding 
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of the work. The seemingly abstract	movement	reads differently in conjunction with 
the directives, as users are able to appreciate the performers’ decision making, thus 
providing a	framework through which to understand the movement. 
The deepening of the user’s understanding demonstrates a key motivation for 
‘choreographic objects’; to enhance appreciation through demystifying dance making 
and movement. The connection between understanding and appreciation is 
particularly apparent	on the	‘Introduction to Concepts’ page. It	seems that	enhancing 
the user’s understanding of No Time to Fly is arguably the primary focus of this set. 
For example, in the first	video at	the top of the page, Hay discusses how the dancers 
work with multiple questions. She suggests that	these questions are like balls, which 
must	be kept	in the air (Hay in	Motion Bank 2013). The four questions are listed under 
section two of the score: 
What	 if the question “What	 if where I	 am is what	 I need?” is not	
about	 what	 I need but	 an opportunity to remember the question 
“What	if where I	am is what	I need?”? 
What	if dance is how I	practice my relationship with my whole body 
at once in relationship to the space where I am dancing in 
relationship to each passing moment	in relationship to my audience? 
What	if the depth of this question is on the surface? 
What	if my choice to surrender the pattern, and it	is just	a pattern, of 
facing a	 single direction or fixing on a singularly coherent	 idea, 
feeling, or object	when I	am dancing is a	way of remembering to see 
where I	am in order to dis-attach where I	am? 
What	if how I	see while I	am dancing is a	means by which movement	
arises without	looking for it? (Hay in	Motion Bank 2013). 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
171 
Hay explains that	it	is these questions that	form the continuity within No Time to Fly 
(2013). Using the Sky provides access to this information, and understanding how the 
dancers respond to these questions gives the movement	significance that	is arguably 
not	possible to access without	this knowledge. 
In another film Hay outlines how the questions form part	 of her daily practice, in 
order to add interest	 to otherwise “dumb” movement	 (Hay in	Motion Bank 2013). 
Moving both arms from above her head to the floor, Hay demonstrates a	movement, 
then repeats it, whilst	 activating the question “[w]hat	 if all of space was altered?”	
(Hay in	 Motion Bank 2013) This allows the viewer to see how the reading of the 
movement	 is changed through the acquisition of this knowledge. Although the 
movement	 is the same, the addition of the question means that	 it	 now appears	
differently - as an exploration of the nature of space, and the power of the body to 
alter its surroundings. This example clearly demonstrates an aspect	of Hay’s practice, 
explorations of this type are continually occurring for the dancer in Hay’s work. 
Therefore, once users have witnessed Hay’s demonstration they are arguably able to 
understand more about	 the layers of experience that	 contribute to the making and 
interpretations of the work,	thus demonstrating the aims of this site. 
Jeanine During and Ros	Warby	Insights 
One of the sets on the site, ‘Janine Durning and Ros Warby Insights’, features 
articulations from Warby and Durning about	 their experiences of performing the 
work. Users are able to watch the dancers performing No Time to Fly, alongside the 
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text- score, and their written account	of each section. The recordings are played in	
small boxes surrounded by diagrams, images and text. The way in which the 
recordings are not	placed in either the largest	or most	central position on the page 
points to the significance of other components of the work, such as; the text-score, 
space and the dancers’ experiences.	The result	of this is that	the moving body is only 
one component in the user’s conception of the work. 
During’s insights further demonstrate the centrality of the performer’s experience to 
the instantiation of No Time to Fly. For example, section 10 of the Hay’s text-score 
reads: 
My body is still while joy and sorrow wash across my face like a	
stream of instances. When not	streaming, my face may briefly return 
to normalcy, or it	may sustain a	 single reflection of joy/sorrow for 
longer moments (Hay in	Motion Bank 2013). 
In one of the recordings of Durning performing this section users might	 notice her 
subtly changing facial expressions and inward focus. On the right, she explains: 
So it's not	from moment	to moment, I'm sad this moment	and then 
joyful this moment. It's that	those two things are co-existing always. 
And one never achieves, never fully achieves one or the other. I	also 
see joy and sorrow happening in the space, not	 just	 in my 
experience but	it	is happening all the time in who or what	I see so 
the curtain may appear to be an image of either joyfulness or 
sorrow-ness. You really have to be empty there and not	 have a	
notion of how it's going to go (Durning in	Motion Bank 2013). 
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Considering Durning’s articulations might	 alter the user’s reading of the work. 
Observing the moment	solely in relation to Hay’s score, viewers can perhaps start	to 
see During expressing joy and sorrow, as prescribed by the directives. However, 
Durning’s account	 demonstrates a	 deep engagement	 with the instructions. Users 
learn that	 During is not	merely mimicking the emotions, but	 experiencing them in 
various ways. Observing her performing this moment	in connection with her account	
might	change our perception of it. Users of the digital-score are invited to see not	a
moment	 of pretence, or representation but	 of human experience. This further 
demonstrates how the digital-score might	 impact	 on the reading of the work and 
foregrounds features of it	that	are arguably imperceptible in performance alone. 
Although the sets are not	 numbered, this page is positioned to the right	 of 
‘Introduction to Concepts’ on the homepage, meaning that	following the left	to right	
navigation we arrive at	this page after the previous one. This seems important	when 
encountering the site for the first	 time. Without	 accessing the information in 
‘Introduction to Concepts’, the insights of the performers might	 be less significant. 
Some prior knowledge of Hay’s process and the concepts of the work allow for us to 
understand the way that	the performers’ experiences and observations arise. In this 
way the site has linear form. We are given access to information in an order that	
makes it	 logical and easy to follow, despite the way the site is designed to appear 
non-linear or discontinuous. This demonstrates a	 paradox between the apparent	
fluidity of the site and an underlying motivation to provide the user with specific 
information. The site’s interactive potential seems apparent	 through its non-linear 
appearance, which encourages the user to engage actively. However, there are 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




underlying structures that	promote a	certain logic, implying that	the construction of 
the site was concerned with ensuring that	 users are able to make sense of certain 
ideas and concepts. The site occupies an interesting position, as both opaque and 
didactic. 
Digital Adaptation of N Time to	Fly 
The next	set	to be encountered features an animated adaptation of No Time to Fly by 
digital artist	Amin Weber. The animation can be viewed alongside the text-score, a	
written account	 of Durning’s experiences and a	 recording of one of Durning’s 
interpretations. The format	 allows us to see how each section of the text	 was 
interpreted in both danced and animated form. The page also includes filmed 
excerpts of a	 conversation between Durning and Weber, in which he discusses his 
creative process. 
The animation consists of continually moving black and white lines, with flashes of 
colour;	 they are the visual texture of paint. The lines form a flock of virtual 
brushstrokes, chasing themselves through space, they gather at	 times, echoing a	
body, but	never quite reaching a	complete mimetic form. The lines collapse into dots, 
filling the screen, before re-grouping into a	headless form. The shapes are never still; 
collecting, forming, dispersing, they move at	an even pace. Slow moments are notable 
in their rarity. 
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Interestingly, the animation is set	to music. This is in contrast	to the danced versions 
of No Time to Fly. Hay states, “I	 have absolutely no interest	 in choreographing to 
music” (2000: 4). The presence of music in the animation draws attention to its 
absence in the dance. Furthermore, it	perhaps helps to emphasise the danced quality 
of the animation.	The presence of music seems to imply a	dancing form. Despite the 
lack of music in the executants’ adaptations, they are not	silent. At	one point	a song is 
sung; tapping, clicking, walking and breathing all contribute to a	soundscape arising	
from the dance. It	is these sounds that	form the basis of Weber’s soundtrack (Weber 
in Motion Bank 2013). They are enhanced and embedded within computerised sound, 
and only recognisable at	a few moments during the animation. The way that	Weber 
uses	sounds arising from movement	demonstrates how his process is an extension of 
Hay’s. Despite moving away from her disinterest	 in music, using sound that	 arises 
from the body highlights the presence of the body within the animation. 
Weber describes how he started with a	series of abstract	sketches, but	realised that	
there “has to be a	 thing or a	 form that	 the ability that	 a body has, that	 way of 
behaving” (Weber in	Motion Bank 2013). The need for a	body reiterates the specific 
concerns of Hay’s practice. For example the animated structures on Synchronous 
Objects do not	behave like bodies. In fact	Synchronous Objects is explicitly concerned 
with Forsythe’s interest	 in expressing choreography without	 the body (2008). 
However, it	seems as though the choreographic principles of Hay’s work could not	be 
portrayed without	 employing the body as a pivotal concept. The implication of 
Weber’s approach is that	the score cannot	be appropriately interpreted without	the 
body, even if the body is to manifest	in abstract, digital form.	
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Despite obvious differences, the animation does share some of the unifying qualities 
of the danced renditions, referred to in the opening paragraph. It	is worth mentioning 
here that	 Weber had seen the dancers perform the work multiple times before 
creating the animation (Weber in	Motion Bank 2013). This is arguably evident	through 
the tone of the animation, which is reminiscent	 of each of the executants’ 
adaptations. 57 This demonstrates how a	 non- material feature of Hay’s practice is 
transmittable purely through digital media. But	 can it	 count	 as an instance of the 
work? Furthermore, how does it	relate to the text-score? 
It is possible to suggest	that	the animation is a	work of art	in its own right. However, 
this raises identity questions. How does it	 relate to the text-score, recordings and 
work? Given that	it	is a	response to Hay’s text-score, is Weber’s animation a	version 
of No Time to Fly? Perhaps it	makes sense to think about	it	as a	re-working, allowing 
for it	to be both No Time to Fly and a	new artwork. Dual - identity of this kind is fairly 
commonplace within dance. One only has to look at	the work of well-known British 
choreographer Matthew Bourne, to see how dances can be re-worked into new 
versions, whilst	 retaining the identity of the original.	58 However, this sets it	 apart	
from the danced adaptations, as it does not	seem feasible to consider each of the 21 
danced adaptations as individual artworks. But	 why is this? Margolis (1981) for 
example suggests that	dance is autographic, implicating each performance of a	work 
57 The notion of ‘adaptation’ is important	to Hay’s thinking (Hay 2013: 64 – 66). It	was 
adopted by the Motion Bank team to refer to the three versions of the work.
58 See Nutcracker (1992), Swan Lake (1995), Cindarella	(1997) and Sleeping Beauty 
(2012) 
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as an individually authored work, however, this view is complicated by the way that	
we tend to think of performances as different	instances of the same thing. 
Adopting Goodman’s terminology, and using the terms in slightly different	 way, 
performance theorist	Linden Hill suggests that	whilst	Hay’s text-score is autographic, 
each interpretation is allographic (2015).	 Goodman’s concern is with the nature of 
works, rather than performances. However, following this line of thought we might	
also suggest	 that	 the animation is equally an allographic instance of the work. But	
what	are the implications of this for No Time to Fly? How can it	have both autographic 
and allographic instances? Furthermore, following Margolis we might	want	to argue 
that each instance is	autographic to the interpreter? Whilst	 it	seems problematic to 
claim they are new artworks, the use of the term ‘adaptation’ (Hay and Motion Bank 
2013)	 to describe the interpretations suggests the cultivation of something new, 
which stands in relation to the work. Hill acknowledges these complexities, pointing 
to the ‘tangled’ nature of the score’s parts (2015). 
Hill argues that	Using the Sky problematises Goodman’s conception of scoring due to 
the way that	it	does not	specify the essential features of No Time to Fly, but	highlights 
the variability between each rendition (2015). However, I	suggest	that	the score does 
function to capture the essential properties of the work, and that	these are revealed 
as expanded concepts which include metaphysical features, such as variation in 
performance, as opposed to a	reductionist	approach, which looks to strip the work to 
a minimal set	of structural requirements. Furthermore, the interpretation of the work 
in digital form, through Weber’s animation demonstrates how the body is 
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simultaneously central to the work, yet	able to be rendered and present	in non-fleshy 
form, thus situating the score within a	posthuman framework. 
The use of the term ‘adaptations’ arises from Hay’s practice (Hay 2013:	64 – 66). 59 It
implies	 the potential for change and	highlights the role of the executant.	 The open	
nature of this terminology suggests that	 responses to the score might	 take various 
forms. Proposing that	the animation can count	as an instance of the work is perhaps 
contentious and certainly raises questions about	where the edges of the work are. It	
is possible to argue, as McFee and Carr are likely to, that	this cannot constitute a	valid 
instance of the work as it	does not	 involve the human body. However, according to 
deLahunta	(2015), Hay has validated Weber’s animation as a	legitimate adaptation of	
the work, thus further demonstrating its open, multiple and fluid ontological form. 
Movement Character 
The ‘Movement	 Character’ page contains multiple visualisations that	 record the 
pathways and use of space for each of the dancers by plotting and manipulating 
information from each adaptation. The diagrams are shown both individually and 
overlaid in alignment	with the score. Users are able to access a	visualisation of the 
‘convex hull’ of the pathways. The site helpfully explains that, “[a] convex hull is a	
shape formed by connecting the outmost	points of a	dataset	like a rubber band that	is 
wrapped around it” (Motion Bank 2013). 
59 See also Foster (2015: 4 – 15) for a	discussion of how this notion underpinned Hay’s 
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Figure 7:	(Left) 'Convex Hull'	demonstrating Durning's use of space (Motion Bank 2013) 
Figure 8:	(Right) 'Convex Hull'	demonstrating Warby's use of space (Motion Bank	2013) 
These diagrams allow us to see how each performer uses space differently by
showing the entire space covered. For example, they	 allow us to see how Durning
generally covers a larger area than Warby, reiterating	 the individuality	 of the
interpretations. We can also see that each performer follows different pathways and
covers differently shaped space in each performance. Although small deviations in
movement and pathways are, to	 some extent inevitable with multiple renditions of	
any work, these	 diagrams demonstrate fairly large differences — reiterating the
inherent variability of the work.
Digital media allows for the realisation of spatial information that is not apparent
when only watching the recordings. Although each performer’s	 version is evidently
different in terms of movement, the	 spatial mapping allows us to see difference in
more detail. Furthermore, the	identity features of the work are foregrounded again.
The decision to visualise spatial patterning arguably demonstrates	 that the
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relationship between the dancer and space is a core property of the work. 
Alternatively, it	is possible to argue that the diagrams attribute such features a	central 
role in the identity of the work, by emphasising them in the reading of the work. 
During the launch of the score Motion Bank team member Florian Jenett	explained 
how they used Piecemaker to mark significant	 points in the recordings (2013).	 The 
team added points in relation to the text-score, and asked workshop participants to 
select	sections that	they thought	were important, or where a	change occurred. This 
process allowed for the team to divide the recordings into sections in order to align 
them with the score. It	 also provided data	 for mapping the travel pathways, and 
convex hull (Jenett	 2013). Of the many methods and processes employed by the 
Motion Bank team during the development	 of the digital-score, it	 seems that	 the 
analysis of movement	 with Piecemaker is perhaps the most	 closely aligned with 
traditional scoring or notational methods, such as the development	of a	Labanotation 
score by deconstructing and plotting movement. However the team focussed on 
components other than specific movements of the body, reiterating the open nature 
of the work and suggesting other features, such as the dancer’s relationship to space 
and time, as essential to the work. Importantly, these inscriptions are not	intended as 
tools for instantiation.	 Although they inscribe features of the work, following the 
diagrams would not	result	in an instance	of No Time to Fly, the performance of which 
arises from an executant’s engagement	with Hay’s text-score, artistic principles and 
relationship with their own body. Attributing the relationship between the 
executant’s body and Hay’s principles and text-score a fundamental role 
problematises the previous claim that	 Weber’s animation can be considered an 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
181 
instance of the work. However, whilst	Weber did not	interpret	this information with 
his own body, he constructed a	 digital form, through which he could do so. 
Furthermore, he did not	mimic movement	patterns or diagrams therefore the validity 
of his interpretation arguably arises from his deep engagement	with the principles 
and directives of the work, albeit	interpreted through a	digital body. 
The diagrams derive from the movement	 of the body; however, this mode	 of	
transmitting ‘choreographic knowledge’ perhaps aligns more closely with the 
structural approach of Synchronous Objects, than Weber’s expressive and body-
centric framework. Abstracting the behaviour of the body in space and reducing the 
three-dimensional to a	 flat, diagrammatic form runs the risk of negating the body’s 
complexity. This is arguably a	methodological problem for any form of notating or 
describing dance, or indeed any moving body. 
Hayles identifies two theoretical moves that	 may help to clarify the relationship 
between these diagrams and the movement	 they embody. The first	 approach is 
referred to by Hayles as “Platonic backhand”	she suggests that	this method begins by 
inferring from the world’s multiplicity a	simplified abstraction (1999: 12).	This seems	
to describe some traditional methods for notating movement, whereby the dance is 
abstracted into a	 simplified	 diagram, which is	 used as a	 tool for re-embodiment. 
Hayles suggests that	 a problem occurs when this abstracted version of reality 
becomes the “originary form”, from which multiplicity arises (Hayles 1999: 12), 
because the multiplicity that	results from a	simplified abstraction can appear a	messy 
version or a “fuzzing up” (Hayles 1999: 12) of reality, which has come to be 
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represented in simplified form. Anyone who has attempted to read and enact a	
Labanotation score may relate to this account. The complexity of activating the body 
in space can seem to distort	the simple ‘reality’ of the dance on the page. 
Hayles’ second suggested approach aligns more closely with the diagrams created for 
Using the Sky. She refers to this as “Platonic forehand”, suggesting that	this method is 
more recent, as it	requires the involvement	of powerful computers (1999: 12). Hayles 
suggests that	 Platonic forehand also starts from simplified abstractions but	 that	 by 
using simulation techniques such as algorithms, multiplicity is evolved from the 
abstraction, and that	this multiplicity is sufficiently complex to be seen as “a	world of 
its own” (1999: 12). This description relates to the visualisations on Using the Sky, 
which were generated by computers from simple abstractions, and re-configured in 
order to re-present the multiplicity of the lived experience. This is evident	in the way 
in which the convex hull diagrams of each rendition are overlaid into one diagram, 
visualising the repetition and multiplicity central to the work’s ontology. Further, 
unlike traditional notations, these diagrams are not	intended to function as a	tool for 
re-activation; their complexity demonstrates metaphysical properties of the work, yet	
it	simultaneously limits their practical usefulness. This suggests that	such images can 
be seen as deriving from the body, yet	inhabiting a	posthuman “world of [their] own”	
1999: 12), representing movement, without	 codifying it. Although the diagrams do 
not	 maintain the perceptual presence of the body, considering how they operate 
under the Platonic forehand framework, it	is possible to suggest	similarities with the 
animation. Both approaches abstract	 the body, and reactivate it	 through digital 
media. Each form re-establishes multiplicity, as opposed to existing merely as a	
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simplified version of ‘real’ or non-digital world. Considering how digital media	extends 
the body reiterates the centrality of Hay’s practice, and the way in which the use of 
technology expands the concepts of No Time to Fly.
These observations imply a	posthuman paradigm, however there are some tenants of 
posthumanism that	do not	align with a	pragmatist	framework. It	is important	to note 
that	the term ‘posthuman’ refers to a	wider project	concerned with decentralising the 
place of the human and questioning the very notion of human beings. Causey (2007)	
suggests that, “[m]ore recently theorists have figured the model of the posthuman as 
an artefact	 of technoculture” (2007: 52). It is specifically this component	 of the 
overall posthuman theses that	 is relevant	 in this context. Hayles (1999:	 3), for 
example argues for no demarcations between the body and the digital. Whilst	 this 
case study demonstrates the potential for interaction between the digital and the 
flesh, it	 is important	 to remember the role of human practices in the cultivation of 
theoretical perspectives. Whilst	digital technology plays an increasing central role in 
our lives, the distinction between virtual and actual reality is generally maintained. 
Causey describes the notion as “seductive”, but	also troubling and faulty (2007: 52). 
He suggests, 
[t]he ideas that	 our humanness has somehow disappeared or that	
our bodies are not	of the same corruptible flesh as the animals and 
earthly environments that	 surround us are dangerous models 
(Causey 2007: 52). 
How then are we to acknowledge the relation between the flesh and the digital 
without	entering into ‘dangerous’, or at	least	purely theoretical territory? 
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Braidotti proposes a	more moderate view than Hayles, suggesting that: 
[t]he posthuman predicament	 is such as to force a	displacement	of the 
lines of demarcation between structural differences, or ontological 
categories, for instance between the organic and the inorganic, the born 
and the manufactured, flesh and metal, electronic circuits and organic 
nervous systems (Braidotti 2013: 89). 
The relationship between shifting boundaries and ontological categories is useful 
here.	Thinking of these distinctions as displaced, as opposed to absolutely resolved is 
more appropriate in relation to this example. Whilst	viewers are able to experience 
the body and the work through its digital representation, it	 is not	 confused, or 
interchangeable with the work in live form. Whilst	posthmanism is a	helpful concept	
for thinking through these relations we need to maintain that	 the experiences are 
different. 
Summary 
There is one set	on Using the Sky which has not	been discussed, ‘All Recordings (with 
Overlays) From April 2011’, houses each of the 21 recordings, and ‘overlays’, in which 
each executant’s recordings are overlaid to form a	single rendering. This set	 further 
highlights the multiplicity at	the heart	of the work. There is also a	tutorial section on 
the website, which further demonstrates the educational underpinnings of the site. 
Whilst	 these pages are interesting, it	 seemed pertinent	 in this chapter to focus in 
more detail on features of the other four sets. 
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This chapter has provided an insight	into Using the Sky and some of the questions it	
raises. I have discussed the identity questions generated by the multiple 
interpretations in danced and digital form. I	 have further suggested that	 the digital 
methods respond to Hay’s practice by abstracting and re-configuring the body into 
digital cells. This study has raised key questions about	how the digital-score informs	
the viewer’s understanding of No Time To Fly.	The format	of the site leads the user to 
see certain components of the work, which informs its identity. This leads to a	tension 
that	 raises the questions that	are at	 the heart of this thesis regarding the interplay 
between perception and ontology. 
Considering how the text-score and recordings inter-relate it	 is possible to suggest	
that	knowledge of Hay’s practice not	only enhances appreciation of the work, but	is 
essential to full appreciation. 60 The introspective nature of Hay’s practice means that	
the movement	 alone is perhaps challenging to observe. For the most	 part, the 
dancers do not	follow recognisable aesthetic forms. Viewing the movement	alongside 
the information presented on the digital-score encourages a	reading of the work that	
aligns with Hay’s principles. This serves to clarify Hay’s intention, while 
simultaneously foregrounding the potential difficulty of reading the work in 
performance alone. Hill (2015)	suggests that	the autonomy of the user to choose their 
path through the site aligns with Hay’s beliefs about	giving the dancer more agency, 
rather than forcing her to realise a	 pre-conceived piece of choreography. Whilst	 I
agree that	the site echoes the principles of Hay’s practice in a	variety of ways, I	also 
60 This claim relates to the concept	of ‘aesthetic empiricism’ mentioned in Chapter 
One (p.23). 
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suggest	 that	 both the site and the choreography are pre-conceived, that	 the 
seemingly open nature of the score relies upon detailed orchestration, and that, as 
previously suggested, the user’s experience is more tightly choreographed by the 
Motion Bank team than perhaps is initially apparent. 
The claim that	access to Hay’s intention enhances the user’s ability to interpret	and 
appreciate the work raises many questions about	meaning, understanding, value and 
intention. For example, there are well-documented debates in the philosophy of art	
and literature about	 the significance of the author’s intention. Philosophers such as 
Wimsatt	 and Beardsley (1946) and Barthes (1977) claim that	 the intention of the 
author is entirely insignificant. Others, such as McFee believe that	whilst	it	might	be 
helpful at	 times, the work should speak for itself (2011: 120 - 152). Debates about	
artistic intention tend to focus on matters of meaning and interpretation. However,	
the issue here is slightly different. The non-representational nature of Hay’s work 
means that	 understanding the work does not	 rely upon comprehension of Hay’s 
intended meaning. However, the ambiguous nature of the work means that to fully 
appreciate the work audiences arguably require some information about	 the 
motivation of the movement, which begins with Hay and is transmitted to the 
dancers, who bring their own responses to the work. 
The claim that	knowledge of Hay’s process is essential for the adequate interpretation 
and full appreciation of No Time to Fly demonstrates a	 similarity with Synchronous 
Objects and is problematic for a	variety of reasons. Importantly, the work was made, 
performed and presumably valued prior to the development	of Using the Sky. Having 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	













accessed the work for the first	time through Using the Sky, it	is hard to imagine fully 
appreciating No Time to Fly without	 the information offered through the score. 
However, this is not	 necessarily the case for those who have seen the work	 in live	
form first. This demonstrates the way in which the audience’s conceptions of the 
work may be altered by the digital-score and therefore the identity of the work might	
be changed. This leads to further questions about	 the nature of dance works. A
platonist is likely to argue that	the work cannot	acquire or lose properties, although a	
spectator’s interpretation might	 change over time. However, a	 perspective such as 
mine,	which sees dance works as intrinsically linked to human practices, implies that 
if cultural readings of a	 work evolve, the identity of the work becomes different. 
Ontological tensions such as these are at	 the heart	 of this research as I	 go on to 
theorise the philosophical implications of ‘choreographic objects’. Before moving into 
the more abstract	 examination of the objects, the following chapter describes and 
analyses the third and final case study, A Choreographer’s Score: Fase, Rosas danst	
Rosas, Elena’s Aria, Bartók, returning to the central questions concerning the analytic 
and philosophical frameworks, and the way in which the work is rendered and re-
presented through ‘choreographic objects’. 
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Chapter Eight: A Choreographer’s Score: Fase, Rosas danst Rosas, 
Elena’s	Aria, Bartók 
Introduction 
This chapter considers A Choreographer’s Score: Fase, Rosas danst	Rosas, Elena’s Aria, 
Bartók (A Choreographer’s Score) (2012),	 which documents four of Belgian 
choreographer Anne Teresa	 De Keersmaeker’s works from the beginning of her 
career in the 1980s.	This is the first	of three scores co-authored with Cvejić.	The score 
is described	by Cvejić	as having multiple functions and motivations, including helping 
to “take dance more seriously” (in	De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012: 8), and offering a	
form of authorial poetics (in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012: 8). This chapter 
outlines the format, appearance, intentions and methods of the score, drawing 
comparisons with previous case studies and analytic frameworks. I provide an 
overview of some of the philosophical questions posed by the score regarding 
meaning, authorship and ontology. 
Discussing A Choreographer’s Score alongside Synchronous Objects and Using the Sky 
requires some qualification. They are described as belonging to the same emerging 
form of dance literature (deLahunta	 2012), share many motivations and similarly 
problematise the nature of scoring outlined in Chapter One. 61 Whilst	 theses 
similarities are sufficient	 to warrant	 their shared titling as ‘choreographic objects’,	
there are also many differences between them. One of the difficulties of discussing 
61 Such as those previously discussed from McFee (2011), Van Imschoot (2010) and 
Hutchinson Guest	(2000).
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‘choreographic objects’ is that	each example is unique. A Choreographer’s Score for 
example, is different	to Synchronous Objects and Using The	Sky, firstly because it	does 
not	 arise from Motion Bank. Secondly, it	 does not	 exist	 online, thirdly it	 must	 be 
purchased, and lastly it	does not	use very advanced technology. 
This chapter draws comparisons between the objects. However, prior to this it	seems 
necessary to outline the common characteristics between the three scores in order to 
understand their relationships, validate the decision to compare them, and justify the 
generalising of claims made in relation to this case study. The first	 thing that	 links 
these three objects together is that	each of them is referred to as a	‘score’. One of the 
motivations of this research is to gain and articulate a	 clear understanding of the 
ontology of these scores, and their relationship to other scoring practices. Identifying 
commonalities may help to shed light	on the notion of the score under the broader 
rubric of the ‘choreographic object’. Common characteristics that	I have identified so 
far include that	each of the scores is co - authored, in collaboration with researchers 
and technologists. This is in contrast to other process-oriented publications,	62 such as 
Burrow’s	book	A Choreographer’s Handbook (2010), for example, which is written by 
Burrows alone. Whilst	 Forsythe, Hay and De Keersmaeker are central to the 
development	of the scores, they are authored and curated by at	least	two, and often 
a larger team of people, from various disciplines and perspectives. An important	
similarity is that each maps a	single work. Whilst	some ‘choreographic objects’,	such 
as Improvisational Technologies (Forsythe 2009) and Material for the Spine (Paxton 
2008) offer enquiries into specific methods and techniques, these three scores focus 
62 This group of publications is clearly delineated by deLahunta	(2013a). 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





on individual works. Another common characteristic is that	the scores aim to gain and 
share a	deeper understanding of the works than is accessible in performance alone. In 
relation to this aim, each score uses visualisation methods to demonstrate features of 
choreography that	 are not	 visible in live performance. Lastly, none of the scores is 
intended for the re-instantiation or re-interpretation of the work. 
Motivations and Methods 
Anne Teresa	 De Keersmaeker trained at	MUDRA in Belgium in the late 1970s, and 
Tisch School of the Arts in New York in the early 1980s where she choreographed her 
first	 work Asch (Rosas n.d.). After making her second	 work, Fase in 1982, De 
Keersmaeker founded her own company, Rosas, in 1983,	which has become one of	
the most	 well-known contemporary dance companies in Europe. In 1995 De 
Keersmaeker established the Performing Arts Research and Training Studios 
(P.A.R.T.S.) in Brussels. She continues to make works and run the company and the 
studios.	A Choreographer’s Score documents De Keersmaeker’s “early works” (Cvejić	
in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	 8). These	 are	 Fase (1982) Rosas danst	 Rosas 
(1983), Elena’s Aria (1984), and Bartók (1987). This chapter concentrates on	Rosas 
danst	Rosas, although the methods and approach to the documentation and analysis 
















	 	 	 	
	 	 	







Rosas danst Rosas is arguably one of De Keersmaeker’s most	widely known works. For
example, UK dance critic Jenny Gilbert suggested in 2009 that the work still, 
stands as	 her company's signature, not	 least because it has been
hailed far and wide as a kinetic primer on contemporary creative
process (Gilbert 2009).
The work premiered in the Kaaitheater	 in Brussels in 1983, and	remains part of the
Rosas repertoire. It was	most recently performed in Leipzig in 2015 (Rosas	n.d.). A film	
version of the work was made in 1997 by Thierry De Mey, a long-term	collaborator of
De Keersmaeker’s,	 who also	 composed the	 music for the original work alongside
Peter Vermeersch (Rosas n.d.).
As previously mentioned, the	 score consists of
a book and four DVDs. These	are presented
white cardboard sleeve. The front of the sleeve
includes only the title of the score in black
print. The reverse includes a summary of
contents in small black text and a black
white picture of De Keersmaeker	 next
diagram that	 appears to be drawn onto
blackboard. The aesthetic of the box is in stark
contrast to the complex digital images of
Figure 9:	The cover of A
Choreographer's Score (De 
Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012) 
This item has been removed 
due to 3rd Party Copyright. 
The unabridged version of the 
thesis can be found in the 
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This item has been removed due 
to 3rd Party Copyright. The 
unabridged version of the thesis 
can be found in the Lancester 
Library, Coventry University.
Synchronous Objects. It sets the tone of the publication, which	is detailed and sincere.
The presence of the chalkboard implies a sense	of history and tradition, a	riposte to
the virtual, perhaps.	
As	shown in Figure 10 the	covers of the book
and accompanying DVDs present matching
red diagrams. Close inspection reveals that
this image consists of two unbroken lines, 
which travel backwards and forwards on a
complex, repetitious	 pathway. The sense of
movement is generated by small arrows, 
which indicate directionality and travel.
These arrows demonstrate to the readeFigure 10:	The Cover of Choreographer's 
Score (De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012) 
that the images are not abstract;	 they	 are
representations of	movement in space. This level of detail is typical of many of the
diagrams within the score.
In the Introduction to	 the score Cvejić outlines	 the motivations and aims of the
project. It becomes quickly apparent to the reader that understanding the analytic
method and framework is important.	 This is due to the way in which Cvejić	and De
Keersmaeker	formulated an idiosyncratic methodology in	order to analyse the works.
Cvejić	 explains how the project arose after De Keersmaeker	 explained in 2012 that
she would be reviving these works, and	that it would be the last time that she would
dance in them. Paraphrasing	De Keersmaeker, Cvejić explains	how the choreographer
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went	on to ask; “[i]s this an occasion to write these choreographies down?” (Cvejić	in
De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012: 7). The presentation of these four works together is 
significant, as it demonstrates the early progression of De	 Keersmaeker’s 
choreographic approach (Cvejić in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	7). 
Cvejić	suggests that, “[t]hese four works introduce four lines that	run through more 
than forty choreographies De Keersmaeker has made to this day” (in De Keersmaeker 
and Cvejić 2012: 7). This approach demonstrates a	way of thinking about	the works 
that	 moves beyond formal and structuralist	 models of analysis, such as those 
discussed in Chapter Six (pp.149	 – 150). It outlines a desire to generate an 
understanding of the relationship between the works, an approach perhaps aligned 
with the post-structuralist	notion of ‘intertextuality’ (Kristeva	1980). As discussed in 
Chapter Two (pp.46 – 47), this perspective originated in linguistics and suggests — 
contra	to structuralist	and semiotic approaches — that	meaning is generated by the 
way that	 texts refer to one another. Intertextuality proposes that	 works, or texts 
consists of multiple references to other texts, and that	recognising these references 
helps the reader to determine meanings and generate interpretations (Adshead 
Lansdale 1999). 
The intertextual framework of	A Choreographer’s Score contrasts with Synchronous 
Objects, which is set	within a	predominantly structuralist	paradigm and is therefore 
primarily concerned with the organisational features of the choreographic act, as 
opposed to the relationship between such acts and other texts. Synchronous Objects 
adopts multiple disciplinary frameworks,	 which arguably cultivates multiple texts, 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	







however each focuses	 solely to One Flat	 Thing, reproduced,	 reinforcing the 
strucutralist	paradigm. In contrast, A Choreographer’s Score frequently refers to the 
relationships between the four works, as demonstrated by Cvejić’s articulation about	
these early works and subsequent	choreographies. Furthermore, the score considers 
external and causal factors, such as the De Keersmaeker’s influences, collaborations 
and so on. This encourages a	reading of the work that	acknowledges its broad cultural 
significance, and establishes its place within De Keersmaeker’s oeuvre.
Cvejić	outlines the well- documented complexities of notating, recording and writing 
(about) dance, suggesting that, 
in comparison to music, visual arts, theater and cinema, dance 
suffers from a	 significant	 lack of self-reflective writing that	would 
illuminate choreography as an authorial poetics (Cvejić in	 De 
Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	8). 
Here Cvejić	 articulates a	 perspective that, as she points out, is also addressed by 
Forsythe’s projects (Cvejić in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	 7), however other 
scholars in different	 contexts also address the issue. For example, in 2006 Susan	
Melrose suggested that, “[e]xpert	 composition remains a	 curiously under-theorised 
notion in expert	performance-making, despite the interest	in composition” (2006: 1). 
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It seems that	a perceived lack of theoretical reflection is a	motivational force for the 
publication of ‘choreographic objects’. For example, Cvejić	goes on to suggest	that, 
[t]his may be said more bluntly: in order for dance to be “taken 
seriously”, it	needs to take itself seriously. The more we, amateurs 
de danse and scholars, can learn from choreographers and dancers 
about	 their notions and methods, the more complex our 
experiences and thoughts will be […]. (Cvejić in De Keersmaeker 
and Cvejić 2012:	8). 
This claim offers an opinion that	the political and cultural value of dance is related to 
accessing ‘choreographic thinking’ (Forsythe 2008). This is a	topic discussed by Leach	
(2013), who points out	that	 ‘choreographic objects’ arise from cultural contexts that	
place high value on knowledge. The implication of this claim is that	 the expert	
knowledge of the choreographer might	 enhance viewers’ experience of the work. 
Melrose suggests that	 ‘expert	practitioners’ see dances - even those choreographed 
by others - in a	different	way to other spectators (2009: 24). 
A Choreographer’s Score, alongside Synchronous Objects and Using the Sky, can be 
understood as an attempt	to share and encourage expert	ways of seeing. This desire is 
not	new, as long ago as 1988 Adshead et	al suggested that	their dance analysis model 
provided a way to educate spectators as to what	 is happening in a dance, 
acknowledging a	 lack of literature in this regard (1988: 5). However, more recently 
the focus has shifted towards the practitioner, as projects such as A Choreographer’s 
Score encourage readers and spectators to see the dance through the eyes of the 
choreographer. De Keersmaeker is central to A Choreographer’s Score, meaning that	
users are engaging with her way of conceptualising the dance. This feature is less 
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immediately apparent in the case of Synchronous Objects as there are no films of 
Forsythe, although he contributes written and spoken text, furthermore, the 
interactive tools can be seen to allow the user autonomy to construct	 their own 
experiences of the choreography. However, the site has been very carefully curated in 
accordance with Forsythe’s intentions. For example, the decision to look at
counterpoint, as opposed any other component, such as the rhythmic organisation of 
the movement	 for instance, focuses the user on specific, structural features of the 
work. 
Cvejić	 acknowledges the questions posed by the resituating of the author’s voice, 
suggesting that, 
[i]t would be a	 premodern regression to argue for the 
ontological priority of the choreographer’s insight	as a	kind 
of first-hand knowledge in relation to theoretical “second-
hand’ readings (Cvejić in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	
8). 
However she remains confident	 that	 self-reflective choreographic writing will 
enhance appreciation and understanding of dance. This claim reiterates the way in 
which these objects offer a	new form of dance scoring. As with Synchronous Objects 
and Using the Sky, this publication is not	 intended for reinterpretation or 
reconstruction (Cvejić in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	 18), however, it	 does 
provide a	 highly detailed account	 of the works’ structures and De Keersmaeker’s 
process. In a	review of the score, dance scholar and practitioner Simon Ellis describes 
it	 as, “obsessed with process; it’s the full monty of the history and underlying 
structures of these works” (2013: 219). Its motivation lies in the analysis of 
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choreographic structures and processes, and the dissemination of ‘choreographic 
knowledge’. 
Similarly to Forsythe, Cvejić	 articulates a distinction between dancing and 
choreography. She explains how she searched for the most	 appropriate methods for 
extracting the choreography from the dancing (in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	9).
This is a	similar quandary to those faced by the Motion Bank team. However, although 
the motivations are similar, the methods are very different. Whilst	Motion Bank opted 
for digital annotation techniques and creative programming in order to explore the 
potential of digital media	 for illuminating difficult	 to see phenomenon (Motion Bank 
2013), Cvejić and De Keersmaeker’s approach is more analogue. 
Cvejić	 explains how the score was devised over the following four stages. First	 she 
examined all available documents about	 the given work, including recordings, live 
performances, (where possible), notebooks containing sketches, drawings and notes, 
programmes, letters, budgets, reviews, technical lists and many more types of 
document	 including personal diary entries and letters. Cvejić	 suggests that	 these 
‘archaeological’ findings gave her clues as to what	was invisible in the work alone (in	
De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012: 10). This articulation points to another similarity 
with Using The	 Sky and Synchronous Objects,	which use visualisation techniques to 
expose the structures and relationships present	 in the work, which are not	visible in 
performance, or are perhaps visible only to the ‘expert	 practitioner’, to borrow 
Melrose’s term (2006). However,	Cvejić	and De Keersmaeker do not	appear to share 
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Forsythe’s desire to explore the various ways that	 choreographic principles can be 
expressed without	 the body. Unlike Forsythe’s research, this score does not	 offer 
abstract	renderings of the choreography. Rather it	uses verbal, written, diagrammatic 
and archival methodologies to provide as much information about	 the work as 
possible.	
To prepare for stage two of the method Cvejić used her examination of the resources 
to draft	questions for her first	interview with De Keersmaeker. She describes this as, “a	
dialogue where De Keersmaeker and I	try to lay out	the work and all that	constitutes 
it” (Cvejić	 in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	 11). Cvejić explains how De 
Keersmaeker drew diagrams on a blackboard to illustrate her points, and often 
demonstrated by dancing (in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012: 11). These initial 
interviews informed the development	of the second interviews, which follow a	script	
and are organised into sections, according to theme (Cvejić in De Keersmaeker and 
Cvejić 2012:	 11-12). These interviews form the basis of the DVD component	 of the 
score. They are intended to be viewed alongside the book, to visually demonstrate 
certain points or ideas (Cvejić	in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012: 18). Following the 
second interview the next	 stage of the method involved “mapping out	 the score” 
(Cvejić	in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	12),	which involved plotting and illustrating 
the work through notes and photos. These sources are accompanied by text, which 
was composed by Cvejić	 from the transcripts of both interviews and was then re-
edited in collaboration with De Keersmaeker (Cvejić in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 
2012: 12). Cvejić	 explains how the selections of materials were made: “We were 


















		 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
199 
the choreography” (Cvejić	 in De Keersmaeker	and Cvejić 2012:	12). Thus, reiterating	
the central analytic concern of the score. This methodology was applied to each of the
four works, resulting in four micro-scores	within the larger score.
The Rosa danst Rosas Score 
The Rosas danst Rosas score starts with an introduction to the work taken from the
interview transcripts. De Keersmaeker	 outlines the multiple meanings of the title, 
suggesting that it points to the way in which the dancers in Rosas dance themselves in
the work. She points out that the	repetition of the title refers to a key component	of
the work (De Keersmaeker in	 De Keersmaeker	 and Cvejić 2012).	 The centrality of
repetition becomes apparent as De	Keersmaeker	outlines the complex structure of the
work. In the book these
explanations are illustrated by hand
drawn diagrams and photographs, 
which help the reader to
understand the rules and forms of
organisation that constitute the
work. 
Figure 11:	De Keersmaeker's notes demonstrating the 
structure of Rosas danst Rosas (De Keersmaeker and 
Cvejić 2012:	83) 
This item has been removed due to 3rd 
Party Copyright. The unabridged version 
of the thesis can be found in the 
Lancester Library, Coventry University.
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Rosas danst	 Rosas consists of four acts or “movements”	 (De Keersmaeker in	 De 
Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012), each of which is addressed in detail. Each section 
deconstructs the choreographic material, structure and relations present	within that	
particular movement. For example, the section that	 considers the first	 movement	
starts with a	discussion of how the choreography in this movement	arises from one 
basic phrase (De Keersmaeker in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012: 86). Readers are 
directed to the correlating section on the DVD, where De Keersmaeker uses the 
chalkboard to explain how the phrase is made up of five sections, labelled: A,B,C,D and 
E. She suggests that	 each part	 of the phrase can be danced in two different	 ways, 
either with attack, or with a	 slow and suspended dynamic (De Keersmaeker in	 De 
Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012). 
De Keersmaeker goes on to explain how these phrases are used in the work, outlining 
the number of dancers performing each one during every	 section of the first	
movement. For example phrase A may be completed at	 a ratio of 3:1, with three 
dancers performing A in unison, whilst	 one dancer performs phrase B. De 
Keersmaeker outlines the entire movement	 in this way, explaining how the phrases 
are repeated throughout	at various times and in both dynamic states. This allows the 
reader and spectator to see how counterpoint	 arises, and to understand the logic 
behind the repetitious structuring of the movement	material. 
The approach both demonstrates and generates complexity. The detailed accounts 
of structure in written and audio-visual form are hard to follow if one is trying to 
visualise the dance. A potential reason for this is that	 the entire movement	 is 
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described without	referring to the vocabulary of the body. Denoting the movement	
material merely as section A, for example, does not	help the reader to formulate an 
image of the work. The dancing is not	present. The shapes, aesthetics and specific 
behaviours of the body are not	 referred to, thus demonstrating Cvejić’s desire to 
extract	 the choreography from the dancing. The result	of this is that	watching and 
listening to De Keersmaeker outline the structure of the work bears no resemblance 
to the experience of watching Rosas danst	Rosas. 
However, these sections are interspersed with clips	 of recordings	 of the work in 
performance and the film version. These allow the viewer to see how the	 dancers 
enact	the structure.	As	De Keersmaeker narrates these sections, her tone changes. She 
speaks softly and slowly, as though not	wanting to overshadow the movement. This 
observation relates to Cvejić’s suggestion in the Introduction that, 
the video demonstrates the movement	that	can’t	be described enough, 
but	 has to be performed. The choreographer’s parole fleshes out	 the 
account	 with affective tones of storytelling that	 the text	 is numb to 
(Cvejić in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	12). 
The clips allow the dancing to be reinstated, helping the reader to appreciate the 
complexity of the seemingly simple dance. The aesthetics and methods of the score 
are reflective of De Keersmaeker’s minimal choreographic style. The	design highlights 
the idiosyncratic nature of the method, and the relevance of the artists’ ‘signature’ 
practices (Melrose 2009) in these scores. The aesthetics certainly inform the overall 
project, perhaps contributing to Ellis’s summary of the score as, “beautiful, thorough 
(without	going too deep) and captivating” (2013: 220). 
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Ellis suggests that	Cvejić	missed the opportunity to probe De Keersmaeker, and ask in-
depth questions about	 her decision making process (2013: 219). Rather, the 
excavation of the work focuses primarily on historical and structural features, through 
which features of De Keersmaeker’s process are made clear. Multiple forms of archival 
materials, including extracts from De Keersmaeker’s notebooks, a	funding application 
and various reviews are included in the publication. 
Cvejić	suggests that	the inclusion of archival material as appendices provides, 
a glimpse into the long working processes and the resonances and 
layers that	 the work accumulated throughout	 their reception over 
three decades (Cvejić in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	12). 
This points to two more of the central concerns, first	 to demonstrate process and 
secondly to reveal how the work has accrued intertextual meanings and cultural 
significance. Cvejić	 suggests that, “A Choreographer’s Score makes the ecriture of 
choreography graphic” (in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012: 18), using a	 term from 
deconstruction methodologies to point	to the inter-related and textual nature of the 
choreography. 
Intertextual	Relations 
Intertextual relations are highlighted throughout	the score as De Keersmaeker recalls 
the influences that	informed the work, including Charlie Chaplin and punk music (in	De 
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Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	82). Cvejić	asks how influences from De Keersmaeker’s 
predecessors	 in minimal dance, such as Judson artists Lucinda	 Childs and Trisha	
Brown, may have inspired the work (in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	 85). De	
Keersmaeker responds that	at the time of making Rosas danst Rosas she had not	seen 
the work of Judson Dance Theater,	63 explaining how she did see Childs’ work at	some 
stage, but	that	it	did not	affect	her, and that	it	was Wilson and Glass’s Einstein on the 
Beach (1976) that	 left	a lasting impression (De Keersmaeker in De Keersmaeker and 
Cvejić 2012:	85). 
De Keersmaeker explicitly articulates the relationship between the choreographic 
structure and cultural reference points. For example, the transcript	reads: 
The structural framework demands that	 you physically throw 
yourself against	 a wall. I remember I associated it	 with the 
machine from Kafka’s “In der Strafkolonie” (“The Penal Colony”); 
going beyond the pain to the verge of ecstasy (De Keersmaeker in	
De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	82). 
This type of information encourages the reader to consider Rosas danst	 Rosas in
relation to other cultural texts, highlighting the way in which meaning arises through 
such connections. This approach both extends and limits readings of Rosas danst	
Rosas. As Cvejić	 suggests,	 learning about	 the process of choreography allows the 
reader and spectator to experience the layers that	are not	perceptible in performance 
alone (in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012: 8). However, this account	 of the 
63 As discussed in the Chapter Two (pp.33 – 34), Judson Dance Theater were an 
influential avant-garde movement	collective, working in New York in the 1960s. See 
Banes (1983) and Burt	(2006) for detailed considerations of their work. 
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intertextual relations also limits the potential for a	wide-array of readings as it	frames 
experiences of the work in accordance with De Keersmaeker’s experiences and 
intentions. For example, suggesting that	 she was not	 affected by Childs’ practice 
encourages a	correct	and incorrect	way of reading the work. 
De Keersmaeker’s framing of the work is further demonstrated by her discussion	of
the role of silence. Speaking on the DVD 64 she suggests that	 the contrast	 between 
noise and silence helps the audience to listen (in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012). 
This is demonstrated by a recording	that	presents a	section of the work in which the 
dancers stand still, with their backs to the audience whilst	 loud, mechanical music is 
played. De Keersmaeker explains, “[w]hen the music stops. We fall” (in	 De 
Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012). She continues as the music stops, “[a] simple action of 
falling, going from verticality to horizontality” (De Keersmaeker in De Keersmaeker 
and Cvejić 2012); her final word correlates exactly with the dancers’ unison descent	
from standing to lying. ‘Which is quite unexpected” (De Keersmaeker in De 
Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012) she states. 
Paradoxically, in this context	 the fall is entirely expected as it is framed through the 
narration of the movement. This offers an entirely different	 experience than seeing 
the work without	 narration. Furthermore, although the commentary does not	
continue for the entire clip, the framing encourages the viewer to notice the contrast	
and attend ‘appropriately’ when watching the work. The issue of correct	and incorrect	
64 Although, as previously mentioned the discussion on the DVD is also articulated in 
writing. 
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readings is addressed in the score. For example, Cvejić suggests that	the movements 
and gestures that	 constitute the work “are performed with a	 pronounced feminine	
character” (in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012: 85). Indeed, gender seems to be a	
prominent	 theme in many readings of the work.	65 Yet, De Keersmaeker responds to 
this suggestion as follows: 
True, but	 it	was never our strategy or desire to manifest 
such an attitude. I	must	say I	even had an allergic reaction 
whenever people referred to it. We wanted everything to 
stay close to ourselves, and since we were women, it	was 
“Rosas danst	Rosas” – we dance ourselves. Se we did what	
we had to do and expressed what	 seemed natural and 
close to us, and was not	external (De Keersmaeker in	De 
Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	85). 
Understanding De Keersmaeker’s intentions not	 to represent	 certain ideas, or 
replicate cultural ideas affects how the reader understands and perceives the work 
and limits the potential for mis-reading. 
Whilst	 Cvejić	 suggests that	 understanding the intentions of the choreographer does 
not	take “ontological priority” (in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012: 8) these examples 
highlight the complexity of the relationship between intention and ontology. Do 
readings that	do not	 align with De Keersmaeker’s fail to truly experience the work? 
Are the work’s essential features therefore determined solely by De Keersmaeker?	
Such questions demonstrate how these objects reframe philosophical questions 
65 See Jennings	(2009) and Brown (2009). 
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around authorship, meaning and intention that	 have been addressed from both 
Analytic and Continental philosophy for many years.	66
Melrose suggests that	traditional modes of documentation and archiving prioritise the 
product	 over the process (2006: 1). A Choreographer’s Score, Using The Sky and 
Synchronous Objects can be seen as a	response to the situation. However, Melrose’s 
point	 is made in relation to the question of ‘finishing’ the work, implying that	 the 
documentation of a	 finished work may be an inappropriate way of thinking about	
dance practice (2006:	1). Indeed the desire to maintain the fluid nature of dance works 
might	 be a contributing factor to the current	 interest	 in process. However, A
Choreographer’s Score both centralises process and presents a	finished work. The fact	
that	it	is not	intended for reconstruction or	re-working means that	this score is not	a
tool to enable the four works to continue to be remade. In this sense the score is 
archival and the wealth of detail stabilises the work. Cvejić	describes the score as, “an 
attempt	 to comprehend everything that	 the choreographer considers constituent	of 
the four works examined here” (in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012: 8). This aim 
implies that	the score offers, or at	least	aims to offer a complete account	of a	finished 
work. This suggests that	 the score steadies the work, meaning it	 will not	 evolve 
through time, or at	least	demonstrating a	desire to resist	such an occurrence. 
De Keersmaeker’s score seemingly fixes readings of the work in accordance with her 
intentions. However, there is an important	counter-argument	to consider. Whilst	the 
66 The role authorship in matters of meaning is addressed by Barthes (1977), Carroll 
(1992) Foucault	(1984), Wimsatt	and Beardsley	(1946) amongst	others. 
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structural features and influences may remain, the meaning and significance of both 
De Keersmaeker’s views and the work are able to evolve and change over time, 
despite their stabilisation in print. For example, learning of De Keersmaeker’s 
resistance to representation outlined previously may draw to mind various 
associations that	 have no causal relationship to the work. For example the 
articulations about	the work remind me of Nigel Thrift’s theory of non-representation 
(2008). Thrift	 argues against	 notions of representation, offering an account	 of the 
world, which rests upon the notion that	“encounters are all there is, and their results 
cannot	 be pre-given” (2008:2). Thrift’s phenomenological stance aligns him with 
scholars such as Manning (2006,	2013) who is	similarly concerned with cultivating an 
account	of being that	acknowledges what	Thrift	refers to as, “the lived immediacy of 
actual experience, before any reflection on it” (2008: 6). He uses dance as an example 
of this immediacy, and an experience that	 is essentially non-representational, he 
states: 
For my purposes dance is important; it	 engages the whole of the 
senses in bending time and space into new kinaesthetic shapes, taps 
into the long and variegated history of the unleashing of performance, 
leads us to understand movement	 as a potential, challenges the 
privileging of meaning (especially by understanding the body as being 
expressive without	being a	signifier) (Thrift	2008: 14). 
Although he talks in general terms, here Thrift	articulates a	very specific conception of 
dance,	67 which does	not necessarily relate to all forms	of choreographed movement, 
many of which are planned, representational and dependent	upon the body adopting 
67 This view is reflected in Noë’s recent	work on choreography (2015) 
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the role of a	signifier. 68 Therefore, there are many things to be said about	Thrift’s use 
of dance to illustrate his ideas, but	what	 is of particular interest	 here is the way in 
which De Keersmaeker suggests that	her work is non-representational, as though this 
is not	a usual feature of dance performance, which relates to Thrift’s claim about	the 
nature of dance. 
Importantly, this discussion and the association with Thrift’s theory arises from	my
analysis of the score.	 The example demonstrates how intertextual meaning and 
significance are not limited to the intentions of the author. Furthermore, it	shows how 
understanding intention has the potential to ignite further associations, hence 
justifying Melrose’s (2009) suggestion that	 there will be various modes of reading, 
dependent	on the level of relevant	knowledge of the spectator. Perhaps it	is possible 
to suggest	that	although the work is fixed by the score the meaning and significance of 
it, as with any artwork, will evolve and change over time.	However, the question is 
posed; how much can the meaning of a	work evolve and change?	Furthermore, how 
does this impact	on the ontology of the work? This is a	particularly relevant	question 
when considering ‘choreographic objects’, as they appear to cultivate ‘stable’ versions 
of the works, fixing the identity in accordance with the intentions of the 
choreographers. Adopting an	 ontology positioning that	 suggests dance works are 
essentially linked to human perceptions and practices, means that	 ‘choreographic 
objects’ facilitate changes in the identity of work, but	that	they cannot	entirely fix it, as 
readings will continue to evolve alongside changing cultural contexts. 
68 Interestingly Noë’s argument	(2015) that	choreography is philosophy adopts a	
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The stabilisation of the work has arguably been	a particularly pertinent	concern of	De
Keersmaeker in recent years. In 2011, Rosas danst	 Rosas gained international 
attention after pop star Beyoncé Knowles used some of the material from the second 
movement	of the work in her music video for the song Countdown (Knowles	2011).
De Keersmaeker accused Knowles of stealing (Gardner 2011). The case reiterates the 
ontological instability of dance works, and raised multiple practical and philosophical 
questions around ownership, authorship and copyright.	 69 What is particularly 
significant	in the context	of this discussion is that	this event	predated the publication 
of the score. Cvejić	suggests that	De Keersmaeker initiated the project	in 2010 (2012: 
7), so the events are not	explicitly related, however, it	is possible to suggest	that	the 
production of the score can be seen as an active attempt	to constrain the identity of 
the work by providing a	first-hand account	of exactly what	the work is, and to closely 
tie the work to De Keersmaeker. 
Following this line of thought, it	 is interesting to note that	 in 2013 De Keersmaeker 
published a	detailed account	of the material from the second movement	as part	of the 
Re: Rosas project, developed with fABULOUS.	70 Contrasting De Keersmaeker’s outrage 
at Knowles’s use of the work, this project	 sees De Keersmaeker and Rosas dancer 
Samantha	 van Wissen provide a	 detailed account	 of the movement	 structure and 
vocabulary, encouraging users to develop and record their own versions of the work. 
Unlike	 A Choreographer’s Score, and despite using video recording as opposed to 
69 As discussed by	Yeoh (2013). 
70 See http://www.rosasdanstrosas.be/en-home/
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notation, Re:Rosas has similarities to a	notated score, insomuch as it	breaks down the 
components of the movement	 specifically to allow re-instantiation. It actively 
encourages re-interpretations and variations, therefore raising familiar ontological 
questions, posed in the previous chapter in relation to Using the Sky (pp. 176 – 178), 
such as; is each version an instance of Rosas danst	Rosas? How many changes can be 
made to the movement	 before it	 becomes another work entirely? What	 are the 
essential features of the work? And who is the choreographer of each version? 
Nonetheless, this example offers an interesting contrast	 to A Choreographer’s Score 
and demonstrates De Keersmaeker’s increased interest	 in scoring and sharing her 
work, as well as her heightened authorial presence. 
Summary 
Although A Choreographer’s Score does not	utilise technology in the same way as the 
other two scores, the DVD component	 plays a	 central role. The visual and aural 
presence of	De Keersmaeker serves to ensure her place in the legacy of the work and 
the function and affect	of the score is dependent	upon this feature. Furthermore, as 
with Synchronous Objects and Using the Sky the dance has been transformed into 
digital data, whilst	 this is not	 shared via	 computation in this instance, it	 has the 
potential to be, as the information exists in the same, digital form as One Flat	Thing, 
reproduced	and No Time to Fly. 
As with Synchronous Objects and Using the Sky this score can be analysed through 
frameworks derived from linguistic theory, but	 this time to promote an intertextual 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





























reading of the works that	moves beyond the closed structure of the choreography to a	
conception of the works as essentially linked to their context	of production. 
Building on the observations and comparisons made in this chapter, the following one 
returns to discussions about	 the nature of dance scores, asking how the 
‘choreographic objects’ discussed in the previous three chapters relate to, and 
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Chapter Nine:	Scores Revisited and Revised 
Introduction 
In ‘How To Take Dance Seriously’ (2013), cultural theorist	Katja	Čičigoj suggests that	A
Choreographer’s Score poses a	challenge to what	she describes as “essentialist” and 
“normative” modes of dance notation, referring to Ann Hutchinson Guest as an 
example of someone whose work demonstrates such an approach (2013: 108).	Whilst	
some ‘choreographic objects’ such as TWO (Motion Bank and Miller and Hauert	2013)	
and Double Skin/Double Mind (Emio Greco|PC 2004) use standardised notation 
systems as a point	 of departure, the three scores discussed here offer alternative 
modes	of inscription. Furthermore, they have different motivations to notated scores. 
Whereas standardised notational methods are intended to record the minutiae of the 
movement	 to allow for faithful or ‘authentic’ reconstruction, A Choreographer’s 
Score, Using The Sky and Synchronous Objects are study objects, intended to inform 
the reading, as opposed to the dancing of the work. 
In this chapter I	 return to the observation that	despite the wide usage of the term 
‘score’ in dance practice, there seems to be a	consensus amongst	both philosophical 
aestheticians and performance studies scholars, 71 that	 scores have a direct	
relationship to practice. In McFee’s terms they are seen to operate either as a	record, 
a ‘recipe’ or both (2011: 52	– 69), a	sentiment partially echoed, albeit	 in alternative 
terms, by Van Imschoot’s observation that	 scores instigate praxis (2010), implying 
action on the behalf of the user. It	seems fair to suggest	that	although the way that	
71 See Birringer (2013) and Van Imschoot	(2010). 
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the term is used is very broad, it	generally refers to a	set	of instructions or parameters 
- that	may or may not	be written down - which documents, underlies and instigates 
action. Dance scores are generally considered to provide a	 way into movement, 
and/or to instigate the performance of a	specific practice or dance work. 
These three objects do not	entirely contradict	this conception of the score, but	they 
do extend it	 insomuch as they do not	provide tools for movement	but	are also not	
merely	 “records” (McFee 2011:	 52 - 69). Rather, they focus on articulating the 
processes and intentions of the choreographer, revealing features of the work, and 
providing a	place for self-reflection, expression and analysis. These case studies differ 
in methods, aims and politics from conventional frameworks, and re-pose some well-
versed philosophical questions regarding the potential of documentation to capture	
or stabilise the elusive ‘work’. 
The lack of universal scoring methods means that	 the relationship between dance 
works, performances and scores is not	straightforward. Various conceptual maps can 
be visualised between the abstract	work, multiple performances, and the permanent	
physical document. Using the Sky is a good example of how this complexity is 
increased with the construction of ‘choreographic objects’, as the presence of two 
scores, and the situating of the text-score within the digital score adds further layers 
to the puzzle and offers forth all kinds of geometric re-configurations. Furthermore, 
the presence of multiple recordings adds another layer of ontological density. One is 
now faced with the task of conceptualising relationships between the abstract	work, 
numerous ephemeral performances, multiple permanent	 representations, the text-
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score and the digital-score. The fact	that	many of these components are dependent	
upon one another further complicates the psychological mapping. This chapter starts 
to consider these relations and examines the score-status of the case studies, 
considering how they relate to and problematise even an expanded conception of 
dance scores. 
Dance	and Notation 
To a	greater or lesser degree, dance works differ in each instantiation, a	situation that 
poses ontological questions, such as; how many changes can occur before it	is a	new 
work altogether? And, which features must	 be present	 in a	 performance for it	 to 
count	as a	genuine instance of the work? As previously	discussed (p.8 and pp. 84 - 89) 
Goodman (1976) proposes that	these questions can at	least	theoretically, be resolved 
by demanding compliance to a	 notated score, thus offering a	 tidy solution to the 
issue. This perspective rests upon the claim that	dance works have the potential to be 
fully indicated through the inscription of a	 specific movement	 structure. In Chapter 
Four I	outline some of the problematics with this view, including the vague nature of 
the term ‘notation’. The three case studies further challenge the relevance of 
standardised notational systems. None of the scores presented are concerned with 
the documentation of particular movements. Rather they demonstrate an approach 
that	 considers a	wider range of components including the choreographer’s process	
and intentions, the experiences of the dancers, the structure, the choreographic 
devices, the use of space and so on. So, leaving aside for the moment	 the vague 
nature of the word, what	does this say about	the notationality of dance? 
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In the case of Using the Sky the methodologies used can perhaps be seen as a	
response to the “open” (Rubidge 2000a: 7) nature of No Time to Fly. Open	works that	
enable very different	 interpretations are not	 amenable to movement	 notation. As 
demonstrated previously No Time to Fly may, and indeed should, look different	 in 
each performance, therefore notating a	 single version would not	 record the work. 
However, it	is not	the case that	any performance can be an instance of No Time to Fly.
The work is constrained through Hay’s practice. Instantiating the work depends upon 
the interpreter developing a	close relationship with Hay’s movement	philosophy and 
principles, alongside the text-score. Thus the work is indicated through concepts 
expressed in language and practice, as opposed to a	 notated movement	 structure. 
This feature is made clear through Using the Sky and is arguably true of other open 
works, which may be instanced through following ideas, prompts,	 rules or	
instructions. Of course such works take many forms, and it	is not	necessarily the case 
that	language and practice are responsible for determining identity in all cases, thus 
pointing further towards a	conceptualisation of (at	least	some) dance practices as not, 
even theoretically, amenable to notation. However, what	is significant	here is that	the 
non-notationality of open works does not	mean that	they are non-constrained, 
Furthermore it	 is not	only open works that	do not	align with the traditional view of 
notationality. Concept	focused choreography provides another example of work that	
does not	 succumb to notation. For example, Bel’s Shirtology (1997), mentioned 
briefly in Chapter Five (p.113), involves a	 solo male performer slowly removing a	
series of jumpers with various logos on them. Each time one is removed, another logo 
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is revealed. The repeated movement	 is not	 un-choreographed, however if one 
wanted to re-instantiate the work, merely repeating the movement	structure would 
not	 be sufficient. Equally, notating the movement	 would not	 capture any of the 
essential characteristics of the work, such as the costumes, the performance quality, 
and the concept. This approach to choreography generates works that	 are not	
constrained by movement, but	rather through the demonstration of an idea, or the 
posing of a	 philosophical question. Perhaps seen as a	 continuation of an approach 
adopted by choreographers of Judson Dance Theatre, choreography that	 is 
constrained by ideas as opposed to movement	has had a	notable presence in the USA 
and Europe over the past	 six decades. Bel and his contemporaries use stillness, 
parody and cultural referencing to critique dance’s perceived ontological dependence 
on movement	(Lepecki 2006: 1-18). As discussed in Chapter Five (pp.125 – 126), this 
work has inspired scholarship and discourse that	challenges the relationship between 
choreography and human movement. Importantly, not	all of these works are open, 
and some depend upon fairly exact	 repetition, 72 however they also cannot	be fully 
articulated as notated structures of movement. This is perhaps a	result	of the way in 
which such choreographers consciously and deliberately mis-align themselves with 
the traditional view of dance. 
Each of these examples further demonstrates that some dance works resist	
articulation through standard notation systems, and perhaps accounts for the 
development	 of idiosyncratic forms of inscription. McFee suggests the ease and 
72 See Pakes (2015) for a	detailed discussion of the ontology of works of ‘conceptual’ 
dance. 
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increase of video technology is responsible for the lack of interest in notation (2011: 
52). However, I	 suggest	 that	 the situation may be attributable to the way in which 
only certain types of dance works are constrained by specific structures of movement. 
As McFee points out, 
[t]oday, what	 is standardly called dance notation is essentially 
movement	notation, designed to record accurately movements of the 
human body (McFee 2011: 52). 
However, the conflation of dance and movement	 may be inappropriate. Even 
choreographers whose work demonstrates formal and aesthetic priorities, such as 
Forsythe, adopt	variability as a	key choreographic component	(Casperson 2013). For 
example One Flat	 Thing, reproduced features sections of improvisation, which are 
constrained by agreed sets of cues, but	do not	rely on the exact	repetition of specific 
movement. Although systems such as Labanotation do incorporate mechanisms for 
dealing with unset	 material models which assume a relationship between dance 
works and set	movement	structures may be flawed. 
One feature of dance that	is foregrounded through the examination of ‘choreographic 
objects’ is that	works take multiple forms. Whilst	 some, such as Rosas danst	Rosas 
can be accurately instanced through learning a	sequence of movement, others, such 
as No Time to Fly rely upon engagement	with deliberately open-ended instructions 
and the principles of Hay’s practice. In relation to music Stephen Davies uses the 
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notion of ontological thickness to explain how some works are more fully indicated 
than others. He suggests that, 
[p]ieces consisting of abstract	 structures of note types are 
ontologically thinner that	 those specified at	 the level of note 
tokens. Thinner works determine less of the fine detail of their 
performances than do thicker ones (Davies 2001: 3). 
This way of thinking might	also apply to dance works, which vary greatly in terms of 
how much detail is required for an instance of the work. 
The inherent	 variability of dance performances means that	 it	 is possible to suggest	
that	even ‘thick’ works, correlating with Rubidge’s “ontology of substance” (2000a:	6) 
are not	 “closed” (Rubidge 2000a:	 7).	 Each staging of a	 work involves individual 
performance interpretations,	 and often departs dramatically from Goodman’s strict	
demands regarding compliance to the score. There are of course examples of works 
that	 rely on close compliance to a certain set	 of movements, equally, close 
compliance to sets of instructions might	 be important	 to some works, such as 
Summers’	work	 Instant	 Choice, referred to in Chapter Four (p.88), whilst	 others do 
not	 share this feature at	all. I	 therefore suggest	 that	 the binary of open and closed 
works is somewhat	 simplified and does not	 fully explain the ways in which dance 
works seem to exist	 on a continuum in relation to compliance with movement	
notation, inscription, instructions and so forth. I suggest	that	the flexibility of dance 
works perhaps accounts for the way in which standard notation systems have not	
been universally adopted. Whilst	 Armelagos and Sirridge (1978), McFee (2011) and 
Pouillaude (n.d.) argue that	 systems such as Feuillet	 and Labanotation 
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underdetermine the work, I	 suggest	 that	 in fact	 the opposite could be true, in that	
flexibility plays a central role in dance works, as well as features other than 
movement	often being central to the work’s identity. 
Pouillaude suggests that	 the development	 of notation systems allowed for dance 
works to circulate, marking a	 shift	 from the autographic to allographic (n.d.: 6). He 
states that, 
notation made it	possible to consider the choreographic work an ideal 
object	 that	 functions as a	 set	 of correct	 performance instances and 
thereby allows restaging and reconstructions outside of the linear series 
produced by oral transmission (Pouillaude n.d.:	6). 
It is suggested by Pouillaude that	this shift	was conceptualised by Laban and Feuillet	
as a	 form of emancipation, but	 that	 this was in fact driven by ideologies of control 
(n.d.: 7), echoing Foster (2011)	 and Bench’s (2008) argued connection between 
Feuillet	notation and colonialism, discussed in Chapter One (pp.16	– 17). Pouillaude 
goes on to suggest	that, 
the ambiguous status of the choreographic work, neither 
autographic nor allographic, is a	 direct	 consequence of the 
failure of notation, understood not	as an incapacity to describe 
dance, but	as an incapacity to become integrated with practice 
(Pouillaude n.d.: 8). 
Pouillaude’s claim is that	notation systems were insufficient	 to transform the 
nature of the choreographic work into a	stable entity.	However, I	suggest	that	
the failures of notation are less to do with the lack of a	sufficient	system, than 
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with the disconnection between the notion of structurally replicating 
movement	and the nature of dance works. It is possible to suggest	then that	
the way in which some works resist	 inscription via	notation, accounts for the 
development	 of scoring methods that	 bring together the debris of 
choreographic process, performance documentation, artist	 interviews and so 
on in order to give equal weight	to features other than movement. 
Process, Product and Score 
As demonstrated by the discussion in Chapter Four, the term ‘score’ is used to refer 
to a	wide variety of objects. They may be mental, verbal or written entities, which 
may be shared or private. However, despite being an expanded concept, it	is not	the 
case that	 the term can refer to anything, or the word would become redundant. 
Scores have some unifying or ‘constitutive’ 73 features. Generally speaking McFee’s 
record/recipe distinction still applies, because whichever form they take, scores 
generally serve to document	or instigate action. Van lmschoot	suggests that	despite 
the breadth of the concept, 
[i]n most	 cases, however, scores are fundamentally characterized 
by the contiguity and metonymy of tools and aids: they are a	trace 
of and a	 reroute back to a	 praxis, whether directly or indirectly, 
mimickingly or mockingly, revered or reversed. Metaphorically,	
linking us back to the body and its modes of enactment, one could 
say that	 they are neurological centers of determinacy in a	 larger 
synaptic network where information fires (Van lmschoot, 2010). 
73 Goehr provides a	helpful account	of the difference between ‘essential’ and 
‘constitutive’ features (1992:	71 -75). 
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This account	 articulates a commonality between the multiple types of score. 
However, the double clause of record and recipe or ‘trace’ and ‘reroute back to 
praxis’ is problematic in the case of Synchronous Objects, Using the Sky, and A
Choreographer’s Score. If we are to concede that	scores are defined by their ability to 
provide both a	trace (or record) and/or ‘recipes’ to instigate reroutes to praxis, where 
does this leave these objects? 
In the case of Using the Sky, both the text-score and the digital-scores are records, or 
traces. Furthermore, the text-score simultaneously performs the function of a	recipe, 
however the function of the digital-score is harder to establish. It	is important	to note 
the way that	Van Imschoot	views scores as offering a	“reroute to praxis”	(2010).	This
suggests that	scores do not merely instigate a	specific performance, rather that	they 
can be used to generate practice and arguably offer access to the artist’s working 
processes, offering something broader than the mapping of a	single work. However, 
the score is still conceived of as underlying action of some kind. Although 
‘choreographic objects’ have generative potential, this is secondary to their status as 
a tool for studying the work. 
Suggesting that	scores instigate practice, as opposed to specific movement structures 
further	points towards the out	the difficulties of inscribing some dance works through 
standardised notation.	 Importantly, however choreographic process and practice is	
often shared, not	 only through idiosyncratic scores, but	 also in various academic, 
artistic and performative contexts. This means that	process, practice and praxis often 
become part	of the final product, sometimes even eclipsing the performance as the 
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primary point	of interest,74 yet	processes cannot	be captured via	movement	notation 
methods. 
Van Imschoot’s articulation accurately describes Hay’s text-score – which provides	
information about	how to practice in order to perform the work. However, the digital-
score offers a	different	type of information. The wealth of visual images provided on 
the site means that	 adopting Using the Sky as a	 route into Hay’s practice would 
provide a	very different	experience than using only the text-score. Responses to Hay’s 
directives are likely to be influenced by the recordings, animations and visualisations. 
It is hard to imagine being able to work with the text-score via	Using the Sky without	
images and recollections of the executants’ 75 versions informing the resulting 
movement. This means that	specific movements or images become synonymous with 
the work. This situation negates its established ontology as essentially variable and 
intrinsically linked with the practice and bodily perception of Hay and the executant. 
Furthermore, were one able to ignore the images and respond purely to the text-
score and Hay’s explanations, the function of Using the Sky would be called into 
question. If the goal is to practice and instigate No Time to Fly, working with the text-
score alone would be more effective than accessing the work via	Using the Sky. 
74 For example, in a	discussion of her work Revolve (2011), Carol Brown suggested 
that	there would be no reason to re-perform the work, as it	was the choreographic 
process that	was the primary outcome. 
75 This term is used by Hay and the Motion Bank team (2013)	to refer to the dancers 
who interpret	the score.	
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This outcome reposes the question; is Using the Sky a score? Its function does not	
align it	with explanations from McFee and Van Imschoot. Perhaps these articulations 
are not	the most	useful. Burrows identifies two main approaches to writing a	score: 
[i]n the first	kind what	is written is a	representation of the piece 
itself, a	template which holds within it	the detail, in linear time 
of what	you will eventually see or hear. A classical music score 
works this way (Burrows 2010: 141). 
This description accurately explains how a	 score might	 be created of a	 work that	
requires a	 resistance to variability. This type of score is typical of Labanotation and 
other standardised approaches, whereby the primary aim is to flatten variability by 
documenting as many details as possible. Burrows outlines the second approach: 
[i]n the other kind of score, what	is written or thought	is a	tool for 
information, image and inspiration, which acts as a	source for what	
you will see, but	 whose shape may be very different	 in the final 
realisation (Burrows 2010:	141). 
Here we have an accurate description of how scoring is used within certain practices, 
for improvisation and in the development	 of new choreography. Burrows’ second	
type of score can be adequately applied to Hay’s text-score. The written directives 
provide information, create images and inspire the dancers’ responses; rather than 
dictating the shape of the movement. Some features of Using the Sky can be seen to 
enhance this function. For example, Hay’s explanations of the concepts of the work 
provide further information and inspiration. However, the impact	 of the recordings 
remains; imposing visual shape. These accounts further enforce my suggestion that	
Using the Sky was not	developed to function as a	recipe or a	tool to instigate action.	
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Artists and researchers use scores differently. Burrows is likely to be thinking about	
the role of the score from an artist’s perspective, whereas from a	researcher’s point	
of view a	 score might	be a	 tool through which to analyse the work, rather than to 
instigate action. Whilst	scores are conventionally created by artists (or notators) and 
perhaps used by researchers for analysis, ‘choreographic objects’ are primarily 
research oriented. For example, as outlined in Chapter Four (p.149), Zuniga	 Shaw 
(2009) suggests that	 Synchronous Objects was developed as a choreographic 
resource,	not	as a	means of work-preservation. 
It certainly does not	 seem feasible to instantiate One Flat	 Thing, reproduced via the 
digital-score and in this sense it	is possible to argue that	it	does not	fit	within the required 
parameters to truly count	as a	dance score. However, the site does embody a	motivation 
to feed back into practice. As discussed in Chapter Five (pp.150 – 152 and 153 – 154),	
Synchronous Objects has a	 generative capacity. For example, Cressie’s suggestion that	
one of motivations for the Statistical Counterpoint	Tool is, “not	only to summarise, but	to 
inspire”	(Cressie 2009).	
Equally, Cvejić suggests that	no matter how extensive A Choreographer’s Score is, “it	
wouldn’t, without	 further enquiry, be adequate as the exclusive source for 
reinterpreting or reconstructing the whole choreography” (in De Keersmaeker and 
Cvejić	2012: 18). However, she goes on to express the intention that	 the score will, 
“spark further in-depth specialist	 research and interpretation” (2012: 18), thus 
reiterating the score as an object	of study and implying that	it as not	merely a	static 
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document. It	 has a	 generative, capacity, albeit	 in an open and indirect	 sense. The 
impact	 of the process of generating the score on De Keersmaeker’s own process 
perhaps remains to be seen. Interestingly, Hay has recently developed a	 new 
performance work for the Cullberg Ballet, called Figure a	 Sea, which uses the 21 
recordings from	Using the Sky as the choreographic stimuli (deLahunta	 and Jenett	
2015). 
As discussed in Chapter Five (pp.	153 – 154), analysing the choreographic principles of 
the work as a	 way to feed back into the making process aligns with Adshead’s 
suggestion that	 analysis informs choreographic practice (1988: 7). Although these 
‘choreographic objects’ do not	provide ‘recipe’s per	 se in the forms of strict	 sets of	
rules, notations or instructions, they can be seen as providing a	way to further and 
develop choreographic practices. Therefore, despite not	being primarily intended as 
tools for instantiation, the scores do have generative features, both for the 
choreographer’s continued practice and for the users of the objects. 
The next	 important	question is, in	what	way(s) do theses	scores allow access to the 
work? This issue seems particularly pertinent	 in regards to Using the Sky and 
Synchronous Objects, as both sites feature born-digital, full-length, unedited 
recordings of the work. In both cases the recordings are specially shot	 and the 
camerawork means that	the action is clearly displayed. Even prior to their mediation 
through the sites, these films stand in an ambiguous relationship to the work itself, 
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however, following the discussion in Chapter Six, I	 suggest	that	they offer tokens of 
the works, albeit	 in a	 different	 form to a	 live performance event. The recordings 
included within A Choreographer’s Score offer a	 different	 form of access. They are 
excerpts, both from recordings of the work in performance and the specially made 
film of the work. They are specifically used to illustrate De Keersmaeker’s discussion, 
as opposed to being the primary stimulus for analysis. Whilst	 the film tokens on	
Synchronous Objects and Using the Sky provide access to the work in its entirety, the 
edited recordings presented here offer only short	insights into features of the work. 
Upon the first	 reading it	appears that, given how the film-tokens of One Flat	Thing, 
reproduced and Using the Sky allow us to see the works in question, presumably 
scores can be seen as facilitating this experience. However, this is not	 as 
straightforward as it	first	appears. The way that	the sites function, means that	users 
are encouraged to engage with the movement	 content	alongside textual and audio 
information. How does this then stand in relation to the work? On the one hand, the 
function of this information is to reveal features of the work, yet	on the other hand it	
provides a starkly different	 experience to watching the work through a	 film or 
performance token. Furthermore, the fragmentary nature of the sites means that	
users are perhaps less likely to encounter the entire film. 
Accepting that	recordings allow access to the work means that	accessing No Time to 
Fly, for example, via	 the via	 multiple recordings, extensive written accounts, 
interviews with Hay and digital visualisations provided on Using the Sky arguably 
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provides	more knowledge of the work than witnessing a	single live performance of it. 
For example, I	 have never seen the work live yet	 I am highly knowledgeable of it. 
Using the Sky facilitates multiple instances of the work. However, this has implications 
for the nature of the work. For example, does it	mean that	No Time to Fly has become 
a digital work? It	does not	seem right	to suggest	that	it	is no longer a	live work, as it	is 
still possible to perform and encounter it	 without	 the digital score. However, the 
work’s	potential instantiations have multiplied. No Time to Fly is shown to exist	 in 
constant	 permutations, activations and performances through live, abstract	 and 
digital forms. Although the score can be seen as concerned with capturing its 
essential features, it	 equally alters them, meaning that	 a score might	 be able to 
comment	upon the work’s features, but	arguably cannot	constrain them, because in 
doing so it	alters the very nature of the work 
This situation can also be said to apply to One Flat	Thing, reproduced and Rosas danst	
Rosas. The way that	the works are manifest	in multiple forms raises questions about	
the interpretation of the work, such as; is there a	correct	way to perceive, construct	
and remember the work? Birringer points out	 that	 projects such as Synchronous 
Objects and Motion Bank allow users to assemble and manipulate the material of the 
work, posing the question, “[w]hat	 exactly is being remembered?” (Birringer 2013: 
10). This question is not	exclusive to digital scores; spectators of live performance are 
equally able and likely to remember fragmented, dis-assembled versions of the work. 
However, Birringer’s question does foreground the roles of the people who develop 
and use ‘choreographic objects’. As discussed in Chapter One (pp.17 – 18), scores	
embody ideologies and the selection of components and methods is not	neutral. This 
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is evident	in the adoption of particular analytic frameworks, which present	the work 
in accordance with cultural and philosophical principles. Each of these scores is 
expansive in approach, and the user has the ability to navigate an individual path 
through the score. Yet	they present	the work in accordance with the beliefs of those 
who developed them. 
This discussion foregrounds key metaphysical questions; does this mean that	 the 
work is now essentially defined by these ideologies? Has the identity and ontology of 
the work changed as they are re-inscribed through digital media, or does this process 
of scoring reveal ontological features of the work that	were inaccessible before?	This
question highlights the tension between a platonist	 view, which suggests that	 the 
features of the work are set	and unchanging and a perspective, which believes that	
the nature of the work is essentially linked to its reception and perception.	 The 
question will have to remain open for now,	however, it	 is worth mentioning that	 if 
one were to argue that	 the very nature of dance is capable of change, the 
conceptualisation of the work as a	stable entity would be under threat, thus implying 
the potential for alternative modes of explaining dance and its multiple instances 
Scores as	Study	Tools 
The motivation to share ‘internal’ features of the work is evident	on all three objects 
through design decisions as well as the selection of materials. For example, the 
construction and design of Using the Sky suggests that	it	has been developed to teach 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
229 
users about	 Hay’s process, and provide information about	 the conceptual and 
choreographic features of No Time to Fly. It	therefore seems to be intended as a	study 
object. Despite the non-linear appearance of the site, the information is organised in 
a systematic way, making it	 easy to follow developing themes. For example, as 
explained in Chapter Seven (p.172), the set	 that	 features the executants’	 insights is 
positioned to the right	 of the ‘Introduction to Concepts’ page, meaning it	 is 
encountered first, assuming users follow a left-right	 navigational format. This is 
significant, as the reflections of the performers would arguably make little or no sense 
without	 Hay’s prior explanation of the work. For example, in the ‘Introduction to 
Concepts’ section Hay explains how the ‘what	 if’ questions are like balls that	 the 
executants must	 “keep in the air” (Hay in	 Motion Bank 2013). Meaning that	 the 
activation of these questions is an essential feature of any dancer’s interpretation. 
Moving on to Durning’s insights, she says of Section Four, “[f]or fred and ginger what	
I'm trying to do is keep all of the balls in the air as much as possible” (Durning in	
Motion Bank 2013). Importantly, without	knowing that	Durning is referring to Hay’s 
questions here, the insight lacks context.	Hay’s previous explanation allows users to 
understand Durning’s insight, implying that	 there is linearity to the site, despite its 
fragmented appearance. 
Synchronous Objects and A Choreographer’s Score similarly provide a	 deepening in 
understanding. It	has been established that	these objects are intended to disseminate 
‘choreographic thinking’, but	how does this contribute to their ontology? This feature 
does not	automatically exclude them from the category of scores, as the sharing of 
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choreographic thought	 is arguably a	 feature of all dance scores. However, the 
centrality of recorded versions of the work, and the way they are removed from 
practice means that	they are more complex. Significantly, the way that	the scores are 
given different	 titles to the works implies that	 they are individual entities of some 
kind. Indeed Zuniga	Shaw suggests, 
[t]he idea	 of a choreographic object	 allows for the 
transformation of a dance from one manifestation (the 
performance onstage) into an array of other possibilities 
including but	 extending beyond visualizations (such as 
information or installation) (Zuniga	Shaw 2014: 117). 
This points to ontological complexity, as the ‘choreographic object’ is at	 once a	
manifestation of the work and a transformation of it	 into a distinct	 entity. 
Synchronous Objects demonstrates this ontological ambiguity. For example, the 
visualisations create aesthetically stimulating patterns and forms and the abstracted 
representations offer creative renderings of the data. Such objects can arguably be 
understood as belonging to the category of ‘computer art’.	76 Yet	artworks are often 
considered to be distinct	from objects with practical functions, and require different	
modes of attention (Stolnitz	1969), thus implying that	despite their creative attributes 
and aesthetic qualities,	the way that	these visualisations,	were developed as part	of a	
tool for disseminating knowledge can be seen to problematise their art-status.	
Aesthetician Jerome Stolnitz	 draws a	 distinction between practical and aesthetic 
76 See Lopes (2009) and Popper (1993) for detailed philosophical interrogations of 
computer art. 
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attention, suggesting that	 our usual mode of attention is practical and therefore 
considers things in terms of their usefulness, whereas the ‘aesthetic attitude’ requires 
a non-practical, or “disinterested” mode	of contemplation (1969: 18 - 19). 77 Thinking 
about	 the types of attention paid to the visualisations reveals their ontological 
complexity, whilst	 they can be considered purely aesthetically, they also have 
practical functions, to reveal features of the choreographic structure of One Flat	
Thing, reproduced. 
It seems that	we do not	seem to view	‘choreographic objects’ solely as artistic entities 
due to their practical function — to communicate knowledge about	 the work(s). 
Perhaps then it	 is more appropriate to think about	these scores in relation to other 
types of tools. It is possible to suggest	that	they function as guides to help the reader 
understand more about	the work. They might	be compared to an audio guide at	an 
art	gallery, an annotated copy of a	novel, or a	‘Behind the Scenes’ section on a	DVD. 
Each of these things encourages viewers to understand and appreciate features of the 
work that	 are not	 present	 purely in their physical manifestations. Yet, they do not	
stand entirely alone from the work of art, as their existence is dependent	 upon it. 
The motivation to guide the user’s attention implies that that	greater knowledge of 
certain features of the work will enhance their appreciation of it. For example, users 
are able to comprehend the depth of complexity involved in the construction and 
performance of One Flat	Thing, reproduced. They can appreciate the structural rigour 
of De Keersmaeker’s process, and the depth of the performer’s experience	in No Time 
77 Stolnitz’s notion of the ‘aesthetic attitude’ is widely discussed in Philosophical 
Aesthetics. It	is disputed by Dickie (1969), amongst	others. 
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to Fly. This phenomenon is similarly demonstrated by the previous comparisons. For 
example, gallery audio guides provide further contextual and analytical knowledge 
about	 the work in order to deepen visitor’s readings of the work and, arguably 
enhance their appreciation. Not all of the objects on the sites share this feature. On 
Synchronous Objects, for example, the more abstract	‘artistic’ objects engage users in 
a different	way. However, the objects situated in the far left	hand column seem to 
share a	motivation to ‘explain’ the work, implicitly suggesting that	knowledge of the 
structures of the work will be of benefit	to users of the score. 
However, despite some similarities, the relationship between the ‘choreographic 
object’ and the work is more complex than merely providing a	 guide. This is partly 
because the objects do not	sit	alongside a	performance of the work, but	rather such 
instances are embedded within them. They often contain primary source material, 
such as rehearsal footage and choreographic notes, bridging the distance between 
the work and the score. Furthermore, they visually represent	the work. Unlike the use 
of “symbols”	(Peirce	2001: 10) in standardised notations, as discussed in Chapter	Four 
(pp.97 – 98), the use of drawings, video and verbal descriptions function as “icons”	
and “indexes” (Peirce 2001: 10), standing for the object	 of performance via	
correlation, resemblance and associative connection as opposed to through abstract	
codes. Therefore these scores generate visual images of the work in performance, 
meaning that	 they do not	merely guide a	 reading of the work, but	 simultaneously 
present	a version of it. This methodology challenges the traditional view that	scores 
are outside of the work, demonstrated through Pouillaude’s notion of “externality” 
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(n.d.:	 5), by offering alternative modes of representation. Hence, such scores re-
configure the work/score/performance relationship. 
Given that	 the ‘choreographic objects’ discussed	 do not	 strictly adhere to the 
commonalities and conditions identified by Burrows	(2010), Goodman (1976), McFee 
(1992, 2011)	or Van lmschoot (2010), why should we accept	them as scores? I	wish to 
ground ontological suggestions in the common practices of those who use the terms, 
therefore, if these objects are widely accepted as scores, our ontological structures 
should accurately reflect	 this. However, the newness of the objects means that	 it	 is 
not	 entirely clear that	 they are commonly accepted as scores. Zuniga	 Shaw implies 
some disagreement	 with Forsythe about	 their score-hood, opting instead for the 
terms “visualizations” and “objects” (2014: 97), However, I	 suggest	 that	considering 
these objects as a	new form of score,	(without	dismissing them as also ‘visualisations’ 
and ‘objects’), reveals insights into the motivations and intended role of the objects. 
After all, those people developing them noticed, either implicitly or explicitly, that	
they had sufficient	score-like qualities to label them as such. Furthermore, thinking of 
them in relation to other forms of score allows for the consideration of ontological 
features and relations. If we are to concede that	they are indeed scores, the result	is 
that	 scores do not	 need to function as tools for (re) performance. This offers an 
alternative relationship between the score and the work. The score offers a
rendering, expansion and guided reading of the work. It	 is a	 tool for the spectator, 
researcher and practitioner to (re) think the work, as opposed to a	 mechanism 
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Summary 
Considering the score-status of these objects demonstrates the link between scores 
and ontology. Examination of their features suggests that	 they seek to uncover and 
establish characteristics of the work, implying that	they are the result	of ontological 
modes of enquiry. Whilst	these scores do not	serve the function of traditional scores, 
they also do not	entirely contradict	traditional scoring practices. They seem similarly 
concerned with documenting the work’s features, but in an expansive, as opposed to 
reductionist	manner. A further insight	from Zuniga	Shaw articulates the extension of 
the work through the ‘choreographic object’, 
[i]n our work, dances act	as choreographic resources, not	to be 
pinned down, but	 instead to be fleshed out, to explore their 
contours, to see what	is generated in an engagement	between 
choreographic information and its articulation in digital media	
visualization, and to offer this up for exchange (Zuniga	 Shaw 
2014: 99). 
This comment	demonstrates a resistance to the stabilising function associated with 
movement	notation scores. However, these scores do provide some stability for the 
work in accordance with the motivations and intentions of their makers, whilst	
simultaneously informing the identity of the work; thus demonstrating that	 it	 is 
arguably impossible to entirely fix a	dance work. 
The methods, mediums and incentives for scoring are vast	 and varied, however I	
suggest	 that	 a further expanded conception of the term allows for scores to be 
developed as objects of study and that	 they can also be associated with the act	of 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




ontological enquiry.	 Although not	 all scores might	 be conceptualised as such, I
suggest	that	the motivation to uncover the existential and identity features of a	work 
does relate to many forms of score. For example, Pouillaude writes,	”Feuillet	notation 
aims at	discovering, by the graphic and analytical device of the sign, the real nature of
choreographic entities” (n.d:	 16). This motivation can be linked to ‘choreographic 
objects’, which deploy both theoretical and visualisation modes	of	enquiry,	proposing	
new forms	 of score that	 both stabilise and theorise the work. The next	 chapter	
continues to probe the nature of the three case studies, considering how they offer a	
form of ‘poetics’, which comprise ‘affective’ expressions of choreographic principles, 







	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
236 
Chapter Ten:	Posthuman Poetics 
Introduction 
The positioning of the author at	the centre of A Choreographer’s Score, Synchronous 
Objects and Using the Sky raises many interesting questions about	 authorship, 
interpretation and transmission. One thing that	 is clear is that	 all three objects 
provide an opportunity for the choreographer to articulate and discover elements of 
their practice. This observation perhaps leads to a suggestion made by both 
deLahunta	 (2013a: 2)78 and Cvejić	 (2012: 8) that	 these objects offer a form of 
‘poetics’. This chapter considers this claim in detail, asking specifically how technology 
facilitates the cultivation of a	posthuman poetics, which captures and re-presents the 
emotive, or affective nature of movement	 alongside choreographic theories and 
structures. 
In order to further examine what	these scores are, and move away from comparisons 
with movement	 notation, I	 consider the notion of ‘poetics’, and the relationship 
between this function and current	cultural discourses. ‘Poetic’ is a	term that is usually 
associated with language, perhaps thought	of as that	which emotes, or describes in a	
way that	 need not	 be objectively ‘truthful’. The poetic function of language is 
described by linguist	 Roman Jakobson as emotive, as opposed to denotative (in 
Louppe 2010: 4). So perhaps the poetic function of dance is that	 which makes it	
expressive. What	then is	a poetics? 
78 As mentioned previously (p.22) I	am working with an unpublished version of this 
article, which is published in various places. 
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French literary theorist	Gérard Genette draws a	helpful distinction between criticism 
and poetics. He explains that	 criticism is an internal, formal and/or interpretive 
analysis of single texts or works and that	 this approach does not	 deal with the 
“immanence”	of the work (2005: 5). This is an issue that	has been keenly discussed in 
dance. The nature of dance, as accessed through live performance, means that	many 
have suggested that	 documentation does not	 capture the ephemeral, singular and 
immanent nature of live performance. 79 However, although dance performance is 
ephemeral, it	 leaves traces, these are sometimes tangible (such as documents), and 
often non-tangible, such as memories, mental images, emotions, sensations and so 
on. This is where the idea	of a	poetics might	be helpful. Genette defines poetics as 
the “analysis of (more or less) lasting traits of the literary fact” (2005: 5). This account	
can perhaps be directly applied to these dance scores. Furthermore, dance analysis 
has an established relationship with linguistics. 80 Scholars have drawn on frameworks 
and methods arising in literary theory to develop analytic methods for dance (Bunker 
et	al 2013: 6, O’Shea	2010: 6, Rowell 2009: 137)	the adoption of the notion of poetics, 
can perhaps be understood as another way of drawing connections between literary 
frameworks and dance analysis. 
79 Phelan’s (1993) view	is perhaps the most	well known example of this perspective.	
She clarifies her view in an interview with Marquard Smith (2003), explaining that	she 
is not	against	documentation per	se, but	that	recording is something ontologically 
distinct	to performance (2003: 294 – 295). 
80 This relationship is not	without	its critics, for example Williams (2004) challenges 
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Dance	Poetics 
The relationship between poetics and dance is not	new. In Poetics of Contemporary 
Dance Laurence Louppe provides a	 detailed justification for the applicability of the 
notion to dance. Originally published in French in 1997, this book was translated by 
Sally Gardner in 2010, meaning that	 the idea	 of a	 poetics has been give recent	
attention in dance discourse. Louppe’s book considers contemporary dance as a	
whole and provides detailed consideration of the ‘”lasting traits” (Genette 2005:	5 of	
the form, as opposed to focussing on a	single choreographer or work. 
Nevertheless, some of Louppe’s explanations are helpful in relation to these scores. 
For example, the book starts with the articulation that, 
[a] poetics seeks to define and uncover in a	 work of art	 what	
touches us, animates our sensibility, and resonates within our 
imagination (Louppe 2010: 3-4). 
This quote demonstrates how a	poetic analysis is not	purely concerned with mapping 
particular body parts, or considering the choreographic structure of the work,	it	also 
addresses the expressive, or affective nature of the work. This articulation clearly 
relates to Genette’s conception of poetics, and already seems to justify deLahunta	
and Cvejić’s use of the term, these scores are certainly concerned with ‘uncovering’. 
For example, the desire to discover and share features that	 are not	 accessible in 
performance, as articulated by Cvejić	 (in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	 10), 
suggests a	process of excavation and revelation. In the case of Synchronous Objects, 
computerised annotations probe and explore that	 which is physically present	 in 
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performance, in order to reveal non-physical features. The annotations offer a	form 
of uncovering — making imperceptible features tangible to viewers, in order to 
theorise how the movement	generates its effect. 
Louppe suggests that	a poetics, “not	only tell us what	a work does to us, it	teaches us 
how it	 is made” (2010: 4). Each of these three scores embody this double function.	
For example, the animations of choreographic principles on Using the Sky	 and 
Synchronous Objects clearly relate to the first	 function. It	 is apparent	 through these 
objects that	maintaining, or simulating the effect	of the live performance of the work 
is an important	 feature in the construction of the sites. The animations provide 
alternative renditions of the works. Once the body is removed as the primary focal 
point, the energetic, affective sense of the movement	is heightened. 
This approach to scoring dance can be linked to a	broader interest	in Philosophy and 
Critical Theory with the notion of affect. The so-called ‘affective turn’, arising from the 
philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1980), Brian Massumi (2002),81 and 
their contemporaries, has seen an increased emphasis on bodily experience in a	wide 
range of fields including; Cultural Studies, Sociology, Philosophy, and Performance 
Studies. There is a	particular emphasis on interpersonal relations, and the ability of 
bodies to impact	on the experiential state of another body. 82 As a	bodily act, often 
shared, the experience of dancing and watching dance has a	clear link with 
81 Massumi has translated some of Deleuze and Guattari’s work, as well as 
formulating his own theories and writings.
82 See Apostolou-Hölscher (2014) for an account	of the ‘affective turn’ in relation to 
dance. 
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discussions of affect. Indeed, a	lot	of recent	discourse in dance has started to draw on 
this area	of thought.	83 
Whilst	Deleuze, Guattari, Massumi and others are firmly situated within the field of 
Continental Philosophy, I	am interested in the link between discourses that	consider 
affect	in relation to dance, and conversations occurring in Philosophical Aesthetics. It	
seems that	 there may be an interesting comparison to be drawn between affect, 
expression and kinaesthetic empathy. For example, whilst	 dance theorists are 
increasingly referring to dance’s affective function, 84 as long ago as 1938 RG 
Collingwood suggested that	expression is a	defining feature of art. The significance of 
expression has also been examined in specific relation to dance.85 Louppe herself	
suggests that, “[a]ll movement	 is…automatically expressive, even if it	does not	have 
‘expression’ as its aim” (2010: 4-5). Capturing the expressive nature of dance seems 
central to these scores, yet	 given the close relationship between the body and 
expression or affect, this motivation perhaps seems at	odds with Forsythe’s interest	
in expressing choreographic principles without the body. This is where the animations	
are particularly interesting, as they re-present	 bodily actions and features through 
abstraction. 
There are of course differences between affect	and expression. The distinctions and 
comparisons between these notions require further exploration, however, this 
83 See Manning (2013), McCormack (2014) and Sabisch (2013), amongst	others. 
84 For example Čičigoj’s	(2013) discussion of A Choreographer’s Score refers to the 
role of ‘affect’. 
85 McFee (2011), Beauquel (2013), Carr (1987).
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relationship provides a	 good example of the interplay between Continental and 
Analytic Philosophy. As with kinaesthetic empathy, affect	 is perhaps most	 simply 
conceptualised as occurring between the dancer and the audience, whereas these 
scores are at	 least	 partially authored by the choreographer. Part	 of the analysis 
concerns choreographic process, and prioritises the voice of the choreographer. This 
leads us to the second part	of Louppe’s description that	poetics, “not	only tell us what	
a work does to us, it	 teaches us how it	 is made” (2012: 4). This suggests that	 the 
author or artist	is central to a	poetics. This point	is further demonstrated by Cvejić’s 
suggestion that	the process of making the score allowed De Keersmaeker,	
to articulate the ideas and intuitions underlying her methods, thus 
inscribing into the text	 a statement	 of her poetics, and a	 kind of 
reasoning that	 leads her in creation (Cvejić in De Keersmaeker and 
Cvejić 2012:	9). 
This statement	 relates to the ways that	poetics are concerned with explaining how 
the affect	of a	work is generated, rather than merely describing the affective function. 
As repeatedly mentioned, one of the key differences between Synchronous Objects,	
Using the Sky and A Choreographer’s Score and traditional dance scores is that	
‘choreographic objects’ are broadly concerned with drawing attention to the 
processes involved in formulating and performing the work, rather than purely 
inscribing a	 sequence of movement. The work is not	 only analysed as a	 product	
through the annotation of performance events; but	 the choreographic labour 
involved in the process of making is also analysed and shared. This approach 
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highlights the relationship between the choreographer and the audience. A method 
clearly articulated through Louppe’s suggestion that	a poetics asks, 
[w]hat	 path does the artist	 follow to reach the point	 where the 
artistic act	is available to perception, there where our consciousness	
can discover it	and begin to resonate with it? (Louppe 2010: 4). 
This is illustrated through a	section of the written component	of A Choreographer’s 
Score, which reads, 
[t]he second movement	meant	 “morning” for us, that	 is, high energy, 
“arbeit” (work), mechanic. I remember having the image of Charlie 
Chaplin’s Modern Times, but	 a punk “fuck you” attitude was also 
already present. 
The music recalls the industrial rock	of the 1980s. 
Yes, the music we were listening to was D.A.F., Joy Division, Nina	Hagen, 
Talking Heads, TC Matic, and also Sex Pistols…the choreography was 
structured into a	 binary division of two pairs (De Keersmaeker and 
Cvejić 2012:	81). 
This extended quotation demonstrates how the dialogue of the score replicates the 
relationship between the choreography and the music. The topics are addressed 
alongside, echoing the decisions and connections at	 the heart	of De Keersmaeker’s 
process. The focus on the artist’s creative path also relates to Synchronous Object 
and Using the Sky, each of which foregrounds the decision-making processes of the 
artists, through interviews, narration and interactive tools. 
This positioning of the author informs the viewer’s interpretation of the work, 
contradicting influential post-structuralist	 notions of authorship. As mentioned in 
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Chapter Two (p.41),	as Dance Studies was established as an academic discipline in the 
1980s, scholars such as Adshead et	 al drew connections between the reading of 
dances and post-structuralist	 thinking (Carter and O’Shea	 2010: 145). In particular, 
the authority of the reader to determine the meaning of texts proposed by Barthes 
(1977) and others, informed the development	 of a	 spectator-oriented paradigm. 
Barthes’ seminal essay ‘The Death of the Author’, originally published in 1967, 
dismisses the author as the source of empirical truth, and suggests that	the reader is 
responsible for determining the meaning of a	text. Barthes suggests that, 
[t]o give a	 text	 an Author is to impose a	 limit	 on that	 text, to 
furnish it	with a	final signified, the close the writing (Barthes 1977:	
147). 
This notion had a	significant	 impact	on the roles adopted by choreographers, critics 
and audience members, as discourses in Dance Studies have mirrored those in 
Literature, Critical Theory and Philosophical Aesthetics, prioritising the autonomy of 
the reader or spectator to determine meaning, over the intentions of the author, as 
demonstrated through examples such as the dance analysis model by Adshead et	al 
(1988) discussed	 previously (pp. 43 – 44 and 148 – 149), which makes no explicit	
mention of the intentions or motivations of the choreographer. 
It is important	to note that	De Keersmaeker, Forsythe and Hay’s articulations do not	
refer to denotative functions of the movement. For example, none of the 
choreographers claim that	movement	 x means y, thus avoiding offering the explicit	
“final signifiers” referred to by Barthes (1977: 147). The decision to articulate process 
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and structures, as opposed to semiotic meanings, offers a	form of revealing, exposing 
the work (as a	verb) behind the dance work, and leaves some aspects of the reading 
open. However, contra-Barthes, the texts are clearly provided with authors, who 
openly direct	 the attention of the reader. The emphasis on the choreographer 
challenges Barthes’ view as the author is foregrounded, shaping the identity and 
reading of the work. As mentioned in Chapter Eight (p.196),	 Cvejić suggests that	 it 
would be regressive to prioritise the choreographer’s insights over other readings 
(2012: 8). However, the location of the choreographer in the construction and 
transmission of the poetics offer constraints on the interpretation of the works, 
guiding the viewer to see features of the work in accordance with their processes and 
intentions. 
Perceiving	Abstract Forms 
Louppe’s claim that	a poetics considers what	a work does to us and how it	touches,	
animates and resonates (2010:	 4- 5), has particular significance in relation to 
Synchronous Objects and Using the Sky, both of which feature abstract	 forms, not	
only to analyse but	 also to re-present the expressive qualities of the works though 
digital media. I	want	to return now to the topic of affect, expression and kinaesthetic 
empathy, considering whether animated expressions of choreographic principles can 
generate the bodily experiences associated with these concepts. Durning describes 
her response to Weber’s animation as “visceral” (in Motion Bank 2013),	 implying a	
















As the descriptions of the animations hopefully demonstrate, they	 are compelling
aesthetic forms.
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged 
version of the thesis can be found in the Lancester Library, Coventry 
University.
Figure 12:	Annotations demonstrating alignments (Forsythe and	OSU 2009) 
For example, the	alignment annotations on Synchronous Objects	operate in real time
and are visible only as long as the moment of alignment between the dancers occurs, 
meaning that that they echo the rhythms and	dynamics of the movement, creating	
striking aesthetic forms. Furthermore, they	 can be viewed separately from the
dancers.	Without the body the annotations become animations, with	expressive, as	
opposed to didactic functions. The animated annotations carve	through space as they
re-live	 the impetus of the body and foreground the expressive trace of the
movement. Removing the body from view paradoxically helps to highlight its
expressive capabilities through animated traces. Thus exemplifying the first part	 of
Louppe’s	double function to “ tell us what a work does to us” (2010: 4). 
	



















The ‘3D	 Alignment Forms’	 object,	 previously	 described (pp.154 – 156), further
abstracts the	 data, re-presenting	 the action of the body in immaterial form. The
images occupy a paradoxical	space, as	the body is visibly removed, yet	perceptually
present. This paradox is equally true of Weber’s	 animation on Using the Sky.	 As 
mentioned in Chapter Seven (p.175), Weber	 describes how he realised that the
animation needed bodily features to	adequately interpret the score.	86 He goes on to
state that he wanted to avoid developing images that were too “bodyesque” (Weber
in Motion Bank 2013), thus he developed	a body in	abstract form.
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The 
unabridged version of the thesis can be found in the Lancester 
Library, Coventry University.
Figure 13:	Animated adaptation of No Time to Fly (Weber in Motion Bank 2013) 
Weber’s animation	 consists of a continually moving flock of lines, reminiscent	 of
brush-strokes.	 They move in an out of bodily shapes, never	 reaching a fully
representational form. Weber manipulated the medium to maintain bodily features
despite not creating a direct representation of a human form.	 Like a body, the	
86 This is not exclusive to Hay’s	practice and relates to an observation made by
deLahunta and Leach (2015) in discussion of their project with Wayne McGregor, 
which involved the development of another digital, abstract body. 
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animated lines move sequentially and travel as a	 unit. Sketched lines create the 
impression of a	floor, meaning the form has a relationship to gravity. This seems to be 
a key characteristic of the animation, as gravity is a	 fundamental component	 of 
human experiences and therefore encourages a	reading of the animation as in some 
way bodily. At	one point the lines form a	stick figure, which waves a	finger in the air, 
directly responding to the score, the words of a	quote from a	Samuel Beckett	poem 
are written in space, “[S]trictly speaking I	 believe I	 have never been anywhere” (in	
Motion Bank 2013). The words fall to the floor, their origin remaining in the figure’s 
grasp, like wool unravelled, the moment	 passed. This section demonstrates the 
similarity between the animation and a	 dance performance, as the continual 
movement	 emphasises the ephemerality of the animation and shows how Weber 
manipulated the medium to maintain bodily features, despite not	 creating a	 direct	
representation of the human form. 
Suggesting that	 the body take digital form can be seen as an adoption of Hayles’ 
posthuman perspective (1999). She suggests that 
the posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis 
we all learn to manipulate, so that	extending or replacing the body 
with other prostheses becomes a	 continuation of a	 process that	
began before we were born (Hayles 1999: 3). 
Under Hayles’ paradigm, the extension of the body into the digital sphere can be read 
as the next	 stage in the body’s socio-cultural evolution. As Hayles points out, this 
perspective allows for the human being to be articulated with machines (1999: 3), 
allowing for the material and digital to seamlessly interact. She suggests that, “[i]n the 
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posthuman, there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between 
bodily existence and computer simulation” (Hayles 1999: 3). The location of the body 
in these examples poses many interesting questions; such as; is the bodily nature of 
the image the reason for Durning’s response? And is it	possible that	such imagery can 
ignite the same form of physical response as live dancing body? 
deLahunta	and Leach write, “‘the body’ is something that	is compelling to be with. It	
has presence, and that	presence has an effect” (2015: 8). The way that	our minds and 
bodies respond to dance has been researched and theorised from multiple 
perspectives and often involves recognition of the relationship between the dancer 
and spectator’s bodies. As long ago as 1933 John Martin — a writer influential in 
formulating seminal ideas about	dance at	that	time — suggested that	the observation 
of movement	 triggers physical responses in observers, suggesting the notion of 
‘metakinesis’ to explain this reaction. 87 Martin’s concept	 of a	 kind of one-to- one 
resonance between viewer and mover appears to have a	 lot	 in common with later 
scientific work on dance perception, particularly kinaesthetic empathy 88 and mirror 
neurons 89 — all exploring the idea	of a	certain sensed relationship between viewer 
and performer. More recently, the affective turn has resulted in dance scholarship 
that	 focuses on bodily sensations and experiences.	90 It is possible to suggest	 that	
cultivation of digital poetics are an indirect	 result	 of an interest	 in affect; the 
87 Republished in Copeland, R. and Cohen, M. (eds.) (1983). 
88 See Foster (2011), Reynolds & Reason (2012), Rubidge (2010) amongst	others. 
89 See Calvo – Merino et	al (2005); Gallese & Goldman (1998) 
90 See Badiou (2005);	Gil (2006);	Manning (2009,	2013); Portanova	(2013),	amongst	
others.
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endeavour to capture what	 the work does to us involves maintaining or replicating 
the resonance between the spectator and dancers’ bodies in live performance. 
The notion that	 digital images can ignite affective or kinaesthetic responses in 
observers, further implies a	 posthuman paradigm, whereby the machine and the 
body no longer operate as binaries. Moreover, this example demonstrates Hayles’ 
argument	that	information is embodied. Even if one was to maintain a	somewhat	out-
dated dualist	perspective regarding perception – suggesting that	it	takes place purely 
in the mind, Weber’s animation, and other similar projects challenge this view by 
posing the possibility of digital information being perceived physically. Following 
Hayles, it	 is possible to see the animation as an example of machines and bodies as 
co-existing within a	 continuum of reflective, embodied experiences. However, it	 is 
important	to remember that	there is a	clear difference in our encounters with actual 
and abstract	bodies. Here I	wish to recall the pragmatist	posthumanism proposed in 
Chapter Seven (pp.183 – 184), and think about	the shift	in terms of a	displacement	of 
boundaries (Braidotti 2013: 89), as opposed to an absolute confluence of the physical 
and virtual worlds. 
There has been a large amount	 of theoretical attention paid to the physical 
perception of dance movement, however, the development	 of abstract	
choreographic images, enhanced by developments in digital technology is relatively 
new and poses related questions. This is a	 topic explored by Rubidge who uses the 
notion of “liminal imagery”	 (2010: 1) to describe abstract	 digital images that	 arise 
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from the movement	 of the body and are used to generate new artistic works. She 
suggests such images are situated on, 
a perceptual and conceptual threshold, hovering in an in-between 
state that	 is replete with ambiguity and indeterminacy in both 
perception and conception (2009:	2).
I suggest	 that	 this account	 closely relates to these animations, which negotiate 
boundaries on the threshold between physical and digital. Furthermore, both 
examples arise from, and feature movement, yet	 the forms are polysemic — free 
from prescribed, determinate meanings. The role of indeterminacy in their 
conception is also a	 significant	 factor, as both objects are the result	 of subjective 
interpretations of the choreographic data. Unlike notation, diagrams and recordings, 
they do not	aim to quantify, explain or represent	the movement; their making is more 
open and their function more opaque. 
Rubidge’s discussion concerns art	works that	use motion-capture images arising from	
the movement	of a	body. Whilst	there is some overlap with these animations,	in the 
case of motion capture, a	human body has performed the movement. This affects the 
ontology of the image. The Synchronous Objects animations have a different	
relationship to the body, as they were developed from data	 gathered through 
analysing a	 film. Furthermore Weber’s animation has yet	 another ontology, as it	 is 
cultivated by hand in response to choreographic stimuli (Weber in	 Motion Bank 
2013). However, despite their different	roots, I	suggest	that	these images share many 
features. For instance, Rubidge addresses the affective nature of such images, 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




suggesting that, “embodied modes of consciousness are essential to the process of 
understanding liminal choreographic imagery in the digital domain” (2009: 1). Whilst	
theorists such as Noë (2004) and performance scholar Maaike Bleeker (2010) suggest	
that	 perception always concerns the body, these images ignite a	 different	 form of 
response to a textual description, for example. It is therefore perhaps worth 
considering the role of affect, as a	way of understanding how reading the animation 
differs from other modes of perception. Rubidge draws on the work of Brian 
Massumi, who describes affect	 as the “prepersonal intensity corresponding to the 
passage from one experiential state of the body to another” (Massumi in Rubidge 
2009: 3). So, can this passage occur between live and digital bodies? Furthermore, 
can it	account	for the impact	of abstract	‘bodily’ images? 
Rubidge suggests that, 
[i]t is the ability of liminal imagery to create such affective resonances, 
independent	 of ‘content’ or ‘meaning’ that	 holds my attention as both 
maker and viewer (Rubidge 2009: 3). 
Considering the animations to be affective has repercussions. Further implicating a	
posthuman paradigm, it	 implies that	 affect	 is not	 restricted to the interaction 
between human bodies in the same space. Rather, abstract	 images with bodily 
qualities may evoke the same response as the body is extended into the digital 
sphere.	
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The affective nature of the animations further demonstrates the desire to share 
‘choreographic knowledge’ with people from outside of dance. The ambiguous form 
of the expressions requires no analysis or expert	knowledge. As mentioned in Chapter 
Two	 (pp.52)	 Montero (2013) suggests that	 viewers who have undergone dance 
training have different	 physical responses to non-trained observers, due to the 
recognition of certain steps. Removing the steps, and foregrounding the expressive 
function of the dance, holds the potential to open up open up the dance to a	wider	
audience. 
The digital animations on	 Synchronous Objects and Using the Sky, foreground the 
issues at	hand, however the poetic function of A Choreographer’s Score is less	obvious.	
The perceptual presence of movement, and therefore (arguably) affect	or expression, 
is limited to De Keersmaeker’s short	demonstrations and excerpts of the work on the 
DVD. This is where the use of technology and De Keersmaeker’s narration of the 
movement	 becomes particularly significant, as it	 allows for the conflation of the 
analytic with the expressive. The video clips, narrated by De Keersmaeker’s “affective 
tones” (Cvejić in De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012:	12), allow for the poetic, expressive 
nature of the work to be present	in the score. However, Cvejić	and De Keersmaeker’s 
approach more closely aligns to the second part	of Louppe’s double function, to teach 
us how the work is made (2010: 4), as the approach is less ambiguous and more 
didactic. 
Whilst	Using the Sky	and Synchronous Objects contain alternative, artistic renditions of 
the choreography, A Choreographer’s Score focuses on deconstructing the work, 
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leaving it	 undone, as opposed to re-constituted in order to generate affect. The 
extraction of the choreography from the dancing is expressed in a	more formal and 
pedagogic manner, allowing for further levels of analysis.	91 Therefore, I	suggest	that	
A Choreographer’s Score is demonstrative of an approach that	 combines Genette’s 
distinctions between criticism and poetics. It	 offers a	 rigorous internal, formal and 
interpretive analysis of single works, whilst	 including examples that	 aim to capture 
their “immanence” (Genette 2005:	5). Furthermore, the score provides a	place for De 
Keersmaeker to clearly articulate her personal poetics, ensuring the presence of her 
signature in the legacy of the works. 
Summary 
Despite the differences between Synchronous Objects, Using the Sky	 and A 
Choreographer’s Score, they share many features, including, the revelation of 
structural components, the deconstruction of the making of the work and a	concern 
for capturing the immanence and affect	of the body in performance. The combination 
of these closely relates to articulations from Louppe and Genette about	the nature of 
poetics, as concerned with analysis of the immanence and lasting traits of the work 
(Genette 2005: 5), as well as examining the making process and resonance with the 
viewer	(Louppe 2010: 3-4).
91 As demonstrated by Karreman’s work	(2014b), for example, which pays careful 
attention to the transmission of De Keersmaeker’s practice through the score in 
relation to motion capture and other digital technologies. 
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The question of how to capture and re-present	the lasting traits of dance has posed a	
well-versed theoretical and practical puzzle. This chapter has demonstrated the 
potential of animation in this regard. I suggest	 that	 these three case studies are 
demonstrative of a	broader, emergent	interest	in examining both affect	and process, 
and that	 it	 is the combination of these two interests that	 formulate a	 poetics. 
Drawing together articulations about	 choreographic process with expressive 
rendering of the choreographic principles through animation and narration cultivates 
a new form of poetics, which has the potential to evoke affective resonance between 
the viewer and the abstracted ‘bodily’ images on screen. This interaction 
demonstrates a	blurring of boundaries between the digital and the flesh, implicating a	
posthuman paradigm. The perceptual presence of the choreographer and 
construction of affective liminal imagery proposes a	 sensorial posthuman poetics, 
intrinsically linked to the cultural zeitgeist	in which they were produced. 
Further exploring the cultural context	 of ‘choreographic objects’ the next	 chapter 
draws on	 discourses	 from Social Anthropology, to think through the relationship 
between the objects and the artistic and cultural context	 of their production. I 
consider examples of recently developed performance works that	 foreground 
choreographic process to probe the broader artistic setting, enabling me to further 
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Chapter Eleven:	Process and Politics 
Introduction 
Building on the philosophical theorising of the ‘choreographic objects’ in Chapters Six 
and Seven, this chapter focuses	 on the artistic and cultural context	 of their 
production. I discuss the cultural value systems governing the development of the 
three case studies. I	 focus in particular on the role of knowledge and labour, asking 
how the foregrounding of these elements relates to ideas from Dance Studies, 
Theatre Studies and Social Anthropology. 
This chapter returns to Birringer’s suggestion outlined in Chapter One (p.1),that	
discourse about	 choreographic practices has increased in recent	 years (2013:	 8). 
Alongside ‘choreographic objects’ I consider	 how	 such discourse also manifests 
through the performance of	 process	 in contemporary dance practices. Drawing on 
recent	 examples from Siobhan Davies (2014) and Jonathan Burrows and Matteo 
Fargion (2014),	 I consider how the foregrounding of choreographic process in 
performance relates to ‘choreographic objects’. Furthermore, considering 
performative examples helps to gain a	 clearer picture of the artistic and cultural 
context	of the three case studies. 
I address the overarching question of how ‘choreographic objects’ inform spectatorial 
engagement	 with dance, as both sets of examples generate alternative ways of 
responding to dance works. Also considering the central question, of what	 a 
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‘choreographic object’ is, this chapter addresses subsidiary questions such as: What	
motivates artists and researchers to foreground choreographic processes?	How does	
this reveal and reconfigure cultural and artistic value systems? And, what	 is the 
impact	 of the socio-political climate on the ontology of ‘choreographic objects’? In 
order to explore these questions I	 draw largely on the work of James Leach (2006, 
2012, 2013), who provides insight	 into socio-cultural context	 of ‘choreographic 
objects’ and responds to questions of value. This perspective allows me to further 
understand the motivations and significance of these objects. Furthermore, the 
discussion reveals how cultural value and philosophical ontology can be seen as 
enmeshed. I revisit	 the notion of ontological hierarchies began in Chapter Five
(pp.122 – 124), suggesting that	 ‘choreographic objects’ have the potential to 
decentralise performance, thus challenging its status as the most	 significant	
component	of the work. 
Throughout	 its relatively recent	history, contemporary dance has been defined by a	
constant	re-shaping, and challenging of imposed or perceived parameters. The genre 
92 indeed	 arose from a desire to escape the restrictions imposed through the 
conventions of classical ballet. Early modern dance practitioners, such as Isadora	
Duncan, dismissed the codified movement	 and restraining costumes of ballet, and 
expressed themselves through ‘natural’, seemingly improvised, unbound	movement.	
93 One of many responses to Duncan’s movement	 can be seen in Merce 
92 I use this term to refer to the broad range of dance styles and techniques 
considered as contemporary dance, and acknowledge the complexity of the notion.
93 See Daly (1995) for a	detailed consideration of Duncan’s work, including 
consideration of the notions of the ‘natural’ and ‘expressive’ body. 
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Cunningham’s strict	 formalism, and deliberate inexpressiveness, thus demonstrating 
how the genre is not	 describable in relation to a	 specific stylistic character, or 
choreographic approach. 
Although we tend to think of dance works as ‘choreographed’, this term does not	
describe a	 specific set	of actions. Contemporary dance is made in a	wide variety of 
ways, however there are some overlapping strategies, such as; improvisation, chance 
procedure, rules, tasks, responding to stimuli, embodying concepts, constructing ideal 
forms, narratives, political messages, and so on. Although these strategies are shared, 
taught	and borrowed they also constantly evolve and are multiple in nature. There is 
no standardised choreographic practice or method and each artist	 develops 
idiosyncratic approaches. 
Initially it	 might	 seem that	 the multiple forms of choreographic process perhaps 
contribute to the desire to share strategies. However, as previously mentioned, there 
have been multiple approaches used for some time, meaning that	other reasons must	
be at	play. In this chapter I	consider whether the examples discussed could be seen as 
motivated by artists’ desire to claim more value in their work, through exposing the 
labour, logic and intelligence of their processes. Traditionally value judgements of	
dance are focussed on two major components, the work and the performance, the 
judgment	 of which may be distinct. For example it	 is possible to see a bad 
performance of a	 good work, and vice versa. However, scoring and performing 
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Knowledge	Economies and	Commodity	Forms 
The increased interest	in articulating choreographic processes can be attributed to a	
number of factors. For example, the increased acceptance of practice-as-research in 
UK Higher Education means that	 dance artists working within these contexts are 
often required to find ways to articulate the research-ful nature of their practice. 94 
Although these projects are not	solely developed within,	or	funded by Universities, 95 
this shift	 towards valuing choreographic practice can be seen to contribute 
significantly to the context	of their production. 
The motivations for the development	 of ‘choreographic objects’ are considered by	
Leach,	 whose	 background in	 Social Anthropology gives	 him a	 particular interest	 in 
how they generate relations between people. Writing in 2006, prior to the AHRC 
‘choreographic objects’ project	Leach suggests, 
[i]n the face of dazzling technology, it	is easy to miss the 
point that	what	the technology enables are collaborations 
and combinations of people’s work and ideas in new ways. 
Collaboration is obviously at	the heart	of what	drives value 
forward in the “information society” and the “knowledge 
economy” (Leach 2006: 447). 
Although not	 writing specifically about ‘choreographic objects’ here, these insights 
are important	for demonstrating the framework through which he writes. Leach reads 
94 See Pakes (2009) 
95 There are links between these objects and particular Universities. For example, 
scholars from OSU were instrumental in the development	of Synchronous Objects. 
Furthermore, Scott	deLahunta	is a	Senior Research Fellow at	Coventry University. 
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the objects through a	 specific lens, focussed on the nature of relationships and 
transaction. This is an important	perspective to consider, as philosophical notions of 
artistic value are not the only system at play in the making and reception of 
‘choreographic objects’. The value of the objects for those who make and use them is 
intrinsically linked to the exchange that	 occurs between artists and researchers as 
well as the artist, object, researcher and receiver. 
Leach suggests that knowledge	is another key component	in the value of the object.	
Writing in 2013, he suggests that	the relationship between knowledge and value is a	
key motivation for the development	of ‘choreographic objects’,	proposing that	 they 
are the result of a	concern by contemporary dance practitioners to demonstrate the 
knowledge producing nature of the form.	He suggests that, 
[t]he emergence in the last	 two decades of publications of 
choreographic ideas indexes a	 real desire on the part	 of leading 
choreographers to show that	 choreography is an intelligent	 and 
creative practice that	has its own language and sense (Leach 2013: 
6). 
Leach’s interpretation of the motivations for ‘choreographic objects’ suggests that	such 
projects are a	product	 of dance’s on-going drive to demonstrate the seriousness of its 
worth. The way that	dance possesses its ‘own language and sense’ referred to by Leach is 
often considered the form’s downfall, in that	 the particular form of bodily knowledge	
that	dance making generates is considered difficult	 to articulate through language. For 
example, in Chapter One (p.13) I	discuss Klein’s suggestion that	theories on modern art	
see dance as ‘other’, and therefore dance knowledge is seen as an ‘other’ type of 
knowledge, “a	form whose physical nature prohibits discourses about	it” (Klein 2007: 28). 
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According to Klein, the physical ‘otherness’ of embodied dance knowledge presents a	
challenge for those wishing to share and articulate it. 
Why then face this challenge? Leach outlines the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ motivations for 
artists and researchers to undertake the projects. Referring to articulations from 
Forsythe, Leach suggests that	 internal motivations arose from, “a	 strong assertion that	
the practice has huge value, but	is restricted to a	small audience” (Leach 2013: 6). Here 
he suggests that	 sharing ‘choreographic knowledge’ with a larger audience is a
motivating factor for artists. This claim aligns with the external motivations proposed by 
Leach, who suggests that	 these objects are the product	 of the ‘knowledge economy’, 
explaining that, 
[t]he governments of the countries in which these contemporary 
dance companies are situated promote the ‘knowledge economy’ 
(Drucker 1969; Castells & Cardoso 2005). For them ‘knowledge’ has 
become a	 value term in its own right, denoting something that	
people (should) strive to produce, strive to have recognised, to 
evaluate, rank, and transact	(Leach 2013: 6-7). 
Leach suggests here that	 in order for dance making to be acknowledged as a
knowledge-rich activity within the current	 cultural climate, ‘choreographic 
knowledge’ needs to be expressed in a sharable and recognisable form. This 
suggestion is	echoed	by Klein, who suggests that	“[i]n the globalised world of the 21st 
century, knowledge is considered the key to prosperity, influence and power”	(2007: 
26). The primarily bodily nature of ‘choreographic knowledge’, combined with the 
pressures of Leach’s ‘knowledge economy’ point	 to a	 socio-cultural incentive for 
artists to develop sharable modes of transmitting dance knowledge in order to 
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demonstrate the value of their work to audiences in accordance with political 
structures. 
Democratising Components 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, the performance of the work, manifest	
through recordings, is only one component	 of the scores. Although they often 
function as source material, the recordings and films of the works are not	given pride 
of place in the design of the scores. For example, Using the Sky features boxes 
containing text, recordings and diagrams that	 overlap one another. Every page 
contains multiple sections of relatively equal size. The viewer is not	explicitly directed 
towards one set	 of properties over any	 other. The result	 of this is that	 physical 
instances of the work, manifest	in recorded documentation, are presented as equally 
significant	to interviews, written accounts, diagrammatic forms and so on, helping to 
draw attention to the knowledge-rich nature of dance making and performance. 
The reorganisation and democratisation of the work’s features through the 
‘choreographic object’ can be seen to relate to theatre scholar Hans Thies Lehmann’s 
discussion of the non-hierarchical arrangement	of theatrical signs, which he suggests 
is typical of ‘Post-Dramatic Theatre’ (2006). Lehmann states, “[t]he dehierarchization 
of theatrical means is a universal principle of post-dramatic theatre. The non-
hierarchical structure blatantly contradicts tradition”	(Lehmann 2006: 86). 
Echoing Lehmann’s descriptions, the structure and organisation of the components 
on Synchronous Objects and Using the Sky do not	follow a	hierarchical structure. 
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Considering how the democratisation of signs impacts on perception, Lehmann draws 
a comparison with painting.	He suggests that	
[w]hat happens here within the medium of painting can also 
be found in manifold ways in postdramatic theatrical 
practice: different	 genres are combined in a	 performance 
(dance, narrative theatre, performance, etc.); all means are 
employed with equal weighting; play, object	 and language 
point	 simultaneously in different	 directions of meaning and 
thus encourage a	contemplation that	 is at	once relaxed and 
rapid. The consequence is a	changed attitude on the part	of 
the spectator (Lehmann 2006: 87). 
This description of distributed attention can be applied to the process of 
encountering the scores, as users are required to engage in active contemplation. 
Clearly, this characteristic is not	unique to ‘choreographic objects’, yet	thinking about	
how the construction of meaning is altered is of interest. In a	 live performance 
context	 the viewer is in direct	 contact	 with the work. However, encountering the 
work via	 the ‘choreographic object’ the viewer is presented with three articles, the 
performance, the work and the object	 itself. Furthermore, the work is exposed as a	
multi-layered web of physical and non-physical instances, reconfigured into a	 new 
form of object. Attention is thus triangulated between three objects, and across an 
abundance of metaphysical, epistemological and kinaesthetic properties. 
Lehmann suggests that	the result	of the non-hierarchical organisation of signs is that	
perception remains open. He draws on the term ‘evenly hovering attention’ used by 
psychoanalyst	Sigmund Freud to characterize the interaction between the analyst	and 
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their patient	(Lehmann 2006: 87). He explains that	this form	of interaction relies upon 
non-immediate understanding, and that	 perceiving ‘Post-Dramatic Theatre’ also 
involves the postponement	 of the acquisition of meaning. This observation can be 
equally applied to encountering ‘choreographic objects’. No individual component	
makes absolute sense of the work when encountered alone. Thus viewers’ attention 
must	 be active, yet	 hovers across elements, building a	 picture of the work and 
developing understanding of its signs and significance. 
Value	and Labour 
One of the unifying features of ‘choreographic objects’ is that	 they demonstrate a	
concern for showing how dance making and performance involves more that	 the 
mere movement	 of a	 body in space. The use of interviews, documents from the 
creative process, detailed annotations of relations and so on, serve to present	dance 
as a	complex interplay of ideas and systems, demanding both cognitive and physical 
labour. A primary example of this is Hay’s repeated discussion of her “daily practice” 
(Hay in	Motion Bank 2013). She emphasises her commitment	to repeatedly working 
with a	set	of ideas. Similarly it	is explained how the ‘executants’ of Hay’s score were 
required to commit	 to the daily practice for a	 period of three months. This is a	
characteristic of Hay’s approach to dance making, further demonstrated by the 
requirements of her ‘Solo Performance Commissioning Project’. In interviews on 
Using the Sky, Hay emphasises the repetition and extended time frame of her 
practice, drawing attention to the amount	of work required to create, interpret	and 
instantiate the work (Hay in Motion Bank 2013). 
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The way in which Hay refers to her process as a	‘practice’ suggests that	she does not	
work	 towards finishing a	 product, rather that	 her relationship with herself and her 
work is in a	constant	 state of exploration. Yet, it	 is stable enough to be taught	and 
adopted by those who undertake renditions of her scores. It	relates closely to Thrift’s 
description of artistic practice as, 
understood as material bodies of work or styles that	have gained 
enough stability over time, through for example, the 
establishment	 of corporeal routines and specialised devices, to 
reproduce themselves (Thrift	2008: 8). 
This certainly seems to describe Hay’s approach and portrays the notion of practice as 
it	is usually understood. It	should be made clear that	Hay’s use of the term ‘practice’ 
is distinct	 from ‘rehearsal’. Many dance works are stabilised through practicing a	
certain set	 of steps or repeating routines. Rehearsals are usually product	 oriented, 
directed towards the construction and stabilising of a	performance event, yet	Hay’s 
practice involves exploration and an on-going enquiry into particular facets of dance. 
That	is not	to say that	Hay’s practice does not	generate a	performance product	of a	
dance work. Indeed her practice itself is stabilised through repetition, demonstrated 
by her sharing of it	 though teaching, discussion and writing.	96 The key point	here is 
that	rehearsals involve practice, but	that	not	all practice is a	rehearsal. 
Arguably, the stability of Hay’s practice is achieved through the type of established 
corporeal routines referred to by Thrift (2008: 8).	Furthermore, the development	of 
96 Lamb at	the Altar: The Story of a Dance (1994); My Body, The Buddhist	(2000) 
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the ‘choreographic object’ relates to Thrift’s description, by offering a	 “specialised 
device”	 (2008:8) through which Hay’s practice — or at	 least	 an account	 of if — is
reproduced. This explanation from Thrift helps to demonstrate Hay’s suggestion 
during ‘The Continuity of Discontinuity’ that	Using the Sky extends her practice (Hay 
2013). 
To return to the key point; the reproduction of practice via	the ‘choreographic object’ 
foregrounds the temporal, cognitive and physical commitment	 required in the 
processes of making and interpreting Hay’s choreographies. This is further 
demonstrated on Using the Sky by the inclusion of written insights from the 
performers As discussed in previous chapters, the alignment	 of recorded 
interpretations and written insights allows the user to acknowledge the experience of 
the performer, offering another way to acknowledge and appreciate the level of 
cognitive and physical labour involved in the performance. 
How then does the re-configuration of performance, knowledge and exchange impact	
on the way in which the work is valued? As previously demonstrated, ‘choreographic 
objects’ call for users to acknowledge the role of labour and knowledge, meaning that	
value judgments will respond to more than the performance event. Indeed, this may 
be seen as a	motivational factor in the creation of these types of objects: revealing 
the complexity of process may encourage spectators to value the work, even if they 
do not	 value the aesthetic properties of the performance. For example, 
comprehending the repeated practice required to instance Hay’s work, is likely to 
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lead the viewer to value the work is a	different	way. This suggestion can be seen to 
relate to a	Marxist	view of value, as intrinsically related to labour. Marx suggests that, 
[i]f then we leave out	 of consideration the use value of commodities, 
they have only one common property left, that	 of being products of 
labour (Marx 1887:	28). 
Marx’s theory proposes that	 the value of a	 commodity directly depends upon the 
labour taken to produce it	 (1887:	28). He focuses specifically on the quantity of the 
labour, suggesting that, 
[w]e see then that	 that	 which determines the magnitude of the 
value of any article is the amount	 of labour socially necessary, or 
the labour time socially necessary for its production (Marx 1887:	
28). 
Under this paradigm, the amount	 of labour required to generate an object	 directly 
correlates with its value. So does the quantity of choreographic labour undertaken 
inform the value of a	dance? It	is possible to argue that	we are unlikely to consider a	
piece of choreography developed in five minutes as equally valuable to a	 work 
cultivated over three months. However, the two do not	directly correlate. A work is 
not, by necessity more valuable solely because it	took a	long time to develop. Indeed, 
paradoxically, a	 good work made in a	 short	 amount	 of time may be considered	
impressive or valuable partly because it	was developed so quickly. Therefore, Marx’s 
theory does not	 directly apply. However, I	 suggest	 that	 although the quantity of 
labour does not	directly inform the value of the work, the articulation of process via	
‘choreographic objects’ suggests that	 the quality of the labour does become 
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significant	in our perception of the work, reiterating the central role of ‘choreographic 
knowledge’. Processes that	 are revealed as possessing valuable qualities, such as 
being particularly innovative, thoughtful, inclusive and so on are likely to positively 
inform our judgments of the work. For example, in the case of No Time to Fly, 
comprehending the depth of thinking and practice required of the ‘executant’, allows 
the viewer to see that	 the movement	 is not	 random or meaningless, despite being 
non-representational.	 Rather, it	 is underpinned by complex cognitive and physical 
processes. This is likely to lead to an acknowledgment	 that	 the work has valuable 
features, even if it	does not	necessarily lead the viewer to favour Hay’s style over any 
other. This suggestion returns us back to the notion that	 value is related to 
‘choreographic knowledge’, and therefore that	 the distribution of this form of 
knowing might	open up Hay’s work to a	wider audience. 
Performing	Process 
The foregrounding of labour and knowledge is also demonstrated in live performance. 
Table of Contents (Davies 2014), is a	 durational performance, which takes place in 
gallery settings. Performances of the work	involve Davies and her company recalling 
and re-enacting moments, memories and traces of Davies’ previous works. Sections 
of structured movement	and tasks are broken up by gatherings of the audience and 
company around a	 large table,	which is frequently moved to a	different	part	of the 
space. During these gatherings the performers explain what	will follow, and map their 
intended pathways through space on the table in chalk. The events pose multiple 
philosophical questions, not	least	regarding the conventions of performance, and the 
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notion of spectatorship. My attention here, however, is on the way that	 Table of	
Contents relates to a	tradition of foregrounding process in performance, arising in the 
postmodern work of Judson Dance Theatre, and echoing the priorities of ‘process’ 
artists such as Richard Serra. 
Similarly to Using the Sky, Table of Contents offers many ways for the spectator to 
share in the internal world of the performers. For example, performer Rachel Krische 
responds in movement	to a	recorded talk by dance artist	Gill Clarke, which is played 
through headphones passed between audience members, allowing access to a	shared 
aural world. Meanwhile Charlie Morrissey and Andrea	Buckley talk their way through 
an improvised duet. 97 They explain where their focus is, what	“usually happens”, and 
what	 they must	be aware of at	 any given point. Similarly, Helke Kaski continuously 
explains her thought	 process, repeatedly promising to “shut	 up in a minute”.	
Foregrounding of the thoughts, experiences and processes of the performer 
generates a particular form of spectatorship, grounded in phenomenological 
awareness of the self and others. Whilst	traditional performance modalities present a	
repeatable object	 or work for consideration, this approach highlights the non-
objective nature of human performance, articulating subjective experiences as they 
arise. These experiences also demonstrate a	 form of knowledge that	 is generated 
through the experience of performing and making. 
97 This idea	was similarly explored in Philipp Gehmacher’s Walk +	Talk series, in which
he invited ten choreographers to create lecture performances, in which moving and 
speaking occur simultaneously. See http://oralsite.be/pages/Walk_Talk_Documents 
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For performers there is likely to be a	distinction between performing a	set	of learned 
steps, and the process of improvising, or engaging in an activity with unknown results, 
in which case the dancer is seemingly involved in a	process of discovery, as opposed 
to rendition.	98 The spontaneous generation of movement	is perhaps a	key feature of 
some forms of choreographic process, which rely on improvisation on behalf of the 
dancers. This method may or may not	 result	 in the cultivation of a	 repeatable 
sequence of movement. In cases where the cognitive and physical processing of	
stimuli by the dancer is key to the choreographic process, the explicit	articulation of 
the thought	processes of the performer can perhaps seen as a	way of disseminating 
‘choreographic knowledge’. However, the processes being articulated by the 
performers are not	 exactly the same thing as Davies’ creative processes. Although 
they are arguably entangled, there is an important	distinction. The dancers articulate 
performative as opposed to choreographic processes. Referring back to Using the Sky, 
this is similar to the distinction between Durning and Warby’s insights and Hay’s 
directives. Whilst	it	is perhaps possible to describe both forms of articulation via	the 
term ‘choreographic knowledge’, there is a	 distinction between Davies’ and Hay’s 
making process, which are directed towards the construction of the work and the 
dancers’ experiences in performance. Although these distinctions are not	 absolute 
and can be blurred, especially if one wishes to argue that	the internal processing of 
the dancers is integral to the process of making the work. 
98 Although it	is important	to note that	Table of Contents is a	repeatable work, some 
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Performing	Labour 
The hiding and revealing of the work or labour of dancers in performance has been 
debated in various contexts. Feminist	dance scholarship has considered the traditions 
of classical ballet	in this regard. For example, a	debate between Ann Daly (1987) and 
Jordan and Thomas (1994), equates the hiding and revealing of the ballerina’s 
physical labour as indicative of American ballet	 choreographer George Balanchine’s 
representation of women. In a	 different	 context, the priorities of Judson Dance 
Theatre, summarised in Rainer’s seminal ‘No Manifesto’ (1965)	discussed	in Chapter 
Two (p.49),	challenged the traditions of dance, imploring an approach that	does not	
offer illusions, or fantasies, but	that	demonstrates the reality of the form (1965: 178).	
Elements of Table of Contents are reminiscent	of Rainer’s seminal work Room	Service,	
discussed	 in Chapter Two (pp.49 – 50). The pedestrian moving of furniture recalls 
Banes and Carroll’s description of the work as involving, “two dancers carrying a	
mattress up an aisle in the theatre, out	one exit	and back in through another” (1982: 
37). Whilst	both works use functional movement, it	perhaps goes without	saying that	
the significance of this movement	is very different	in each instance. Room	Service can 
be seen as an exemplar of Rainer’s manifesto, and an explicit	 challenge to the 
perceived priorities of dance. So successful was the work of Rainer and her 
contemporaries, such as Robert	Dunn and Steve Paxton in pushing perceptions of the 
form, that	 knowledgeable dance audiences are unlikely to find the presence of 
pedestrian movement	 in Davies’ work particularly challenging. Familiarity with the 
style allows for the work not	 to be about	 the fact	 that	 the dancers are performing 
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pedestrian actions in performance, rather this is simply utilised as a	 choreographic 
strategy. My point	is not	that	Davies deliberately or consciously evoked Rainer, rather 
that	the work can be seen as part	of an established trajectory of dance works that	do 
not	follow traditional structures regarding the role of the audience and performer, or 
expectations regarding the movement	 and behaviour of those who are being 
observed. Furthermore this tradition encourages the revelation of the labour of 
performance. 
The repeated moving of the table in Table of Contents generates a	consciousness of 
the work of the performers. The table is made up of multiple sections, requiring many 
people to be involved in the process of moving it	 around the space. It	 is tall and 
heavy, constructed of cumbersome wooden blocks. At	 times individual performers 
take hold of one end of a	unit, waiting for someone to take the other side so that	they 
can move it	into its new position. Spectators are suspended, unsure whether to help 
or not, confused by their role. This discomfort	generates a	heightened sense of the 
physical effort	 of those performing, and the inherent	 hierarchy between audience 
and subject. They are working, we are watching. Despite the deconstructed space, 
and altered performance context, this fact	remains – brought	into perception through 
the demonstration of labour. 
I suggest	 that	 the presentation of physically demanding activities foregrounds the 
work within the ‘work’. This idea	is furthered in Table of Contents through the way in 
which the performers plot	 their space, map out	 their intentions, and share their 
experiences.	 This encourages spectators to engage with features that	 are usually 
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hidden in performance. What	becomes clear is that	the movement	is one outcome of 
a complex and detailed set	of experiences. Dance is demonstrated as more than mere 
movement, which becomes secondary to ideas and experiences. It is possible to 
suggest	 that	 the same is true of Rainer’s work, however I	 disagree. The cultural 
context	 of Room	 Service meant	 that	 the movement, albeit	minimal, purposive and 
pedestrian, is nevertheless a	primary feature of the work. It	 is within the movement	
that	the concept	and political significance resided. In Davies’ work, the politics are in 
the performance of process and the explicit	demonstration of the labour required to 
bring forth the event. 
Davies and Rainer’s work is motivated by different	interests and the comparison is in 
some ways limited. For example Davies was trained in visual art	 originally and has 
made other works for gallery spaces, 99 so features of her work can equally be seen to 
arise from visual art	 traditions. However, the comparison is reflective of the way in 
which these examples pose similar philosophical questions to conceptual visual art	
practices arising within the same historical and cultural context	as Rainer’s work. The 
1950s and 60s saw a	 shift	 towards concept-driven visual art	 works, perhaps most	
famously exemplified in the work of artists such as Marcel Duchamp and Andy 
Warhol. ‘Conceptual Art’ is a	broad term, covering a	 range of artistic practices and 
priorities. However, it	 can perhaps be loosely summarised by artist	 Sol LeWitt’s 
suggestion that, “[t]he idea	 becomes the machine that	 makes the art” (LeWitt	 in 
99 Such as The Collection (2009) at	the Victoria	Miro Gallery in London. Siobhan Davies 
Dance has published a	text	addressing this relationship, alongside dance practitioner 
and scholar Sara	Wookey called Who Cares? Dance in the Gallery & Museum.
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Kosuth 1969: 4). In other words, conceptual art	 is driven by the demonstration of a	
particular idea, as opposed to the creation of an ideal aesthetic form. 
A subset	of the ‘Conceptual Art’ movement, arising in the mid 1960s is the genre of 
‘Process Art’. The Guggenheim museum characterise the movement	as emphasising, 
“the "process" of making art	 (rather than any predetermined composition or plan) 
and the concepts of change and transience” (Guggenheim, n.d.). Artists such as 
Jackson Pollock and Richard Serra	are seen to belong to this category. Their creative 
processes became the subject	 of the art	 product, as demonstrated by Pollock’s 
multiple drip paintings, and Serra’s work Verb List	 Compilation: Actions Related to 
Oneself” (1967 – 1968),100 each of which use the process of making as the primary 
content	of the work. 
Verb List	Compilation: Actions Related to Oneself is a	list, formulated by Serra, of 107 
verbs. It	starts: “ To roll, to crease, to fold” (2012: 102). The actions derived from the 
behaviour of the body in the process of art	making. The method of list	making can be 
seen as a	mode of systematising the creative process. Serra	generated an art product 
through describing and organising observations about	process, conflating process and 
product. The political and creative motivations for this work are aligned with Rainer’s 
and Davies’ exposure of process. The plotting of the choreographic plan on the table, 
for example, echoes Serra’s presentation of verbs describing his process. Incidentally, 
100 Reprinted in Lepecki, A (ed.)	(2012). 
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Serra’s work has been used as a	 choreographic stimulus by Wayne McGregor;	101 
demonstrating the way in which sharing artistic processes can extend knowledge 
across artistic disciplines. 
In an interview with artist	Liza	Bear, Serra	states, “I	think the significance of the work 
is in its effort	not	 its intentions” (1980: 36). The foregrounding of the process shifts 
notions of value from the final work, to the labour of making. Serra	and Pollock were 
not	 the first	 artists to use process as content. Klein addresses this topic in 
collaboration with performance theorist Bojana	Kunst	(2012).	They claim that	artistic 
work has been the subject	 of some artistic productions since the development	 of 
‘fine’ art	 at the end of the eighteenth century (2012: 1). Furthering this genealogy, 
they suggest	 that	 the broad field of ‘performance’ that	 emerged in the 1960s has 
often included reflection upon artistic practice (2012: 1) Serra’s work can be seen as 
an example of this, as he suggests that	 art	 can be conceptualised as an activity, as 
opposed to being oriented solely towards the achievement	 of a	 certain goal, thus 
implicating art	as performative. 
However, Klein and Kunst	 suggest	 the examination of artistic practices within 
performance changed in the 1990s. They claim that	recent	critical performance work 
is more focussed upon collaboration, experimentation, research and discourse and 
that	such practices challenge hierarchical and institutional structures (2012: 1).	They 
argue that, “[o]ne of the important	 aesthetic and political outcomes of these 
101 The work was used as a	stimulus for the development	of UNDANCE (2011) 
(McGregor | Random Dance n.d.) 
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explorations is that	 labour has become visible in performance work” (2012: 1), thus 
further reiterating the way that	 ‘choreographic objects’ and Table of Contents are 
indicative of current	socio-cultural frameworks. 
The confluence of process and product	in Table of Contents is perhaps more complex 
than in Serra’s work due to the way in which dance performance is perceptually 
linked with human processes. Whilst	 scholars such as David Davies (2004) suggest	
that	 all art	 is essentially performative, the performing arts involve the display of 
human process in more explicit	ways than the visual art	tradition, as the body is both 
the vehicle for making and the subject of the work. In cases such as Table of Contents, 
the processes of making and performance are entwined, the confluence of which 
serve to draw the labour of dance sharply into focus. 
Performing	Choreographic	Knowledge 
A related example is provided by Rebelling Against	 Limit	 (2014),	which is a	 lecture-
performance by Burrows, and Fargion.	102 Described as a	 “sermon on structure” 
(Burrows	 and Fargion 2014), the event	 involves Burrows reciting a series of 
observations regarding the role of scores and structures in their work. This 
monologue is accompanied by animated sketches by Peter Rapp, which are projected 
onto a	screen behind Burrows, while Fargion plays the piano. 
102 The work was created for the Tanzkongress in Düsseldorf in	2013. 
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Burrows talks the audience through the works of the long-term collaborators. The 
structure of the score for each work is explained and illustrated. The process of 
ordering and performing each piece is revealed, echoing Leach’s suggestion that	
‘choreographic objects’, can be read as “reverse engineering the final product	 - the 
dance piece – to show its component	 parts” (2013: 7). In this context	 the work 
involves the dissection of previous works, generating a	 complex form of self-
referential, analytic and intertextual performative event. Dance critic Flora	Wellesley 
Wesley	 suggests the format	 “allows us to catch a	 glimpse of another aspect	 of the 
work beyond the art	object” (2013). However, I	suggest	that	the work behind the art	
object	 is the art	object. Thus, herein is another example of the conflation of process 
and product. 
Interestingly, and perhaps paradoxically, Burrows makes it	 clear that	 the work 
involved in making performance works is not	structured in the same way as the final 
score, and resulting performances. Therefore through foregrounding the structures of 
their scores, Burrows and Fargion articulate the process of performing as opposed to 
making. This approach is akin to Davies’ work, which is also concerned with 
demonstrating the process and structures of the performance artefact, as opposed to 
reflecting upon the creative journey that	generated the work.	 Both Table of Contents 
and Rebelling Against	 Limit adopt	 non-conventional approaches to dance making 
however they are also aligned with established performative and artistic traditions, 
which challenge convention, meaning that	 the format is not	 the sole focus of the 
work. I	suggest	that, although presented in very	different	ways, both works exemplify 
some of the key characteristics of ‘choreographic objects’ outlined by Leach.	Through	
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the performance of choreographic processes ‘choreographic knowledge’ is 
foregrounded, thus encouraging the audience to value the work behind the work and 
demonstrating the priorities of ‘knowledge economies’. The point	of this analogy is 
not	to suggest	that	either artist	has accidentally constructed a	‘choreographic object’, 
rather it	 is to demonstrate how the objects share political, artistic and research 
motivations with dance works currently being performed. Thus demonstrating how 
the incentives of the three case studies mirror broader artistic and cultural concerns 
relating to the value of knowledge and labour. 
Davies and Burrows and Fargion have been involved in the development	 of 
‘choreographic objects’. Davies’ online archive RePlay, discussed	 in Chapter Three 
(pp.78 – 79)	was one of the first	objects to be developed in the field. Furthermore, it	
played a	central role in the making of	Table of	Contents, serving as a	resource for the 
restaging and development	 of fragments of Davies’ previous works. Burrows and 
Fargion have developed a	 Motion Bank score called Seven Duets, which compiles	
sections of many of their duets in order to consider links between them (Burrows in	
Motion Bank 2013). Indeed deLahunta	explains that	Rebelling Against	Limit	 fed into 
the development	 of the object	 (2014b). The involvement	 of these artists in such 
projects suggests a further link between ‘choreographic objects’ and their 
performance work. It	 is possible to suggest	that	the consideration of their processes 
involved in the development	 of the objects has a	 causal effect	 on their creative 
practice, drawing attention to the value associated with the knowledge, structures 
and labour of performing and promoting a	desire to share these features. 
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Here we should turn our attention to Leach’s suggestion that; 
[a]t this juncture then, contemporary dance has found itself, 
through internal and external motivations, justifying its 
practice as a	 form of knowledge production. The need to 
show the knowledge aspect	of contemporary dance requires 
something other than the performance 
(Leach 2013: 7). 
The suggestion that	 ‘choreographic objects’ are evidence of dance justifying itself 
though demonstrating the knowledge it	produces can equally be applied to both of 
the examples discussed. Although Table of Contents and Rebelling Against	Limit	are 
performative works, the foregrounding of structure and labour indicating a	desire to 
show something ‘other than performance’. 
Another way that	these works contribute to and mirror the broader cultural context	is 
demonstrated through the centralising of the choreographer’s voice. As Leach points 
out, “[c]ontemporary dance practitioners are experimenting with forms of self – 
presentation” (2013: 9). This ‘self-presentation’ is evidenced in the way that	Davies 
chose to return to her previous work, to reflect	 upon and re-present	 her personal 
archive. Burrows and Fargion also chose to focus on their previous work. Furthermore 
both choreographers perform in their works, demonstrating a	 desire to present	
themselves, both literally and figuratively. Whilst	 Burrows has always performed in 
his own work, Davies has done so far less frequently.	 103 As with Hay and De 
Keersmaeker, Davies’ decision to claim presence within the work is interesting. All 
three choreographers have been making work for many decades, so what	 is it	 that	
103 This claim is made in response to evaluating information on RePlay. 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	








has driven this desire for self-presentation? Alongside political and economic 
incentives, this presentation can be read in accordance with Leach’s notion of ‘self 
preservation’ at	 the heart	 of ‘choreographic objects’. As they approach the end of 
their working lives the choreographers are explicitly claiming ownership of their work 
through preservation, poetics and performance. 
Summary 
‘Choreographic objects’ and the performance of process call for viewers to appreciate 
both the product	 of performance and the depth of the making and performing 
processes. This may be seen as a	motivational factor in the creation of these types of 
objects. Revealing the complexity of process might encourage spectators to value the 
work of the choreography, even if the final product	is not	to their taste. Furthermore, 
the foregrounding of knowledge generates value that	 is distinct	 from the work’s 
aesthetic features. As Leach, writing with anthropologist	 Richard Davis suggests, 
knowledge is itself a	 value term; “there is a transformation of value in the 
contemporary world when something is labelled, ‘knowledge’ (whether accurately or 
otherwise)” (Leach and Davis 2012: 212). 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




Klein and Kunst	suggest	that	the emphasis on knowledge arises from the pressure of 
socio-economic	 crisis, suggesting that	 under recent pressure contemporary society 
has undergone a	restructuring of values and a	revaluation of artistic work (2012: 2). 
They suggest, 
[i]n these social and economic framings, a	 need to rethink the 
processes of making performance art	exists as well as a	need to 
connect	 it	 to questions of labour. Any reflection on the process 
of labour is therefore deeply connected with ways in which the 
artist’s role is re-evaluated through the economic and political 
crisis, especially in relation to current	 cultural and political 
discussions about	the applicability of knowledge and imaginative 
creative practices (Klein and Kunst	2012: 2). 
Considering the context	 of their production and drawing on discourse from Social 
Anthropology has shown how ‘choreographic objects’ relate to the context	 of their 
production.	
Drawing on performative examples has demonstrated how the foregrounding of 
choreographic process	 occurs	 within the broader cultural context	 of ‘choreographic 
objects’. This chapter has helped to gain a	deeper sense of what	these objects are, and 
how they reframe spectatorial engagement	 with dance. Crucially, the focus on 
knowledge and labour highlight	 how they challenge traditional aesthetic theories 
about	the value and appreciation of art. The next	chapter further explores this topic, 
considering the role of knowledge in the perception of the work and asking how 
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Chapter Twelve:	Choreographic Knowledge and Aesthetic Empiricism 
Introduction 
The way that ‘choreographic objects’ foreground process, alongside performance,, 
reveals a wide range of the work’s properties. For example, features such as 
choreographic labour and variability in performance are highlighted in a way that is 
not possible in a singular encounter of the work in live performance. This is a 
phenomenon that is facilitated by the use of technology. Articulations from 
choreographers and dancers are often presented alongside, or integrated into 
recordings, thus highlighting the ways in which ‘choreographic knowledge’ is 
embedded within movement. But how does this inform perception? This chapter 
focuses in more depth on the question, how do ‘choreographic objects’ inform 
spectatorial engagement with dance? I consider how the dissemination of 
choreographic process and the subsequent acquisition of ‘choreographic knowledge’ 
problematises traditional theories in Analytic Philosophical Aesthetics regarding the 
perception of art. I examine the concept of ‘aesthetic empiricism’, 104 which claims 
that the proper appreciation of art concerns engagement only with those properties 
present in the direct and immediate encounter with a work, and demonstrate how 
this notion is challenged through choreographers publically sharing their processes. 
Drawing on David Davies’ Art as Performance (2004), I test the applicability of 
aesthetic empiricism in relation to dance examples, paying particular attention to 
questions posed by ‘choreographic objects’. 





	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	












As previously mentioned, the documentation of dance has conventionally been 
focused on the event of performance. Notation and recordings alike inscribe the 
public, physical manifestation of the work. Historically non-performance documents 
have tended to remain behind the scenes, perhaps saved in performance archives, 
but often discarded and disregarded. The prioritising of performances and recordings 
over other forms of document is reflective of the hierarchy of the work’s instances, 
discussed in Chapter Five (122 – 124) with live performance ‘tokens’ considered the 
primary way of accessing the work (Sparshott 1995; McFee 1992, 2011; Pakes 2013). 
This may be followed by various forms of performance documentation, with the 
remnants of process and rehearsal situated at the bottom of the metaphorical pile. 
Furthermore, metaphysical features, such as repetition and variability in performance 
have often been seen as a problem for dance, 105 documentation methods have 
strived to iron-out the complexity of dance’s multiple instances. However, as 
previously discussed ‘choreographic objects’ foreground contextual and provenance 
related features, such as the artist’s intention and the circumstance of the work’s 
making.




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




Zuniga Shaw succinctly articulates the shared aims of ‘choreographic objects’, 
[w]ith very different outcomes, each of these projects is concerned 
with the idiosyncratic nature of choreographic knowledge and with 
discovering new possibilities for tracing and transmitting ideas 
contained within the specific dance practices of each artist (Zuniga 
Shaw 2011: 207). 
This observation raises a key question; what is ‘choreographic knowledge’? Pakes 
asks; “[w]hat does choreography have to do with knowledge?” (2009: 10). She 
suggests that recent debates regarding practice-as-research have raised questions 
about the type of knowledge generated through choreography, and the way that this 
is shared (2009: 10). Drawing on Gilbert Ryle’s (1963) discussion of the distinction 
between knowing how and knowing that, Pakes suggests that, 
[k]nowing how to make a dance work is distinct from being able 
to analyse existing choreography or explain how and why it is 
effective (Pakes 2009: 11). 
It certainly seems as thought there are different forms of knowledge acquired, and 
available to, makers, performers and spectators of dance. What exactly constitutes 
knowledge is a very large area of enquiry, for the sake of ease, here I will work with a 
simple conception of the term, as used to refer to familiarity with a certain subject, 
theory and so on, or to refer to information, facts, skills and so forth. I acknowledge 
that knowledge may arise from doing, seeing and thinking, or a combination of these 
things. 
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Importantly ‘choreographic knowledge’ does not only belong to the choreographer, 
but also to those who perform the work. This is made clear on Synchronous Object 
and Using the Sky, both of which include testimony from the dancers. 106 So, in very 
simple terms, I suggest that ‘choreographic knowledge’ generally refers to: 
1.) Skills or information acquired or utilised by a	choreographer through the 
process of making (a) dance. 
2.) Skills or information acquired or utilised by dancers regarding the process 
of performing (a) dance. 
Of course 1 and 2 may refer to the same person in instances where the 
choreographer also performs the work. What is significant is that the term does not 
seem to refer to knowledge produced through the non-directed observation of a 
dance work. It refers to knowledge that arises from ‘inside’. 
Pakes’s discussion of Ryle’s distinctions poses an important question, if knowing that 
a work is effective is possible without knowing how it was made, why share 
‘choreographic knowledge’? As discussed in Chapter Eleven there are many socio-
political reasons for the motivation to disseminate this form of knowledge, however, 
my interest here is in the implied motivation to encourage users to see inside the 
106 The lack of dancer testimony in A Choreographer’s Score is discussed	by Karreman 
(2014b).
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work. The drive to share 1 and 2 suggest that there can be a third conception of 
choreographic knowledge that is: 
3.) Skills or information acquired by a spectator based on 1 and/or 2.
The claim that ‘choreographic knowledge’ can be shared is contentious; one might 
wish to argue that the forms of knowledge that arise from doing are only accessible 
through doing. Or, that 3 is by necessity not equal to 1 and/or 2. In some ways the 
notion of ‘choreographic knowledge’ relates to Melrose’s discussion about expert 
intuition and mastery (2009), however Melrose maintains that such expertise is not 
available to the spectator (2009: 29). 
Related questions are posed regarding the skills and knowledge of the spectator. 
Those with experience of doing are perhaps better equipped to access ‘choreographic 
knowledge’ than those with no experience of performing choreography, even if they 
have not	 experienced the specific form of making being articulated.	 As previously	
discussed (p.53), Melrose distinguishes between the expert-practitioner and expert	
spectator. She describes watching dance performances alongside practitioner 
Rosemary Butcher,	suggesting that	as an expert-practitioner, Butcher sees the other 
side of the dancer (2009: 23-24), while Melrose can only see “the side I	actually see” 
(2009: 24). This observation suggests that	Butcher may be better poised to access 
knowledge arising from inside the work. However, does this necessarily put	her in a	
privileged position? A question is posed as to whether the skills of the spectator are 
enhanced by acquiring the knowledge of the expert-practitioner. 
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The development of ‘choreographic objects’ implies that access to internal features of 
the work, such as the intentions and experiences of the choreographer and 
performers, is likely to improve the abilities of spectators to ‘see’ or appreciate the 
work, however, the question remains: how can this knowledge be shared and 
accessed? The examination of ‘choreographic knowledge’ is an epistemological 
endeavour. Davies suggests that, 
[e]pistemology in general is concerned with the nature of 
knowledge and the conditions under which it is possible. By 
extension, epistemology of art is concerned with the nature of 
artistic appreciation and understanding and the conditions 
under which it is possible (Davies 2004: 26). 
The transmission of ‘choreographic knowledge’ foregrounds what Davies describes as 
a central concern in the epistemology of art, 
the relationship between the generative act that brings a work into 
existence and the receptive act that is a proper appreciation of that 
work (Davies 2004: 26). 
Of particular interest here is the relationship between knowledge of the generative 
act and ‘proper appreciation’.107 The claim that the acquisition of ‘choreographic 
knowledge’ enhances an audience’s experience of the work 108 might seem 
straightforward given the priorities of knowledge-oriented western cultures. 
107 This relates to debates around ‘cognitivism’, which are addressed in relation to in 
dance by McFee (2011: 235 – 268).
108 Although this claim is not	explicitly stated in the literature on the objects it	is 
implied, to varying degrees by deLahunta	(2013a), Leach (2013) and Zuniga	Shaw 
(2014)
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Suggesting that understanding and appreciation are linked seems to be reflective of 
our practices. For example, as one learns about an object, idea and so on, we are 
likely to comprehend differently its relevance, intelligence, physical wonder and so 
forth. This certainly seems to be the case for natural objects. For example, learning 
that the rings on a tree trunk signify age, might generate admiration for the wonders 
of nature, the age of the tree and so on. The popularity of nature programmes, for 
example further suggests that knowledge of natural kinds is closely linked to 
appreciation. Whether or not one is interested in nature, it would seem strange to 
claim that knowledge of the natural world could in any way damage or limit one’s 
enjoyment and/or appreciation of it. However, the case of artworks it is more 
complicated. Conventional theories of art appreciation, dating back to Kant (1781), 
commonly suggest that art should be perceived, appreciated, valued and judged 
merely on the aesthetic experience that it affords. Specifically, that knowledge 
external to the physical experience of the work is not relevant. This view, labelled 
‘aesthetic empiricism’, is defined by Davies as the term used for, 
epistemologies of art that minimize the role, in artistic 
appreciation, of resources not available or derivable from an 
immediate encounter with an instance of a work (Davies 2004: 
25). 
Davies uses the concept of the “manifest work” (2004: 27) to refer to the work as it is 
encountered directly. He describes the term as, 
an entity that comprises only properties available to a receiver in 
an immediate perceptual encounter with an object or event that 
realises the work (Davies 2004: 27). 
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Applying this concept to dance is not entirely straightforward. As previously discussed 
(pp.29 – 30, 111) Carr (1987) and McFee (2011), suggest that dance works are 
fundamentally dependent upon the physical presence of the human body and are 
therefore only accessible in performance, thus viewing of the manifest work depends 
upon seeing the work live. However, I suggest that in the case of dance, the manifest 
work may be encountered via dance film or recording, as well as conventionally ‘live’ 
performances. 
Conflated Properties 
A significant component in the empiricism debate concerns ‘aesthetic’ and ‘artistic’ 
properties. The two notions are used by aestheticians to draw a distinction between 
properties that are perceptible in the work alone and those that are extraneous to 
the manifest work, but that are crucial for its status as an artwork. For example, 
McFee 2005: 368 – 369), discusses how we might attend to the aesthetic properties 
of both a painting and the wallpaper on the wall upon which it hangs, but that we 
would value the two things differently, because the painting possesses artistic 
properties, related to its construction and presentation, that make it an artwork. This 
distinction between aesthetic and artistic properties might help to further 
comprehend the relationship between the work and the ‘choreographic object’, as we 
can consider which features of the work are accessible through the digital rendering. 
There is some dispute about exactly what constitutes aesthetic properties. However, 
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Jerrold Levinson suggests that, 
[i]t is widely agreed that aesthetic properties are perceptual or 
observable properties, directly experienced properties, and 
properties relevant to the aesthetic value of the properties that 
possess them (Levinson 2003: 6). 
A traditional conception of aesthetic properties includes characteristics such as 
beauty, grace, balance, harmony and form. A broader range of qualities is now 
acknowledged, with Levinson (2003: 6) including, wiriness, comicality, sentimentality, 
gaudiness and vehemence, to name a few. Artistic properties, on the other hand, are 
those properties that are not aesthetically perceptible, such as the work’s context, 
the identity of the author, and its sociological, cultural or historical significance. 
Artistic properties is an umbrella term for a wide range of features that derive from a 
work’s provenance related properties, such as a work’s context, origin and ‘history of 
production’ (Goodman 1976: 122). For example, the cultural context in which a work 
is made might mean that it possesses the artistic property of being particularly 
original, shocking or avant-garde. 
Whilst the questions posed by extraneous information are not new, digital technology 
highlights the issue due to the way in which is has been adopted to overlay and merge 
aesthetic and artistic properties. This is evident in A Choreographer’s Score in which 
De Keersmaeker narrates recordings of her work. The vocal description conflates 
contextual information about the work with the presentation of movement. A similar 
example is found on Synchronous Objects. In the object entitled ‘The Dance’, the film 
of the work is surrounded by data that demonstrates the cues and alignments 
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between the dancers. As previously discussed (p.147), these features are also 
demonstrated by real-time annotations, laid over the top of the movement. The 
viewer can select which of the annotations to view. The film can also be accompanied 
either by ambient sound, the score from the live work by Thom Willem, Forsythe’s 
sung account of the action, or a spoken commentary from Forsythe. The choice of 
sound significantly informs the viewer’s experience of the work. Willems’ score 
provides an atmospheric musical accompaniment, heightening the sense of drama, 
perhaps invoking a stronger emotive response than when viewing the movement 
alone. In contrast, the film version initially included only “ambient sound” (Forsythe 
and OSU 2009), which serves to echo and reflect the sparse nature of the space, and 
draw attention to the abstract nature of the movement. Forsythe’s “sing through” 
(Forsythe and OSU 2009), focuses the viewer’s attention on the rhythms, dynamics 
and flow of the movement. 
The question here is posed: which of these experiences offer purely aesthetic 
properties and which include the presentation of artistic and provenance related 
properties? It is perhaps possible to argue that viewing the movement alongside 
Willems’ score provides access to the manifest work, as all of the ‘original’ properties 
are maintained. However, this seems problematic. If we are allowing for the manifest 
work to be encountered through the screen, it seems illogical to suggest that the 
aesthetic properties must remain exactly the same as those present in the live event. 
This is especially evident here, as the source material is a filmed version of the work 
and therefore already possesses different properties to the live work. So, the 
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question remains; does Forsythe’s spoken articulation of the contextual properties of 
the work become an aesthetic feature of the work equal to the original score? 
The conflation of properties is not exclusive to ‘choreographic objects’. It is further 
demonstrated in a recording on You Tube of American choreographer Merce 
Cunningham’s work Biped (1999), narrated by New York Times dance critic Alistair 
Macaulay. 109 Macaulay introduces the four-minute film by briefly explaining 
Cunningham’s biography, going on to provide detailed account of the physical and 
choreographic principles of a solo performed by Banu Ogan. He articulates contextual 
and artistic properties of the work, in correlation with formal and aesthetic features, 
which are further demonstrated through video annotation. For example, the image 
below demonstrates how annotation highlight’s Cunningham’s use of the torso. 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged 
version of the thesis can be found in the Lancester Library, Coventry University.
Figure 14:	Annotation highlighting the position of the torso (contperf 2009) 
109 Uploaded onto YouTube by	contperf in	2009.	See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a-QMlTsNtxM 
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As with Synchronous Objects, the annotation draws the viewer’s attention to certain 
features of the movement. But what properties do the annotations have? Perhaps 
they can be considered to highlight artistic properties – a visual manifestation of 
‘choreographic knowledge’. However, they become part of our aesthetic experience 
of the work. The annotation and narrations give artistic properties aesthetic form, 
blurring the distinction between the two. They offer an experience that has 
dramatically departed from attending a live performance of the work. However, 
allowing as I am for recordings to count as instances of the manifest work raises 
interesting questions; for example, if ‘choreographic knowledge’ is explicitly 
articulated within an instance of the work does it become an aesthetic property? And 
if so, how does this relate to an empiricist view? 
Returning to the central argument, the claim that knowledge of choreographic 
process informs appreciation poses an obvious challenge to an empiricist view. 
However, a complete rebuttal of empiricism would rest upon proving the claim that 
knowledge of choreographic process is essential to the full appreciation of a dance 
work; a problematic outcome for dance, as a form conventionally accessed through 
(live or digital) performance. It seems clear that a moderately empiricist stance might 
be the solution, meaning the question is posed; what role does this knowledge play in 
our experience and appreciation of a work? 
In response to Thinking With The Body (2013), an exhibition examining choreographer 
Wayne McGregor’s process, Stephanie Jordan questions the role of process-based 
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knowledge in the perception of live work. Indirectly referencing an empiricist view 
and referring to Pakes, she suggests that, 
[t]here is […] a convincing argument within aesthetics that works 
of art should be evaluated as autonomous aesthetic objects that 
embody knowledge (Jordan 2013: 7). 
She goes on to talk of the problem of “knowing too much” (2013: 7); citing an 
example of learning about American choreographer Mark Morris’s process, including 
being taught part of one of his solos, Jordan suggests that this experience fixed the 
meaning of the dance, diminishing the alluring ambiguity that she had previously 
valued (2013: 7). This observation offers a clear counter-argument to the idea that 
knowing how the work is constructed is superior to knowing why it is effective from a 
spectator’s position. 
Despite these observations, Jordan however does not advocate an empiricist 
perspective. She suggests that knowledge of a choreographer’s process can, at times 
be useful, suggesting that understanding Cunningham’s theories and practices is likely 
to have enhanced her appreciation of his work. Jordan explains how this knowledge 
helped her, “to accept the moment in a piece, as opposed to thinking about context 
and future, a more pressured stance” (Jordan 2013: 7). Following Jordan’s discussion 
it seems tempting to suggest that knowledge of a choreographer’s process might 
sometimes inform appreciation. However, this seems a little unsatisfactory, as it 
means that the empiricism problem, which rests on whether or not casual and 
provenance related facts are essential to the full appreciation of the work, would be 
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resolved solely on the basis of subjective experience and opinion. The question would 
remain as to what it is that makes knowledge of process essential to some works and 
not others. 
The implication of Jordan’s example is that Cunningham’s work would not be fully or 
accurately understood without knowledge of his principles, which, given the nature of 
his work is perhaps a fair outcome. To suggest that this type of knowledge is essential 
to full appreciation of the work is not to suggest that the work cannot be seen, 
analysed, valued and so on without such knowledge. However the claim does imply 
that appreciation would be furthered by the acquisition of provenance related 
information. Thus, this would be essential for full appreciation to take place.
Moderate empiricism might suggest that there are some levels and forms of external 
knowledge that inform appreciation, but that these must be constrained. However, 
advocating even a moderately empiricist perspective involves subscribing to some 
features of the strong version of the view, therefore consideration of the counter-
arguments is important. 
Counter-Arguments	to	Aesthetic	Empiricism 
In the case of dance there are three significant counter-arguments to aesthetic 
empiricism. First, our appreciation of a work may increase retrospectively following 
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the acquisition of various types of information. My experience of using A 
Choreographer’s Score provides a clear example of this. 
In 2009 I attended a performance of Rosas danst Rosas (De 
Keersmaeker 1989) at Sadler’s Wells. I recall being moderately 
affected by the striking simplicity of the work. I also remember 
being distracted and suspecting that I was missing something — 
enough knowledge to appreciate the piece perhaps. Years later, 
consulting A Choreographer’s Score greatly informed my 
appreciation of the work. Learning about the structural properties 
of the choreography, the detailed and systematic way that De 
Keersmaeker developed the movement, and the gendered 
undertones (De Keersmaeker & Cvejić 2012) meant that I was able 
to appreciate the depth and intelligence of the work. Gaining 
access to De Keersmaeker’s choreographic knowledge 
retrospectively informed my appreciation of the work. 
This account provides a first hand example of the potential relationship between 
knowledge and value. The acquisition of ‘choreographic knowledge’ through 
information external to the physical instantiation of the work has the potential to 
alter the way that the work is understood. In turn, this might inform the way that it is 
valued, a shift that can occur after the performance event and even without the need 
to see the work again. 
The second counter-argument is based on the claim that perception is purely 
aesthetic. Dance audiences possess, to varying degrees, knowledge of artistic and 
provenance related facts prior to their viewing of the work. As Jordan points out, 
[o]ur reception of dance remains a complex and slippery business, 
as we bring our different backgrounds to bear upon what we 
encounter (Jordan 2013: 8). 
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In relation to this, Davies challenges the notion of manifest and non-manifest 
properties, suggesting that, 
[w]hat would be manifest to the untrained observer clearly differs 
considerably from what would be manifest to an observer possessed 
of various perceptual and cognitive skills that can be brought to bear 
upon a work (Davies 2004: 29). 
He argues that if one was to claim that the artistic properties of a work are those 
manifest to a trained observer, a question arises regarding the types of knowledge 
and skills required to access these properties. Therefore, the manifest work cannot be 
entirely distinct from knowledge, and therefore does not manifest in the same way to 
every viewer. 
The third rebuttal concerns the philosophical notion of indiscernibles. 110 Simply put, 
this term refers to two objects that are perceptually indistinguishable but that have 
artistically different qualities, due to variations in their context and they way they 
came into being. The implication is that artistic properties therefore inform aesthetic 
ones. For example, if a graffiti artist were to scrawl ‘R Mutt 1917’ on a urinal in a 
public toilet, it may result in an object that is perceptually indistinguishable to 
Duchamp’s Fountain (1917). Yet, due to its status as an artwork, and the context 
within which it is viewed, Fountain has qualities that make it aesthetically different to 
other urinals. The implication is that aesthetic properties might ‘supervene’ 111 on 
110 See Lamarque (2010) for a	detailed account of the notion of indiscernibles. 
111 ‘Supervene’ is a	term used in philosophical literature to describe properties that	
are in some way dependent	on other properties. See Currie (1990) for a	detailed 
explanation of aesthetic supervenience. 
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artistic ones. Furthermore, this example demonstrates how appropriate appreciation 
relies upon knowledge of the way the work came into being and therefore depends 
on the perception of more than physical properties, thus undermining the empiricist 
view. 
A closer examination of indiscernibles is of particular interest in the case of dance 
works, due to the variability of their instances and the loose identity conditions 
governing works. It is not possible that there be two exactly similar renditions of the 
same performance. McFee discusses this issue in relation to the distinction between 
qualitative and numerical identity (2011: 36). Numerical identity asks whether 
something is exactly the same thing over time, perhaps in spite of changes to some of 
its properties, whereas qualitative identity determines whether two objects are 
qualitatively identical (McFee 2011: 308). McFee suggests that whilst numerical 
identity questions can be asked of multiple art form tokens, the most significant 
question of numerical identity will concern the abstract type (2011: 40), and thus will 
ask whether two performances are the same work. 
McFee suggests that we tend to use the word ‘identical’ to refer to qualitative 
identity judgments, he uses the example of a watch suggesting, “my watch being 
identical to yours usually means that both have a Rolex – hence there are two 
watches!” (McFee 2011: 308). 
So, can there be two identical performances? It seems far fetched, yet if this were 
possible, say in a future where cloning allows for exact duplications of dancers, the 
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question arises; would two identical performances arising from distinct processes by 
different authors be of the same work? This thought experiment poses the question; 
could there be two perceptually identical works, and if so would they automatically 
be the same work? To argue that two perceptually identical performances must be 
the same work exemplifies an empiricist stance, suggesting that the features of the 
performance alone determine its identity. On the other hand, allowing for identical, 
yet distinct works foregrounds the significance of authorship and context, therefore 
advocating an anti-empiricist framework. The reason that this scenario is not a 
practical concern for dance is due to the way in which instantiation depends on the 
individual the dancer(s) who perform the work there could not be two exactly alike, 
parallel instances. 
However, the potential for indiscernibles is perhaps greater in light of digital 
technology. Two identical digital works offer a far more likely scenario than the 
cloning-dependent example outlined previously. In a hypothetical scenario whereby 
two identical dance films were created, by different choreographers the relevance of 
provenance related properties might be revealed. Even if the films possessed the 
same title, the fact that they were authored by different people is potentially enough 
to validate the claim that they are distinct works, thus attributing a central role to the 
choreographer in issues of work identity, and demonstrating that it is more than 
merely aesthetic properties that contribute to the character of a work. This thought 
experiment can be further stretched: If one of the aesthetically identical films were 
made not by a choreographer at all, but by a digital artist and displayed in an art 
exhibition, the work would arguably not count as dance at all. So, the ontology of a 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




work is also informed by provenance related facts, but how does this impact on 
appreciation? It seems fair to suggest that we must recognise what kind of work we 
are engaging with in order to fully appreciate it. This view is supported by Arthur 
Danto (1964) who contra-empiricism, argues that proper appreciation of art is 
dependent upon knowledge of the context and tradition in which it occurs. 
In agreement with Danto, Stephen Davies advocates a ‘contextualist’ view of artwork 
ontology. Suggesting that, 
a work’s artistically significant properties depend for their existence 
and character as much on circumstances surrounding the work’s 
creation as on its material features (Davies 2007: III). 
It may appear that Davies is advocating the dissemination of provenance related 
facts. However, it is important to remember that some of the properties surrounding 
a work are accessible merely though a direct encounter with the manifest work. As 
the identical digital work example demonstrates, artistic properties are present in the 
manifest work, insofar as it is presented by an artist within a specific socio-cultural 
context. However, the suggestion that non-aesthetic properties are of equal 
significance to aesthetic properties does pose a challenge to the empiricist view.
Furthermore, this outcome implies that the knowledge of the viewer informs the 
identity of the work. 
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So, how does this ontological argument relate to the acquisition of ‘choreographic 
knowledge’? Thought experiments aside, does the notion of indiscernibles have any 
significance in relation to our practical engagement with dance works? I suggest it 
does; digital works not only potentially allow for perceptually indiscernible but 
distinct works, they also allow for the same performance of a work to be re-played 
exactly. Therefore the concept of digital indiscernibles might be applicable to the 
repeat playing of a single recording. I will draw an example from encountering Using 
the Sky to demonstrate this idea: 
Entering the site I select a recording at random. I observe Jeanine 
Durning standing in silence the centre of the space. She faces stage 
left, profile to the camera, she flicks both hands in front of her body, 
her left foot steps forward, flexed at the ankle. Her right leg joins 
behind. Her posture relaxes, micro contractions occur in her torso. Her 
eyes are alert; she looks quickly around the space as if searching for an 
unidentified sound. Minute movements ripple through her body. Her 
right shoulder twitches, her head bows, she looks up, then quickly 
away. Her arms explore space as she moves in a slow, small circle 
around herself. Durning’s gaze is alert, yet inward. There is no explicit 
meaning, character or narrative to decode. The movement is not 
virtuosic. 
Encountering the manifest work in this way I am not struck by classical aesthetic 
properties. Although the movement is not un-graceful, it makes no feature of it. The 
body is not organised into recognisable or symmetrical forms. There is a notable lack 
of spectacle. However, the work does have aesthetic qualities, such as being 
introverted and tranquil. There is no narrative or representational meaning to 
decode. Therefore, the viewer is left to contemplate the significance of this 
somewhat ambiguous movement event. 
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Access to Hay’s text-score reveals that at this moment in the work Durning is 
responding to directive 17: 
I start spinning, not literally but as a part of an onstage 
counterclockwise spinning vortex that only I perceive. I am a 
speck, a dot, a flake, endlessly spiralling toward center stage, 
and absolutely no one can possibly identify me as such (Hay in 
Motion Bank 2013). 
Re- viewing the recording after reading the directive informs the way the movement 
is read. Knowledge of the private ‘counterclockwise spinning vortex’ (Hay in Motion 
Bank 2013) illuminates Durning’s anti-clockwise pathway in space, and her internal 
focus. The movement appears different — less arbitrary and more measured. 
Further exploring the site allows users to watch recorded interviews with Hay in 
which she articulates some of the principles of her work. In one film she explains the 
importance of the dancer’s perception: 
My choreographic work is insisting that the dancer who performs 
this work notices the potential for feedback from their whole body, 
and unless they’re doing that the dance is not happening (Hay in 
Motion Bank 2013). 
Returning once again to the danced rendition of the work and viewing the movement 
whilst considering Hay’s articulation, further impacts on the way the movement is 
seen. The non-representational nature of the work is foregrounded. Spectators are 
able to comprehend that the dancer is focused on receiving feedback from her body, 
giving the movement greater significance. But what kind of properties are we 
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responding to? It seems that the revelation that the dancer’s experience is essential 
to the work foregrounds artistic properties. For example Hay’s articulation provides 
contextual knowledge, as it situates the work within a somatic tradition. 112 The 
question is then posed as to whether the aesthetic properties of the work supervene 
on the artistic ones? Does this knowledge alter the aesthetic properties of the work, 
and if so does this imply that proper appreciation of the work demands knowledge of 
these properties? This seems to be an essential question for Using the Sky and other 
‘choreographic objects’. It seems fair to suggest that the movement appears 
different, and that the interviews help us to acknowledge the logic and intelligence of 
the work. 
To claim that proper appreciation requires access to Hay’s process is potentially 
problematic, as the work was seen and presumably appreciated prior to the 
publication of Using the Sky. One solution to this quandary is to suggest that skilled 
observers, or “expert spectators” (Melrose 2009: 23) of Hay’s work, or those with 
existing knowledge of her process would be able to appreciate the work for its 
intelligence and logic without assistance from Using the Sky. The score, and related 
‘choreographic objects’, therefore serve to make more spectators skilled in the act of 
appreciation. This anti-empiricist outcome suggests that knowledge of external 
factors is essential for full appreciation. This view refers back to Davies’ previous 
suggestion that claiming artistic properties of a work are only manifest to trained 
observers, challenging the notion of the manifest work and raising the question of 
112 See Eddy (2009)	for a	brief history of the ‘field’ of dance and somatic practice 
(including a	discussion of the relevance of the term ‘field’). 
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what type of knowledge is required. It seems, therefore that we have come full-circle 
here, and a single outcome to the issue is not straightforward. However, this point is 
important as we should remember that observers may be able to fully appreciate the 
work without access to the digital score. 
Summary 
Although the three counter-arguments presented in this chapter demonstrate the 
weaknesses in a strictly empiricist perspective, the view does have some validity. As 
previously suggested a complete counter-argument would involve claiming that 
causal or contextual properties are always essential to fully appreciate a dance work, 
an outcome that, as Jordan (2013) points out, is not entirely reflective of our 
practices. Furthermore, dismissing it completely would leave us no closer to 
understanding the role of ‘choreographic knowledge’ in the appreciation of dance 
works. This study moves only some way towards a moderate form of empiricism, and 
it is possible to suggest that the somewhat inconclusive outcome of the empiricism 
argument implies that the relationship between the acquisition of ‘choreographic 
knowledge’ and appreciation is not entirely clear. Furthermore, this chapter has 
demonstrated how technology facilitates the conflation of provenance related, 
artistic and aesthetic properties. I suggest that this reveals features that 
knowledgeable viewers may have access to without such tools, thus demonstrating 
how dance works are not solely aesthetic entities, but also comprise artistic, 
kinaesthetic and metaphysical properties, the recognition of which are dependent 
upon to the knowledge of the viewer. 
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Building on the observations about the presentation of the work’s properties, the 
next chapter goes on to think about how the examination of the three case studies 
reveal ontological features of the dance works they score, and reconfigure our 
engagement with them. Furthermore, I propose a visual model, designed to help 
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Chapter Thirteen:	Ontological Implications 
Introduction 
There are two usages of the term ‘work’ at	play in dance discourse and practice, the 
word refers to both the labour and product	of dance making. However, the two uses 
are interchangeable. Even in contexts where the construction of a stable art	object	is 
the primary goal of choreographic activity, the point	 at which the work of dance 
making	 becomes a dance work is not	 clearly defined. This conflation of labour and 
product	is exposed through scoring strategies that	pay equal attention to the process 
of making and the instance(s) of performance. Equally the inclusion of multiple 
versions	of the work(s) through digital media	highlights the metaphysical features of 
repeatability and performance variability, thus ‘choreographic objects’ reveal 
ontological features of the work. 
‘Choreographic objects’ also cultivate a	 very different	 version of the work than is 
shown in performance. So, what	 does this do to the identity of the work? Does it	
change with each new expression of it? Whilst	 identity questions are essentially 
ontological, here I draw a distinction between those features of the work that	
concern the nature of its existence, such as the claim that	 it	 is an abstract	 entity,	
manifest	 in multiple forms, and identity features, which are those things about	 the 
work that	 make it	 distinct	 from other works, such as its form and meaning. 
Addressing both of these areas, this chapter explores this question;	can a	dance work 
change? I	 return to the type/token terminology, asking how ‘choreographic objects’ 
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further challenge this schema, by highlighting the ontological instability of dance 
works. 
The claims that	‘choreographic objects’ both reveal ontological features not	visible in 
live performance, and inform the identity of the work is made after deep	probing and 
analysis of the objects.	 The ontological repercussions are arguably evident	 only 
through critical engagement	with the objects. This observation led me to develop a	
visual model, designed to facilitate engagement	with ‘choreographic objects’, as well 
as encouraging readings of dance works through the objects. Drawing on my analytic 
method and practical and philosophical observations, the latter part	of this chapter 
introduces and outlines the model, which offers a	 visual representation of various 
components present	in the three case studies. As previously discussed (pp.	42 – 48),	
there are many ways of describing, interpreting and analysing dance. Scholars such as 
Adshead et	al (1988), Banes (1994), Foster (1986), Hanna	(1979), Jordan and Thomas 
(2010) and Laban (1947), 113 have contributed significantly to the field. Dance, as both 
an activity and an art	form can be examined from a	wide variety of perspectives. The 
analytical methods and models developed and adopted by dance theorists provided a	
basis from which I	 developed my own way of conceptualising the components of 
‘choreographic objects’. As with the rest	of the thesis, this model focuses on dance as 
an art	form, as opposed to that	which occurs in social, ritual or educational contexts.	
113 These authors have published many texts on this theme those cited here are 
indicative only.
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Throughout	 the previous	 chapters, it	 has been demonstrated how each 
‘choreographic object’ utilises different	 frameworks and methods.	 Together they 
generate an emergent	 form of analysis, which utilises digital technology in various 
ways to consider the process, structure and affect	 of the work. The breadth of 
approaches means that	 field is defined by multiplicity and that	 comprehending the 
framework used in each object requires analytical engagement	 with it.	 The 
Choreographic Objects Model	 is designed to facilitate analysis of ‘choreographic 
objects’. It	maps their central characteristics in order to meet	four key aims. Firstly it 
encourages the user to explore the features of ‘choreographic objects’,	 secondly it	
facilitates philosophical questioning, thirdly it	helps to develop digital dance literacy,	
and lastly it emphasises the relationship between the ‘choreographic object’ and the 
work, encouraging a	reading of the work that	acknowledges the role of the object. 
Can Dance	Works Change? 
The lack of a	 universal notation system for dance means that	 works are not	
constrained through a	 single method.	 Depending on where one stands on the 
potentials of notation, this situation can be seen either to facilitate flexibility within 
the forms of dance works, or else be reflective of it. Either way, there are often large 
differences	 between instantiations of dance works,	 raising the question of which 
features of the work are essential to its identity. ‘Choreographic objects’, such as the 
three discussed in this thesis,	 seem to make visible essential features of the work, 
both constraining and informing the identity of the work.	 As I	 claimed in Chapter 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




Nine (pp.234	 - 235),	 the three case studies suggest	 a link between scoring and 
ontological enquiry, as both approaches consider the features of the work that	make 
it	what	it	is. This results in a	detailed record of the work, yet	simultaneously informs 
how it	is is	remembered, impacting fundamentally on its identity. 
The claim that	 the identity of the work is changed through its digital rendering is 
perhaps contentious. It	 rests upon the idea	 that	 the way the work is perceived can 
have a reciprocal impact	 on its identity. Furthermore, arguing for this outcome 
depends upon the claim articulated in Chapter Five that	 it	 is possible to access the 
work through digital representation. As mentioned in Chapter Nine (p.226), the 
fragmented nature of the recordings on A Choreographer’s Score mean that	 it	 is
perhaps problematic to claim that	watching these provide full access to the works 
discussed, even encountering the score at	length does not	mean that	one is truly able 
to claim one has seen Rosas danst	 Rosas. In this case therefore the viewer’s 
knowledge	of the work is cultivated through first-hand accounts of it.	 In the case of 
Synchronous Objects and Using the Sky, the full-length, unedited nature of the film 
and recordings mean that	 they arguably offer a	 complete experience of the works. 
However, as discussed in Chapter Twelve,	 these recordings are annotated and 
narrated,	offering alternative occurrences of the work. So is it	the case that	One Flat	
Thing, reproduced is now fundamentally about structure? Are the annotations a	
feature of the work? Do Hay’s explanations mean that the truly ambiguous nature of 
No Time to Fly is lost	forever? To put	it	another way, can the identity of a	dance work 
change? 
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A platonist conception of types does not	allow for change, as under this view types 
exist	 independently of human actions and thought	 processes (Pakes 2013: 87). As 
discussed	 in Chapter Two (pp.32 – 33), Dodd advocates a	platonist view of musical 
works, 114 claiming that musical works are simple sound structures (Dodd	2000: 425). 
He explains that	under this model, 
[n]either the historico-musical context	 in which the piece was 
composed, nor any particular means of sound production (i.e. 
instrumentation), are essential to the work (Dodd 2000: 425). 
This	empiricist	perspective posits the type as divorced entirely from the practice and 
context	of instantiation, for example Dodd’s concept	of “sonicism” (2007: 2), suggests 
musical works are identical as long as they sound the same (2007: 2). 115 This means 
that	regardless of the instrumentation, performers, context	and so forth if a	sequence 
of notes sounds exactly like a	work, then that	sequence is an authentic instance of the 
work. Furthermore, following the discussion of indiscernibles in the previous chapter 
(pp.296 – 297), conceptualising the work as purely a	sound structure means that	two 
different	people can compose the same work.	
So can we suggest	 that	 dance works are abstract	 structures of movement, 
independent	 from their historical and cultural context? Some works	 appear to be 
relatively stable and can therefore arguably be instanced by performing a	 specific 
114 Pakes (2013: 83 – 88) refers to aesthetician Peter Kivy as another advocate of a	
platonist	view of music, suggesting however that	he accepts that	types may not	be 
considered under the platonist	framework. 
115 It is important	to reiterate that	there are multiple views regarding music ontology	
and Dodd’s view is not	widely accepted. 
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sequence of movement. We might	concede that	as long as a	sequence of movement	
looks	 like a	certain work, it	 is an instance of that work. Indeed our practices around	
some dance works seem to suggest	 that	 features other than the movement	 and 
perhaps the music can be inessential, but	this may be contentious. For example, can a	
ballerina	perform the Romantic ballet La Sylphide (Taglioni 1832) in her pyjamas in 
her bedroom, and still be dancing La Sylphide? We might	want	 to argue that	 she is 
executing (part	of) the choreography, but	to instance the work requires the presence 
of more components, such as music, costumes, other characters and so forth.116 
Further problems with conceptualising dance works as movement	 structures arise 
when we are faced with “open” works (Rubidge 2000a; 7), such as No Time to Fly. The 
claim does not	necessarily appear problematic on a	metaphysical level, as the work	is	
manifest	 via a movement	 structure. However, because these structures feature 
different	 movement	 every time, it	 cannot	 be considered as a single movement	
structure, meaning that	it	seems inappropriate to conceptualise the work in this way. 
Rather, iIn such cases we might	want	to think of the work as a	set	of conditions, as 
opposed to a	movement	structure. 
116 As previously mentioned this topic is explored in depth by Pakes (2013). 
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Another key feature of platonist types is that	 they are eternal, meaning that	 they 
cannot	be either created or destroyed. Thomasson explains that	many philosophers 
have traditionally treated artworks as, 
[e]ternal or timeless, changeless entities independent	 of all 
human activities; as a	result, abstractist	views face the challenge 
of accounting for the apparent	role of artists in creating works of 
art	(Thomasson 2006: 247). 
The implication of this view is that	 composers and choreographers are engaged in 
acts of discovery, as opposed to creation. This might	seem far-fetched; we are used to 
thinking about	the choreographer creating a	dance work (Pakes 2013: 90). However, 
some dance artists do conceptualise their work in this way. For example, in discussion 
of his collaborative practice with visual artist	 Ellen Kilsgaard, dance artist	 Chris 
Crickmay suggests, 
[r]ather than creating the work, it	would be more accurate to say 
it	 is discovered from what	 we notice around and within us 
(Crickmay 2015: 144). 
Crickmay’s work is improvisational therefore not	 strictly ‘choreographed’; however 
these articulations highlight how dance making is an emergent	 process. He is not	
suggesting that	he is attempting to uncover a	specific movement	structure, but	that	
the work pre-exists its discovery by the choreographer.	117 
117 Although Pakes acknowledges the problems of a	platonist	account	for dance, she 
advances a	convincing argument	for the relevance of the notion that	dance works 
might	be discovered as opposed to created (2013: 88 – 94). 
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The eternal nature of platonist types means that	they are incapable of change (Dodd	
2007: 4). Pakes suggests that, 
the platonist	conception [of types] maintains that	types are abstract	
objects which do not	belong to the spatio-temporal world, and so 
must	be causally inert, unchanging and either timeless or eternally 
existent things (Pakes 2013:	88). 
The idea	that	dance works are unchangeable may seem feasible, as dance works do 
seem to posses some core features that withstand revisions, re-workings and so forth. 
However, this perspective means that	the work is entirely divorced	from the context	
of its instantiation. The implication is that	 even if the work comes to look entirely 
different, and/or have an entirely new meaning it has not	changed. This might	imply 
that revisions lead to new works, however we generally seem to accept large 
revisions to works without	attributing them the status of an entirely new piece. 
A platonist	 view is not	 the only option, Pakes goes on to explain that	 there are 
alternative ways of conceptualising types, including Levinson’s (1980) notion of
‘indicated types’ and McFee’s (2011) rebuttal of Dodd’s characterisation (Pakes 2013:	
88). Such a	view is also critiqued by Thomasson (2006), who suggests that	there are 
abstract	artefacts that	lack a	spatio-temporal location, (such as dance works) but	that	
they are created as opposed to discovered, and can change and cease to exist	(2006: 
247). This certainly seems more reflective of our practices. The way that	 each 
performance differs, and new versions of the same work can be created, means that	
dance works certainly appear to change and evolve. 
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The outcome of this claim for fluidity is that	 conceptualising a	 ‘type’, as a stable 
entity, means that	 it	 does not	 adequately account	 for the nature of dance works.	
Cvejić’s	 discussion of Pouillaude’s view may help to move towards an alternative 
conceptualisation. She refers to the way that	Pouillaude re-formulates the type/token 
schema	 in order to relate more appropriately to dance. She suggests that	under his 
view, 
[t]he work of dance exists at	 once as a	 ‘public object’, shared and 
offered for judgment, and as a	‘resistant	object’, capable of surviving 
the death of its initial protagonists, or in other words, existing 
beyond the experience or memory of its creation and performing	
processes	(Pouillaude 2009, 77)	(Cvejić	2015: 10). 
In order to outline this mode of existence Pouillaude uses the notion of 
désoeuvrement, described	 by Cvejić as, “the regime of an ‘unworking’	 (idle,	
inoperative) work” (Cvejić	 2015: 10).	 Cvejić	 suggests that	 dance’s unworking is 
characterised by both physical expenditure and indifference to the trace of action, 
resulting in an infinite cycle of energy as opposed to specific objects or things (Cvejić 
2015: 10). This articulation releases the work from the relationship to object-hood, as 
implied through the notion of the type, and allows for a	more open conception of the 
work, concerned with energetic cycles and fluidity. Whilst	I am sadly unable to engage 
more fully with Pouillaude’s thesis, 118 this indicates a	shift	in thinking and paves the 
way for further theorising. 
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Properties and Perception 
In this context	 claiming that	 dance works are fluid entities is the outcome of an 
ontological positioning that	 sees human knowledge and perception as intrinsically 
linked to the ontology of entities. However under what	 conditions does the work 
actually change? Faced with multiple different	versions, we might	want	to argue that	
it	 is the features they share that	 are essential to the work’s identity. On the other 
hand, these features may be too few or vague and/or change over time. This is where 
human practice and perception of the work can be seen to play an integral role in its 
ontology. I	 suggest	 that	 ‘choreographic objects’ alter our conception of the work, 
which, in turn changes its identity, suggesting that	dance works are at	least	partially 
constructed via	the perceptions of those who receive them. 
As outlined in Chapter Three (pp.80 – 82) Thomasson argues that	 the ontology of 
works is intrinsically linked to social practices (2005: 8). Dance works are the 
intentional outcomes of directed human activity, as are ‘choreographic objects’ and 
therefore their ontology is dependent	 upon human concepts and language. 
Furthermore, they do not	 provide a	 neutral rendering of the work 119 rather the 
object	is informed by the intentions of the makers. Moreover, the interactive nature 
of the objects means that	the user also plays an important	role in shaping what	the 
object	is. I suggest	that	this framework can also apply to dance works, meaning that	
their properties might be altered by shifting social conceptions; such as those 
facilitated by ‘choreographic objects’.	 This poses the central question, are the 
119 Indeed, there is a	debate to be had regarding whether such a	thing is (even	
theoretically) possible. 
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perceived	 properties truly attributable to the work itself or merely	 the spectator’s 
interpretation? Of course these questions are not	specific to ‘choreographic objects’ 
and underpin many of the debates in literary theory about	 the role of the author, 
reader,	 work and text,	 120 however these objects foreground the debate by 
reconfiguring the spectator’s experience of the work. 
In order to explore	 how the identity of the work is changed by its rendering through 
‘choreographic objects’ it	 might	 help to think about which features of One Flat	 Thing, 
reproduced are accessible through Synchronous Objects. In a	review of the stage version of 
One Flat	Thing, reproduced for the New York Times, Anna	Kisselgoff suggests that	in One Flat	
Thing, reproduced Forsythe is, 
[c]oncentrating on the different	use of cues. Dancers often move to 
counts (internal or musical), but	 here they are alert	 to one 
another's breath phrases and also use visual cues (some 
occasionally yell ''Go'') 
(Kisselgoff	2003). 
These observations demonstrate that	the significance of cueing in the work is not	only 
evident through Synchronous Objects, however it	is central to the site. For example, in	
Manning’s discussion of Synchronous Objects she suggests, “Forsythe’s choreography	
is replete with actual and virtual cues” (2013: 104).	
120 Such as Barthes’ (1977) view, as previously discussed (pp.248	– 249).	
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Going on to describe the significance of the relationships between the dancers, 
Manning explains, 
[t]he cue lands non-locally, meeting the dancer in the between of 
movements-moving. The dancer cues or aligns not	 by stopping 
the movement	but	by engaging directly with the nonlocal interval 
of the cue as it	meets movement-moving (Manning 2013: 107). 
So, the relevance of cues is apparent	in both versions of the work, however there are 
features of the work that	are not	discussed on Synchronous Objects; for example there 
is little mention of representational content, or external choreographic stimuli. There 
is also limited direct	 reference to any expressive properties of the work, which is 
described as “an ensemble dance that	 examines and reconfigures classical 
choreographic principles of counterpoint” (Forsythe and OSU 2009), and described in 
terms of ‘Movement	Material’, ‘Cueing’ and ‘Alignments’ (Forsythe and OSU 2009). 
Does this mean that	the work is non-representational and non-expressive? Kisselgoff’s 
review highlights the expressive qualities embodied in the live performance. She 
describes the work as a	“visualized adrenaline rush” (2003), and suggests the sound is 
“both exhilarating and ambiguous: part	earthquake, part	industrial noise, part	joyous 
release” (2003). This demonstrates how non-structural properties of the work were 
intrinsic to Kisselgoff’s experience. Manning’s discussion of the work through 
Synchronous Objects however makes no mention of expressive content	 rather it	
explains how the structural properties of the work generate perceptual fields. Through 
describing her perceptual experience Manning’s writing implies it	is that	it	is possible 
to experience expressive qualities through abstract	structures, however this does not	
seem as central to her experience as Kisselgoff’s. It	is not	the case that the site implies 
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that	the work	is entirely non-expressive, rather that	whilst	the structural properties of 
the work are presented in a	 fairly didactic manner, the expressive qualities are left	
more	 open, demonstrating how the site does not	 exhaust	 the work, and whilst	
appears to be concerned with the essence of the work, does not	 reduce every 
property to an essential form.	
Thinking back to Forsythe’s distinction between choreography and dancing, perhaps it	
is possible to conceptualise the focus on structure as an implicit	 suggestion that	
choreography is structural, whereas dancing is expressive. Thus the aim to render 
choreographic thinking without the body requires alternative ways to present	
expressive qualities. This is where the abstract	animations, such as the ‘3D Alignment	
Forms’, play a	 significant	 role. As discussed in Chapter Ten, these capture and re-
present	 kinaesthetic and affective features of dancing, without	 literally representing 
the body, offering a	more ambiguous rendering than the annotations and narrations. 
The implication of this is that	whilst	expressive properties are arguably fundamental to 
the work, it is not	 the case that	 they can be taught	 or described to the user. This 
reprises the question, which properties need to be present	 to truly instantiate and 
capture the work? The way that	 dance does not	 have an established method for 
recording essential features affects how one answers these questions. The fact	 that	
standardised scores are rarely, if ever used in dance means that	judgements about	the 
identity of dance works and indeed ‘choreographic objects’ in general can perhaps 
only be made in relation to human language and description. 
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Synchronous Objects users see a	different	version of the work than those who watch 
it	 in a	 live performance, and those who have seen the non-annotated film	 version	
through a	different	site. The framing of the film, including the data	and other forms of 
information offers an alternative form of engagement. Centralising human practice in 
ontological accounts implies that	 if readings and perceptions of a	dance work change, 
so too does the work. For example, the live version	of One Flat	Thing, reproduced was 
accompanied by programme notes explaining how the work was inspired by explorer 
Robert	Scott’s failed expedition to the South Pole (Kisselgoff 2003) however, the film 
version does not	share this feature. Again, this implies either that	the property is non-
essential, or that	the work has changed. Perhaps Dodd’s view is beginning to appeal: 
to suggest	 that	 the work is purely a	 sequence of movement, and that	 only the 
presence of certain movements that	can be seen as essential would provide a	simple 
solution to this puzzle, it	would allow the work to take various forms, as long as the 
movement	 structure remained intact	 the work would be completely instanced. 
However, the dance equivalent	to Dodd’s sonicism would mean that	the movement	
would need to look exactly the same for each instance to be recognisable as the work 
(Pakes 2013: 96). That	is not	the case here; viewing One Flat	Thing, reproduced as a	
dance film on Vimeo for instance, and viewing the film on Synchronous Objects 
reveals the movement	is exactly the same. However, it	looks	different. 
So it	seems that	the challenge here is not	variability in performance, but	variability in the 
presentation platform and the audience’s perception. The sites encourage users to see 
different	 features to the live performance, and therefore understand the movement	
differently. In Varieties of Presence (2012) Noë discusses this phenomenon in relation to 
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visual art. He asks the reader to imagine encountering a	 painting by an artist	 they are 
unfamiliar with, suggesting that	in such scenarios the painting might	appear flat	or opaque, 
“[y]ou don’t	 get	 it” Noë suggests, “[i]t	 is incomprehensible” (2012: 3). Noë goes on to 
suggest	 that	 as we further consider the painting through relating it	 to previous 
experiences, learning about	how it	was made, or discussing its features with others, the 
piece “opens up” (2012: 3). He suggests that, “you can see it	 now and appreciate its 
structure. The piece is now present	 to you as meaningful” (2012: 3). He continues; 
“although your experience of the art	work has been transformed, there is no change in the 
work itself” (2012: 3). Noë suggests that	 the change that	 has occurred is solely in the 
viewer’s ability to perceive things in the work that	they were previously unable to. He does	
not	 ponder these claims for long, however, this example indicates a	 sense in which he 
appears either to believe that	the work simply is its physical form, or else adopt	a stance 
that implies the work, as either an abstract	or physical is entirely distinct	from the viewer’s 
perception of it. However, there is something more ontologically complex about	 the 
situation than Noë acknowledges. 
One the one hand, if we concede that	 individual readings inform the nature of work it	 is
conceived or posited as a	fluid, mental entity. This means that	we cannot	ascribe it	any 
objective properties at	 all, which seems somewhat	 problematic, as everything we say 
about	 the work is purely a	property of the receiver’s mental engagement	with it. 121 The 
implication of this is that	the way we generally talk about	works is incorrect, for example if 
I were to say that	One Flat	Thing, reproduced is an ensemble work that	uses tables as a	
central feature, I	should really say, ‘My view of One Flat	Thing, reproduced is that	it	 is an 
121 See Pakes (2013) for a	more detailed discussion of this argument. 
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ensemble work that	uses tables as a	central feature’. The relatively non-contentious nature 
of my observations means that	 the inclusion of these conditions seems unnecessary. 
Although we might	disagree about	matters of taste and value, we usually reach a general 
consensus about	what	occurs in the work. It	does not	seem to follow therefore that	 the 
properties of work can be entirely attributed to the mind of the viewer. Here I	wish to 
employ Davies’ pragmatic constraint, outlined in Chapter Five (p.116), and suggest	that	if 
the dance world accepts certain features of the work, including those that	they might	have 
acquired, the identity of the work can change.	 This stance follows philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s theories about	 the nature of perception (1958). He suggests that	
perception lies with the viewer, but	 that	 the viewer needs to be able to argue for their 
interpretation. He discusses the “danger” (Wittgenstein 1958: 201) of trying to define the 
concept	of a	material object	through what	 is really seen, rather calling for acceptance of 
everyday language and the acknowledgment	 of false accounts (1958: 201). Through 
describing our perceptions and interpretations we can generally reach some form of 
agreement	about	the properties of a	work, therefore calling on dance world practices thus 
resolves us from the somewhat	 unsatisfactory outcome that	 the nature of the work is 
determined by every individual reading, but	allows us to acknowledge the place of social 
practices in ontology. 
Experiencing One Flat	 Thing, reproduced through Synchronous Objects, links	 the 
identity of the work with the site, thus structural properties are demonstrated as 
integral to its identity. To claim that	Synchronous Objects changes the work suggests 
that	 features present	 only in the live performance are not essential to the work. 
Furthermore, it	implies that	readings of the work that	do not	consider the structure, 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




for example, can be seen as incorrect	 or insufficient. Although it	 is still possible to 
engage with the work independently of the site, Synchronous Objects provides a	
framework through which users can read One Flat	 Thing, reproduced, which will 
inform some conceptions of the work through history. Comparing readings from 
Kisselgoff and Manning, it	seems fair to suggest	that	the work has taken a	different	
form through its rendering on Synchronous Objects, and that	 the ways the work is 
understood, appreciated and in existence throughout	history is therefore multiplied. 
However, the work is not	 fixed, rather it	will continue to evolve alongside changing 
social practices. As Noë suggests, Synchronous Objects, is an, 
instrument, really, […] a	 gesture towards a	 conversation that	will, 
that	must, go on. It	will go on differently than it	would have (Noë 
2009). 
This suggestion highlights the way that	Synchronous Objects informs the nature of One Flat	
Thing, reproduced, but	 is only one component	 in the work’s large, on	 going and ever 
evolving	 form.	 The link between the audience’s perception of the work and its ontology 
further highlights the importance of ‘choreographic objects’, as they have the potential to 
have a	 lasting impact	 on the fundamental nature of works they render. However, their 
ambiguous nature means that	encountering them, and the work in this form, is not	entirely 
straightforward. The following section introduces the Choreographic Objects Model, 
designed to assist	 encounters with the objects and encourage consideration of their 























                                                                                                
 
 



































Choreographic Objects Model 
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Modelling ‘Choreographic Objects’ 
The three ‘choreographic objects’ analysed in this thesis are indicative of how dance 
is encountered in an ever-increasing variety of ways. As discussed in Chapter Five 
(pp.111 - 112) we can engage with recorded dance through websites, scores and 
archives,	which are accessed in classrooms, cinemas, libraries, museums, homes and 
theatres. It	is apparent	that	the vastly varied contexts and formats for viewing dance, 
facilitated by digital technology, trigger different	 modes of perceiving dance and 
require alternative modes of attention to conventional theatre contexts. Although the 
phenomenon of dance on screen is by no means new, ‘choreographic objects’ 
demonstrate emergent	 ways of conceptualising and re-presenting the work, 
conflating the process of making with the product	of performance and foregrounding 
of metaphysical, epistemic and kinaesthetic properties through technology and 
language, thus reconfiguring the relationship between the work and the spectator. 
The implication of this is that	established methods and frameworks for reading and 
analysing dance – focussed primarily on the event	of live performance – require	re-
consideration. 
As discussed in Chapter Three (p.70), Hanstein suggests that	 using models can be 
helpful for the researcher, as they encourage new ways of seeing (1999: 71). Models 
are used in various disciplines to visualise the relationships between components, or 
to demonstrate stages of a	process. For example, in 2004 Helmut	Leder, Benno Belke, 
Andries Oeberst	 and Dorothee Augustin published a	 model demonstrating the 
process of aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic judgments.	This model takes the form 
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of a	 chart, and addresses areas such as; context, prior experience, discourse and 
classification, theorising how they inform aesthetic emotion and aesthetic judgments. 
The process of perceiving art	 is deconstructed and re-presented in visual form, in 
order for the elements at	play in the experience to be made clearer to the reader. 
This is a	common method for model making. Visual diagrams allow for the reader to 
conceptualise information in an alternative form to purely linguistic description. 
In dance contexts models serve various functions. They may be developed to help the 
researcher conceptualise certain ideas (Hanstein 1999), and may also serve to share 
information about	a theory or practice with a	reader. For example, Victoria	Hunter’s 
‘Model of influence’ (2009) demonstrates interactions between the components in 
site specific performance practice. Furthermore, work conducted by Scott	deLahunta	
and Phil Barnard with Wayne McGregor|Random Dance, resulted in various models 
that	 demonstrate McGregor’s process. For example, their ‘bridging’ model (2011) 
demonstrates the way in which various forms of representation are connected by 
different	processes during choreography. 
Such examples map relations between components and concepts and are therefore 
similar to the construction of ontologies in computer science. As outlined in Chapter 
Three (pp.69 – 70),	computational ontologists use diagrams to visualise the parts of 
an object, experience or idea. They function as tools for classification and analysis, 
such as Ceuster and Smith’s (2011) adoption of computational methods to ontologise 
folk dance movement. However, the two approaches are not	 exactly the same. 
Ontologies are highly categorised, and codified, developed from exhaustive data	sets. 
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Models on the other hand have the potential to be more open in approach. For 
example Noë	(2009) suggests that	Synchronous Objects provides a	model of One Flat	
Thing, reproduced (2009).
Noë	highlights how this method is conventionally scientific, 
[s]cientists — who seek	 knowledge	— frequently make models of 
phenomena	 in the domain that	 interest	 them. Working with the 
model, thinking about	the model, enables them to think about	what	
is modelled	(Noë 2009). 
Although not	 scientific, the model proposed in this chapter equally serves this 
function. It	is a	research tool, allowing me to think through the features and relations 
of the three scores considered in the thesis, and related ‘choreographic objects’.	
Furthermore, through mapping the components I	 aim to share this knowledge with 
others. This motivation generates an interesting tension, in order to make the 
thinking accessible to others, the images should be readable, yet	the model must	also 
capture and replicate the complexity of the objects. As Noë suggests, 
[f]or one thing to model another, it	must, at	least	notionally, exhibit	
something like the complexity, or the possibilities, of that	which it	
models	(2009). 
As discussed by deLahunta	 and Barnard, models are particularly useful in 
interdisciplinary contexts, as when information is distanced from its original context	
similarities across fields become clearer (2011). As discussed in Chapter Three (p.71) 
the use of models for interdisciplinary research is an area	further explored by Saaze 
and Dekker (2013) who discuss the way that	 their documentation model for dance 
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functioned as a	‘boundary object’, meaning that	it	allows for greater communication 
across boundaries and between disciplines. 
There is an important	 distinction between diagrams and models. It	 is not	 the case 
that	 all diagrams, sketches and charts are model-like. The sketches and diagrams 
developed as part	 of the choreographic process, for example do not	 necessarily 
function in the same way. Furthermore, whilst	 diagrams might	 serve a purely 
prescriptive function, models enable the creator and user to think about	entities in 
new or richer ways. They tend to focus on communicating relations. Furthermore, 
models are not	always diagrammatic they can also be purely linguistic, such as those 
generated by Susan Leigh Foster (1986) and Adshead, et	al (1988). These two models 
are didactic; they are designed to lead the reader or user through a	 process of 
analysis. Although they adopt	 distinct	 methods, there are some similarities, in 
particular in the way in which both models offer categories for consideration, 
presented in charts or tables, in order to encourage the reader to systematically 
consider certain features of movement	and dance. 
Both of these linguistic models are used primarily in educational contexts. Jo 
Butterworth suggests that, 
in Dance Studies, students will probably start	the course by learning 
to identify all the components of a	dance. How many dancers are 
there? What	is the style of the dance, and what	skills to the dances 
need? What	 steps are used, and where does the dance travel in 
space? (Butterworth 2012: 134). 
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Such training often includes reference to these models.	122 German dance researcher 
Wibke Hartewig argues that	 analysis is also central to dance practice, writing,	
suggesting that	“[d]ance movement	is observed for a	myriad of reasons by a	number 
of people with different	 levels of expertise” (2010: 126). Hartewig suggests that	
analysis operates in many different ways in dance contexts, whether or not	 it	 is 
identified as such, explaining how alongside forms of	movement	analysis that	occur 
within practice there are systems that	focus more on theoretical analysis (2010: 126). 
Hartewig describes Synchronous Objects as a	form of movement	analysis, suggesting 
it	can be understood as, “the documentation of a	movement	analysis study of a	group 
choreography’s structure” (2010: 132). 
It is important	to reiterate the distinction between movement	analysis, which can be 
applied to movement	 in all contexts, and dance analysis, which focuses on what	 is 
specific about	dance. The models	 from Adshed et	al (1988) and Foster (1986) focus 
specifically on analysing and interpreting dance on stage. These theories have been 
influential in my own thinking about	 how to deconstruct	 and read dance through 
‘choreographic objects’. This	model uses the thinking offered by these scholars as a	
point	of departure in order to expand how we think about	analysis to facilitate and 
acknowledge the role of digital media. 
122 According to preliminary online research, the Adshead et	al dance analysis model 
is currently being taught	on undergraduate degrees at	Leeds University, University of 
Kent, and Exeter University. I	have personal experience of encountering the model on 
syllabi at	Kingston University, Coventry University, and the University of East	London	
and I	envisage that	there are many more examples. 
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The work of Adshead et	al demonstrates a	poststructuralist	positioning of the author, 
as absent	 from the act	of interpretation, whereas Foster,	 clearly states the need to 
think about	the role of the “choreographer’s mission” (Foster 1986: 42), implicating a	
concern for the intentions and processes of the choreographer.	 The objects under 
analysis split	open hierarchical structures regarding the viewer, performance and so 
forth, they also foreground the role of the author, meaning that	 the identity of the 
choreographer and work are enmeshed. The Choreographic Objects Model	therefore 
attempts to collapse binary ways of thinking about	 meaning in relation to the 
spectator and author, therefore the choreographer is acknowledged, without	offering 
them visual or conceptual dominance. 
The first	 aim of this model is to encourage the user to examine the features of 
‘choreographic objects’. It	was developed through analysing the components present	
on the three central case studies. Not	every ‘choreographic object’ analysed features 
every component included in the model, for example, A Choreographer’s Score	does	
not	 include animation, and there are no graphs on Using the Sky. However, I	 hope 
that	 the components included are extensive enough to provide a guide for 
recognising the features of the objects and for mapping relations. Including a	wide 
range of components, which are not	essentially linked to all of the case studies means 
that	 the model has the potential to generalise, as related objects are likely to 
comprise at least	 some of the elements included in the model. The model	
foregrounds the principles and properties of the ‘choreographic objects’,	encouraging 
the user to question how these are represented and develop more abstract	theorising 
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about	 the work and object, at	 some remove from the choreographic identities 
present	on the sites. 
Secondly, the model explores the potential to share and encourage philosophical 
thinking through diagrammatic representation. There are areas of the model that	are 
left	open, to allow the user to develop their own questions, connections and readings. 
The abstraction of the information aims to avoid the essentialist	 framework 
associated with scientific modelling and positivist	philosophical enquiry. Negotiating 
this tension is one of the key motivations for the model. It	 is experimental; I	 am 
interested to see how the ideas are communicated and the potential of such an 
approach, as opposed to offering a	 finished final outcome. The development	of the 
model is not	an attempt	to legitimise ontological enquiry through the production of a	
fixed output.	 Rather I	 consider it	 an interesting experiment	 and hope that	 it	might	
inspire further theorising. 
Many of the key questions posed by Synchronous Objects, Using the Sky and A
Choreographer’s Score are due to their use of digital technology. Even though A
Choreographer’s Score does not	 depend on technology to the same extent	 as the 
other two scores, the features of the DVD such as de Keersmaeker’s narration and the 
recorded interviews are central to the claims I	have made about	the object. The vital 
role	 of technology means that	 the model I	 propose is more likely to generalise to 
other forms of digital representation, 123 than to related process-publications that	are 
123 I take this term from Whatley and Varney (2009). 
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published	 in non-digital formats, such as the books by Hay and Burrows discussed 
previously (p.41). 
The questions driving the construction of the model are not	specific to dance and can 
be equally applied to any form of recorded representation. Therefore the third aim is 
to encourage reflection upon digital forms and a	deeper understanding of the nature 
of digital representation,	 thus developing the digital literacy of the user. Indeed 
furthering Adshead’s argument	 for the importance of analytic education (1988:	 4 – 
20), it	 is perhaps possible to suggest	 that	 aesthetic education must	 now comprise 
training in analysing digital forms, such as ‘choreographic objects’ in the case of 
dance. 
Understanding the language and structure of the online scores	 requires digital 
literacy. ‘Born Digital: Dance in the Digital Age’ (2009) written by Whatley in 
collaboration with Ross Varney, discusses the increased technological abilities of 
dance practitioners. The authors suggest that the interaction between dance and 
digital technology may have informed the development	of a	generation of artists who 
are ‘born digital’. Whilst	the focus of their paper is on the technical abilities of dance 
students and practitioners, it	 raises the question of whether the born digital 
generation see dance differently, due to their potential comfort	 with accessing 
information via	a screen. 
The term ‘digital literacy’ encompasses a	wide range of literacies. It	 is described on 
the Jisc (formerly the Joint Information Systems Committee) website as “those 
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capabilities which fit	an individual for living, learning and working in a	digital society” 
(n.d.). The site outlines seven forms of digital literacies, referring to a	wide range of 
skills, including: “Learning Skills: Study and Learn Effectively in technology-rich 
environments. Formal and informal” (jisc	n.d.), and: “Digital Scholarship: Participant	
in emerging academic, professional and research practices that	 depend on digital 
systems” (Jisc	n.d.). Each of the seven literacies could be applied in some way to the 
three scores analysed. It	 is possible to suggest	 that	 through clarifying the nature, 
function and role of ‘choreographic objects’ this model might	 play a	 part	 in the 
development	 of digital literacies. Interestingly it	 seems that	 encouraging and 
cultivating ‘dance literacy’ is often a driving force in the construction of digital 
‘choreographic objects’, yet	in order to develop skills in the reading of dances certain 
digital competencies need to be gained, thus further demonstrating the intrinsic 
relationship between dance and technology in such contexts. 
This	model	provides a	way for users to consider the properties and relations of the 
‘choreographic object’. It	offers a	visual representation of philosophical associations, 
in the hope of meeting the final aim of enabling users to access the work through the 
object. It is intended for scholars, students and artists, encouraging them to engage 
theoretically with	 ‘choreographic objects’ and other forms of digital representation,	
and acknowledge their role in our perception of dance, as opposed to trying to see 
through the media	to the ‘truth’ of performance. 
Whilst	dance has been recorded in many ways since the 19th Century, it	was not	until 
the 1990s that	 recording became commonplace in contemporary dance practice. 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	




Adshead and Foster’s models were developed prior to this shift	and therefore do not	
mention the role of the screen or recording technology. Yet, both models are used for 
the analysis of dance via	a screen, despite making no reference to the wide range of 
additional components that	 this experience affords. ‘Choreographic objects’	
demonstrate how the work, and the literacies required to access the work are 
essentially linked to the confluence of the movement	and screen, therefore I	suggest	
that	as our practices for reading dance evolve, so too must	our analytic frameworks. 
The	 Choreographic Objects Model foregrounds ontological enquiry, encouraging 
users to think in-depth about	what	it	is they are looking at. I	chose to leave the user 
with choices regarding how to engage with the object and have therefore adopted a 
more	 polysemic visual approach, as opposed to a	 didactic teaching methodology, 
such as the approach utilised by Foster and Adshead et	al. This move away from a	
pre-occupation with the physical presence of the body in performance demonstrates 
processes of abstraction (Portanova	 2013: 1- 15). The	 body	 is	 re-formed through 
digital media, which is in turn abstracted through philosophical enquiry, concepts of 
which are re-presented in the concrete images of the model. The hierarchies of 
dance, work, performance and experience are further muddled. Portanova	suggests 
that	 her work, “refuses to give ontological precedence to phenomenal materiality; 
not	everything is reducible to the body” (2013: 6). This framework is	echoes	 in this 
model, which seeks to foreground the concepts of	 ‘choreographic objects’, through 




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
                                                                                                                                                
 
 






Features	o the Model 
This	 model maps the various features of the ‘choreographic object’.	 Some of the 
terminology may be familiar, as it	arose from my analysis of the case studies outlined 
in previous chapters. The model is deliberately open in places, in order to encourage 
the user to participate actively in drawing connections between the constitutive 
parts. The arrow at	the top of the page, which travels from left	 to right	encourages 
users to identify the format	 of the object. The two broad arrows are intended to 
represent	 continuum, meaning that	 the categories offered operate in conjunction 
with one another and can be seen as components of the same thing. 
Figure 17:	The top section of the Choreographic Objects Model 
The top section of the model (see Figure 17) involves identifying what	the object is,
through acknowledging its format. The broad arrow running across the top of the 
page demonstrates how ‘choreographic objects’ can be accessed in multiple different	
ways. Broadly speaking they exist	either, as DVD, videos, websites, programmes, and 
apps. These digital manifestations may be all or only part	 of the object. 
Supplementary materials are acknowledged in the arrow above. There are potential 
overlaps, for example, some works are both online and on DVD. This means that	
there may be examples where the user is not	 able to allocate an object	 to either 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 			
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	



































category. In which case they can decide how to conceptualise the object, these 
distinctions are intended to draw attention to format, rather than provide strict	
categories. The blue circles below the top arrow offer preliminary categories for 
establishing what	 the objects are or how they are intended to function. The three 
classes, ‘Artistic Platform’, ‘Archive’ and ‘Score’ are not exhaustive or exclusive. 
Objects might	feasibly belong to all three of the categories, as indicated by the arrow 
running through the circles. 
Figure 18:	The central section of the Choreographic Objects Model 
The central section (see Figure 18) is the most	complex. The purple circle invites the 
user to consider the place and nature of recordings within the ‘choreographic object’.	
The grey rectangles provide stimuli to think about	 the features of the recordings. 
Users are encouraged to address the ‘Angles’, ‘Screen size’, ‘Completeness’, ‘Editing’ 
and ‘Sound’. Camera	 angles significantly inform the viewer’s perception of the 
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movement. As well as considering the place of the camera	 in relation to the body, 
features such as zoom, the number of cameras, and whether the camera	is static or 
mobile are also significant. Here I	 chose not	 to include reference to all of these 
options, as it	overcomplicated the visuals. I	hope that	by drawing attention to camera	
angles, the user is able to notice such features. ‘Screen size’ is fairly self-explanatory, 
whilst	the size of the screen one encounters the object	on is significant, thinking more 
specifically about	the size of the screen that	presents the recording is also important. 
For example, accessing recordings through full screen projections means that	it	is the 
only image on screen, whereas small screen recordings are embedded within other 
forms of representation, which impacts on the way the movement	 is seen. 
‘Completeness’ refers to the question of whether the recording captures an entire 
performance. The word is deliberately slightly ambiguous as it	might	also encourage 
the user to consider the completeness of movement	phrases 124 for example. ‘Sound’ 
is a	straightforward starting point, simply encouraging the user to consider the aural 
effect	 of the recording, which of course may include conventional musical 
accompaniment or another sound component.	
The green symbol represents linguistic accounts; here the grey rectangles invite the 
user to consider whom these accounts are from and which form they take. The 
‘Visuals’ section offers various options for the user to establish which forms of visual 
information are present	 on the site. The six categories; ‘Annotation’, ‘Sketches’, 
‘Graphs’, ‘Charts’, ‘Photos’ and ‘Animation’ encompass the forms of visuals offered on 
124 See deLahunta	and Barnard (2005) for a	discussion about	the nature of movement	
phrases. 
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the three scores considered here, although other categories may need to be added or 
considered. Again here some overlap is likely, for example, there may be no obvious 
distinction between a sketch and a chart, as exemplified by some of De 
Keersmaeker’s notes (p.197). Equally animation and annotation may be conflated, as 
is the case with Synchronous Objects. 
The black arrows linking each circle to the various options demonstrate the many 
forms each component	 might	 adopt. The blue arrows, on the other hand are 
demonstrative of the types of relations that	might	be discovered through using the 
model. They are by no means exhaustive but	serve to demonstrate to the user how 
connections can be drawn and conceptualised. For example, the potential for 
narration is signified by the arrow joining recorded linguistic accounts to the 
‘Recordings’ circle via	 the ‘Overlaid’ box, demonstrating how the two components 
might	relate. 
‘Choreographic objects’ are often the outcome of extensive analysis, therefore the 
work is already deconstructed, meaning that	reader’s analytic role is perhaps unclear,	
are we to analyse the work further, or read the analysis presented as the single truth 
of the work? In order to help users navigate such questions, the model encourages 
users to consider the forms of analysis provided, so that	they can further understand 
how the work has been deconstructed and re-presented, offering the opportunity to 
cultivate their own, perhaps contrasting analyses. The pink boxes on the right	offer 
further clarification about	 the nature of the visuals, drawing the user’s attention to 
the question of whether they are ‘Static’ or ‘Animated’. Meanwhile, the two yellow 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
                                                                                                CON TEX T FOR VIEWIN G POSITION AN D RELATION
337 
boxes below encourage consideration of the relations between the recordings, 
linguistic accounts and visual components, asking if they are ‘Overlaid’ or ‘Aligned’. 
Figure 19:	The lower section of the Choreographic Objects Model 
Watching dance via	 digital media	 happens in a	 variety of different	 contexts. This 
impacts on the experience of the viewer, and in turn, their perception of the dance. 
The increased accessibility of dance via	digital platforms means that	 the context	 for 
viewing is an important	 thing to consider. There is a clear difference between 
watching dance via	a phone while on a	bus, and attending a	cinema	screening. The 
size of the screen, the physical location of the spectator’s body, and the other people 
present	will all impact	on their experiences. The final broad arrow (see Figure 19)	
encourages the user to articulate their location and position, before focussing on the 
other people who are part	of the experience. It	is important	to consider whether the 
experience is shared or solitary, and how this informs the reading or experience of 
the work. Lastly, the green circles on the far right	of the page represent	the range of 
properties manifest	 through the digital rendering of the work. ‘Artistic’ and 
‘Aesthetic’ properties are presented alongside ‘Epistemic’, indicating features that	
explicitly provide knowledge about	the work, ‘Metaphysical’, to refer to non-physical 
properties such as repetition and difference, and ‘Kinaesthetic’ features used to refer 











that the user can start to draw connections between the components of the object
and the manifest properties, thus probing the confluence of the work and technology. 
Using	the	Model 
The following section demonstrates how the model can be used to encounter a
‘choreographic	object’.	I provide a narrative account of encountering Two (2014) one 
of the objects made for Motion	 Bank by	 Palazzi and Zuniga Shaw, alongside	 Bebe
Miller and Thomas Hauert, through the model. 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The 






This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The 
unabridged version of the thesis can be found in the Lancester Library, 
Coventry University.
This brief example demonstrates how the model might be used in practice. It
highlights its non-didactic	nature and its use as a guide to encourage theorising of the
features	 and relations of the object. There are methodological questions posed; 
moving between the model and the object at times I wonder where to look next.
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Should I	 explore the site at	 random and return to the model to help me make 
connections, or use the model as a	 guide, leading me to search for kinaesthetic 
properties, charts and so forth? It	seems that	moving between the two provides the 
most	helpful experience. However, as with the ‘choreographic objects’, the way that	
this is used can be left	open. Each user can decide how to utilise the model in order to 
help them move and think through the object. 
Summary 
This chapter considered the impact	 of ‘choreographic objects’ on the identity and 
ontology of dance works. I	suggest	that	as the work is re-presented in an alternative 
form to live performance, readings of it	change, I	suggest	that	this has a	direct	impact	
on the identity of the work. This claim means that	the work cannot	be conceptualised 
as an unchanging platonist type, rather that	it	is a	more flexible, unstable entity. The 
central role of social practices on the ontology of works means that	the way we read 
the work through the ‘choreographic object’ is an important	area	to consider, hence 
the motivation to develop the ‘choreographic objects’ model, in order to facilitate 
analytic and philosophical probing and encourage users to think through the how the 
object	informs readings of the work. 
What	then does the model bring to the analytic process? Presenting philosophical and 
analytic enquiry in visual form allows for a	 more open approach than a list	 of 
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questions, for example. deLahunta	and Barnard suggest	 that	using visualisation can 
help bridge the gap between dance practice and scholarship. They state that, 
[o]ne of the primary points at	which separations occur between 
choreographers/dancers and scholars/critics is at	the point	where 
analysis and language are brought	 into play (deLahunta	 and 
Barnard 2005: 5). 
Although this model clearly uses language, this is limited. It	is intended to encourage 
analysis, rather than demonstrate analysis that	 has already occurred. The model is 
not	 a strict	 categorisation of components, or a	 codified diagram, the mapping of 
relations, for example is deliberately polysemic, a	feature that	would be much harder 
to communicate solely through writing. The process of close reading and 
categorisation informed my methodology, which involved listing features and 
considering how the reading of the object	was constructed. In this sense it	follows a	
structuralist	 paradigm, yet, following poststructuralist	 thought	 it allows the user to 
generate individual readings. 
Although models from Adshead et	al (1988), Banes (1994) and Foster (1986) served as 
points of departure, unlike dance and movement	analysis, this model is not focussed 
solely on the work, but	on the ‘choreographic object’, and its relation to it.	This is due 
to the way that	the dance and technology arguably play equal roles in our conception 
of the work. Focussing on the object	is intended to encourage users to think about	its 
place and relevance in their experience,	echoing a	shift	in thinking. Our engagement	
with dance works through archives, scores and so forth encourage us to know the 
work as well, or even instead, of seeing it. Analytic methods therefore are also 
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	





shifting away from being concerned with ways of seeing towards an interest	in ways 
of knowing.	 Therefore ‘choreographic objects’ reflect	 a cognitivist	 approach to 
analysis, implying that	 dance analysis methods might	 need rethinking for the 
experience of watching dance through digital media, which often conflates 
provenance related, aesthetic and artistic properties of the work. The next	 chapter 
provides a	conclusion to this study. I	reflect	upon the key findings, drawing together 





	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
343 
Chapter Fourteen: Conclusion 
This thesis has explored some of the philosophical questions posed by three recently 
developed dance scores. I have focussed on three key questions; what	 are 
‘choreographic objects’? How do they reconfigure spectatorial engagement	 with 
specific dance works? And, how does this reconfiguration encourage a	rethinking of 
their ontological statuses? I	have answered these questions through detailed probing 
and theorising of the case studies, suggesting that	they are new forms of dance score 
which utilise and extend dance analysis methods, drawing together articulations 
about	choreographic process and affective imagery to cultivate a	form of posthuman 
poetics. I	suggest	that	through revealing properties of the work that	are not	evident	in 
performance alone, such as causal information, repeatability and performance 
variability, the viewer is led into a new form of engagement	 with the work, 
conceptualised as consisting of more than merely temporary movement	in space. The 
presentation of various forms of information reconfigures the identity of the work, 
and reveals its fluid and unfixed ontology. 
‘Choreographic objects’ have arisen from	a group of artists and researchers, who are 
interested in finding ways to analyse and share choreographic principles and 
knowledge, with the aid of digital technology. Together they give rise to a ‘community 
of practice’ (Wenger	1998, deLahunta	2013b). Related to these projects are a	range of	
artist-led, process-focussed publications. However, I	draw a	distinction between these 
two forms, and use the notion of ‘choreographic objects’, following Leach, deLahunta	
and Whatley (2008) to refer specifically to explorations that	 are developed 
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collaboratively and use digital technology. Zuniga	Shaw (2014: 207) and Cvejić (2012: 
9) each point	 out the idiosyncratic nature of ‘choreographic objects’, which is 
demonstrated by Synchronous Objects, Using the Sky and A Choreographer’s Score. 
Each of these objects are developed and designed to reflect	 the choreographer’s 
unique ‘signature practice’ (Melrose 2006). Not	 only do the scores appear and 
function differently from one another, they also demonstrate distinct	 analytic 
frameworks. For example, Synchronous Objects can be seen to adopt	a structuralist	
perspective, focussing on the closed structure of One Flat	 Thing, reproduced. A 
Choreographer’s Score, on the other hand demonstrates an intertextual approach, 
drawing connections across De Keersmaeker’s works, and outlining her influences. 
Using the Sky centralises the body through digital representation, implicating a	
posthuman paradigm, in which the body and technology are entwined. 
Despite the labelling as ‘scores’ and the adoption of existing frameworks for analysing 
dance, I argue that	 ‘choreographic objects’ are novel entities, advancing and 
problematising existing ways of understanding dance scores and developing new 
analytic methods. The way that	they challenge existing categories such as ‘archive’,	
‘document’ and ‘score’ makes them particularly interesting. The ambiguous nature of 
the objects and the way that	 they elude simple categorisation first	 sparked my 
interest	and caused me to question what	they are, which I	explored through analysing 
their form and function. As I	studied the objects I	was led to think about	the types of 
knowledge and tools required to navigate them in order to understand the 
contribution they make to existing ways of conceptualising dance making, works and 
performance. This thinking drove the development	 of the Choreographic Objects 
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Model (p.322), which aims to share my system of analysis with others. My analysis of 
the objects gave rise to a	 systematic, yet	 open frame through which others can 
explore, encounter and make sense of the objects. The emergent	 nature of 
‘choreographic objects’ means that	 this new form of entity is currently under-
theorised, therefore this research is timely and important. 
Each score utilises the potentials of digital technology in different	 ways. Whilst	
Synchronous Objects and Using the Sky exist	as websites which are freely accessible 
online, A Choreographer’s Score is more analogue, taking the form of a	book and DVD. 
Synchronous Objects and Using the Sky utilise some similar methods, such as 
annotation and animation, alongside recordings, images, diagrams and so forth. 
However, the aim of Synchronous Objects to enhance dialogues across disciplines 
(Forsythe and OSU 2009) means that	 it	 uses a wider range of methodological 
approaches than the other scores,	 including data	 visualisation, graphs, interactive 
tools and so forth. A Choreographer’s Score uses only the DVD to render information 
digitally. However, the way that	this component	allows for the integration of speech 
and movement	 and foregrounds De Keersmaeker through spoken and danced 
explanation, means that	it	is an essential feature of the object. 
Despite the differences, the collaborative methodologies and central role of 
technology means that	 they fall under the rubric	of ‘choreographic objects’. In the 
final chapter I	 suggest	 that	 the way that	 these objects depend upon technology 
means that	 they may have more in common with other forms of digital 
representation than other forms of process-focussed publications (pp.329 – 330).	The 
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semantic details may appear arbitrary; however locating these objects in relation to 
other types of entities has been an important	 part	 of this enquiry, which has been 
occupied with attempting to understand what	these objects are, as well as what	it	is 
that	they do — on both practical and philosophical levels. 
The emergent	nature of ‘choreographic objects’ means that	disambiguation has not	
been	a straightforward venture. However, despite their numerous differences, these 
three objects share more than the label of ‘choreographic object’, their similarities 
are also indicated through their collective labelling as scores. The first	 stage of this 
thesis establishes what	 it	 is that	 is implied by, and expected from a	 dance score. 
Chapter One outlines a brief history of dance scoring and demonstrates its 
relationship with standardised notational systems.	 Here I	 sketch a	 traditional view 
proposed by Goodman (1976) and McFee (1992,	2011), amongst	others, under which 
scores are notational and function theoretically to constrain the identity of dance 
works. I	 demonstrate how there have been many attempts to formulate sharable 
movement	notations systems, in order to save dance from the “lament” (Arbeau in	
Lepecki	2004: 125)	of its ephemerality. 
Chapter Two provides a literature review, outlining key arguments about	 the 
ontology, documentation and analysis of dance works. I introduce philosophical 
discourses about	art	and dance ontology, in order to lay the theoretical foundations 
for the development	of my argument	that	‘choreographic objects’ reveal ontological 
features of works and reconfigure our relationship with them, encouraging a	
rethinking of how we might	conceptualise their ontology. 
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Chapter Three discusses the methodology for the research. I	contextualise the study, 
outlining how it	 draws on discourses from multiple fields. I	 explain my decision to 
focus on three case studies and discuss how the research navigates tensions between 
positivist	 and postpositivst	 frameworks. I suggest	 that	 such paradigms echo the 
philosophical tensions around the role of social practices in ontological enquiry. For 
example, positivists see the world, and entities within the world, such as dance works, 
as comprising stable features, about	 which we can be correct	 or incorrect. A 
postpositivist	paradigm, on the other hand, acknowledges the place of the researcher 
and the potential for multiple versions of reality, relating to an ontological positioning 
that emphasises the role of human perception, language and practice;	 allowing for 
multiplicity and fluidity in ways of knowing, seeing and being within the world. 
This research adopts a	 postpositivist	 perspective, foregrounding the significance of 
social practice for dance ontology, however, the adoption of a philosophical 
methodology, which includes constructing arguments through theory testing can be 
seen to lean towards the centre of the positivist/postpositivist	 spectrum. As 
articulated in Chapter Three (pp.62	 - 65), Analytic Philosophy is at	 times accused of 
adopting positivist	 frameworks. For example, Cvejić	 refers to the field’s “positivist	
logic”	 (2015: 10). This view is perhaps due to the way that	 arguments tend to be 
focussed towards the resolution of a	philosophical problem with a	singular outcome, 
as opposed to allowing for multiple possible results. Following this framework, there 
are times within this study where I	resist	the temptation to resolve issues on a	case-
by- case basis, or in relation to individual opinion. For example, in Chapter Twelve 
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(pp.293	- 294), I	suggest	that	resolving the empiricism issue by allowing for access to 
‘choreographic knowledge’ to be deemed essential in the case of some works and 
inessential in others is unsatisfactory. Such claims can be seen to lean towards a	
positivist	framework, despite being rooted in postpositivist	enquiry. 
I propose that	this research has demonstrated the relevance of Analytic Philosophical 
Aesthetics for thinking through some of the questions posed by current	 dance 
practices. The breadth and depth of the literature means that	 many of the 
philosophical problems encountered have been addressed and argued from multiple 
angles, greatly expanding my thinking. Furthermore, the adoption of a	 logical and 
rigorous approach to argument	 building has allowed me to disambiguate 
‘choreographic objects’, shedding light	 on their role, function, motivations and 
ontological impact. Building on this philosophical theorising, I	 adopted the use of 
modelling in order to share my thinking through a	visual tool. This approach helped 
me to think through the objects and make sense of their role and function. 
Furthermore it	 allows me to make my method for probing ‘choreographic objects’ 
more accessible to others than when articulated in language alone. 
Scoring an Ontology 
The discussion of scoring is further developed in Chapter Four, where I	 propose a	
move away from the traditional view. Alongside Goodman and McFee, I	 analyse a	
range of theoretical perspectives from Van Imschoot	 (2010), D’Amato (2014), 
Burrows	 (in Burrows and Van Imschoot	 2005) and Birringer (2013). I also pay 
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attention to examples of dance scores from Forsythe (1997), Butcher (1999) and Stark 
Smith (2008). Considering various examples, I outline an expanded conception of 
dance scores, which aims to encompass the wide variety of artefacts and practices. I	
suggest	 that	 dance scores may be physical or mental entities, which provide 
parameters from or through which the activation of a	work or practice is generated. I	
outline some of the ways that	 scores and dance works are related, suggesting that	
whilst	 some scores might	 aim to fully indicate dance works, others, such as 
improvisation scores, for example are more open, leading the interpreter into 
movement	which does not	necessarily generate the performance of a	specific work. I	
suggest	that	such scores might	be conceptualised as action instigating, as opposed to 
work indicating (p.104). I	 draw a	 distinction between the role of scores for dance 
artists and scores as tools for study, but	suggest	that	however they are used, scores 
are usually created with a	 direct	 relationship to action (pp.109	 – 110). It is this 
characteristic that	the three central case studies problematise, as they are designed 
first	and foremost	as research tools, disrupting even a	very expanded conception of 
dance scores. 
Before addressing the three case studies, Chapter Five considers the nature of 
recordings and their relationship to the work. I	argue that	viewers can access dance 
via	 recordings, disputing proposals from McFee (1992, 2011) and Carr (1987) that	
dance can only be legitimately	encountered in live performance. This is an important	
stage in the construction of the overall argument	that	‘choreographic objects’ impact	
on the ontology of dance works, as each object	 uses recordings as central to their 
analysis and re-presentation of the work. I	discuss the way that	we encounter dance 
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works through films and recordings and establish a	 view that	 we are able to 
legitimately access the work in this form. I	argue that	the type/token schema	used by 
many aestheticians fails to adequately account	 for dance in digital form, arguing 
instead for a hierarchical conceptualisation of dance, which acknowledges the 
significance of the live event, without	dismissing the relevance of recordings (pp.122	-
125). The centrality of recorded versions of the work to each of the scores means that	
demonstrating their close relationship to the work lays the foundation for me to 
argue in Chapters Twelve and Thirteen that	 ‘choreographic objects’ have an impact	
on the lasting identity of the work, as recordings are annotated, fragmented, overlaid 
and presented alongside contextual and causal properties. The implication of this is 
that	 the work accrues different	 meanings, aesthetics and significance than when 
presented in live performance. This further questions the idea	 that	 a work can be 
conceptualised as a	 fixed, unchanging ‘type’, as the identity of the work is both 
constrained and altered by its rendering. 
The case studies in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight provide detailed descriptions of 
each of the objects alongside some initial analysis. Here the emphasis is on cultivating 
an image of the scores for the reader and exploring the paradigms embodied within 
them. These chapters pave the way for Chapter Nine,	 which discusses how	
‘choreographic objects’ do not	align with the expanded conception of the score, due 
to the way that	they do not	directly instigate a	work or practice. Although the scores 
have generative functions, these appear to be secondary,	as the scores are primarily 
concerned with the dissemination of ‘choreographic knowledge’, and training how 
viewers see and know the work as opposed to documenting or instigating action. 
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Despite posing challenges to the notion of the score, I	argue that	the labelling of the 
case studies is not	 incorrect	 and instead allows us to rethink the nature of dance 
scores.	Their classification draws attention to their score-like qualities. For example, 
each object	demonstrates a	concern with capturing the features of the work. The way 
in which this is done in an expansive as opposed to reductionist	way implies a concern 
with the essence of the work, as opposed to a	quest	 to stabilise essential features. 
This is reflected in Zuniga	 Shaw’s suggestion that	 the research is concerned with 
“fleshing out” the dance, as opposed to pinning it	 down (2014: 99) and Čičigoj’s	
(2013:	 108) suggestion regarding the challenge posed to essentialist	 frameworks 
mentioned in Chapter Twelve (P.212). 
I suggest	that	the motivation to capture the essence of the work demonstrates a	link 
between scoring and ontology, which is equally occupied with the quest	 to 
understand the nature of dance works. Conceptualising this form of scoring as a	
mode of ontological enquiry and an excavation of the work allows for the 
emancipation from the term as essentially linked to action. This link is further	
compelled by the use of mapping and visualisation techniques on the scores, echoing 
methods used in computational ontologies, thus linking abstract	 and physical 
ontologies through the concept	of the score. 
These scores can be understood to occupy a	place in the trajectory of dance analysis. 
Close reading of the concepts and actions of dance works are central to their 
construction. The objects deploy a	wide range of analytic frameworks, which recall 
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established ways of reading dances, associated with Labanotation,	
(post)structuralism,	 intertextuality, criticism and poetics, as well as drawing on 
methods from disciplines outside of dance, such as Design,	 Computer Science and 
Geography, at times implicating a posthumanist paradigm through the digital 
rendering and relations of the body. 
Another commonality between the scores concerns the (re)situation of the 
choreographer. Forsythe, Hay and De Keersmaeker each play a	 central role in the 
construction and presentation of the scores. Whilst	Forsythe is less visually present	
than Hay and De Keesmaeker, his written and narrated accounts provide a	perceptual 
presence at	 the heart	of the score. These direct	 accounts from the choreographers 
challenge poststructuralist	notions of authorship and represent	a shifting cultural and 
artistic landscape. As choreographic process is increasingly shared and analysed, the 
identity of the maker is	foregrounded, disrupting established ways of reading dance, 
which traditionally prioritise the interpretations of the viewer, and constraining the 
work in accordance with the intentions of the maker. This, in turn impacts on the 
identity of the work, highlighting the potential for ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ readings 
and diminishing the role of ambiguity. This shift	 points to a	 post-poststructuralist	
paradigm, in which the author is perceptually present	in the rendering of the work; a	
feature facilitated by the capabilities of digital technology. 
The central role of the choreographer is considered in Chapter Ten, in which I	explore 
suggestions from Cvejić	(2012: 8) and deLahunta	(2013a: 2) that	these objects offer a	
form of poetics. I	consider how the scores align with the double function of a	poetics, 
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outlined by Louppe to both tell us what	a work does to us, and teach us how it	was 
made (2010: 4). I	consider the role of affect	in the scores, suggesting that	animations 
and narration foreground the affective function of the movement. The abstraction of 
the body and the reconfiguration of the relationship between the spectator and 
dancers’ bodies leads me to suggest	 that	 such objects are indicative of a
posthumanist	paradigm, in which the body is extended, abstracted and represented 
through the screen. I deploy the concept	 of posthumanism with care, calling for 
pragmatism and arguing that	 despite the ever-increasing relationship between the 
body and the screen, we generally maintain a	distinction between the technological 
and actual. Whilst	digital images might	have affective potential, I	do not	suggest	that	
this draws us into a	 space whereby we cannot	 delineate between abstract, digital 
bodies and our own forms. Although one might	 draw on examples of immersive 
practice or submersion in virtual realities to argue that	such a	thing is possible, these 
are marginal cases, and I	propose that	such examples should not	be used as evidence 
for an on-going	or	ever-present	muddling of the digital and the flesh. 
Labour, Value an Knowledge 
All three scores foreground the process, labour and structure involved in the making 
and performance of the works. This decentralises the performance event, 
reconfiguring established ontological hierarchies. In Chapter Five I argue for a
hierarchical ontological structure that	reflects our experiences of dance. This notion is	
reprised in Chapter Eleven, where I	argue that	the established hierarchy of the work’s 
features is reorganised through ‘choreographic objects’. Whilst	 performances have 
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traditionally been the “commodity form” (Leach 2013: 11) for dance, documentation, 
rehearsals, authorial intentions and the debris of the making process are 
conventionally viewed as secondary to the performed manifestation of the work. 
Value has typically been ascertained through the perception and evaluation of 
aesthetic and artistic features of the work. However, these objects reveal other 
properties, for example, they highlight	the role of features such as repetition, as is the 
case with the multiple recordings of Using the Sky. Furthermore, they foreground 
affect	 through abstract	animated renderings of the work, and articulate knowledge, 
via	written and spoken accounts from the choreographers. Metaphysical, kinaesthetic 
and epistemic properties are therefore presented alongside artistic and aesthetic 
ones. The reorganisation of the work’s components resituates value, as viewers are 
encouraged to appreciate the labour and knowledge involved in the making of the 
work. This not	only recalls Marxist	(1887) notions, but	also highlights the link between 
the objects and the knowledge-centric socio-political climate in which they were 
constructed. 
As Zuniga	 Shaw (2014:	 207) articulates, the notion of ‘choreographic knowledge’ 
played an important	role in the construction of the objects.	Chapter Twelve considers	
how the transmission of this form of knowledge impacts on the perception and 
appreciation of the dance work. Exploring empiricist	 perspectives regarding the 
appreciation	 of art, I demonstrate how ‘choreographic objects’ challenge this 
perspective and ask what	 role ‘choreographic knowledge’ has on the viewer’s 
appreciation of the work. Calling for moderate empiricism, I	suggest	that	knowledge 
from inside the work can inform our appreciation of it, but	aim to acknowledge that	
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such information is not	 necessarily helpful or required in all contexts, and 
furthermore, suggest	 that	 it	 is deeply problematic to suggest	 that	 the explicit	
articulation of ‘choreographic knowledge’ is essential to the appreciation of the work. 
The ways in which the ‘choreographic objects’ inform the appreciation of the work is 
central to this enquiry. In particular I	 explore the relationship between perception 
and ontology, asking whether the presentation of the works through the 
‘choreographic objects’ can be seen to change the identity and ontology of the work. I	
argue that	 dance works have the potential to change, thus challenging the 
applicability of a	 platonist	 model for explaining the ontology of the work (Pakes 
2013). 
Chapter Five introduces the unsuitability of the type/token schema	 for dance, 
outlining how it	does not	account	for recordings and is therefore not	reflective of our 
evolving practices for viewing dance. Chapter Thirteen further considers the way that	
‘choreographic objects’ highlight	 problems with the use type/token schema for 
dance. I suggest that	 the identity of the work might	 change through its digital 
rendering, meaning that	 they cannot	 be explained as stable, unchanging ‘types’. 
Furthermore, I	propose that	such case studies reveal ontological features of the work. 
For example, that	the work of making and performing dance is intrinsically linked to 
the artwork. 
The question of whether the scores reveal or reconfigure features of the work has 
repeatedly occurred. I suggest	 that	 both are possible. The objects simultaneously 
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raise philosophical questions, reveal ontological features of dance works and 
reconfigure the identity of the works in question, and our spectatorial engagement	
with it. Whilst	I suggest	that	they reorganise the ontological structuring of the work, 
by revealing features other than performance as of equal importance. However, they 
do not	 reconfigure the metaphysical nature of dance works per	 se, which I	 suggest	
still exist	as abstract	entities made present	in various ways. Rather, they highlight	how 
the work is an open form, which has the potential to change and evolve as the 
identity of the work and the properties it	possesses are linked to social practices and 
therefore fluid and unfixed. Suggesting that	 the work may change reiterates that	
some works are not	amenable to codified notation, as they appear to elude fixation.	
Furthermore, it	 implies that	scores are unable to constrain the work, as in doing so 
they fundamentally change it. This is a	 feature demonstrated by ‘choreographic 
objects’, which appear to be the result	of a	desire to shape conceptions of the work, 
and in doing so impact	fundamentally on its very nature. 
The motivation to further develop the philosophical probing of the work, in particular 
in relation to technology is further demonstrated through the Choreographic Object	
Model presented in Chapter Thirteen. Here I adopt	 the methodology of visual 
modelling. This approach is conventionally used in scientific contexts and increasingly 
adopted in dance research to translate concepts across disciplines. This model is not	
an attempt	to validate theoretical philosophical enquiry through the construction of a	
fixed output, I	 hope that	 the previous chapters demonstrate the relevance of 
philosophical theorising in its own right. Rather the model provides a	frame through 
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which users can probe and explore the ‘choreographic objects’, in order to facilitate 
further philosophical thinking. 
The way that	 the model foregrounds the ‘choreographic object’, as opposed to 
focussing solely on the dance work aims to encourage users to consider the way that	
the two co-exist. This work responds to established dance analysis models, such as 
those developed by Foster (1986) and Adshead et	 al (1988), which use linguistic 
categories relating to the work’s components. However, I	 suggest	 that	 the role of 
technology in the perception of the work must	be considered, thus drawing attention 
to the way that	properties are framed by and arise from the features of the objects. 
One of the most	interesting things about	the case studies considered in this thesis is 
that	 they are new and understudied objects. This means that	 the importance of 
understanding their ontology for our perception, use and analysis is evident. Simply 
put, we need to know what	they are before we can use them to their full potential. 
Furthermore, they are relatively ambiguous objects, meaning that, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the ways that	they are used will shape what	they become. I	hope 
that	 the model can provide a	contribution to the way that	 the objects are engaged 
with. By tracing the various discourses and modes of reading that	impact	on knowing 
what	 a ‘choreographic object’ is, I have constructed a model that	 aids this 
understanding, and provides evidence for the argument	that	‘choreographic objects’ 
offer new forms of dance analysis, which impact	fundamentally on the way we read 
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Future Areas of	Enquiry 
There are many discussions in this thesis that	 deserve and inspire more detailed 
discussion. Cvejić’s article (2015) in the Performance Philosophy journal was published 
just	 prior to the completion of this thesis and appears to invite dialogue between 
Analytic and Continental frameworks regarding the ontology of dance works. 
Interestingly Cvejić refers briefly to projects such as Motion Bank, suggesting that	
they imply that ontologies should be determined on a	case-by-case basis (2015: 10). It	
seems this claim is perhaps based on the implicit	acknowledgment	of the way such 
objects foreground the author and expose the term ‘work’ as a	conflation of verb and 
noun, referring to both the labour and product	of dance making, implicating them as 
one and the same. Cvejić suggests that	such an enquiry, 
entails paying attention to the idiosyncratic relationship between the 
shareable (exterior or public) and the reticent, self-absorbed or 
shattered aspects of a	dance work, case by case (Cvejić	2015: 10). 
The notion that	ontological issues must	be resolved individually, also touched upon 
by Pakes (2015), requires further consideration. Of particular interest	 is how one 
might	develop a	model that	encourages this mode of enquiry. I	am interested in the 
potential for developing a	visual aid for metaphysical enquiry and further exploring 
the tension and complexities involved in such a	project. The forthcoming publication 
of Pakes’s monograph as well as her translation of Pouillaude’s text	is likely to greatly 
inform the development	of my thinking around philosophical ontology. 
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At	the time that	this research draws to a	close ‘choreographic objects’ continue to be 
developed. Cvejić and De Keersmaeker have now published three scores. The Motion 
Bank team are furthering their research through a	 series of ‘Choreographic Coding 
Labs’, (deLahunta	 and Jenett	 2015), which draw together choreographers, dancers 
and creative coders to further probe the reciprocal relationship between dance and 
digital data. Furthermore, there are multiple researchers and artists working on 
related projects.	125 As ‘choreographic objects’ develop so too will this research. The 
suggestions and observations made here may evolve alongside social and artistic 
practices. The unset	nature of the objects and the emergent	nature of the field mean 
that	as digital scoring continues to evolve, so too must	our probing, examination and 
theorising. 
125 See the ‘Knowledge Base’ page of the Motion Bank website for an example of 
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